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INTRODUCTION 
Eileen R. Anderson 
Director. Department of Budget and Finance 
January. 1979 
In 1978 a new emphasis in public policy legislation and debate 
occurred which will influence policy decisions in Hawaii for decades to 
come. This emphasis focused on the increasing responsibility of our 
State Government to plan and manage growth in Hawaii and was a recurring 
theme in public hearings and debate on various pieces of environmental 
and social legislation. 
During the 1978 legislative session, Governor George Ariyoshi 
presented to the legislature the first comprehensive package for manag-
ing growth in Hawaii . This package was an innovative approach on the 
part of the JOvernor intended to trigger community discussion and 
legislative activity on various aspects of growth management. It 
identified possible strategies by which the State could reasonably 
expect to influence the direction, rate, and timing of growth. 
The success of that effort may be measured by the significant amount 
of dialogue and ideas which it generated. In addition, during that 
session, the legislature passed and the Governor Signed into law the 
Hawaii State Plan which sets out planning priorities and directions for 
future growth in Hawaii; the first planning document of its kind in the 
nation to be adopted by statute. 
The Hawaii State Plan is a long-range guide to Hawaii's future. It 
establishes an overall theme with goals, policies, priority directions, 
and a system for plan formulation and program coordination in major 
state and county activities. 
The plan addresses concerns about our growing population, the need 
for jobs and a stable economy, the maintenance of a quality physical 
environment, adequate facility systems, and the socio-cultural advance-
ment of Hawaii's people. The input of various public and private 
groups, the Governor, and the Legislature helped formulate a plan which, 
as accurately as possible, reflects the needs and desires of Hawaii's 
residents. 
In sum, during the last legislative session both the executive and 
legislative branches of state government recognized and responded to a 
growing statewide concern for our future social, economic, and environ-
mental well-being. This was truly the birth of a "growth management 
ethic" in Hawaii's public policy. 
, 
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Though much controversy surrounded just how this "ethic" should be 
best expressed in statu tory form, one f undamental point of agreement .. 
remained intact. That point i s that the citizens of the State of Hawall 
have a fundamenta l right t o a whol esome soci al, physical, and economic 
envi ronment and t hat protecti on of the right to this kind of envi ronment 
must begin with affi rmative state action. 
The soci al, physi cal, and economic elements of our environment are 
all interdependent . That is, acti ons upon any one area will likel~ 
affect these other areas , ei t her initi al ly or over a prolonged perlod of 
ti me. Therefo re, state act ions in each of these areas must be under-
t aken to protect or improve exis t ing condi tions without causing untoward 
ha rm in ano the r area . For exampl e, the State mus t act to encourage 
economic stabi l ity bu t must ta ke care not t o encourage polluting indus-
tri es which wou ld di srupt our is land ecol ogy. Clari fying and balancing 
t hese tradeoffs in pu bl ic poli cy decisions is t he greates t challenge to 
proper growth management in Hawa ii. 
Of part icu lar concern, in recent years , i s t he management of the 
phys ical env i ronment and the ramifi cations th is managemen t mi gh t have on 
the ava i labili ty of housi ng and jobs, and the economy in general . 
Increas i ngly, publ i c opinion reflects the sentiment that t he State of 
Hawa ii needs to play an acti ve role in t he shap ing of its envi ronmental, 
soc ial, and economic future. 
Thi s new growth management ethi c recognizes t hat sta te envi ronmental 
responsib ilities extend fa r beyond previously recogni zed areas of 
general conservat ion or public health regul at i on. Our people's ri ght to 
a decent environment means t he State must t ake affirmati ve action t o 
preserve and main ta in not onl y clean .ai r and pure water , but ·al so the 
natural, scenic, hi st oric, and esthetic val ues of the community. 
The problem is not as s imple as l imiti ng the number of people who 
enter the State. It is a far more complex process of as sessing the 
impacts and trade-offs of devel opment and growth deci sions on the 
economy, t he enviro nment, and the welfare of the people in general. 
However, the goa l of t he process can be simply sta t ed. The State is not 
only obligated to see tha t our natural resources are devel oped to the 
most beneficial soci al uses in order to accommodate ou r popul ati on, but 
it is also obligated to preserve those resources i n such a manner as to 
permi t futu re generations to en j oy a life at least as ri ch and varied in 
natural, sceni c, and cultural beauty as that wh i ch we enj oy today . 
Responsible management of our resources, especia lly land and water, 
is more than just good sense; it is a necessary condition for future 
prosperity. Previous genera t i ons did not forsee the consequences and 
extent of environmental and soci al degradation brought about by the new 
demands of our highly technical society. As Governor Ariyoshi has 
repeatedly pointed out, this is a legacy we cannot afford to pass on to 
our children. 
The Gove rnor's concern for responsibl e planning and management of 
growth has been expressed freq uently and has been t he major focus of his 
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State-of-the-State address in previous years . In his 1977 address the 
Governor outlined the probl em: 
"Hawaii is a national t reasure, but i t is a 
very fragile treasure , one which can be easily 
destroyed by overpopulati on and excessive demands 
on its resources. 
There is no reason why we mus t endure what 
an uncontroll ed and an unreg ul ated future holds 
for us. He mus t shape our own future, not have 
it thrust upon us by fo rces over which we have 
little or no control." 
IIhen introducing the State Plan during his 1978 address, t he 
Governor underscored the progress being made to control t he futu re : 
"The H.awa.i i St ate Pl an is not the end, it 
is a beginning. It is the beg inni ng of us finally 
tak ing control of our destiny. It will serve 
notice that we know what is good for th i s Sta te , 
what is proper and wha t is achi evable." 
The importance of the state's role in managing and protecting t he 
environment was al so reinforced by t he Hawaii State Cons tituti onal 
Conventi on , hel d during the summer months of 1978. The amendments from 
the Convention def ine new sta te constitutional ob l i gations and respon-
sibiliti es in managing and pl anning growth and devel opment. 
These amendments call for the State to promote a healthful envi ron-
ment, to conserve and protect the natural beauty and resources of 
Hawaii, and to pl an and manage populat ion growth. The amendments aim at 
promoting self-suff iciency and go so far, in the protection and cont rol 
of water resources, as to mandate t he l egis l ature to create a water 
resources agency to regul at e that resource. 
The No vember electi ons of 1978, which saw these amendments added to 
the State Co nst itution , indicate the importance of these concerns among 
the general public. These consti tutional amendments now provide the 
statutory bas i s for l egislati on needed to impl ement state prog rams in 
compliance with the changes. 
But the mos t i mportant change, t hat is the change in how we think 
about environmental problems , has already taken pl ace. Land and wa ter, 
as elements of our environment, are more f requently and properly being 
thought of as resources rather than commodities. This shift in per-
spective recognizes that these elements have a va l ue to soci ety beyond 
their market price, and this soci al value requi res that l and and wa t er 
deve lopment and preservation decisions uphol d t he public interes t. 
In anticipati on of this shi ft ing emphasis in state policy, var ious 
executive departments th roughout the sta te governmen t have already begun 
to respond to t hese new considerations in res ource al l ocati on decis ions. 
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At this point, numerous state actions have provided broad policy guide-
lines concerning how to proceed in t he future . Yet, the element still 
necessary to assure that resource all ocation decisions reflect the most 
beneficial social purpose is t he decision-making mechanism .and tools ~o 
turn general guidelines i nto affi rmative public policy. Slmple beneflt-
cost analyses are no longer adequate to assess the complex and occas-
sionally contradictory social benefits and costs which must now become 
an integral part of the decisi on-making calcul us. 
It is toward this impact assessment and decision-making methodology 
of alternatives ana lysis and trade-off reconciliation that the attention 
of state government is now being directed. 
The three reports in this study have taken a close look at land and 
water resource allocations and the trade-offs, probl ems, and constraints 
associated with them. Hawaii has faced the problem and noted the likely 
effect of uncontrolled growth in the Stat e. Now we are working to 
identify the reasona ble bounds within wh ich we may act for the public 
welfare while respecting the importance of a healthy economy, county 
planning and management efforts, and the rights of private citizens. 
These reports exami ne three differen t aspects of resource alloca-
tion decisions: land use, water all ocation, and water rights. This 
effort should ass i st various government agencies and other planning 
groups improve resource allocation decision-making and help assure a 
futu re in Hawa ii that we can be proud to pass on to future generations. 
GROWTH MANAGEMENT AND THE LAND USE COMMISSION: 
SOME OPTIONS FOR CHANGE 
John Holmstrom, University of Hawaii , Team Leader 
Kem Lowry, University of Hawaii , Assistant Team Leader 
John Ettl, Department of Health 
Nobert Koziatek, Col., United States Army 
Merle Miura, Department of Budget and Finance 
Francis Okano, Department of Budget and Finance 
3hirley Ann Otsuka, Department of Budget and Finance 
Maxine Sandison, Department of Health 
Paul Schwind, Department of Planning and Economic Development 
Gary White, Department of Agriculture 
Carol Whitesell, Commissioner on Hawaii State Land Use Commission 
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SUMMARY 
Hawaii is not confronted with t he issue of whether or not it should 
develop a growth managemen t system; it has one . A ra nge of polici es, 
land use controls, and other mechani sms provi des this State with t he 
oppor tunity to direct growth and manage the consequences of that growth 
to a greater degree than any other state in the nation. The existing 
system is a reflection of public attitudes toward growth. The is sue i n 
Hawaii is rather that of how its system of growth management should 
evolve. 
The policy environment within which Hawaii's growth management 
system exists is not only very differen t from that fo und in other jurisdictions, but it is also changing over time. For exampl e, wh ile 
the intent of the La nd Use Law was re l ati vely simply expressed in a few 
s ta tements when t ha t 1 aw was passed in 1961, the. range of pol i ci es to 
which that law must now relate is much more compl ex. The culmination of 
this process of enriching the policy context of Hawaii's state l and use 
regulatory system was the adoption of the Hawaii State Plan by the 1978 
Legislature.l/ That pl an, which was the product of years of effort and 
which reflects a balancing of diverse constituencies, includi ng the 
state and county governments, is a very significant "given" in any 
ensuing discussi on of growth management. 
Act 100, the Hawaii St ate Plan, provides a framework of objectives, 
policies, and "pr iority acti ons" which are t o be addressed by all state 
agencies, including the Land Use Commission and the Board of Land and 
Natural Resources. These objectives, policies, and guidelines are 
significant as elements of state growth policy because, in particular, 
the Land Use Commission is a principal state agent of growth management. 
When examlnlng developments in the state's growth management 
program in the i mmediate future, the reality of the State Plan and 
related legislation looms large. Fundamentally, there are two choices: 
first, think in terms of a growth management system irrespective of the 
existing system and design a system which is not constrained by existing 
law; and second, deal with marginal improvements to the existing system, 
recognizing that that system represents a significant statement of 
values and prefe rences. This study t akes the latter course. As recent 
as one or two years ago, the choice between these two alternatives might 
easily have been the former; however, the Hawaii State Plan has greatly 
altered the environment within which any growth management sys tem must 
be developed. 
This study begins with a recogni tion of the pivotal role of the 
Land Use Commission (LUC) in determi ning the direction of growth in 
terms of land use. Certainly, other instruments of public policy exert 
an influence on the location of growth, such as tax policies and the 
provision of public f aciliti es. But with few of these is the l inkage 
between decision and consequence so direct as it is with the LUC. 
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The LUC is guided by legislatively enacted policies. An essential 
characteristic of the existing system is that the LUC is granted con-
siderable discreti on in its decision-making; the guiding policies are 
general and require both considerable interpretation and the exercise of 
judgment in their application. Improvements in the system might focus 
on any of severa l components of the system. For example, such improve-
ments might be concerned with increasi ng the specificity of the poli-
cies, with constraini ng the decisions of t he LUC when certain conditions 
are met by proposed developments, or wi th modifying the procedures of 
the Commission. This study examines several marginal changes to LUC 
operations, disc usses their operation, and assesses their performance. 
The alternatives investigated are : 
(1) Guideli nes Revision. This option would entail a focusing 
of the multitude of concer ns expressed in existin~ legislation (partic-
ularly the Hawaii State Pl an and t he Land Use Law) by specifying a 
smaller set of guidelines for use by the Land Use Commission in its 
decision-making processes . Any such system of guidelines revision must 
accept the reality of existing legislation which constrains the LUC. 
This option would not be a substitute f or that legislation, but would 
serve to clarify it and provide a focus on the most significant factors 
which the Legislature judges should influence LUC decision-making. 
(2) A System of Perfo rmance Standards. A performance stan-
dards system would specify levels of consequences of land use changes 
which are deemed acceptable. As such, t hey are akin to guidelines, but 
allow less room for making value judgments. These levels of acceptabi-
lity, or standards, could be adopted by regulat i on. By clearly stating 
what the standards are, the LUC could exercise considerable leverage 
over development. The LUC would have a framework for comparing the 
relative acceptabil i ty or des i rability of different development pro-posals. 
(3) A Regional Environmental Assessment System. This option 
is a response to observations that the LUC has had a geographic per-
spective that is too narrow. This alternative entails a requirement 
that broad scale implications of land use change at a particular site be 
considered in LUC deliberations, for example, an examination of signifi-
cant system-wide transportation impacts of urban development . 
(4) A Regional Sketch Plan. A sketch plan is an interpre-
tation of existing policies in ma pped fo rm . The argument behind this 
proposal is that, given the multi tude of policies embodied in the State 
Plan, the LUC would be well-served by seeing those policies expressed in 
terms of particular land units. For example, a policy specifying a 
preference for preserving certain types of agri cultural land in that use 
could be illustrated by mapping lands of those types. nany policies are 
capable of being mapped in this fashion, although others are not. The 
sketch plan would serve as an information base for the LUC and would 
not, in itself, be a land use district boundary map. 
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(5) A System !or .Consolidated Review of Bou~dary Amend~en~ 
Petitions. This option 1S 1n response to the observat10n that eX1st1ng 
LUC procedures do not provi ~e for a . compreh~nsive overview of what 
changes are being proposed 1n a reg10n. Th1S proposal wou ld have 
boundary amendments in each county being made only once every four 
years . The resulti ng "s tacki ng up" of petiti ons wou l d permit an assess-
ment of the cumulative impac t s of sets of petitions and a selecti on of 
the preferred set of petitions from the total. 
All of these proposal s have s ignificant advantages and disadvan-
tages. While none of them challenges the validity of the LUC as an 
agent of growth management, they all, to different degrees, provi de for 
significant change in LUC process or substance. They all serve to make 
the LUC decision-making process more explicit. 
No single alternative from among those examined here is clearly 
established as the preferred alternative. Rather than adopting a "pure" 
alternative, a strategy for marginal change is suggested. This might 
involve at least the following: 
(1) Guidelines revision to the extent that the multitude of 
objectives, policies, priority actions, and guidance policies now 
bearing on the LUC is distilled into a manageable set . The Stat e Plan 
now requires the LUC to address all the provisions included in the Pl an 
in its rules and regulations. This is a monumental task unless some 
legislative guidance is provided. 
(2) Development of some elements of a sketch plan to the extent 
possible, based on a reduced set of revised guidelines. Given the 
strong pol i cy statements in the State Pl an, it is reasonable to see 
their advance expression on ma ps , if that is possible. 
(3) Further considerat i on should be given to giving the LUC a more 
pro-active role in growth mana gement. Whether or not it is to assume 
such a role is a fundamental question that is far more basic than a 
discussion of specific alternatives. If it is agreed legislatively that 
the LUC is the proper body to exercise pro-active growth management 
functions, then a range of alternatives might be employed in its pro-
cesses, incl ud ing a performance standards system and tools that further 
aid a comprehensive viewpoint, including procedures for requiring 
regional environmental assessment and consolidated review of boundary 
amendment petitions. 
It is, perhaps, these fundamental questions of what role the Land 
Use Commission is to play vis-a-vis the other agents of growth manage-
ment (e.g., whether it is to continue to be reactive or become pro-
active in nature) that require the most attenti on at this time. 
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I NTRODUCTI ON 
Th i s Study i n Context 
This examination of land use mana gement procedures and thei r rol e 
in Hawaii ' s growth management program is a di rect ou t growth of a s tudy 
done i n 1977 which was reported in Growth Management Issues in Hawaii.2/ 
That study investigated state land use management as one aspect of 
growth management. Th i s study seeks to expl ain fu rther some pos sibl e 
modifications to Hawaii's land use regula tory system and to demons tra te 
their application. 
It is useful t o clarify the re la ti onshi p between growth management 
and land use management . Growth ma nagement seeks to conta in the con-
sequences of growth within acceptable level s. For example , traff i c 
congesti on and water quali ty might be t wo aspects abou t whi ch a commu-
nity is concerned and which are li nked t o growt h. A growth management 
program might appropr i ately consider the relat ionsh ip between the 
timing, locat i on , and densi ty of growth and othe r land use considera-
tions on t hese concerns. However , mechanisms ot her than land use 
control s can also be emp loyed in growth managemen t programs. For 
examp le , public transportation polic ies and programs obviously affec t 
automobi l e congestion; pol lutant discharge regu la ti ons affect water 
qua li ty; t axa t i on pol ic ies may i ndirectly af fect both . The purpose of 
havi ng a growth ma nagement program is t o effect a desirable quality of 
life i n the commu nity ; it i s no t t o limit or otherwise in f l uence growth 
~. A va ri ~ ty of mechani sms can be employed to accomplish t his. 
The particu lar aspec ts of growth that communities emphasize i n 
t heir growth management programs depend on the community problems they 
face and the types of growth cont rol tool s available to them. They 
share one centra l charac te r i stic , however . All growth management 
programs have at their core some form of land use management sys tem 
which affects the rate of growth, t iming, location, and density of new 
l and development . That is, l and use management is generally t he prin-
ci pal el ement of growt h ma nagement programs. 
The importafice of land use management to growth management should 
not be underestima ted. While there is a continual stream of new ideas 
about how communi ties' problems can be al levi ated, many of them have not 
been t ested in two respects--either in practice or i n the courts. Land 
use regulation in many fo rms is wel l tested , however , both in te rms of 
effectiveness and legality, and therefore, has immense appeal to growth 
managers. 
One attribute of land use management that contri butes to its appeal 
is that t he process involved in comi ng to a l and use decision can be 
very extensive in t erms of i t s substantive scope. La nd use decisions 
are increasingly based on informati on about a mu l t i t ude of anti ci pated 
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consequences of the decision, such as impacts on the local and regional 
economy, on natural resources, on the housing ma rket, and on government 
finances. Such deliberati ons surrounding the decision require the 
prediction of the impacts.o~ t hat decision and how those impacts could 
be managed. Land use declslon-makers, then, have the capacity for exer-
cising t heir influence on many substantive areas concerned with growth 
management. 
Hawaii's Land Use Law 
Hawaii's attempts to implement a growth management strategy orl gl -
nated with the La nd Use Law.3/ The Land Us e Law, enact ed in 1961, was 
designed to control the rapid urbani zation of the state ' s best agri-
cultural land and t o prevent devel opmen t on land units not contiguous t o 
existing urban areas. 
Means of Cont rol 
The Law mandates the cl ass i fica tion of all l ands in the St at e into 
one of four dis tricts: urban , ru ral , agricultural, and conse rva t ion . 
Definitions are provi ded in t he Law for each of the four districts . 4/ 
These defi nitions are in tended to indi cate the types of l and uni ts t hat 
should be included in each distric t. 
What makes the Law important in t erms of state growth management i s 
that changes in the dis trict boundaries, par t icular ly changes that 
result in addi t i ons to the urban district, determine how much urban 
areas are to be expanded and where new development will be loca t ed. 
This determinat ion of how much growth is to be all owed is cr i tical. If 
the boundaries are t oo loosely drawn, the result may be an irregul ar , 
discontinuous pattern of growth. Such a pat tern of growth can result i n 
much higher cos t s for publi c serv ices and faciliti es, such as roads and 
sewers. Ti ght ly drawn boundaries , on t he ot her hand, increase the 
competition for development approval s and i ncrease land costs as devel-
opers compete for deve l opable land uni t s . 
The second major ca tegory of pl anning decis ions del egated t o the 
Commis sion are those invo l ving the determinati on of where new develop-
ment is to occur . Should Hon ol ulu be all owed to encroach on pri me 
agri cultura 1 1 and? Will more urban expans i on occur i n ~J i ndward Oahu 
where small fa rms and l ow density devel opment are now preval ent? 
Decisions about the locat ion of urban expansion have critical impli-
cations fo r t he direc t public costs of growth; the provisions of water , 
roads, sewers, and schools. They also ha ve impor tant soci al impli-
cations. A tight ur ban limit in which growth is allowed to occur only 
in carefully select ed locations lessens the publ ic costs of development 
and protects certain existing land us es, such as plantation agriculture 
or sma ll farms, but could easily resul t in increased housing costs if 
too tig htly drawn. 
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From a planning perspective, the primary impacts of district 
boundary amendments are on the direction of urban development, the size 
of the urban district resulting from the original boundaries and sub-
sequent district boundary amendments, the trade-offs between urban and 
other uses, particularly agriculture, and the protection of environ-
mentally fragile areas from uses that would degrade or deplete the land. 
Each of these potential impacts has secondary and tertiary implications 
for costs of providing public services, potential agricultural revenues, 
the amount of open space, scenic values, and environmental degradation. 
Procedures 
A nine-member Land Use Commission appointed by the Governor rules 
on petitions for changes in the boundaries.5/ Petitions for boundary 
amendments may be made by: -
1. The Land Use Commission; 
2. State departments or agencies; 
3. County departments or agencies in which the land is situated; 
and 
4. Any person with a property interest in the land sought to be 
reclassified·Y 
By far the great majority of petitions are initiated by property 
owners or those holding a development interest in the property. Nearly 
ninety percent of such petitions are to amend the boundaries in order to 
add to the urban district.Z1 
The process of changing district boundaries begins with the filing 
of a petition with the Commission. Such petitions are required t o 
provide basic information about the land unit including ownership, tax 
map key, county plan designation, and present use of the land. Peti-
tions for urban classification also are required to provide information 
about proposed urban uses, preliminary development plans, availability 
of public services and the like .~ 
The Commission is required to conduct a hearing between 60 and 180 
days after the filing of a complete application and formal notification 
of the public has occurred.9/ A recent amendment to the Land Use Law 
r'equires that such hearings-be conducted according to the "contested 
case" procedures of the Administrative Procedures Act.lQI During the 
hearing, all parties have an opportunity to present evidence, to call 
witnesses, and to rebut the testimony of witnesses. The Commissioners 
themselves may also question witnesses. The presiding officer, whether 
the chairman of the Commission or a hearing officer, administers oaths, 
receives evidence, receives offers of proof, and rules on certain objec-
tions or motions.llI 
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Full participation in boundary amendment process is limited to 
"parties."12/ The petitioner, the Department of Planning and Economic 
Developmenr- and the Planning Department of the county in which the land 
unit is sit~ated are automatically parties. Standing may also be 
granted to "all departments and agencies of the state and of the county 
in which the land is situated ... upon timely application for inter-
vention."13/ Standing is also granted to persons with a property ' 
interest in the land as well as those who reside on it or can demon-
strate that they will be directly affected by the proposed change.~ 
Other persons are granted standing at the discretion of the Commission. 
While the Commission may deny standing to those whose rights to 
standing are not clearly articulated in the law on the basis that their 
testimony is likely to be redundant or that it would make the proceed-
ings unwieldy in practice, the Commission has rarely denied petitions 
for standing on substantive grounds. Denials of standing have usually 
been made on procedural grounds. 
Of particular importance from a planning perspective is the role of 
the Department of Planning and Economic Development and the Commission's 
staff in the proceedings. Earlier in Commission history, the Commis-
sion's staff assumed an advocacy role in Commission proceedings. The 
staff gathered information about the petition and sought to evaluate the 
petition in terms of policies in the Land Use Law and the Commission's 
own rules and regulations. At present, the staff performs a somewhat 
different role; one of generating information for the Commission about 
the petition. The advocacy role one played by the Commission's staff is 
now played more by the Land Use Division in the Department of Planning 
and Economic Development. 
The Commission must approve, modify, or deny the petition within a 
period of between 45 and 180 days following the close of the hearing.15/ 
All approvals for boundary amendments require six affirmative votes.16/ 
Commission decisions are issued as a decision and order.17/ Commission 
decisions are accompanied by separate findings of fact and conclusions 
of law. Moreover, if any party has filed a proposed finding of fact, 
the LUC must incorporate in its decision a ruling on each proposed 
:B,'nding so presented.l§j In approving boundary amendments, the Commission may decide to 
approve only a portion of the land for which the change is requested. 
In addition, the Commission may attach conditions to their approval as 
necessary to uphold the general intent and spirit of the Land Use Law 
and Regulations. Such conditions include, but are not limited to, the 
provision of public services and facilities by the developer or the 
dedication of land for such facilities and for rights-of-way to beaches 
or mountains.l2f 
Provision is made in the Land Use Law for two types of appeals in 
the boundary amendment process. Persons who have been denied standing 
as parties may appeal under one provision.20/ The second type of appeal 
provides for judicial review for parties whO seek to establish that a 
I ( 
"-
I 
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decision and findings are "contrary to the clear preponderance of 
evidence."21/ The section of the Administrative Procedures Act which 
allows for-Such appeals requires tha t they be made within thirty days of 
the Commission's preli mi nary ruling or within thirty days after service 
of the certified co py of the final decision and order.22/ 
Growth Management Issues in Commi ssion Dec ision-Making 
A number of issues have been ra is ed about how the Land Use Law has 
been impl emented by the Commissi on. These issues have to do with both 
the process and substance of Commission decision-making. In this 
section, a number of those issues dealing in particular with growth 
management at the sta t e level are discussed. 
Comprehensiveness. 
One such issue has to do with the comprehensiveness with which 
the Commission deal s with land management issues. As noted above, a 
growth management strategy based on land management requires careful 
attention to questions about where new development should occur relative 
to existing urban areas, as we ll as how much land shoul d be designated 
urban so as to insure that developers can exercise some choice among 
land units (i.e., that the LUC is not a willing ally in the creation of 
land monopolies). A major change in land use district boundaries 
affects not only the petitioner, but also the land use plans of contig-
uous landowners and landowners in other parts ~f the island. It forces 
public agencies to adjust their plans and programs to provide public 
facilities and services not only for the immediate decision, but also 
for other amendments that may follow. 
Critics of the Commission argue that the Commission focuses too 
narrowly on the petition before them and does not give sufficient 
attenti on to the "multi p 1 i er effects" of the deci s i on they face on other 
factors. The Commission's initial decision on ~lil ilani Town in the 
early 1960's is often cited as a case in point by Commission critics. ~lililani was the first major boundary amen dment involving agricultural 
land in Central Oahu. Critics argue that the Commission's decision on 
that petitllo~ set a precedent that made it di f ficult to deny subsequent 
petitions by other landowners in the same area. r·lost such land units 
involved prime agricultural land, and approva l of such land units for 
urban use, whether merited on other grounds, was i n direct contravention 
of one of the original purposes of the law. 
Part of the difficulty in getting the Comm ission to take a broader 
view of its land man agement responsibiliti es has to do wi th the struc-
ture of the law, t he lack of expli cit poli cy gui dance, and the analy-
t i cal capability. The law wa s origi nally deSigned to insure tha t 
amendme nt s to dis tr ict boundar ies occurred as part of a comprehensive 
rev i ew conducted every five years. The so-called "five-year boundary 
review" mechani sm was vi ewed as a mechanism to insure t hat the Commis-
sion took a comprehensive approach to district boundary amendments. 
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Individual boundary amendments could be vi ewed in a larger context or 
i sland and even statewide land allocation in such a process. In prac-
tice however, the so-called "interim boundary amendment" procedure in 
which landowners were allowed to petition at any time for a boundary 
amendment became the norm rather than the exception. Recently, the 
five-year boundary amendment procedure was abandoned entirely in favor 
f the interim petition process.23/ The nature of that interim petition 
pt ?cess encourages memoers to focus more narrowly on the land unit under 
pt tition rather than take a more comprehensive view. 
A second related problem is that the Commission is provided with 
little explicit policy guidance that encourages a more comprehens~i~v~e ___ _ 
perspective. The original district boundary regulations regarding 
changes to urban districts required that the Commission "insure that 
there was a sufficient reserve" of undeveloped urban land to provide for 
urban growth for a ten-year period. Nor do the interim guidance poli~ 
cies adopted in 1975 encourage-a more comprehensive view. There are, 
however, some priority directions in Act 100 which could conceivably, 
but not necessarily, encourage a broader, less ad hoc perspective. 
Finally, part of the difficulty of taking a more comprehensi ve 
perspective is that the bounds of "comprehensiveness" are difficult to 
specify and defend. Which potential effects should be included? Can 
they be identified and measured with any certainty? These and related 
questions have continued to vex those who have argued for greater 
comprehensiveness in Commission decision-making. 
Discretion in Commission Decision-Making 
Some critics of the Commission's decision-making have examined the 
lack of comprehensiveness argument to suggest that decisions are not 
only ad hoc, they are also arbitrary. Hence, the degree of Commission 
discretion in applying statutory policy and its own regulations in 
ruling on specific petitions is at issue. 
Clearly, the potential for the Commission to exercise a great deal 
of latitude in decision-making is inherent in the criteria upon which 
decisions are based. Neither the Commission's regulations nor the 
interim guidelines provide stri ct admonitions to the Commission. 
Scattered urban development is to be "avoi ded," i n the language of one 
guideline, but it is not forbidden. Conservat ion land is not to be 
reclassified "insofar as prac t icable." Rec las sification should not 
result in "significant" adverse effec ts on agricultural, natural, 
envi ronmental, recreat i onal , scen ic, historic, or othe r resources of the 
area. 
The exerci se of discretion by the Commiss i on occurs in two ways . 
Fi rst , the Commission has to make a decision about whether particu l ar 
.~ polic ies app ly to the land unit for which a boundary amendment is being 
;1' sought. Here the issues are factual: Would a boundary amendment result 
in scattered urban development? Does the land unit include some prime 
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agricultural land? Second , the Commissi on exercises discretion by 
making value judgments about the extent .to which particular policies 
apply. Would the impact of the proposed boundary amendment have "sig-
nificant" adverse environmental impacts? Are existing public facilities 
and services "adequate"? 
Alleged "arbitrariness" in COl1l11 ission decision-making occurs with 
regard to the second type of discretion issue. That is to say, the 
COl1l11ission rules that a particular type of impact is "significant" with 
regard to one petiti on, but insignificant with regard to another peti-
tion when, in fact, the two land units have similar attributes and the 
two proposed uses would result in similar impacts. One empirical 
analysis of COl1l11ission decision-making indicated that type of arbi-
trariness was particularly evident with regard to petitions involving 
--- l arge land units.24/ Large land units were more consistently approved 
---- for urban uses, either wholly or in part, than smaller land units having 
similar attributes. 
Major reduction in the degree of latitude exercised by the Com-
mission in its decision-making would not be without some costs, however. 
One obvious way to reduce the degree of discretion is to specify legis-
lative policies in great detail and to bind Commission decisions to 
those policies. The difficulty with this and similar approaches is that 
it requires developing an exhaustible set of policies that describes 
virtually every combination of relevant attributes a potential devel-
opable land unit might have . Not only does such an approach require a 
great deal of technical sophistication to develop such policies, it 
would also require more consensus about value issues in land management 
than has heretofore characterized public control. Moreover, it would 
result in an almost mechaRistic approa£fk to Land Use Commission decision-
making; an approach that !..eaves 1itt1e .J:llQrn.Lo~judgmen.t~ 
LUC as a Guidance Mechanism 
A third concern about the Land Use Law has to do with its utility 
as a land use guidance mechanism. r~ost growth management mechanisms are 
used to guide the location, timing, density, or rate of growth. Such 
mechanisms are usually pro-active in the sense that they are used to 
direct or shape growth consistent with a set of well-specified objec-
tives that mayor may not be set forth in mapped form. In its Ol:igi naJ 
onception, the Land Use Law also fell into this category of pro-active 
mec hanisms. The five-year boundary review procedure was an opportunity 
to choose among several alternatives in directing the location of growth 
and the supply of land available for urban development. The COl1l11ission 
could make explicit trade-offs among several alternatives while still 
leaving most of the development initiative with the private sector. 
Over the years, the five-year boundary procedure declined in impor-
tance and was finally abandoned. The Commission has focused instead on 
individual petitions proposed by the private sector. While the Commis-
sion has the authority to initiate petitions themselves, they have 
chosen instead a reactive posture; a posture of dealing with petitions 
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serially. The net effect of this approach is to place more and more <= 
authority for making basic growth management decisions with the privat ----
sector. The private sector chooses where and, within the time con- --
straints posed by the development review process, when growth will ~ 
occur. 
A fundamental issue raised by the new concern in growth management 
is whether the COl1l11ission should again take a more active role in 
guiding growth. 
Proposals for Reform of the Land Use Commission 
In spite of its many accomplishments, the Land Use Law is fre-
quently identified as being in need of improvement. f"lost of the pro-
posed changes would constrain the action or discretion of the LUC. Some 
recent proposals are now briefly reviewed. 
Guidelines Revision 
The LUC currently operates under rules and regulations which 
incorporate "interim" guidelines for decision-making which were ini-
tially adopted by the Hawaii State Legislature in 1975.25/ Those 
guidelines were intended to be replaced by "permanent" guidelines which 
were to be incorporated in the Hawaii State Plan, which was mandated by 
Act 189, SLH 1975.26/ That plan, adopted as Act 100 in 1978, does not ~~ 
have a "permanent guidelines" section, although the plan. provides 
guidance to the LUC in the fo rm of objectives, policies, and pr iority 
directions. 
To provide the LUC with guidelines, the Department of Planning and 
Economic Development prepared a revised set of guidelines for consid-
eration by the 1978 Legislature. Those guidelines failed to pass out of 
committee. 
Attempts at Enacting Pre-Decisions 
Another approach to land use decision-making is to legislate 
certain decisions--termed "pre-decisions" here. There were proposals in 
the 1978 legislative session for such laws. Noteworthy among these was 
a bi 11 whose primary intent was to preserve in the "agri culture" 1 and 
use classification the state's best agricultural lands.27/ The legis-
lative proposal was noteworthy for its simplicity of operation. Land 
units with certain tharacteristics--basically high agricultural pro-
ductivity--would, under the proposal, simply be barred from cQn¥~ 
to urban use. The Land Use Commission's discretion would b~re:~
in these cases. Some other agri cultura 1 1 ands woul d be capa'bi-e- of 
conversion to urban use if both the LUC and the Board of Agriculture 
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concurred in the conversion. This prOV1 Sl on would have severely cur-
tailed the LUC's freedom of ac ti on. This bill died in committee . 
Nevertheless, it is only one exampl e of attempts that have been dis-
cussed or proposed in the Legislature t o constrain LUC decisions. Most 
objections to such proposals revol ved around the argumen t that such 
simplistic decisi on rul es cannot poss i bly be sens itive to the many 
issues that must be weighed i n comi ng to reasonab le land use decisions. 
Performance Standards 
St ill another proposal before t he 1978 Legislature would have 
resulted i n the LUC modi fy ing its regulations in order to explicitly 
assess a set of consequences of any proposed land use change. Th i s 
procedu re would requi re the foll owi ng: (l ) the devel opment of a set of 
questions to be asked of any proposed land use change which deal wi th 
t he anticipated consequences of t he change (e . g. , Houl d the development 
be adeq uate ly served by hi ghways?); (2) t he determination of some 
minimum performance s tandard for each of the questions (i.e., a level of 
performance, such as a level of hi ghway congest ion which, if not achieved 
by the proposed deve lopment , could result in denial of t hat peti t ion fo r 
l and use change ); and (3) t he devel opment of a negot i ation process by 
whi ch proposed land use development could be app roved if certain con-
di t ions were met by t he peti t ioner {e. g., congesti on probl ems coul d be 
overcome by the provision of highway improvements by the peti ti oner) . 27/ 
One version of this proposal calls for the ass ignment of di fferen t 
scores to the proposed development, based on the degree of severity or 
benefit of the proposed change in te rms of each type of consequence 
(e .g., di f ferent levels of . highway conges tion woul d be assigned dif-
ferent numerical values reflecting their severity ) . This opti on permits 
a combined weighting of indi vidual scores whi ch woul d resul t i n a 
summa ry score representing the to ta l magn i tude of the posi t i ve and 
negative fea tures of the proposed development. 
A central feature of the performance standards system is that it 
permits flexibil ity in responding to defic iencies which are detect ed for 
any proposed development. If, for example, a development was adjudged 
to be crit i cally def icient in terms of the loss of land surface which is 
used i n recharging the groundwater sup ply through the infi ltration of 
rainfall, t he deve loper might propose a confi gurat ion of land devel op-
ment which woul d reduce the amount of impervi ous sur face in the devel-
opment and would as sure the provi s ion of groundcover which woul d promote 
recharge; such assurances could be f ound to resu l t i n a development 
whose performance is within t he standards of acceptabi li ty . 
This piece of proposed legislat ion was al so killed in committee. 
It will be considered again later i n this repor t . 
-19-
Constitutional Convention Proposal s 
The 1978 Constitutional Convention had before it several proposals 
for changing the land use management system in Hawaii. Some of these 
proposed to radically alter t he procedures of the Land Use Commissi on. 
Two of these proposals (Proposal Nos. 336 and 588) woul d have the LUC 
amend land use district boundaries only once ev~ry five years, wi t hou t a 
provision for amendments duri~g intervening years. Thi s is a react ion 
to the current procedure of t he LUC which permits peti ti ons for boundary 
amendment at any time and no longer has a sta t utorily imposed require-
ment for boundary revi ew at regular intervals. (Note: The fi ve-year 
boundary review provision of t he Land Use Law was repealed in 1975. ) 
It i s i nteresting to note that some delegat es to t he Const itut ional 
Convention have considered it neces sary to incorporate detailed pre-
scriptions for the way in which the LUC would function in their pro-
posals, although such detail is customarily rel egated to statute , rule, 
and regulation and not t o t he Sta te Constitution. 
Interpretati on of These Proposed Changes 
The proposal s for changing the Land Use Law which were cited 
above--and others--suggest t hat there is a need to examine the adeq uacy 
of the Law. These proposals also i ndicate t hat there is no apparent 
agreement on what type of changes should be instituted; they range from 
the t otal removal of the LUC's discretion in certain situations (enact-
ment of pre-decisions) to a preservation of the LUC's discretion under 
an expanded set of guidelines. Many of these proposals were stimulated 
by the knowledge that the interim gui delines under which the LUC had 
been operating were set to expire wi t h enactment of the Sta te Plan. 
However, the absence of a comprehensive set of guidelines for the LUC in 
the State Plan and the fai l ure of t he legisl ative propos als mentioned 
above confronted the 1978 Legislature with t he possi bi li ty that the LUC 
would henceforth func t ion wi thout explicit gui delines other than those 
found in other statutes. As a consequence, the interim guideli nes were 
extended until 1980. Obviously, th is is a stop-gap measu re . This 
sugges t s t ha t it is both app ropriate to revi ew the matte r of decision-
making criteria for the LUC and necessary to undertake that review in 
the immedi at e futu re . 
The New Element: The Hawaii State Plan 
Act 100, the state planning legislation enacted by the 1978 Legis-
lature, provides the instituti onal and policy context for Hawaii's 
growth management. The Act mandates a "statewi de planning system" which 
explicitly includes state functio na l pl ans, county general plans, the 
state program appropriations process, state capital improvements appro-
priations, the budgetary revi ew process conducted by the Department of 
Budget and Finance, land use regulatory decisions made by the Board of 
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Land and Na tural Resources and the Land Use Commission and, final ly, a 
Policy Council.29/ 
At the center of thi s "p 1 anni ng system" are the "overall theme, 
goals, objectives, policies, and pri ority directions" incorporated into 
Act 100. These elements provide the poli cy content upon which other 
state and county plans are to be based (see the section on policy 
context below). 
The "stat ewide planning system" can be thought of as includi ng a ~ apparatus, a planning apparatus, an implementation appa ra tus, and 
a monitoring apparatus. Except for the policy apparatus which is 
discussed in a subsequent section, each of these elements is discussed below. 
The Planning Apparatus in the State Plan 
The planning apparatus includes state funct i onal plans and county 
general pla ns. According to Act 100, state fu nc tional plans "shall be 
prepared for, but not limited to, the areas of agriculture, conservation 
lands, education, energy, higher education, health, historic preser-
vation, housing, recreation, tourism, transportation, and water re-
sources development. "30/ State functional plans are to be prepared by 
the "state agency headprimarily responsible for a given functional 
area" in consultation with an advisory committee appointed by the 
Governor and "respective officials and people of each county."31/ 
Act 100 states that "state functional plans shall define, implement, and 
be in conformance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, 
and priority directions" contained in the Act.32/ Furthermore, "(c)ounty 
general plans and development plans shall be used as a basis in the 
formulation of state functional plans. "m There is some ackn owl edgment 
in Act 100 that the functional plans may confli ct with county general 
plans. When such conflicts cannot be res olved , "the policy council 
shall prepare a report t o the legislature citing t he diffe rences and the justification for each of the conflict i ng positions together with 
recommendation. "34/ Functional plans are to be su bmitted to the Legis-
lature by the PoTTcy Council for revi ew, modificati on , and adoption by 
concurrent resolution.35/ 
Act 100 also requires that county general pl ans be consistent with 
the "overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority direc-
tions" of the Act by January, 1982.36/ County general plans or de-
velopment plans "shall indicate desired population and physical de-
velopment patterns for each county and regions within each county."37/ 
In addition, Act 100 states that the "(f)ormati on, amendment, and --
implementation of county general plans or devel opment plans shall 
utilize as guidelines, statewide obj ectives , polic ies, and programs 
stipulated in state functional pl ans adopted in consonance with this 
chapter. "38/ 
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The Implementation Apparatus of the State Plan 
The implementation apparat~s ref~rs specifically to those mechan-
isms so designated by Act 100, lncludlng: 
the appropriation of funds for major programs under the 
biennial and supplemental budgets; 
capital improvement projects and plans; 
the budgetary review and allocation process of the Department 
of Budget and Finance; 
state plans; 
decisions by the Land Use Commission; 
decisions by the Board of Land and rlatural Resources.W 
Act 100 requires that decisions and appropriations be "in con-
formance with the overall theme, goals, objectives, policies, and 
priority directions contained within this chapter . "40/ This section of 
the law also specifies that the appropriation of funds for capital 
improvements and decisions by the Land Board and the Land Use Commission 
must be consistent with functional plans adopted pursuant to the law.41/ 
In addition, rules and regulations adopted by both the Land Board and--
the Land Use Commission "shall be in conformance with provisions of this 
chapter. "42/ 
Another mechanism in the implementation apparatus is the A-95 state 
clearinghouse process. Circular A-95 issued by the federal Office of 
t·lanagement and Budget mandates the coordi nati on of state and 1 oca 1 
comments on designated federal projects. Act 100 requires the state A-95 
clearinghouse to "coordinate the review of all projects requiring 
federal funding" and to "notify the pol icy council of all proposed 
federal projects which conflict · with this chapter, any functional plan 
adopted under this chapter, or any county general plans or development 
plans which are in conformance with the provisions of this chapter."1]J 
The Monitoring Apparatus in the State Plan 
The monitoring apparatus includes both the Policy Council and the 
Legislature. Act 100 mandates an "overall review coordination and 
evaluation process."~ The need for such a coordination and evaluation 
process is apparent. Act 100 is far-reaching both in terms of the 
degree of consistency that is required between the law and individual 
plans and programs and in terms of the sheer number of planning, pro-
grammatic, regulatory, and budgetary processes that must be coordinated . 
Some conflicts between the objectives, goals, policies, and priority 
directions in the Act and specific plans, budgetary or regulatory 
decisions are perhaps inevitable. To deal with such conflicts, the Act 
mandates the formation of a policy council composed of eighteen members, 
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nine of whom are appointed by t he Governor from lists submitted by the 
mayor of each county and nine who represent state or coun ty agencies.45/ 
The Policy Counci l is to "prov ide a forum for the discussion of 
conflicts" between the act and funct i onal plans, county general plans, 
deve lopment plans, and state prog rams.46/ Findings and rec ommendations 
on all such conflic ts are to be reported to t he Governor, the Legisla-
ture and the mayors and legislati ve bodi es of each county.47/ 
Wh ile these responsibiliti es for conflict identification and 
resolution are the most prominent of the Po licy Council's duti es, there 
are other mon i t or i ng and eva luative responsibiliti es. The Counc i l is to 
"review and eval uate st ate fu nctional plans for conformance with the 
provisions of this chapter . . . . "48/ The Policy Council is required to 
"advi se the legis latu re on the admmis tra tion, amendment, and review of 
thi s chapter."49/ They are speci fica lly required to conduct a "compre-
hensive review~of the overal l theme , goal s, objectives, and policies 
every f our yea rs and of t he priori ty directions during odd-numbered 
yea rs to coinci de with state budget process commencing in 1981.50/ The 
Council is also required to prepare an an nual report which is to contain 
an "assessment of progress," an "assessment of legislation and programs 
of the preceding calendar year that have major statewide or county-wide 
impact in terms of their consi stency with th i s chapter," and "recommen-
dations to f urther implement this chapter" and to improve coordination 
within t he planning system.~ 
Hh ile the monitoring and evaluative role of the Legisl ature is 
implicit in their budgeting and lawmak ing responsibiliti es, one explicit 
role has been written into Act 100 . Functional pl ans prepared by state 
agenci es are to be reviewed, modified, if appropriate, and adopted by 
the Legislatu re by concurrent resolution.~ Act 100 specifical ly 
states t ha t "functional plans shall not be used as a gui de or to imple-
ment state policy unless said plans shall have been approved by t he 
legislature. "53/ r~oreover, "the legisla ture, upon a f inding of over-
riding statewide concern, may determine in any given i ns t ance that the 
site for a specific project may be other t han t hat designated on the 
county general plan . .. . "54/ 
The Po 1 i cy Context of State Growth r1anagement 
The policy context of t he Sta t e Plan is to be found in the overall 
theme, goals, objectives, policies, and priority directions found in 
Act 100. Act 100 identifies th ree "princi pl es or values" as consti-
tuting the overall theme of the State Plan: "Individual and family 
self-sufficiency;" "social and economic mobility;" and "community or 
social well-being." Th ree state goal s are identified including "a 
strong viable economy," "a des i red phYS ical environment, characterized 
by beauty, cleanliness, quiet, stabl e nat ural sys t ems, and un i queness 
" and "physical, social, and economi c well -being . ... "56/ 
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Objectives and policies are listed in Act 100 for population; 
economy in general; agricultural economy; visitory economy; federal 
expenditures; potentia~ growt h activit ies; land: base?, shoreli ne , and 
marine resources; scerrlC, natural beauty, and hlstorlc resources; l and, 
air and water quality; facility systems in general; solid and liquid 
waste facility systems; water facility systems; transportation; energy 
and utilities facility systems; housing; health; educati on; social 
services; leisure; individual rights and personal we ll-being; culture; 
public safety; government; and fiscal management. 57/ 
These objectives and policies vary somewhat in the level of gen-
erality in which they are expressed. Most of them, however, are not 
suffici ent ly specific to provide clear-cut gui dance in regul atory 
decision-making or budget allocati ons. For example, the objectives for 
land, air, and water quality are "(m)aintenance and pursuit of improved 
quality in Ha wa ii's land, air and water resources" and "(g)reater public 
awareness and appreciation of Hawaii's environmental resources."58/ 
Representative policies for achieving these objectives are to 
"foster educational activities that promote a better understanding of 
Hawaii's limited environmen t al resources" and "promote the proper 
management of Hawaii's land and water resources."59/ 
The most specific policy guidance in Act 100 is to be fou nd in the 
section on priority directions. Priority directions are defined as 
"overall direction and implementing actions . . . . "60/ Priority direc-
tions were developed for the economy, popula t ion growth and distribu-
tion, and land resources. Some of these priority directions rela te 
directly to growth management and are the refore worth quoting more 
fully : . 
Plan the development and availability of 
land and water resources in a coordinated 
manner so as to provide for the desired 
level of growth in each geographical 
area ·ill 
Encourage urban growth primarily to existing 
urban areas where adequate public facilities 
are already available or can be provided with 
reasonable public expenditures. Secondarily, 
encourage urban growth away from areas where 
other important benefits are present, such as 
protection of valuable a~ricultural land or 
preservation of life-styl es . 62/ 
In order to preserve green belts, give priority 
t o state capital expenditures that encourage 
locating urban development within existing urban 
areas in accordance with the following: funding 
for transportation activities that serve the 
needs of existing urban areas ; allocation of 
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water for urban uses t o areas wi thin urban 
areas, and wherever pos sible, locate state 
buildings and facilit ies with in urban centers 
close to public transportat ion; except where 
compelling public i nteres t dic tates development 
of a non-contiguous new urban core .63/ 
Direct f utu re urban deve lopment away from 
critical environmenta l areas or impose 
mitigating measure so that negative impacts 
on the envi ronment would be minimal .64/ 
While not inclusive of the enti re set of growth management- re lated 
polici es , these "priority directi ons" provi de a sense of both the types 
of concerns expressed and t he level of specifi city. 
Act 100 was not, however , the only piece of legislation enacted in 
1978 with implicati ons for state growth management . Act 166 amended t he 
Land Use Law by providing that the interim l and use gui dance policies 
sha ll rema in in effect until 1980 when measures to impl ement the State 
Plan become operational.65/ 
The in terim policies are: 
(l) Land use amendment shall be approved only 
as reasonably necessary to acc ommodate 
growth and development, provided there are 
no significant adverse effects upon agri-
cultural, natural, environmental, recrea-
tional, scenic, historic, or other resources 
of the area. 
(2) Lands to be reclassified as an urban district 
shall have adequate public services and faci-
lities or as can be so provided at reasonable 
costs to the petitioner. 
(3) Maximum use shall be made of existing 
services and fac i liti es , and scattered 
urban development shall be avoided. 
(4) Urban districts shall be contiguous to an 
existing urban district or shall constitute 
all ·or a part of a self-contained urban 
center. 
(5) Preference sha 11 be gi ven to amendment 
petitions which will provi de permanen t 
employment, or needed housing accessible 
to existing or proposed employment centers, 
or assist in providing a balanced housing 
supply for all economic and social groups . 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
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In establishing the boundaries of the districts 
in each county, the commission shall give con-
siderati~n to the general plan of the county. 
Insofar ai practicable conservation lands shall 
not be reclassified as urban lands. 
The commissi on is encouraged to reclassify 
urban lands which are incompatible with the 
interim statewi de land use guidance policy or 
are not developed in a timely manner.66/ 
Scope of This Study 
The set of possible improvements in the growth management capabi-
lity of the land use management system is extreme ly la rge. The con-
stituencies that have some involvement in land use processes include 
land developers, landowners, users of land in i t s current state (e.g., 
agricultural in te rests) , potential users of land in future uses (e.g., 
potential owners of houses on land now in agricultural use), land use 
decision-making bodies, envi ronmental regulatory agencies , pr i vate 
interest groups (e.g., environmen ta l conservation groups), and others. 
These many factors express values which are frequently competing. That 
is, any land use decision inevitably violates some of the values held by 
these groups. 
The scope of this investigation is necessarily relatively narrow. 
Itis concerned with the rol e of the government of the State of Hawaii 
in growth management, and particularly with its function as a broker 
among the competing values expressed by the ma ny cons ti tuenci es con-
cerned with land use. ~1ore specifi cally, this study is concerned with 
the role of the Land Use Com~ission as a principal agent of land use and 
growth management for the State. The first major aspect of this study, 
then, is to investigate and demons trate means by which the resolution of 
competing values can be accomplished in LUC decisions. This part of the 
study must necessarily consider how t he many types of information 
pertinent to such complex decisions can be i ntegrated. 
The second aspect of this study deals with another dimension of 
decision-making of the LUC. A 9iven land use decision can be based on a 
broad range of information and still be narrow in other respects. Such 
narrowness is principally evident in two forms: (l) the decision might 
not adequately consider the implication of the land use change on the 
surrounding region; and (2) the decision might not take into account 
other land use changes which might follow it, the cumulative effect of 
which mi ght be mare significant than the single decision. Land use 
decisions exhibiting either of these two characteristics can be termed 
"ad hoc." A growth management program is hindered if it is strongly 
based on ad hoc decisions because it cannot be long-range or geograph-
ically comprehen sive. 
~ 
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The Land Use Commiss ion has exhi bited ad hoc decision-making . 
While there has been no l egal restriction placed on it which would 
require it to be ad hoc, a set of procedures evolved under its fo rme r 
chairman which res ulted in consistent treatment of information in an 
ad hoc fashion . Changes in th is aspect of LUC procedures require 
careful examination . 
ANALYS IS OF ALTE RNATIVES 
In th i s section, several alternat ives for changing the admi nis-
trat ion of t he Land Use Law are explored. Each of the five proposal s 
contai ned in thi s section responds somewhat di f fe rently to the concerns 
discussed i n the previous sect ion about the ad hoc nature of Commis s ion 
decision-making, the broad discretion exerci sed by the Commission (and 
the resultant inconsis tencies in decision-making) , and about the lack of 
growth gu i dance provided by the Commi ssion as i t curren t ly operates. 
The specific proposa l s are : 
(1) guidelines revision; 
(2) a performance standards system; 
(3) a regional envi ronmental assessment system; 
(4) a regional sketch plan; and 
(5) a system for consolidated review of boundary amendmen t peti-
tions. 
The proposals are conservative in the sense tha t they recognize the 
centra l role in growth management pl ayed by t he Commi ss ion and propose 
changes in Commi ssion operations rather than abolish in g t he Commi ssion 
or designing an alternative land management system as has been proposed 
by some. 
The discussion of each alternat i ve i s di vided into several sec-
tions. For each al ternative there i s a rat iona le which identifies the 
major purpose and central features of t he alternative. This is followed 
by a section on the mechanics of the method whi ch provides information 
about the attributes of each alternative an d how it would be imple-
mented. Of particular importance in thi s sect ion is the discussion of 
how each alternative departs from exi st ing La nd Us e Commission practice 
and procedure. 
The discussion on each alterna ti ve al so contains a section on the 
org anizational responsibilities inherent in t hat alternative. Of 
particular importance is the identi f i cati on of changes in the current 
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distribution of administrative authority. Each alternative al so in-
volves somewhat different analytic requirements. Ea ch alternative 
involves different emphases about the scale of planning analysis .nd the 
specific impacts for which predictive capability would be required. 
The design of each alternative is based on a se t of assumptions 
about the plann ing environment in which the alternati ve would be imple-
mented. These assumptions are identified for each alte rnative. In 
addition, any changes in legislation that would be required to implement 
the alternative are identified. 
All the alternatives discussed in this section share at least one 
characteristic: They are desig ned to provi de a bridge or linkage 
between the general goals and policies of Act 100 and the specific 
decisions with which the Commission is faced. In a l and management 
system, that linkage can be provided either by devel oping maps based on 
the general statements of policies or by developing more specific 
statements of policy that can serve as decision guides on petitions 
before the Commission. 
One of the alternatives--the regional sketch plan option--seeks to 
provide the critical linkage using mapping techniques. Two of the other 
alternatives are exp licitly based on some va riant of the policy speci-
ficity approach. 
The policy specificity approach is based on the recogn ition that 
there is a hierarchy of policy prescriptions ranging from gene ra l to 
specific. Devel oping specific policy guides first requires a deter-
mination of the desired ou tcome condition wh ich is explicit or imp lied 
in the general statement of policy and then developing several increas-
ingly specific policy gu i des which coul d be used to achieve the desired 
outcome condition . 
For examp le, Act 100 conta ins the following prescription: "En-
courage urban developments i n close proximity to existing services and 
facilities . " The explicit des i r ed ou t come in this case is proximate 
urban developments. Impli cit in this outcome condition is a concern 
about the f i scal costs of new devel opmen t . tlore specific policy guid-
ance with regard to this issue was provi ded by a guideline proposed by 
OPED during the 1978 legislative ses sion : 
Land shall be reclassified t o the urban district 
only when there will be no significant adver se 
impact on existing public se rv ices and facilities 
as are necessary can be provided in accordance 
with the long range plans of, and with no unrea-
sonable burden upon, the fiscal and other resources 
of the appropriate agenci es .67/ 
Note that this guideline, while more specific than the general policy 
statement from Act 100, still requires that significant value judgments 
be made by the Commission. The Commi ssion must still determine whether 
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a "s i gnificant adverse impact on ex isting public services and facil-
iti es" wi 11 occur or whether t he fi sca 1 impacts constitute an "un-
reasonable burden." For purposes of our discussion, such gui de lines 
which leave signifi cant value judgments to the Commiss ion will be termed 
"j udgmental guideli nes ." 
It is possible, of course , to construct po l icy gui delines that 
provi de more explicit gui dance to the Commission on this issue. Thresh-
ol ds can be set whi ch provide rather precise guidance about whether a 
specific petition quali fies wi th regard t o a parti cular standard or who 
should bear t he fiscal cost s . Us ing water as an exampl e, the following 
statements represen t examples of performance standards: 
The estimated cost pe r househo ld for operation 
and maint enance of the water distributi on system 
(well s , mains , etc. ) requi red by t he development 
sha ll not exceed t he average t ota l opera t ing and 
maintenance cos t per household for publ ic water 
servi ce in the county by more t han 10 per cent. 
Pro rata costs shall be borne by t he deve loper for 
construction or improvement of the water di stribu-
ti on sys tem (wi thout provisi on for reimbursement 
f rom water sales revenues). 
Such performance standards provi de the most specificity . It shoul d be 
not ed, however, t ha t the standards in t hese statements are arbi trary 
(a l though, of course , they could be made less arbitrary). Moreover, 
they leave little room for di screti on or flexibility. 
Th i s i ssue of how best to provi de the linkage between general 
polici es and specific decisions is important in assess ing t he al ter-
na tives t hat foll ow. 
GUI DEL INES REV ISION 
Rationa le 
The Land Use Commission has operated unde r a specific set of 
"gui dance polici es" s ince 1975 . These guidance policies, or gui delines 
in our nomenclature, were adopted by the 1975 Legis lature as part of a 
ma jor revision to the procedures of t he LUC. Prior to that ti me , less 
specific guidance was provided by legi slation t o t he LUC . The 1975 
guidelines were termed "interim gui dance policies, " since the legis-
lation creating t hem called for their being replaced by "permanent" 
guidelines upon enactment of the Hawaii State Plan. 
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The Hawaii State Plan (Act 100, SLH 1978) does not itself contain a 
specific secti on with guidelines for the Land Use Commi ssion. Howeve r , 
as explained earlier in -this chapter, Act 100 does provide a hierarchy 
of objectives, policies, and priority actions to which the LUC is to 
adhere'. Some of the priority actions, in particular, are as specific as 
the "interim pol icy guidelines" in terms of their significance to LUC 
decision-making. Nevertheless, the Le~islature apparentl y concurred 
with others in thinking that the guidance provided by the Hawaii State 
Plan would not be sufficient for the Land Use Commission. As a conse-
quence, the "interim guidance policies" were extended for another two 
years. This action was considered especially necessary in light of the 
failure of passage of a revised set of guidelines drafted by the Depart-
ment of Planning and Economic Development, which would have met the 
mandate of the 1975 legislation creating the i nterim guidelines . 
Thus, the issue of guidelines for the Land Use Commission is still 
unresolved . The LUC has adapted itself to operating under some form of 
guidelines, providing for a strong interpretive and judgmental role for 
the LUC . Yet those guidelines under which it was operating (the "in-
terim" guidelines) were deemed by the Legislature to be unsatisfactory 
for permanent application. Furthermore, a major attempt at their 
revision failed. This suggests that a serious effort might be made at 
creating another set of guidelines for the LUC. Such revision, as 
di fficult as it may appear, is nevertheless the most conservative 
modification that can be made to LUC procedures, save doing nothing 
whatsoever. However, even t he do-nothing alternative would result in 
significant change in 1980, when the interim guidelines again lapse. 
An unresolved issue is how any set of guidelines, including the 
interim guidelines now in effect, is to relate to the provisions in the 
Hawaii State Plan. There are really two sets of guidelines with which 
the LUC must concern itself--those in the State Plan and those specif-
ically created for the LUC. It is not clear how this multiplicity of 
guidelines might be interpreted ultimately. However, it suggests that a 
single set of guidelines, drawn from the multitude of concerns expressed 
in the State Plan and from the interim guidelines be formulated and 
promulgated in the form of regulations by the LUC. The purpose of this 
would be to clarify the basis of LUC decisions, since the set of con-
siderations is now so large that it does not in fact provide effective 
guidance to the Conmission. 
These revised guidelines would, in effect, be an interpretation of 
the principal pieces of legislation which serve as the basis of LUC 
act i on : the Land Use Law, including the interim guidelines, and the 
Hawaii State Plan. It would distill the many considerations of those 
laws into a manageable set of guidelines which would be addressed in 
hearings before the Commiss ion and would provide the basis for the 
findings of fact which results from those hearings. 
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~lechani cs of the Method 
Description of the Process 
Development of Guidelines. 
(1) Analyze State Plan for Elements Relevant to Guidelines. 
This initial stage of analysis would be concerned with taking an in-
ventory of provisions of t he State Plan which would be relevant to LUC 
decision-making. An example of such a relevant provision is: 
Encourage urban growth primarily to existing 
urban areas where adequate public facilities 
are already available or can be provi ded with 
reasonable public expenditures. Secondarily, 
encourage urban growth away from areas where 
other important benefits are present, such as 
protection of valuable agricultural land or 
preservation of life-styles.68/ 
These provisions would then be categorized according to their 
applicability, such as their role in guiding decisions on petitions for 
reclassification of land into the various land use classes (urban, 
agricultural, conservation, and rural). 
The intent of each prOV1Slon should also be clarified, since some 
provisions might be duplicative and they could be consolidated i nto 
major categories. 
(2) Draft the Guidelines. Guidelines would be drafted based 
on the provisions grouped into each category of concern in the previous 
step. The utilization of guidelines as a basis for LUC action presumes 
that the guidelines provide for some discretion on the part of the 
Commission. That is, the guidelines need not provide hard-and-fast 
decision criteria or standards for decision-making. Nevertheless, every 
effort should be made to make the guideli nes cl ear and unambiguous. 
The set of guidelines should be no larger than is absolutely 
necessary; that is, it should be a distill ation of the large set of 
goals, objectives, and policies on which it is based . What results is 
essentially a two-tiered system: (1) specific guidelines flowing from 
this analysis; and (2) the laws on wh ich the new guidelines are based 
and to which resort may be made if the guidelines are not suffici ent in 
any particular decision-making situati on . 
(3) Adoption of the Guideli nes . The draft gui delines woul d 
then have to be revi ewed and submitted either for legislati ve enactmen t 
or adoption as regulation by the LUC. These options will be discussed further below. 
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Utilization of the Guidelines. 
Once the revised guidelines are in place, they would be 
utilized by the Land Use Commission in a manner similar to how the 
interim guidance policies have been used. That is, they would suggest 
to petitioners what type of information is usefully introduced in 
boundary amendment proceedings and would signal the important concerns 
that would have to be addressed in coming to a decision. They would 
continue to provide the LUC with the opportunity for exercising its judgment; that is, they would not be as restrictive as would performance 
standards. 
Organizational Responsibilities 
Analytic responsibility during the guidelines development phase 
would lie with the Land Use Division of the Department of Planning and 
Economic Development. Once the revised guidelines were in operation, 
responsibilities would be unchanged. 
~ 
Analytic Requirements 
The program of guidelines revision would require analytic capa-
bilities in the form of judgment, interpretive ability, and careful, 
reasoned editing. These capabilities are currently found within the 
Land Use Division. The review process would provide for augmenting 
these skills with those of outside reviewers. 
Major Assumptions 
The essential assumption of this approach is that land use decision-
making based on guidelines can be effective in terms of the diverse 
issues which must be addressed by the Land Use Commission. Many have 
challenged this assumption in t he past, citing as evidence inconsis-
tencies and ineffectiveness in LUC decision-making with respect to the 
basic intent of the Land Use Law. These charges, of course, can be 
countered by arguments that the LUC is the arbiter among a wide range of 
interests. 
An additional assumption is that the comPlete set of considerations 
embodied in t he Land Use Law and the Hawai i State Plan which now impinge 
on LUC decision-making is t oo broad to effectively be internalized by 
the LUC. The new element here, of course, is the State Plan, which has 
overlaid an extensive set of consi derat ions on what formerly was a tidy 
set of guidelines-- t he i nterim gui dance pol ic ies . If, in fact, the LUC 
can address all these issues in its deci sions, guidelines revi sion will 
be unnecessary. 
Finally, it is assumed that general agreement can be reached on a 
reduced set of gui delines, based on the larger set, without creating a 
legislative or litigious monster. 
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Examp 1 es Where the 14ethod Has Been Used 
The Department of Pl anning and Economic Development has attempted 
to have new guideli nes adopted, but was not successful. 
Legislative Requi remen ts 
Revised guideli nes must recogni ze the reality of existing laws and 
regulati ons which they would supplement or supplant. This means they 
would themselves have to obtain sufficient legal st atus to assure that 
decisions based on them are defensi bl e. The Legislature might take the 
step to clarify the relations hip between t he interim gui de lines, which 
have been given li fe until 1980, and the many provisions of the State 
Plan which bear on LUC decision-making. This coul d be in the form of a 
resoluti on directi ng the Land Use Commission to interpret the many 
guide li nes confronting it in some particular fashion or it coul d be in 
the form of legislation which itself organizes t he many guidelines into 
some hierarchical arrangement. 
The non-legislative approach would be for t he Land Use Commission 
to revise its rules and regulations. Act 100 requires the LUC to review 
its rules and regulations. 
As they currently stand, the LUC's regulations explicitly incorporate 
the interim guidance policies.70/ The mandate of Act 100 suggests that 
a major revision of this section is required. This is probably pref-
erable to seeking a legislative reconciliation of the many guidelines 
and their relationships to one another. The Legislature has spoken. 
Assessment in Terms of ~lajor Growth Management Issues 
It is difficult to design a set of guidelines that meets the test 
of comprehensiveness because such a set would necessarily be lengthy in 
order to cover the anticipated range of decision-making situations. 
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Moreover , any attempt at exhaust iveness is l ikely to result in contra-
dictory guidelines. The guideline approach necessarily involves trying 
to identify major goals to be achieved in land use decision-ma king and 
expressing those goals in general language capable of a range of i nte r-
pretations. 
In the past, petitioners before the Land Use Commi ssion have gone 
to great lengths to describe their proposed boundary amendments in ways 
that would make them consistent with existing guidelines. One of the 
difficulties of most current sets of guidelines used for land use 
regulatory purposes is that t he level of generality at which t hey are 
stated makes it possible to interpret them in several ways. Moreover, 
they often include words and ph rases such as "insofar as possible" and 
"whenever practicable." Such phrases make the exercise of discretion 
not only possi ble, but inev itable. 
Unless guidelines are written for the Commission that specifically 
direct the Commissi on to gui de the location of development into parti -
cular geographic areas and/or away from other areas or contai n clear 
directions about the timing of development, the use of guidelines is 
likely to be more reactive than pro-acti ve. 
A PERFORMANCE STANDARDS SYSTEM 
Rational e 
A performance standard is a specified acceptable leve l of a par-
ticular consequence of some acti on . An important distincti on between 
performance standards and use regu la ti ons is that the latter t end to 
specify how an activity is to be carri ed out, for example in t erms of 
density, type of use, building heights, floor area, and setbacks. While 
the enforcement of performance standards may affect how an activity is 
carried out, t he emphasis of performance standards is on the ultimate 
effects of an activity on the land and envi ronment rather than on the 
causes themselves. As long as consequences are acceptable, the activity 
could be considered acceptable. 
When used in industrial zoning to control noise, gla re , and similar 
side effects, performance standards define acceptable levels of nuisance 
or "externalities" of t he development rather than specifying acceptable 
uses. In meeting environmental concerns, they may specify maximum 
levels of stress to be imposed on natural resources by development. The 
nature of performance standards is summarized by Einsweiler, et al.: 
l 
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As in all zon ing, t he concern is with side effects 
(or in economic terms, externalities) that are not 
taken into account by regular ma rket transactions. 
Performance standards are a means of speci fying 
acceptable levels of exte rnal effect and l etting 
the market dete rmine use as opposed to specifying 
precise uses that woul d produce acceptable levels 
of external effect .1Jj 
Performance standa rds can be and are used in a wide variety of 
situations. They are particularly suitable for application in land use 
regulati on. A land use regula to ry system employing performance stan-
dards requires t he specification of standards and a procedure for 
enforcing decisi ons based on a determinati on of how proposed land uses 
comply wi th the st andards. 
A Si mp le example will illustrate the potenti al application of the 
concept. A st andard concerned with surface water runoff from a proposed 
land development might be: "The amount of water runoff f rom a site may 
not increase more t han 10% above t he level of existi ng runoff. " A 
proposed l and developmen t could be approved if there is a pri or deter-
mination, based on best ava ilable es timates , that the standard woul d be 
met; otherwise, the proposal would be denied. The standa rd does not 
itsel f determine what use can be made of the land ; rather it speci fi es 
that the consequence of whatever use is made of the land mus t be main-
t ained withi n acceptable l evels . In fact, it provi des t he developer 
with considerable flexibility in structuri ng his proposal so that the 
standard can be met. 
A land use regulatory system based on performan ce standa rds woul d 
employ any number of standa rds rela ted to a set of consequences of 
concern. Hawaii could imp lement a decisi on-maki ng system for t he Land 
Use Commission based on performance standards . Many vari at ions on this 
t heme are possible; some will be explored here. 
It is generally agreed that specifi c guideli nes are desirable for 
land use decisions--guidelines that are specific without being restr ic-
tive, flexi bl e without bei ng vague. A system of performa nce standards 
provides a legislative and adminis trat ive framework fo r relating demands 
and capacities of various natural and soci al systems i nf luenced by 
devel opment. It also promotes a negotia ti on process as part of the 
decision-making sys tem. Performance standards attempt t o clearl y define 
the capabili ty of a community to absorb growth rel ated to legally 
defensible health, safety, and welfare crite r ia. 
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Mechani cs of the ~1e thod 
Description of the Process 
This discussion will concentrate on a basic perfo rmance standards 
system employing straightforl~ard threshol d standards . Subsequently, 
some attention will be paid to a variation which cou l d empl oy a more 
sophisticated scoring sys tem which assigns to anticipated consequences 
of an action scores which represent the ma gnitude of their impact. 
The performance standards system would require two distinct stages: 
(1) specification of the system; and (2) operation of the system . 
Specification of the Sys t em 
There are t hree critical components of spec ifyi ng the system. 
(1) Determination of the scope of impacts (or consequences). 
This component is concerned with the specification of the subs tan tive 
scope of the system . That is, what consequences of land use are of 
concern? As indicated in ear lier sections of this report, there are 
many sources where these concerns are expressed wh ich would be relevant 
for the Land Use Commission, including the Land Use Law, the Hawaii 
State Plan, the Hawaii Environmental Policy Act, and t he Coastal Zone 
Manag emen t Program. This stage of development of the s¥stem wou l d 
require screen i ng such legislative mandates (and others) to identify 
those fac tors that could be developed i nto decision-making criteri a. 
The attempt should be ma de to include f actors that have measurable--and 
predictable--consequences. Examples are: amount of agricultural land 
of various productivity cl asses lost; deterioration in levels of service 
on downs tream highways (congestion); and proportion of housing provided 
in the proposed project for certain income groups. 
(2) Specification of st andards. This component requires the 
specification of bounda ry leve l s of acceptability for each of the 
consequences of concern, as discussed above. For exampl e , the State 
Plan conta ins the following policy statement: 
Encourage urban developments in close proximity 
to existing services and facilities.72/ 
Explicit or implicit in such policy statements is the achievemen t 
of some outcome condition. The identification of desired outcome 
condit i ons can then be used as a basis for constructing performance 
standards. Perfo rma nce standards are more specific than the judgmental 
guidelines which were discussed earlier. 
Performance standards designed to achieve greater effic iency in the 
delivery of public services or construction of facilities could take a 
variety of forms. For exampl e, they could be based on the desired level 
of efficiency and on the desired distribution of costs . The following 
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examples provi de a sense of how a genera lly-stated policy of promoti ng 
greater efficiency in publ ic service deli very can be translated into 
performa nce standards: 
Performance standard wi th respect to water: 
The esti mated cos t per household for operati on and 
maintenance of the water dis t ribution system (wells, 
mains, etc.) requi red by the deve lopment shall not 
exceed the average total operati ng and maintenance 
cost per household f or public water service in the 
county by more than 10 per cent . 
Pro ra ta costs shall be borne by t he developer for 
construc ti on or improvement of the water distribu-
tion system (without provi sion for reimbu rsement 
f rom water sales revenues). 
Performance standa rd with respect to sewers: 
Pro r ata costs sha ll be borne by t he devel oper for 
connecting sewerage from t he proposed devel opment 
to the nearest sewage collector and for i ncreasing 
the capaci ty of t he collection system if necessary. 
No te that these exampl es are designed to encourage developers t o 
consider t he effici ency issue in t heir economic analysis of the devel-
opability of a particular site by requiring them (and potential home-
owners) to bear the costs of "inefficient" developments. 
Performance st andards can be constructed to reflect other pol icies 
as well. The foll owing example refers to agricu l ture, for which there 
are severa l policy statements in t he State Pl an. The section of the 
Plan speci fying objectives and policies for the economy conta i ns a 
provision that "it sha ll be t he policy of t hi s state to . . . assure the 
availability of agricultura ll y suitabl e l ands with adequate water to 
accommodate present and future needs."Z1/ To achieve this policy, a 
number of priority directi ons have been specifi ed i n the Pl an including 
the following: 
Seek to accommodate urban growth in existing urban 
areas while mainta ini ng ag ri cultural l ands in agri-
cultural designation.74/ 
Provide adequate agricul tura l lands to ensure t he 
economic viability of the sugar and pi neapple 
industries . 75/ 
Seek to protect prime agricu l t ural and aquacultural 
lands through affi rma tive and comprehensive programs.76/ 
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. . . encourage urban growth away from areas where 
other importan t benefits are present, such as 
protection of valuable agricultural land ... 77/ 
The explicit desired outcome in these policy sta t ements is the 
increased viability in sugar and pineapple industries. A simpl e stan-
dard which achieves this objective might be t he following: 
Pe rformance standard with respect to agriculture: 
Lands with soil classified by the Land Study Bureau's 
Detailed Land Classification as Overall (Master) 
Productivity Rating Class A or B, and lands classi-
fied by the department of agriculture as prime agri-
cultural land, unique agricultural land, and other 
important agricultural land shall be maintained in 
the agricultural district, once so classified . 
Such a standard is an absolute prohibition and as such is not 
sensitive to particular situations in which it might be desirable to 
permit~the redistricting of productive agricultural land. Some flexi-
bility can be built into the standard by adding to it the phrase: 
except where the Department of Agriculture can 
demonstrate that the loss of a particular land 
unit to agriculture would not be detrimental to 
the long-term agricultural productivity of the 
state. 
Another priority action in the State Plan calls for planning "the 
development and availability of land and water resources in a coordi-
nated manner so as to provide for the desired levels of growth in each 
geographical area."73/ The implicit desired outcome in this statement 
is the promotion of~he compatibility of state and county plans and 
actions. An example of a performance standard to achieve this implicit 
goal is as follows: 
Performance standard with respect to compatibility 
of state and county plans : 
Lands shall be reclassified for any urban use only 
if the most specific county land use plan designates 
that land unit for the proposed urban purposes . 
These examples indicate how it is possible to construct performance 
standards using the State Plan as a policy base. 
Another important issue requires special attention. Any concern 
expressed in a simple statement of policy may not be simply translated 
into a performance standard. Some concerns--perhaps most--would require 
a number of standards. For example, a policy-level concern with housing 
. would reasonably be manifested in di fferent performance standards 
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re lating to cost, quality, type, and loca t ion of housing; no single 
statemen t (or standard) could adequately speci fy wh at is adequate for 
all income groups. Similarly, other concerns, such as transportation, 
agriculture, and noise , would ha ve to be expressed in multiple per-
formance standards. 
\!hile this exerci se of translating policy concerns into standards 
might be accomplished wi th sufficient t ime and other resources, the 
resulting compendium might include hund reds of performance standards 
r eflecting scores of concerns. Two problems would confront the LUC i n 
administering such a system. First , getting agreement on the entire set 
of hundreds of performance standards would be extremely difficult, if 
not impossible. An d second, the administrati on of such a system would 
be exceedi ng ly cumbersome. 
If a performance standards system was being instituted without 
hav i ng to re late t o an existing growth management system, such as has 
been the case in some jurisdictions, then developing a reasonably- sized 
set of performance standards would not be so di ff icult. Howeve r , the 
development of such a system in Hawaii would now have to rel ate to the 
scores of provisions i n the Hawaii State Pl an--provisions which have 
been only recently enacted after a considerabl e period of gestation. 
(3) Determination of the use of standards in decision-maki ng. 
The development of performa nce standards would have meaning only if it 
had some bearing on the decisions of the LUC. The standards could be 
employed in a variety of ways, from the very stringent to the more 
rel axed. Under a very stringent interpretation, the LUC would be 
empowered to deny any application that failed to meet the test of all 
standards. However, under this interpretation, allowance cou ld beim.ade 
for the petitioner to amend his petition so that the proposed devel-
opment would have its impacts within acceptable bounds. 
Under a more flexible system, a formal finding of the degree to 
which the proposed use would comply with the standards would be made a 
part of the LUC's record. The LUC might approve a peti ti on if it did 
not comply with all the standards, providing t he mi t igating circum-
stances would be explicitly explained; without such explicit expl ana-
tion, the concept of performa nce standards would have little meaning. 
Another option would merely use the finding of non~conformance to 
standards as a device to flag the petition under consideration for 
special scrutiny. With this approach, peti t i ons meeting all the stan-
dards could receive more streamlined approval, whil e others would get 
added attention. 
Obviously, a variety of arrangements for utilizing performance 
standards in coming to a land use decision could be employed. 
This and the preceding components would obviously require signifi-
cant effort on the part of the Land Use Commiss ion, assuming the LUC was 
responsible for developing the rules and regula t ions of which these 
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would be a part. This system woul d increase the visibility of the LUC 's 
decision-ma king procedures considerably. Perhaps mos t si gn i fican t ly , it 
would require the pre-consideration and speci fication of decision-making 
criteria to an extent neve r experi enced un der the Land Use Law. 
It shoul d be emphasized , however, that such a system would not 
eliminate the role of judgment in the LUC' s decisions. This system 
permits the expression of many growth management concerns in speci f ic, 
measurable standards. However, there are some concerns which are not 
capable of such quantificat ion. For example, the development of a 
particul ar land unit might technically meet the speci f ied performance 
standards, but it mi.ght be determined t hat it runs counter to general 
guiding policies concerning the preferred direction of urban growth on 
the island. Not all judgments can be compl etel y pre-dete rmined. The 
performance standards system would permi t the narrowing of the scope of 
these major judgments , however, while providing clearer gu i dance, 
understandability , and predictability in those areas where standards can 
be specified. 
Operation of the System 
(1) Pr ediction of impacts of the proposed use. The petitioner 
would, as part of his applicati on , prov ide a prediction of the con-
sequences of his proposed use for each of the areas of concern. Thi s 
would be simil ar to what is now required of petitions before the LUC, 
but would be more focused in terms of the specific impacts which are 
reflected in the standards. The use of asser tions by the petitioner , 
rather than analys i s amenable t o verification, wou ld be minimized, 
because the performance standards would be l i mi ted to consequences 
capable of measurement. It woul d continue to be the LUC' s responsi-
bility to judge the petitioner ' s asserti ons regardi ng the consistency of 
his proposal with general objecti ves, poli cies, and priority direct ions, 
frequently without the possi bility of rigorous analysis. 
The staff of the LUC or of the Land Use Division (DPED) woul d 
evaluate the petitioner's predictions of impac t . Th i s review might be 
enhanced by providing for review by others, such as is permitted under 
the Environmental Impact Statement procedures. (Note: Generally , 
environmental impact statements are not required as part of appl i cati ons 
for land use boundary amendments . ) 
Review of impact predicti ons is important because the state-of -
the-art of impact prediction does no t permi t unambi guous results. A 
range of impact prediction methods is ava i lable for each impact, wi th 
each based on different assumptions and having different input data 
requirements. Each method will generally produce a predicti on which i s 
inherently imperfect, although usefu l. 
(2) The finding of fact-relat i ng impacts to standards . The LUC 
would make a finding as part of the heari ng record regardi ng the com-
pliance of the proposed devel opment with the performance standa rds. 
Adjustments to the proposa l coul d be made , with modified fi ndings. 
'I 
(3) 
findings. 
depending 
the LUC's 
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The decision. The LUC wou ld ma ke its decision based on the 
The decision migh t incorporate nonstandard-related findings, 
on the reliance made on performance standards compliance in 
decision-ma king rules of practice. 
A Variation 
The preceding exampl e provided for standards with fixed cutoff 
poi nts; bas i ca lly, they served as "on-off" switches. An a lternati ve 
approach woul d provide a numerical score for various levels of each type 
of impact. Under this va ri ation, a proposed development would be jud~ed 
not in terms of whether it comp 1 i ed with each standard ("yes" or "no" ) , 
but in t erms of the magnitude of each impact. The impact would be 
measured al ong an interval (continuous) scale (e.g., amount of acreage 
lost to agricultural producti on); a "score" would then be assigned 
depending on the magnitude of the impact. Decision rules would relate 
to the scores . For example, cutoff might be set for the minimum (or 
maximum) total score, representing the cumulative effect of all impacts 
under consideration. Such a procedure could explicitly permit the 
trading-off of some types of impact for others; that is, some benefits 
could offset costs because of the numerical summary of impact scores. 
As noted above, such a system would not replace the LUC's role in 
applying judgment to petitions. In the first place, the LUC wou l d be 
instrumental in specifying the performance standard scoring system. 
But, again, numerical standards might not be appropriate for all decision-
making considerations; in other cases, considerable judgment and inter-
pretation would continue to be required of the LUC. 
Organizational Responsibilities . 
The Land Use Commission would continue much as it currently does, 
with the responsibility for hearing information in a quasi-judicial 
procedure and coming to a finding of facts in each case. However, its 
responsibilities would be augmented during the period in which the 
performance standards system would be incorporated into its rules. Roth 
during this period and later, when the system is in operation, the LUC's 
staff would need to be expanded unl ess the process of reviewing impact 
predictions were expanded to include outside reviewers. The staff would 
have added responsibility for interpreting each petition in terms of its 
impacts; this would require consi derable breadth in expertise. 
In most respects, the performance standards system would require 
only minor shifts in responsibility among the various actors invol ved. 
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Analytic Requirements 
A considerable amount of analysis--both quantitative and quali-
tative--would be requi red to make t his system operational. Principal 
among the requirements are: 
Determination of Scope of Standa rds. 
This stage woul d require a thorough review of ex i st ing laws , a 
distillation of the objectives, policies, and priority direct ions of 
those laws into specific impacts of concern. Considerabl e judgment 
would need to be exercised, partitioning provi sions of the laws into 
those which are capable of being transformed into specific standards and 
those which are not. 
Specification of Standa rds. 
Actual standards, or cutoff poi nts, must be determined for 
each of the impacts included in the scope. A question requiring reso-
lution in this regard is, what is the appropriate geographi c and tem-
poral scope of impacts? Some impacts are localized while others are 
very extensive. Some impacts are short-lived, while others are long-
lasting. Some impacts, such as those on large public service systems 
(e.g., transportation systems), may exhibit all these characteristics. 
Therefore, some impacts of concern might require specification in the 
form of several standards. The generation of a set of standards which 
is complete enough to refl ec t legislative requirements while brief 
enough to be manageable would be difficult. 
Prediction of Impacts. 
The petitioner would be required to provide predictions of the 
level of each type of impact reflected in the performance standards 
unless the system specified that such predictions would be made by an 
agency of government (e.g., LUC sta ff or Land Use Division staff). This 
would require the provision of a wide range of analytic capabilities by 
all of these groups, regardless of who produced the original predic-
tions, in order to assure all parti es of the legitimacy of the predic-
tions. 
Requirements Under the Varia~ion. 
The variation of the system, discus sed above, under wh ich 
impacts would be scored, would have additional analytic requirements. 
This system would require: the specification of the appropriate range 
of scores for each impact (i n some cases, both positive and negative 
scores would occur); a correspondence table (or function) relating 
impacts to scores; and, perhaps, a means by which scores could be pooled 
in order to arrive at summary impact scores. The latter possibility 
presents special ana lytic difficulty; it requires the specification of 
trade-offs among the pooled impacts. Tha t is, the scales must be 
mutually consistent and additive. While there are exampl es where such a 
system have been implemented, the considerations embodied in those 
, 
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systems have not been as extensive as exis ti ng statutes wou ld require of 
a performance standard sys tem i n Hawa i i.79/ Avoidi ng charges of arbi-
trariness in the scaling system would be~ifficult. 
Major Assumptions 
The first assumpti on of the performance standards approach is that 
a preponderance of l and use impacts--those incorporated in the system--
are quant i fi ab le . If they are not , then t he operational advantages of 
t he system cannot be ach ieved. This also assumes a willi ngness on the 
par t of those agenc ies and officia ls responsible for managing t he sys tem 
to subj ect wha t are usual ly genera l statement s of publi c pol icy to 
scruti ny i n t he deve lopment of precise language and standards. 
Assumed of the system is tha t it is possibl e t o predict impacts 
both accurately and reliably. Tha t is , that predic t ions do not deviate 
signifi cantly from (eventua l ) observa t ions and t hat predictions by the 
same asses sor are consis t ent from one case to the next . 
It is assumed that the i nd icator i ncorpora ted i n the standard 
actually measu res the "prob lematic" i mpact whi ch t he standard i s i n-
tended t o manage . 
Final ly , i t i s ass umed t hat a cri tica l level can be dete rmi ned (the 
standard itsel f) which is defensibl e. 
Exampl es Wh ere the Method Has Been Used 
Vari ations of the performance standard system are current ly in use 
in several main land jurisdi cti ons. The bes t known sys t ems are employed 
by Ramapo (New York), Mar in County (Cali fornia), and Petaluma (Califor-
nia) . The Petal uma and Ramapo sys tems have surv ived pro longed court 
challenges. Fu r ther elaborat ion of these systems is prov i ded in Lowry, 
et al . 
Legi sla t i ve Requi rements 
The suggestion that a perfo rmance standards approach to decisi on-
mak ing be adopted by the La nd Us e Commissi on i s largely a consequence of 
the proliferation of l eg islative gui deli nes experienced in the l ast few 
years. There is a need to cut th rough the maze of objecti ves, policies, 
and priori ty directi ons and make them operat i onal, if t hey are to have 
any meaning. The perfo rmance standards app roach woul d require some 
added rule-maki ng oriented t oward the procedural aspects of t he LUC's 
decisi on-mak ing, but pe rhaps not toward t he substantive aspects. The 
LUC wou ld have to change its Ru les of Pract ice and Procedure to i ncor -
porate performance standa rds in the pre-deci sion process. It would be 
required to address t he issues add ressed i n t he St ate Plan in i t s rules 
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at any rate, as specifi ed in HRS 226-52(b)(2)(D). It mi ght do t hi s by 
specifying performance standards for those impacts of concern which are 
amenable to such analysis, while leaving those which are not amenable to 
standard specificat ion to qualitative judgments of the LU C. 
The system would also require appropri ations for augmenting either 
the LUC sta ff or the Land Use Divisi on staf f or both , reflecting the 
increased demands on t heir analytic capabilities and workload. 
Assessment in Terms of Major Growth Ma nagement Is sues 
As is the case with the guideli nes reV1Slon alterna tive, a system 
of performance standards would not likely be comprehensive. A manage-
able sys t em of st andards could not realistically i ncorporate the hun-
dreds of standards that would be required to adequate ly reflect t he many 
concerns wh ich are genera lly considered essential t o land use dec ision-
making at the level of the LUC . This resul ts f rom the observation t hat 
a single concern might require several st andards in order to be ade-
quately addressed. For example , rel ati ve ly simple statements li ke 
"provision shall be made for low-cost housing" cannot be s imp ly ex-
pressed in the form of a sing le standard; several would be requi red, 
relating to differen t income groups and/or housing types . 
The impact of performance standards on Commission decisi on -ma ki ng 
discretion depends on the type and extensivenes s of t he st andards and 
their role i n decisi on-making (i. e. , whether they are man da tory or 
advisory) . It is possible, however, to design standards that greatly 
reduce the Commission' s discretion and increase the l ikelihood that 
petitions involving similar l and units will be treated consistently . 
To the extent that the standards we re applied to petitions i ni -
tiated by landowners, the perfo rmance sta ndards approach woul d still 
have to be descri bed as bas ically reacti ve i n nature. This is because 
standards woul d be constructed to gu i de development away from certain 
areas; deve l opment would not necessar il y be guided t oward more prefer red 
areas. 
A REGIONAL EtlVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT SYSTEtl 
Ra ti ona 1 e 
Mu ch land development in Hawa ii has occurred on land units which 
obtained t he necessary land use classification without being pl aced in 
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the context of a larger regi on. That is, the evidence that was con-
sidered as part of the deci sion-making proces s largely ignored the 
spillover effects of the proposed land use change on the community-at-
large. Some actions that occu r at a single site have repercussions that 
extend far beyond the boundaries of that site. They ma~' affect the 
natural resource base, the peopl e, and governmental expenditures in 
regions of va rying extent- - from the nearby community to the statewide level. 
The Land Us e Commission has frequently considered the merits and 
demerits of pe titions fo r reclassi f ication on the basis of the localized 
impacts on the site or in the nea r vici nity of the site. A considera-
tion of impacts at some distance from the land unit has been minimized. 
An example in po i nt is the case of the petition to reclassify nea rly 500 
acres of agri cultural land i n 1977 as part of the Mililani Town develop-
ment on Oahu . Questions regarding the impact of the proposed devel-
opment on water availability elsewhere in the region served by the same 
groundwater aquifer were shunted aside during the hearing in favor of 
the question of whether water was available at the site for the proposed 
development. This was in spite of the common knowledge that some 
dete rioration in service was bei ng experienced in the area served by the 
same groundwa ters. 
While the LUC has tended to limit its purview to narrow site or 
near-the-si te considerations, it has done so without being so mandated 
by law. There is no reason why the LUC cannot broaden its perspective 
to consider regional impacts of its decisions. In fact a strong case 
can be made that, as a principal growth management agency of the State, 
it should be required to have this broader geographic perspec ti ve. 
Prior to 1975, the Land Use Comm ission undertook periodic reviews (every 
five years) of land use cl assification throughout the State , which took 
on a regional character. Nevertheless, "interim" reclassificat ions--
those between five-year reviews--were still generally narrow in geo-
graphic perspective. 
In order to incorporate regional con siderati ons into its decision-
making procedures, the LUC could modify its regu la ti ons in a fa i rly 
simple way. This would call for inclus ion of requirements that peti-
tioners answer a set of questions that represent a regional perspective. 
The importance placed on regional analysis prior to such decisions 
has been recognized in the federal courts. It has been observed that 
[i]t is apparent that geographically restricted site-
specific environmental impact statements will not 
be sufficient to meet the requirements of the NEPA 
[National Environment al Policy Act], as recently 
interpreted by the courts and defined by the Presi-
dent's Council on Envi ronmental Quality: 
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'The interrelationships and cumulative 
environmen tal impacts of the proposed 
action and other related Federal projects 
shall be presented in the (environmental 
impact) statemen t. '80/ 
Of course, decision-making by the LUC does not involve fede ra l projects 
in the typical case. But the observation quoted above does summarize a 
significant shift in thinking away from narrow considerati ons and toward 
the broad view. 11hile some would hope that these issues could be 
addressed simply by a rigorous requirement for a divulgence and review 
of regiona l impacts in an environmen tal impac t statement (EIS) as part 
of the petition application, an EIS is not required in the typical LUC 
reclassificat ion process. Therefo re, such requirements would have to be 
built into the LUC's own regulations . 
The system that is proposed here would provide a shopping list of 
questions that have a regional ori entation and which would have to be 
addressed as part of the land use boundary change application. 
Mechanics of the Method 
Description of the Process 
Specification of the System. 
This component is concerned with identifying the types of 
impacts to be considered and clearly specifying the questions to be 
asked of each type of impact. Impacts of concern are expressed in 
several pieces of legislation, including the Hawaii State Plan and the 
Land Use Law. 
Vlhile there is a questi on of what region is the appropriate region 
to consider in assessing regional impacts, that turns out to be a 
manageable problem. There is no single region that is appropriate for 
the various concerns that ought to be addressed in a regional assessment 
system. ~ifferent types of development have varying regional impacts 
depending on the nature of the development, and different impacts have 
varying spatial expressions. Some developments and impacts might be 
highly localized; others will extend to larger areas which are still 
sub-areas of islands; and still others will affect entire islands or 
perhaps the state. Provision must be made for flexibility in the 
interpretation of "region." 
Operation of the System. 
The informational requirements of this system could be incor-
porated into existing procedures with only minor modification. Basic-
ally, the system would require a response by the petitioner to an 
expanded set of considerations included in the LUC regulations. The 
, 
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expanded application would then be subj ec t to the same type of review 
that it now receives. In addition, findings by the LUC with respect to 
the regional concerns would become pa r t of the hearing record. 
Organizational Responsibilities 
Responsibilities for all parties in the process would remain as 
they are. 
Analytic Requirements 
What Kind of Information is Generated? 
The following set of questions illustrate the way in which 
regional concerns can be incorporated into the informational require-
ments of the LUC's boundary amendment process. These questions are only 
representative of those which might be developed with the implementation 
of this system. They are not intended to replace questions which would 
otherwise be asked. 
Of course, any assessment procedure is premised on having reliable 
methods of predicting the impacts under consideration. It can be 
anticipated that, over time, such methods will become increasingly 
sophisticated and reliable, analogous to the predictive tools that have 
been emerging in site-level analysis in recent years. 
Following are several relevant areas of impact and some represen-
tative assessment questions. 
(1) Transportation 
What will be the system-wide impacts of the proposed develop-
ment in terms of traffic congestion and the fiscal implica-
tions of those impacts? 
(2) I/ater 
What will be the impact of the proposed development on the 
availability of water within the entire water service area fed 
by the same groundwater aquifer? Uhat would be the estimated 
cost of overcoming any deteri orat ion in service? 
(3) Agriculture 
If agricul t ural l and i s being lost to t he proposed develop-
ment , wha t are t he impl i cations of that loss in the context of 
any other l osses t hat may have occurred in the region on the 
long- term viability of ag riculture in the reg ion? 
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(4) Future Development 
What implications does the proposed devel opmen t have for 
future land use changes in the reg ion? 
(5) Historic/Cultural Resources 
If there are historic/cultural sites on the parcel, how 
important are they in relation to other known sites? 
How is the Information Used in Decision-flaking? 
The information generated would be used in the same manner as 
other information is now utilized by the Land Use Commission. The major 
revision in the decision-making process is the change in perspecti ve 
regarding impacts of various proposals. This perspective should expand 
the amount of information generated during the process to enable the LUC 
to more carefully implement the State Plan and other policies through 
its decisions even in the absence of regional development plans. This 
system would increase the burden of proof on both the petitioner and any 
parties opposed to the boundary amendment. 
Major Assumptions 
The first assumption is that there is a realization among the LUC 
and other parties to land use decision-making that a regional perspec-
tive is necessary to the proper exercising of growth management re-
sponsibilities. No matter how strongly the rationale for such a per-
spective might be expressed, even in legislation, the intent can be 
thwarted if the individuals on the LUC do not exhibit this sensitivity. 
Second, proper exercising of this proposal assumes that the pro-
cedure can be understood properly by all parties--as an information-
generating procedure. As with the environmental impact statement 
procedure, what is suggested here is merely a set of questions which, if 
answered prior to decision-making, can enhance the ~uality of decisions 
by introducing into the record information which has not been present 
before. The answers themselves do not foreordain the decision in any 
instance . 
Examples Where the Hethod Has Been Used 
The proposal discussed here can be considered a refinement of 
standard procedures employed in envi ronmental impact statement pro-
cesses. It merely clarifies expli ci tly tha t such statement s reasonab ly 
address iss ues of regional scope. (Hawai i' s EIS regul ations can gen -
erally be interpreted to avo id the regi onal scope, utilizing such 
wo rdi ng as "in the vicinity of the action," "for the area affected," 
and "of the area in question . "§lf 
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However, some jurisdict ions have more explicitly included re~onal 
considerations in their asses smen t requ irements. Some of the best kn own 
among these are Cali fo rnia, Oregon, and Vermont. 
Legi slati ve Requirements 
There is nothing in exi sting State law that precludes the Land Use 
Commission's consi dering petiti ons in part on the merits of thei r 
regional impacts. State law is genera l enough to permit such consi dera-
tions without compromising t he in t ent of the l egi slation . So, one might 
argue, the LUC cou ld simply raise questi ons of regional impact at the 
time of hearing any petiti on for l and use bounda ry amendment. However, 
another approach wh ich would more clearly establish t he significance 
assigned to regional consi de rations is to amend the LU C's regulations, 
inserting language which specifies t hat the reg ion shall be the appro-
pri ate scope of concern in the assessment of impacts. This would 
require no legislation, but would require adherence to regula ti on 
promulgation procedures. 
Assessment in Terms of 11ajor Growth 11anagement Issues 
The regional environmental assessment system is likely to be 
comprehensive with regard to the number and types of impacts cons i dered 
when major boundary amendments are considered. In practice, the degree 
of comprehensiveness depends on: (1) the number and types of regional 
impacts which petitioners are required to identify; and (2) t he defini 
tion of the region for each impact. 
Regional environmental assessment is a mechanism for generating 
information . By making such information explicit, it may have an impact 
on the degree of discretion exercised by the Commissi on . As described 
here, however, the mechanism does not tie Commi ssion decisions to 
findings of fact about regional impacts. The Commission could ignore 
potential impacts revealed by the process. 
The regional assessment system woul d not enhance pro-active growth 
guidance particularly except to the extent that t he process reveals 
potentially adverse consequences of development at a particular location 
and these potential impacts have a bearing on Commission decision-
making. 
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A RE GIONAL SKETCH PLAN 
Rationale 
Traditionally, land use planninH has utilized maps as a device for 
communicating or legally describifl g which land un its had been designated 
for various uses. Such "land use plans" have been the s ingle most 
prevalent device for summarizing implicit and explicit growth policies. 
Increasingly, however, jurisdictions have legislated poli cies, goals, 
and guidelines which have been intended to supplant plan ma ps, which 
were seen as being incapable of providing fl exible land use guidance for 
communities. "Pol icy plans" have replaced general land use map plans in 
a number of jur isdictions, including Honolulu . Other jurisdictions, 
such as the State of Hawaii, have developed sets of polici es , goals, and 
guidelines with the intent of guiding growt h withou t resort to a map. 
Ultimately, growth as it occurs is mappable. This observation 
raise~the question of why a jurisdiction, such as the State of Hawaii, 
does not adopt a map whi ch delimits areas where growth is to occur . 
Such a plan map coul d assist the public in understanding where growth is 
expected to occur and could be a guide to decision-making bodies, such 
as the Land Use Comm ission, when they deliberate growth-producing 
actions . 
There are two essential questions here: (1) How woul d the "plan" 
be developed? and (2) How would it be used? Obviously, such a state 
plan map could not be generated independently of the array of existing 
statutes and regulations which affect growth management. The map would 
appropriate ly be a reflect i on of those sta tu tes and regulati ons. 
Basically, this "sketch plan" woul d be a two-di mensional illustration of 
governmen tal policies in map form. It would be an interpretati on of 
which lands are targeted for growt h and which are not, based on estab-
lished legisl ation and regul ation. Given the scope of existing laws and 
regulations, such a map would have to incorporate inventories of physi-
cal features, natural resources, urban in frastructu re , and other factors. 
These different facto rs would be combined in composite maps to display 
various levels of land use suitability for urban use. The sketch plan 
would indicate the general timing, scale, and location of growth which 
can be expected in a given region withi n which an individual district 
boundary amendment petition is being consi dered by the LUC. 
The sketch plan could be utilized by the Land Use Commi ssion to 
identify acceptable locations for growth and to set priorities for them 
in terms of desirability, suitability, and potential impact. Determina-
tions could be made as to the best locations for p~rticular land uses, 
as well as the best uses of particular locations. Currently, the Land 
Use Law does not provide for m~king boundary decisions based on a mapped 
plan. However, it is not necessary that the sketch plan become an 
official map fn the legal sense. It is suggested here that the sketch 
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plan serve as a guide to the LUC in its deliberations, that it be used 
to summarize a large number of statemen ts of policy wh ich are generally 
only vaguely expressed in words and interpreted in specific, localized 
con texts without reference to other sta t ements of policy. The sketch 
plan could be used to bring t ogether many considerations on a single 
sheet so that the LUC could better focus its responsibilities on criti-
cal questions regarding possible conflicts between a petition and 
established values. 
Hechani cs of the r'lethod 
Descri pti on of the Process 
Inventory of Relevant Policies. 
The initial stage of development of the sketch plan would 
involve mak ing an inventory of specific polic ies in exi st ing laws and 
regul ations which have a bearing on land us e decisions . For example, a 
secti on of the Land Use Law stating a preference for main t aini ng good 
agricul tu ral l and in that use would be included in the invent ory. The 
principal l aws to be analyzed are the Land Us e Law (HRS, Chapter 205 ), 
the Hawaii State Plan (Act 100, SLH 1978) , and the Hawaii Envi ronmental 
Policy Act (HRS, Chapter 205). The specific in t ent of each policy would be determined. 
Inter pretation of Pol icies in flapped Form. 
Once the relevant policies were ident i fied, each of them would 
have to be in t erpreted in te rms of its implicati ons for the use of land 
and other resources. Then each policy would be mapped to the extent 
practicab le. On separate maps , for example , sites sui table for tourism 
facilities, areas suitably served by i nf rastructure , and l ocations of 
critical resources which are to be preserved would be delineated . In 
some instances, standards for identi f i cation of critical areas are 
reasonably well-establ ished (e.g., the 100-yea r flood inundation zone); 
in other instances, standa rds would have to be devel oped or maps of 
varying sensitivity would have to be deve l oped. 
Summarization of Pol ici es in flapped Form . 
The information mapped in t he preceding step could be sys-
tema tically combined for a vari ety of uses. It might be most prac tical 
t o map each factor on transparent myl ar fi lm . Combi na tions of factors, 
when overl aid, would indicate : (1 ) the most desi rable/suitable sites 
for future growth; (2) areas where there is potential conflict among 
policies; and (3) areas to be preserved in their na tural state. This 
composite map is what woul d be referred to as the "sketch plan." 
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Use of t he Sketch Plan in Land Use Deci sion-Making. 
The sketch plan would basically be a descriptive devi ce , 
illustrating a set of interpretations of existing policies. The sketch 
plan would not attempt t o res olve conflicting policies or assess the 
compatibility of agency goals and plans. It would not be a zoning map, 
nor would it supersede the state land use district boundaries. The 
allocation of land to the various distr icts would continue to be made by 
the LUC based on its collective judgment of how land use policies should 
be interpreted. 
The sketch plan coul d also assist the State Plan Policy Council in 
its evaluation of fu nctional pl ans, county general plans , and land use 
district bounda ries for their conformance t o the Hawaii State Plan, a 
responsibility specified in Act 100 , SLH 1978. 
Organizational Responsibilities 
Preparation of the sketch pl an would appropriately be done by the 
Department of Planning and Economic De velopment, as part of its overall 
land use planning funct i ons. Given the magnitude of the work that is 
implied, increases in staff would be requ ired, at least until such time 
as the initi al sketch plan we re completed; updating t he sketch plan 
would not r equire the s taff commitmen t of the initial effort. 
The structure and functioning of the LUC woul d not have t o change. 
The LUC would simply have at its di sposal this additional piece of 
information as a reference. 
Analytic Requirements 
The first analytic requirement is to determine the scope of policy 
factors which woul d be incl uded i n the sket ch pl an. These factors woul d 
be derived by screeni ng existing l aws and regulations. The fu ndamental 
laws to which attenti on should be pa i d are the Hawaii St ate Plan, the 
Land Use Law, and the Hawai i Envi ronmental Policy Act, but there are 
many others. Some elements of the State Plan, most notably some of the 
functional plans, are not yet complet ed or adopted by resol uti on of the 
Legisl ature, as call ed for in Ac t 100. t·1any of these f un ctional plans 
might also be expected to have a policy emphasis; since policies stated 
in those pl ans would also require in terpretat ion in the sketch plan, it 
is important that these plans be comple ted. 
Once the planning elements are completed , their land use implica-
ti ons must be determined. The boundaries of the exten t of any policy 
considera tion must be established. For exampl e , a policy inhibiting 
urban development in areas subject to fl ooding requires f urther inter-
pretation before it can be mapped. HO~I much flooding (with what f re -
quency) might be tolerated? Laws which state general gui ding policies 
rarely are specific enough to answer such questions. Theref ore, major 
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effort would be required f or the identi fication of relevant criteria for 
inc lus ion of l and based on the various policies--and on gai ning accep-
t ance or agreement on the cri teri a. 
Conceivably, there cou l d be scores of policies to be included in 
the sketch plan. ,How these many considerati ons can be effectively 
displayed is another serious analytic concern. 
Another signi fi cant ana lytic consideration revolves around the 
degree of spec ificity of the sketch plan. Is it pos si ble for it to be 
done in a very detailed fashion, on smal l -scale maps with definite 
boundaries? Or woul d that l evel of detail only mask the arbitrariness 
which is i nhe rent in es t ablishing a l~ost all boundaries of this sort, 
suggesting that i t would be more appropri ate to have a sketch pl an with 
"fuzzy" lines? If the latter we re to be the situat ion, of what use 
woul d the sket ch pl an be? Clearly, th i s is a si tuation potentially 
requiri ng the handling of vast amounts of info rma tion, embodying a l arge 
number of analytic judgments which nevertheless coul d have very signif-
icant consequences f or petiti oners before the LUC. Based on this 
informa tion "overload" and the undesi rable possi bility of such a sketch 
plan becomi ng an unknowable or misunderstood "black box ," pe rhaps the 
firs t analytic requiremen t of t he system would be a t es t to demonstrate 
the utility of the approach. 
Ma j or Assumptions 
The fundamenta l ass umption in considering the sketch plan approach 
is that the various policies expressed in the State Pl an, func t ional 
plans , and so on. will in f act be mappa ble. 
It is also assumed that a la rge number of policies--once mapped 
individually--can be overlai d in such a fa shion that the composi t e has 
significance and can be understood by the Land Us e Commission. 
Examples l~h ere the r,lethod Has Been Us ed 
There is a considerable body of experience with the mapping and 
overlayi ng of se ts of maps, each of which di splays the geographic extent 
of some concern. r'kHarg is perhaps best known for work in this area, 
whi ch has gained considerable popularity s ince publication of his book 
Design Hith Nature.82/ The procedure was also applied in Hawaii in the 
Central Oahu Pl'anning Study.83/ 
I'Jhile the overlay technique i s we l l - tes ted, no examples are known 
where extensive analysis of policies as numerous and complex as those 
implied in the present case has been undertaken leading to their even-
tual representation in mapped form. Th i s is untested ground. 
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Legislative Requirements 
In part, because of the level of analytic effort--and hence resou rces --
that would be required to operational ize a sketch plan and, in part, 
because of the visibility and importance that such a sketch plan woul d 
gain, legislative and procedural modifications would be requ ired . 
Act 100 would have to be amended to incorporate references to the sketch 
plan as a representation of the land use element of the Hawaii State 
Plan and functional plans (and perhaps as a means for the eval ua tion of 
Plan conformance). Changes in the Land Use Commission's rules could 
also specify the manner in which the LUC would utilize the informati on 
embodied in the sketch plan and how petitioners would be directed to 
address the sketch plan in their applications. 
Assessment in Terms of r·1ajor Growth rlanagement Issues 
The regional sketch plan alternative has the potential of providing 
for a great deal of comprehensiveness in Comm ission decision-making. 
The degree of comprehensiveness depends on how many factors are seen as 
having a bearing on development in the region and are therefore incor-
porated in the sketch plan. It should be noted, however, that while the 
sketch plan is comprehensive at the regional (or sub-island) scale, it 
would not be used for inter-regional comparisons about the locati on of 
growth. 
To the extent that the sketch plans are regarded as the embodimen t 
of the State Plan and state functional plans, they could greatly circum-
scribe the decision-making latitude of the Commission. Perhaps the 
greatest weakness of the sketch plan is that it does not necessarily 
reflect private sector preferences. Hence, there would be little 
incentive for the private sector to follow the plan. 
Sketch plans are, by their nature, pro-active. They explicitly 
suggest how to direct growth to particular areas and away from other 
areas. To the extent that they incorporate the other planning elements 
of the state plan they would be much more pro-active than any of the 
other guidance mechanisms reported here. 
However, there is the possibility that t he sketch plan would be the 
result of a technical exercise in interpretation by professional staff 
not subject to sufficient external review. The State Plan is, in 
general, a move away from the plan-as-map notion and toward the plan-as-
policy document notion. The sketch plan might be seen by some as a 
regression, but could provide a bridge between general policy and 
specificity. 
~ 
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A SYSTEM FOR CONSOLIDATED REVIEW OF 
BOUNDARY AME NmlENT PETITIONS 
Ra ti ona 1 e 
The Land Use Law, as originally conceived, provided for two bound-
ary amendment processes. The fi rs t of these--and the one which appeared 
most signi ficant in the orig ina l version of the law--was the five-year 
boundary review. The five-yea r review was intended to provi de the 
opportuni ty for ta ki ng t he broad view of land use change and require-
ments throughout the state. This broad vi ew , it was thought, would lead 
to a comprehens ive and pro-active stance on t he part of the State in 
determi ning fu ture growth patterns. The second boundary amendment 
process , which was intended or iginal ly to be subsidiary to the first, 
provided for amendment by petition of private parti es , generally land-
owners i nte res ted in having their land de veloped in urban use . Over 
time, the privately initiated boundary amendment process became more and 
mor e signi ficant; ultimately the five-year review was repealed, and with 
it the manda te for the LUC to simul taneously consider the land use 
changes that occur incremental ly when initiated by the private sector. 
By shi f t ing away from the five-year boundary review, the LUC has 
lost the opportunity to control growth in the pro-active sense. It now 
can only react to petitions. (In fact, it has the authority t o i nitiate 
boundary cha nges itself, but has not actively pursued this opt ion.) 
This makes decision-making easier i n one sense: the LUC can narrowly 
circumscribe its range of concerns when consideri ng any particular 
petit ion. But this procedure ma kes it virtually impossible for the LUC 
to consi der the cumu lative ramifications of a seri es of land use bound-
ary amendments. It is questi onable whether , as a principal growth 
management agent, the LUC can conti nue to operate in th i s mode. 
Proposals have been made to re i nstitute the five-year boundary 
review- -and even to strengthen it. Consti t ut ional amendments have been 
introduced in the 1978 Constituti onal Conventi on which would not only 
mandate that review; but would preclude any interi m boundary amendments .. 
The sentiment expressed in these proposals is one that argues for a 
comprehensive, pro-active state role in land use decision-making. 
The version consi dered here, which wi ll be termed "consolidated 
review of boundary amendment petitions , " is more conservative than some 
proposals. This alternative provi des for t he grouping of petitions, 
privately initiated, by county, for s imultaneous consideration and 
decision-making by the LUC. Each county would have the opportunity for 
boundary amendments only once every four years , on a staggered basis. 
Petitions woul d not be considered during the intervening years, except 
in very restricted circumstances, bu t would accumu l ate until the next 
review per iod for that county. The county is used as the unit for 
accumul ation of pet i tions since , it is argued, the cumulative impacts of 
land use changes are most strongly fel t within the single county. 
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This alternative presents some very significant changes to land use 
decision-making in Hawaii. It would, no doubt, evoke serious legal 
challenges by landowners who feel deprived of the use of their land 
while awaiting Land Use Commission action. This is one of the costs of 
obtaining a decision-making mechanism by which cumulative effects can be 
considered while still basing land use changes on privately initiated 
petitions. 
tlechani cs of the Method 
Description of the Process 
Petitions before the Land Use Commission for boundary amendments 
would be heard once every four years in each county. A variation would 
provide for more frequent consideration of petitions for other than 
urban designation, since the principal impetus for the simultaneous 
review proposal is the cumulative impact of petitions for urban designa-
tion. ~o petitions would be heard during the interim period. 
Each county would follow a staggered cycle with the following 
elements: 
A Six-~lonth Review Period. 
During this period the LUC staff would conduct an analysis of 
undeveloped urban lands and land which appears to be inappropriately 
classified. This information would serve as a basis for petitions 
initiated by the LUC for reclassification. At the same time, and in 
partnership with the county planning department, the LUC staff would 
prepare a written summary of needs and constraints related to land use 
in the county (e.g., population projections, economic and housing needs, 
infrastructure). 
A Three-Month Period for Receiving Petitions. 
A period of three months' duration would be used to accept 
petitions for boundary amendments from the private sector. This period 
would be preceded by an informational program notifying potential 
applicants that if they desire reclassification of their land within the 
succeeding four-year period, they should prepare their petitions for 
submission. As petitions are received, the LUC staff would make certain 
that filing requirements are met and, if they are not, specify what 
additional information is required. 
A Three-Month Review Period. 
In the following three-month period, all petitions would be 
reviewed. Each petition would be sent to the appropriate county plan-
ning department which would solicit and consolidate comments and recom-
mendations from relevant county agencies. The State Department of 
, 
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Planning and Economic Development would ser ve a similar function at t he 
sta t e level . The LUC staff would analyze t he cumulat i ve impacts of all 
petitions by county and by sub-regions within the county when appro-
priate. The staff would construct alternative scenarios of growth, 
based on different combinations of the petitions before it, and analyze 
them in terms of their contributions toward meeting county planning 
objectives (provision of housing, for example) and their cumulative 
impacts. 
A Six-Month Hearing Period. 
During the next six months, hearings would be held on all 
petitions f or boundary changes in the county. 
A Three-Month Decision Period. 
In the f inal three-month period of the cycle, action would be 
taken on all petitions for the county. Priority would be given to 
combinations of petitions that are judged most consistent with state and 
county plans and policies. 
The l engths of time attached to each stage are illustrative only. 
They indicate that at times the LUC staff would be involved in some 
stage of the cycle for more than one county . However, the Comm ission 
itself would be involved in nine months of effort per year--for hearings 
and decisions. 
Organizational Responsibilities 
Under this alternative, petitioners would be responsi ble, as they 
are now, for providin9 all data needed to support their requests. They 
might also elect to provide information on a joint basis with other 
petitioners; that is, they might indicate how a grouping of petitions is 
compatible, since some of the ultimate evaluati on of petitions by the 
LUC and its staff will be done on the basis of groupings of petitions. 
County and state agencies with substantive interests in the peti-
tions would review them and make rec ommendati ons. 
The Land Use Commission staff would need to be augmented under this 
system; it would have its present function s and some additional ones . 
It would be responsible for notifying the public of the time periods 
when petitions will be received for each county. It would examine 
petitions as they are filed and request additional information if 
petitions do not meet requirements. It would have the responsibility 
for preparing an anal ysis of undeveloped urban lands and inappropriately 
classified lands in each county as well as a summary of needs and 
constraints related to land use in the county. It would construct 
scenarios including those involving groupings of subsets of the peti-
tions in order to assess the sens itivity of alternate arrangements in 
terms of their multiple impacts; it would conduct an assessment of these 
multiple impacts. 
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The Commissi on would cons i der each petiti on in t erms of both its 
individual impact and i n terms of the cumulati ve impac t of it and other 
proposed land use changes. It would assign priority to those petitions 
most consistent with state and county pl ans and t he LUC's own guidel i nes 
and approve or deny each petiti on by including it in or excluding i t 
from a package of applications whose cumulative effects are considered 
to be most consistent with LUC guidelines. 
Analytic Requ irements 
Th i s sys tem would requ ire a review every fou r years of actual land 
utilizat ion, by county, in staggered terms ; this woul d be conduc ted by 
the LUC s taff. Of special interest would be information on undevel oped 
land in the urban district, including how l ong it has been cl assifi ed 
urban, why it has not been devel oped, any pl ans for its development , and 
general cha racteristics of the l and. The result woul d be a vacant urban 
land inventory, complete with es t imates for the number of dwelli ng un its 
that mi ght reasonab ly be accommodated on the land , tak i ng into con-
siderati on the diffi culty or un reasona bl eness of developing some land 
units. 
The vacant urban land inventory would provide t he basic i nfo rmati on 
on available supply which would be combined with es timat es on land 
requirements dur ing the ensuing four-year period, based on popul ati on 
and economic projecti ons. A comparison of these t wo figures would 
provide an es tima te of the min imal amount of l and requiring recl as si-
fication to the urban district duri.ng the review cycle. 
As each petition is received, county and stat e agencies would be 
required to review it, both singly and, when scenarios are formul ated 
which combine petitions, coll ectively. These analyses are similar to 
those which are now conducted by these agenci es, although the analyses 
of cumulative impacts anticipated from comb i na tions of petiti ons would 
be broader in scope than t hose done now. Of speci al interest would be 
the analysis which would examine how sensitive the cumulative impacts 
would be to various combinations of pet i tions. This might permit the 
isolation of those proposals wh ich are most consistent with county and 
state objectives from those which are not. 
Petitioners woul d be required to provide t he same i nfo rma ti on 
regarding their proposals as t hey now are. 
Major Assumptions 
The most significant assumption is t hat state and county goals, 
objectives, polic ies, and guideli nes will be clear enough to guide the 
LUC in its decision-making. That is, if this set of procedures does not 
result in a bifurcation of petitions into two distinct classes--those 
preferred and those not preferred- -based on established policy, all is 
for naught. 
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The system assumes that the LUC staff will have adequate resources 
to be able to conduct sets of comparative analyses of cumulative impact, 
based on the alternative scenarios discussed above. This would require 
a larger staff than the LUC now enjoys. 
The system assumes that commissioners will be able to devote large 
blocks of time to hearings. I~ays to balance the workload may need to be 
considered, since significant variation in the number of petitions among 
the various counties might result. At present, the Commission hears 
about twenty petitions for boundary changes per year, meeting an average 
of one-and-one-half days per month. The complexity of the proposals 
varies, so that one or two large proposals might take as much time as 
seven or eight smaller ones. A consideration of multiple proposals 
would entail complex hearings. In 1976, action was completed on two 
petitions on Oahu, three on Hawaii, four on ~1aui, and five on Kauai. In 
1977, the fi gures were four on Oahu, two on Hawai i, four on ~1aui, and 
five on Kauai. (The number of petitions filed was greater, but some 
were withdrawn.) If petitions could be filed only once every four 
years, as proposed, these numbers might be expected to quadruple, making 
the average number to be considered approximately a dozen per year, but 
varying greatly depending on the county. 
Examples Where the Method Has Been Used 
There is no other example of the application of this set of pro-
cedures. The five-year boundary review originally provided for in the 
Land Use Law was similar in some respects. However, there was no 
restriction on reclassification petitions during the interim between 
reviews, as there is in the method described here. Thus, the benefits 
of consolidated review were undermined. 
Legislative Requirements 
The proposal assumes that the LUC remains a quasi-judicial body. 
However, some significant changes in its procedures would be required. 
First, the LUC and its staff would have to adopt a new stance. At 
present, the LUC in essence judges individual petitions on their own 
merits. Under this proposal, the LUC would become more of a planning 
and consciously guiding body; while each petition would ultimately be 
either approved or denied, the LUC would consciously weigh the appli-
cations against one another. This would change the fundamental nature 
of the LUC. 
The Land Use Law and regulations would have to be amended to 
provide for: 
-59-
The consolidated filing, review, hearing, and action on all 
petitions from each county. The amendments should state the 
objectives of such review. 
Changes in the length of time during which certain actions 
were required (e.g., hearings) would be required. 
Notification requirements would require changing so that it 
would be clear at what times petitions were accepted and 
heard. 
Changes in policies and development of guidelines reflecting 
the purposes of consolidated review would be required. 
Changes in the responsibilities of the staff should be speci-
fied. 
Assessment in Terms of t1ajor Growth Management Issues 
Consolidated review procedures make it possible for a comprehensive 
assessment of the impacts of major land use changes on anyone island. 
The juxtaposition of petitions allows for a thorough analysis of alter-
native strategies of new growth. ~~hether the analysis would be compre-
hensive with regard to the range of impacts that would be considered 
would depend, of course, on other legal requirements and who was charged 
with the analysis. 
Under the periodic boundary review procedures as outlined above 
there is nothing proposed that would specifically bind the Commission in 
its decisions. However, when this proposal is viewed within the context 
of the State Plan structure that was enacted by the 1978 State Legis-
lature (Act 100), it is possible that the county plans and state func-
tional plans would serve to reduce the degree of discretion tradition-
ally exercised by the Commission. 
The simultaneous review of several major boundary amendments also 
makes it possible for the Commission to playa more active role in 
guiding growth. The Commission would, in effect, weigh several growth 
alternatives and choose that alternative or combination of alternatives 
most consistent with the goals, objectives, policies, and priority 
directions of the State Plan, the county plans, and the state functional 
plans. 
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A COMPARISON OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
This section will provide an interpretation of the practical effect 
of the alternatives discussed above. This is intended to clarify the 
distinctions among the alternatives and will illustrate their relative 
advantages and disadvantages. 
In order to put this comparison into perspective, it is useful to 
consider a specific decision-making context. There is probably no 
better example of an area under pressure for land use change than the 
sub-region of Oahu termed "Central Oahu." Central Oahu is generally 
defined as the stretch of developable land lying between the Waianae and 
Koolau mountain ranges and extending from the North Shore to Pearl 
Harbor and E~/a. The land in this area is characterized by its high 
agricultural productivity and its efficient conversion to development in 
urban use. The pressures for development in this region were examined 
by the Department of Planning and Economic Development in its Central 
Oahu Planning Study in 1971 and 1972. The pressure for development has 
resulted in a number of significant decisions by the Land Use Commission 
to remove land from the agricultural district and place it in the urban 
district. Notable among recent decisions have been the boundary amend-
ments providing for extension of Mililani Town, development of the 
Gentry-Waipio residential, commercial, and industrial subdivision, and 
the resort/residential development at \~est Beach. Added pressure is 
provided by the anticipated reapplication for conversion to urban use of 
Waiawa Ridge (Bishop Estate), long-range plans for further expansion of 
Mililani Town (Castle & Cooke), and both public and private proposals 
for large-scale urban development in the Ewa coastal plain (Campbell 
Estate). The foregoing are indicative, but not exhaustive, of proposals 
for urban growth in the area. 
It is useful to briefly consider what import each of the alter-
natives in this study might have on LUC decisions. In order to focus 
the discussion, it will be limited to a consideration of a specific set 
of concerns which are especially relevant to the Central Oahu context. 
These are: 
(1 ) impact on agricultural operations; 
(2) fiscal impacts; 
(3) water supply; and 
(4) housing. 
The discussion which follows will suggest how each of the alter-
native proposals for modifying LUC procedures would address these 
issues. 
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Impact on Agricultural Operations 
This is an especially sensitive issue in Central Oahu because much 
of the agricultural land in that region is classified "prime." Yet, 
that land is simultaneously capable of efficient urban development. 
Guidelines Revision 
This approach requires judgment by the LUC of whether the with-
drawal of valued agricultural lands will have an adverse impact on the 
viability of agricultural operations. Even if it is judged to have such 
an impact, this option permits that consequence to be traded-off against 
other valued outcomes. 
A Performance Standards System 
A variety of approaches might be developed, ranging from outright 
prohib4tion of withdrawal of valued agricultural lands to permission of 
withdrawal, subject to economic sanctions or guarantees that performance 
of the agricultural unit will not deteriorate. 
A Regional Environmental Assessment System 
This approach requires detailed information about the potential 
impacts of withdrawal of agricultural lands on the viability of agri-
cultural operations in the region. However, the provision of this 
information does not bind the LUC's decision. 
A Regional Sketch Plan 
This alternative provides for the graphic representation of pre-
ferred locations for urban growth relative to lands of high agricultural 
productivity, such as those areas in the Ewa coastal plain with poorer 
soil characteristics. 
A System for Consolidated Review of Boundary Amendment Petitions 
This approach would allow for simultaneous review of several 
petitions in order to assess their individual and cumulative impact on 
agricultural operations. The analysis would be similar to that accom-
plished by the Department of Agriculture as part of its testimony on the 
West Beach petition; that testimony highlighted the potential cumulative 
impacts of the gradual withdrawal of individual land units in Central 
Oahu from agricultural use. This alternative would also allow an 
ordering of the petitions in terms of preference. 
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Fiscal Impacts 
The fiscal impacts of potential urban development of the Central 
Oahu region was the subject of much analysis in the Central Oahu Plan-
ning Study referred to above. Of special concern is the cost of pro-
viding transportation improvements--not only in the vicinity of the 
proposed developments, but "downstream." 
Guidelines Revision 
This approach requires judgment by the LUC on the likely impact of 
proposed boundary amendments on fiscal resources. Under existing 
procedures, each proposal is considered independently, unless petitions 
pertaining to the same region have been submitted at approximately the 
same time; this inhibits the considerations of cumulative impacts. 
Negative impacts may be traded-off against other valued outcomes. 
A Performance Standards System 
Performance standards can be constructed so as to require a greater 
shifting of financial responsibility for public services and facilities 
to the developer in those areas where they are not readily available. 
Such might be the case, for example, in assessing charges for a new 
interchange with the H-2 freeway for the Gentry-l'!aipio development if 
that development should necessitate such an improvement. Such provi-
sions serve to discourage scattered, inefficient development. 
A Regional Environmental Assessment System 
This approach requires the generation of detailed information about 
the fiscal impact of both on-site and region-wide public service needs 
resulting from the proposed boundary amendment. For example, the cost 
of expanding the capacity of the Red Hill transportation corridor would 
be assessed--at least in part--to large-scale developments in Central 
Oahu. 
A Regional Sketch Plan 
This approach makes it possible to coordinate decisions about the 
location of new development with state functional plans for public 
facilities and services by making such linkages more visible to the LUC. 
A System for Consolidated Review of Boundary Amendment Petitions 
This proposal promotes the coordinated programming of public 
facilities and the estimation of the aggregate demand of public services 
on a regional basis. 
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I'later Supply 
The concern over the groundwater aquifer in the southern portion of 
Central Oahu (the Pearl Harbor aquifer) has intensified in recent years 
with the deterioration in supply and quality, particularly evident in 
the lower elevations. The recognition of this concern as an element 
that links developments in a region will no doubt become more pronounced. 
Guidelines Revision 
This approach draws attention to water availability and quality as 
issues of importance, but because of the imprecision of guidelines 
(e.g., "prevent the significant deterioration of groundwater sources") 
and because of the opportunity to trade-off this value with others, does 
not guarantee non-degradation. 
A Performance Standards System 
It is possible to construct performance standards incorporating 
thresholds for the withdrawal of groundwater and/or requiring the 
applicant to assume the cost of overcoming such thresholds, such as by 
bearing a pro-rata share of costs incurred in importing water from other 
service areas. 
A Regional Environmental Assessment System 
This approach would foster the consideration of the impact of 
development at a particular site on entire water-recharge areas and 
groundwater storage areas. 
A Regional Sketch Plan 
Development of a regional sketch plan would promote the coordina-
tion of new development with existing facilities and assure that avail-
able resources are not exceeded by aggregate demand. 
A System for Consolidated Review of Boundary Amendment Petitions 
Consolidated review would make possible the coordination of aggre-
gate demand for water with available water supplies to promote effi-
ciency in provision of services. For example, if it became necessary to 
begin importing water from another area, necessitating construction of 
transmission lines, it might prove to be efficient to approve petitions 
in the water-short region, if they were of such a magnitude that average 
costs were reduced through economies of scale and if they were located 
in close proximity to one another. 
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Housing 
The provision of housing "demanded" by the public has been the 
principal argument used in the promotion of urban development in Central 
Oahu. In terms of providing a good housing product to the public at 
reasonable cost, only the performance standards and consolidated review 
systems would be particularly effective. 
Guidelines Revision 
Given guidelines promoting housing for moderate-income families, 
there are strong arguments for urbanizing Central Oahu. While a land 
use regulatory system based on guidelines may embody such values, it 
does not specify how to make trade-offs between them and other values, 
such as the preservation of agricultural land. 
A Performance Standards System 
Performance standards could be constructed which would require 
developers to meet specific quotas of different classes of housing or to 
provide land or other assistance to public authorities for public 
housing programs. 
A Regional Environmental Assessment System 
Such a system would not add appreciably to what can be accomplished 
by existing LUC procedures, which consider the type of housing proposed 
and how it relates to the general market. 
A Regional Sketch Plan 
A regional sketch plan could be used to identify areas most suit-
able for residential development based on physiography, environmental 
features, and other factors expressed in public policy. This approach 
would not be particularly useful in dealing with specific housing 
quality or cost considerations. 
A System for Consolidated Review of Boundary Amendment Petitions 
Consolidated review of petitions would permit the LUC to rank 
alternative proposals in terms of how well they address housing needs of 
the community. This might result in a higher level of competition among 
petitioners to provide types of housing to which they believe the LUC is 
particularly sensitive. 
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IilTRODUCTION 
Water use in Hawaii has increasingly emerged as a recurring topic 
of public discussion. There was little reason for the public to be 
concerned about water use as long as there were new sources of ground-
water to be developed at low costs. But these conditions are clearly 
coming to an end, for already some public agencies in Hawaii are delib-
erately withdrawing water from agricultural use in order to provide 
inexpensive water to urban residents. The alternative would be to 
develop more costly sources of groundwater, to exchange "treated" sewage 
water for potable water now in agricultural use, or to desalinize 
brackish water. Although these alternatives will probably be used 
someday, at present their use is being delayed by converting water from 
uses that have low values in the market, particularly for the irrigation 
of taro and sugar. 
Public decisions to convert water from agricultural to urban use 
are relatively new occurrences in Hawaii. Consequently, agency per-
sonnel have not had an opportunity to develop some of the analytic 
approaches that potentially would assist in making significant water 
reallocation decisions. These decisions ideally would be based on a 
full knowledge of the probable impacts on: (1) the physical environ-
ment, (2) the localized economy, and (3) the daily lives of the people 
affected. Although a complete knowledge of these impacts would be 
impossibly expensive to develop, reasonable procedures can be pursued 
which should provide considerable amounts of useful information about 
their nature and magnitude. 
As this study team has assessed the available procedures for this 
purpose, it has become clear that present agency personnel in Hawaii are 
relatively adept at assessing the hydrological and physical environ-
mental impacts of changes in water use. However, they somewhat lack 
expertise in assessing impacts of a social or economic nature. Conse-
quently, it was decided at an early stage in the preparation of this 
report to give emphasis to the use of the most promising techniques that 
will provide at least some estimates of the impact on jobs, incomes, 
production levels, land use, life-styles, etc. Just as important, 
emphasis has been given to the social need for such information, the 
hazards involved in using such estimates, and the reasons why present 
agencies are not well equipped to do such analysis. 
Although water reallocation decisions can be and are made without 
performing the analysis discussed in this report, such efforts can offer 
a decision-maker a number of advantages. For example, an analyst may be 
able to point out unforeseen consequences of an act, or it may be 
possible to define the problem in a way that suggests the need for a 
broader overall decision. 
In any case, a properly conducted analysis should evaluate the 
major alternatives in a convenient and comprehensible fashion. Ideally, 
the impacts of the alternative decisions are described in terms (or 
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numbers) that are readily comparable. In this sense, the analysis is 
similar to the feasibility studies performed by private businesses, 
except that a public agency must include in its considerations all 
significant impacts on society. In other words, instead of looking only 
at the more narrow considerations of efficiency, an agency should be 
asking whether society as a whole will be made better off by a par-
ticular undertaking or by alternatively undertaking some other use of 
the same resources. 
The impacts of these decisions should be ~easured against the 
extent to which they detract from or contribute to the achievement of 
society's objectives. While benefits are defined relative to the 
achievement of fundamental objectives, negative impacts (costs) are 
defined as foregone benefits. Therefore, we should be assured that a 
decision by a public agency implies that no alternative use of the 
resources consumed would secure better results with respect to society's 
objectives. 
Some impacts are registered in the marketolace by prices; some 
prices incorrectly reflect society's values; some impacts are not 
reflected in any market but they can be estimated through simulated 
market values; it is nearly impossible to think of adequate market 
valuation processes for other impacts. In the case of misleading 
prices, the numbers conceivably can be adjusted by examining the inter-
action between fundamental policy objectives and basic resource avail-
abilities. If a particular resource is very scarce or if it has valu-
able alternative uses, then the value assigned can be appropriately 
high. 
It is also iDportant to examine who experiences the impacts in-
volved. flot only does the support for and opposition against a project 
depend on who benefits and who pays, but some water projects are built 
as a means of giving greater advantages to certain portions of the 
population, such as farmers or those in poverty. 
Socioeconomic impact analysis necessarily depends on an accurate 
knowledge of relations among physical resources, but it also must 
include considerations of legal constraints, administrative procedures, 
and budgetary "1 iDits" which affect the nature and distribution of 
impacts. Even when these factors are built into the analYSis, tre-
mendous difficulties remain. For example, by virtue of training and due 
to existing clientele relationships, agency personnel may be prone to 
consider certain impacts to be not as important as they are perceived by 
sor,le segments of society. Also, the basic problems of ignorance about 
the details of the present and future necessarily cause analYSis to be 
inaccurate or frustratingly vague. 
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UNCERTAINTY AS A HAZARD OF ANALYSIS 
"\~ater resources managers typically have only partial 
contro lover the obj ect of thei r concern - the \.,ater whi ch 
they must manage. Therefore, water administration encom-
passes conflict management, interagency coordination, and 
planning in a setting of uncertainty.".!) 
The amount of water we have or can produce and the amount needed by 
society have become topics of increasing concern. Unfortunately, there 
is little reliable information available regarding present and projected 
amounts because of the difficult uncertainties involved in the geo-
logical, economic, social, and political aspects of the situation. 
Supply Uncertainties 
Uncertainties in the supply of water involve both our present 
sources in the form of rainfall and accumulated underground storage, and 
potential sources such as desalination and reuse. Each of these also 
involve uncertainties arising from imperfect knowledge concerning the 
economics, planning, and management of the water supply. At least two 
levels of uncertainty exist. First, the uncertainty in managing our 
existing supply - how much water is there? The second is the uncer-
tainty in creating new supplies - what are the economic and environ-
mental costs of increasing our supply? 
Annual and seasonal variations in precipitation will affect the 
quantity of water available at any time. Extensive rainfall records 
have been maintained over the years, and while "viet" and "dry" cycles 
may occur, they cannot be predicted with any useful certainty. During a 
drought, more water will be pumped from groundwater sources than would 
even normally be replenished by rainfall or surface water. This need to 
rely on groundwater not only reduces the amount in accumulated storage, 
but there also may be long-term effects on the water supply, for studies 
indicate it may take decades for a drop of rain to fully percolate down 
to our typical groundwater aquifers. The effects of a drought on the 
water supply thus may not be apparent until some years in the future. 
"In Honolulu it is believed that following the lowering of basal water 
heads during dry periods or by heavy draft, the related shrinkage of the 
bottom part of a thick Ghyben-Herzberg lens may not be completed for 
many years or possibly several decades."?) A more immediate effect of a 
drought is the increased consumption out of the ground~/ater supply to 
make up for less rainfall. 
Surprisingly little is known about the supply of accumulated under-
ground storage. From what is known to be the physical nature of any 
freshwater lens, inferences can be made about the behavior of a particu-
lar lens under various conditions. These inferences are subject to 
certain parameters such as: the size of the aquifer; the age of the 
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water; the degree of interrelatedness with surface, high level, and 
other groundwater; the rate of recharge; the stability of the balance 
between fresh water and salt water. 
Potential sources of water supply include desalting and recycling, 
which are technologically possible, but not without economic, environ-
mental, and legal costs. These costs will be borne by the public, 
whether the price be direct in a higher water bill or indirect in 
environmental degradation. The values, perceptions, and attitudes 
underlying the magnitude of these costs vary among people and change 
through time. The uncertainties so far mentioned specifically relate to 
the quantity of the water supply, but in many instances increasing 
quantity may decrease quality, often to an unpredictable extent. 
Decreasing stream flows resulting from stream diversions or groundwater 
development produces increased concentrations of dissolved solids which 
not only affects the desired taste and purity of water for certain uses, 
but they create oxygen deficient water and higher temperatures with 
resultant fish kills, odor problems, and the general inability of the 
stream to flush and dilute wastes. Overpunping of groundwater sources 
also may cause intrusion of salt water and degradation of the aquifer. 
Even techniques to increase the supply such as artificial recharge of 
groundwater aquifers or the use of treated sewage effluent for irri-
gation may affect the quality of the accumulated underground storage. 
Demand Uncertainties 
Population growth, the nature and spread of land development, 
changes in per capita use of water, the economic growth of water-using 
industries, the effectiveness of conservation education, emerging 
technology, and changing prices all determine future demand for water. 
The uncertainty of our knowledge of the future nature of these factors 
is reduced by relying on trend projections. The traditional approach to 
such trend projections is to determine how to meet "requirements" rather 
than how to control and direct the demand, even though these factors 
often are subject to governmental actions. 
The Hawaii State Plan contains the most current, official statement 
of Hawaii's future population and economic structure. Civilian resident 
population on Oahu is projected to be 776,900 in 1990; military and 
dependents, 122,480; and visitors 65,900.3/ Even though these pro-
jections might be accepted, many uncertainties still remain in esti-
mating per capita water demand. The county boards of water supply 
provide for commercial, public, some industrial, and some agricultural 
uses. 
... Existing municipal water use data do not 
generally differentiate between types of uses. 
A rough guideline, however, is that water use in 
excess of about 80 gallons per capita per day 
(gcd) is attributable to nondomestic purposes .. . "11 
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As the population grows, water planners are becoming increasingly 
concerned about the rising rate of per capita water consumption. One 
study in Hawaii found that for the period 1960-1971:~ 
(1 ) 
(2) 
(3) 
Per capita consumption is greater in single family 
dwellings than multiple family dwellings due to 
outdoor sprinkling but indoor domestic use is 
greater in multiple family dwellings. 
The water consumption level in established 
residential areas is stable. 
Overall increase in per capita consumption on Oahu 
was due mostly to expanding economic activity led 
by the construction industry. 
One of the policy implications derived from the findings was that 
the "requirement" approach to forecasting future \~ater needs could be 
improved upon by coordination with land use planning. The ... "den-
sity of population and intensity of water use in cert~in tracts will 
largely depend on the type of land development.6/ \Ihile the State may 
have to accommodate growth in population, there-are many techniques 
available to the land and water planner regarding the rate, timing, 
location, and type of development that would provide some control over 
the "demand" for ~Iater. 
Planning studies have generally allowed for 500 gallons of water 
per hotel room per day. This includes not only in-room use, but laun-
dry, restaurant, etc., water to support one hotel room. According to 
the technical studies prepared in developing the State Plan, "suffi-
cient tourism growth" implies an additional 11,401 rooms or water use 
amounting to 18.5 million gallons per day (mgd) in 1990.7/ Because 
tourists do not directly pay a water bill there is no prTce incentive to 
conserve water, although hotels install water-saving devices and re-
cycling systems for laundry and dishwashing. 
The largest water user on Oahu and in the State is the sugar 
industry. Sugar provides about 9,600 jobs in the State; 1,670 on Oahu. 
In 1975, the number of direct-plus-indirect jobs generated by the sugar 
industry was 15,800 or 4.2 percent of civilian jobs in the State.§! 
Irrigation of sugarcane on Oahu requires 239 mgd.2j \Iithout sugar there 
would be no overall water shortage, but there could well be other 
shortages - open space, green belts, water recharge areas, jobs, and 
income. With the end of the Sugar Act in 1974 and the increasing 
competition from a sugar substitute, high fructose corn syrup, uncer-
tainty clearly exists within the sugar industry and is beyond the 
control of state decisions. If the sugar industry survives economi~ 
cally, there are then other related uncertainties for the State, such as 
the urbanization of cane land, transfer of water from irrigation to 
urban use, and the effect of drip irrigation on groundwater recharge. 
Uncertainty in water demand arises not only from uncertainties 
regarding the demand patterns of present users but also from new ones. 
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The Technical Studies for the State Plan concludes: "There is also a 
good chance that one of the developing activities (e.g., aquaculture, 
manganese nodule mining, one or more diversified agriculture crops, 
commercial fishing) will grow rapidly, becoming a major industry by 
1990."lQ! Any of these could have high water demands. The probability 
of one of these activities becoming a major industry largely depends on 
the state policies and programs to support or not support its develop-
ment. For example, to an extent the State supports aquaculture and 
diversified agriculture by making land and water somewhat available and 
affordable and by providing tax breaks and agricultural loans. 
Water for environmental, ecological, aesthetic, and recreational 
purposes is another new and ri sing demand. l'jater pl anners traditi ona lly 
have considered only the economic use of water which has generally been 
the meaning of terms such as "beneficial use" and "highest and best 
use." Although government policies state that environmental uses shall 
be given consideration in any water development project, they frequently 
have given way to economic "uses" of water. In contrast, Ilashington, 
Oregon, Montana, and Colorado have passed legislation recognizing 
nonconsumptive, instream use as beneficial. 
Demand for a quantity of water implies a demand for certain stan-
dards of quality. Water supplied to our homes is high quality drinking 
water, but the portion actually consumed for drinking and cooking is 
very small, for the washing machine, the lawn, the toilet, and the 
garbage disposal all unnecessarily receive the same high quality water. 
What if we bought bottled water in the store for drinking and cooking 
and used lower quality water for all other nonconsumptive uses? The 
quality of water required for crop irrigation varies, although drip 
irrigation requires certain high quality characteristics to prevent 
clogging of the system. Water for industrial processing and water for 
air conditioning may also be of lower quality. The timing and degree of 
adoption of some of these practices to use lower quality water is often 
speculative at best, thus adding to our uncertainty. 
Public education, appropriate pricing, and conservation technology 
are some of the ways water planners and managers can begin to exercise 
some degree of control over demand instead of simply meeting the demand. 
Technology has already provided us with many ways to conserve water in 
the home, in agriculture, and in industry. These include domestic 
water-saving devices for the shower and toilet, closed systems allowing 
in-house reuse of water, waterless toilets. In agriculture, water-
saving techniques include drip irrigation and irrigation with recycled 
water. Industrial methods include cooling towers, and recycling and 
reuse systems. \~ater conservation, however, is voluntary with the 
exception of industrial water reuse which is virtually required by the 
enforcement of water quality standards. 
Conflicts and lawsuits over the use of water are another source of 
uncertainty. The issue may have been clear decades ago when the Board 
of Water Supply was established in part to cap some wells and prevent 
waste of water. Today it is not clear what constitutes a beneficial 
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use, nor are use priorities clear. If the criteria for highest and best 
use is economic, why is not the market mechanism utilized to allocate 
water? The failure to provide a solution to allocation of water is due 
largely to our attitude towards water as a free and unique good. 
We are so accustomed to thinking of rain as 
a free good that we confuse rain with water .•. 
water supplied to a particular person in a particu-
lar place is just as much a commodity as oil. There 
seems no reason to suppose why, in the first place, 
it should not be supplied in the cheapest possible 
way, and in the second place, once it has been sup-
plied it should not pay its full cost. Furthermore, 
the situation is often confused because of the 
failure to realize that water is not one but many 
commodities. Water supplied to the urban bathtub 
is not the same commodity as water supplied to the 
field, the factory, or the recreational area.llI 
There is considerable uncertainty in estimates of supply and 
demand. This results in some difficulty in decision-making. The wide 
gap between knowledge and ignorance may in many cases force us to make 
"choices," not "decisions." Such choices will be made by public agen-
cies in accord with their legal mandates, their perception of the 
"problem," and the resources at their command. This additional set of 
constraints can be discussed in terms of the overall "expected behavior" 
or institutional setting for such decisions. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL SETTING 
The two major public agencies involved in water management deci-
sions on Oahu are the Department of Land and Natural Resources (DLNR) 
and the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (BWS). DLNR has the broad duties 
of collecting and correlating all information for the State concerning 
water resources and keeping it available for public inspection.~ It 
has the responsibility to "initiate and conduct surveys of the water 
resources and requirements in the State as may be required to enable the 
formulation and revision from time to time as necessary of a master plan 
for the development, conservation, and most beneficial use of all water 
resources."13/ Also within DLNR's power is the designation of ground-
water areas-ror regulation, protection, and control.l1I The anticipated 
enforcement of the Groundwater Use Act by DLNR will likely lead to 
numerous situations demanding appropriate analytic and decision-making 
capabilities, as further discussed beginning on page 80. 
The Honolulu Board of Water Supply, as is true for each of the 
other counties, is basically responsible for the county's supply of 
domestic water, but it also supplies water for commercial, industrial, 
; ----------___________ ~..:.-,~..;',n,'j;jj."'---------------__ _
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and some agricultural uses. BWS has control of only about one-third of 
the water used on Oahu. The other two-thirds is controlled by sugar 
plantations, the military, and various private users. Understandably, 
the Board's perspective on the problem is conditioned by the developing 
needs of their clientele. 
The functions and basic structural components of the Division of 
Water and land Development (DOHAlD) under DlNR have remained essentially 
the same since 1962 -- implying current stability in water management, 
but also raising questions of future effectiveness and ability to cope 
with possible impending water shortages. For example, if planning is 
done by the same agency that enforces or regulates policy, a profes-
sional or agency bias may exist, particularly since both DOWAlD and BUS 
are heavily staffed with engineers. 
The positions of DlNR and BWS on the water situation are somewhat 
different. DlNR does not seem to see any important immediate conflicts, 
allocational problems, or tradeoffs; there will be water for all uses if 
careful management procedures are followed. They would like to "move 
along" with the pilot desalination plant "but it's not a pressing 
issue."~ 
BWS perceives more immediate use conflicts and tradeoffs. Current 
policy requires sugar companies to curtail their overall water use if 
land formerly in sugar cultivation is urbanized. The Oahu Hater Plan 
prepared for BWS favors water exchanges and the reuse of treated sewage 
effluent, but not desalinization. 
The differences in these positions may be due to the stronger 
pressure felt by BWS to "deliver the goods." Since BWS is basically 
mandated to supply domestic water, when they fail, they are confronted 
with immediate customer feedback. In contrast, DLNR has much broader, 
less direct responsibilities for data collection, planning and manage-
ment, a "master plan," etc. 
Underlying Problems 
The types of decisions made by any planner or manager are deter-
mined by technical, social, and philosophic factors. Some of the 
technical matters are the problems of developing needed levels of data 
in terms of water quality and quantity, the effectiveness of method-
ology, problems of forecasting needs, estimating system costs, and the 
calculation of economic benefits. Influences on decisions derive from 
conflicts between political interests, changes in social priorities, 
multiple and conflicting objectives, prior decisions, biases of pro-
fessional values, and problems of coordination among agencies. 
Both the State Administration and the Honolulu City Government are 
experiencing enough uncertainty directly related to these factors that 
their abilities to make decisions are being affected. For example, in 
September, 1977, Governor Ariyoshi appointed a commission to assess 
water supplies and needs throughout the Islands, especially on Oahu. In 
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his announcement, Governor Ariyoshi said that his administration's 
growth policy "must be largely structured in accordance with water 
availability ... Before the State can consider priorities and various 
alternatives, it will be necessary for us to have a clear picture of the 
availability and the status of development of all our water resources."l§! 
In Ijovember, 1977, the City Council's task force on water convened 
for the first time and advised the Council to hire an independent 
consultant to provide better information on Oahu's water situation.17/ 
Concern has been expressed that the information received may be biased 
by political considerations, thus possibly causing the Council to make 
unfortunate planning decisions. 
Day-to-day water management decisions are also affected by personal 
experiences, attitudes, values, and opinions. The personality and 
behavior of people are influenced by the person's culture, the overall 
working situation, and the role expected. For example, professional 
value biases may occur when an agency is staffed predominantly with 
certain kinds of professionals, producing a "tyranny of expertise" 
rationale in decision-making. Managers \~ho experience equivalent 
training will tend to behave in accord with organizational precepts. 
Agency traditions undoubtedly exist and become especially obvious when 
there are conflicts over policies and decisions between agencies. 
Finally, individual ideological beliefs based on background, societal 
values, and upbringing could form a personal normative bias in deter-
mining policies in water management.l§j 
The problems arising from agency traditions are illustrated by the 
Department of Health's recent efforts to prepare proposed water quality 
standards regarding minimum stream flow requirements. The proposed 
water quality standards have produced a variety of objections from 
various agency representatives, ranging from a "negative impact on state 
efforts to develop an aquaculture industry" to ". . . di rect confl i ct 
with the functions and responsibilities of the Board of land and fJatural 
Resources and the Natural Area Reserve Systems Commission."li/ 
Furthermore, a study of federal water management practices revealed 
other factors which may also occur among water planners at a state 
level. For example, nature and water were valued to water management 
planners mainly for their potential as economic resources as opposed to 
their ecological or aesthetic benefits. As a whole, they were largely 
unaware of current environmental problems, yet considered them manage-
able.20/ These planners viewed their task to be that of meeting future 
waterijemands by using present technology in the existing institutions 
for purposes of expansion. flany were found to take an "el itist" outlook 
whereby their opinions of public competence and the value of public 
assistance in planning were not very high. The younger planners showed 
more distrust of public motives and the political process than the older 
ones. In general, they did not seem to relate changes in social trends 
to efforts in water resource development. Also, the personal philoso-
phies of the individual planners did not necessarily follow their 
agencies' priorities. 
-80-
The Groundwater Use Act 
In general, the Groundwater Use Act (Chapter 177, Hawaii Revised 
Statutes) gives the State Board of Land and Natural Resources the 
authority to regulate the use of groundwater in areas designated by the 
board as being endangered or likely to become endangered by excessive or 
improper use. The objective of the Act appears to be to achieve the 
"most beneficial use" of the groundwater resources of the state, al-
though this concept is not clearly defined. 
Under terms of the Act, the Board of Land and Natural Resources may 
establish "designated groundwater areas" subject to its regulation and 
control if a particular area's water supply is threatened by groundwater 
withdrawal exceeding recharge, declining water levels, excessive salt 
content, excessive preventable waste, or proposed water developments 
that may lead to such conditions. 
Individual household users are generally exempted from regulations, 
and existing uses are preserved by the Act except in times of shortage 
or emergency, in which case all users in an affected area may be subject 
to mandatory controls by the Board. In "designated" areas, additional 
uses of water, other than individual household uses and "preserved" 
uses, are required to obtain a permit from the Board. The Board is 
authorized to establish classes of permits and to establish fees which 
can vary according to the class of permit, the capital investment 
involved, and the quantity or nature of use. Permit holders may be 
required to relinquish their permits if there are more beneficial uses 
of the available water supply, although reasonable compensation must 
then be paid to the permit holder. 
If a "shortage" of water is judged to exist, e.g., the absence of a 
sufficient quantity and quality of groundwater in a designated area to 
supply lawful use of water, then the Board is empowered to regulate all 
users in the area. In such a case domestic, municipal, and military 
uses will be given priority over other uses, with remaining "preserved" 
uses being given priority over all other remaining permitted uses. 
If an "emergency" condition exists, e.g., a shortage in any ground-
water area which threatens the public health, safety, and welfare, then 
the Board may authorize the appropriation of any water sources needed to 
protect the public health, safety, and welfare. Property rights af-
fected by this action would have to be duly compensated. 
The proposed rules and regulations for the impl"ementation of 
Chapter 177 generally paraphrase the Act without further clarifying 
existing ambiguities. Areas which might need clarification include the 
foll owi ng: 
1. DeSignation of groundwater areas. 
The rules do not further define the technical conditions which 
must occur before an area would be declared a deSignated 
groundwater area. 
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2. Classes of permitted uses. 
The rules do not classify permitted uses according to type or 
method of use nor provide a fee schedule based on volume or 
type of use as permitted by the Act. 
3. r10st beneficial use. 
There is no indication in the rules, and the law provides 
1 ittle guidance, concerning how to determine what are the most 
beneficial uses of the water resource if the Board is forced 
to choose between two or more prospective permitted uses. 
4. Extinguishment of preserved use. 
The rules do not define periods of "non-use" which might lead 
to the extinguishment of a preserved use. The level of 
reduced usage that might represent a period of non-use is not 
defined by the Act nor clarified by the rules. 
Possible Implementation of the Act 
As a major distribution center for Oahu's water supply and use, the 
Pearl Harbor Area is likely to be a central focal point for competing 
uses of readily available water on Oahu (see Figure 1). It is likely 
that BWS will attempt to trade available potable water for water from 
brackish sources in the Pearl Harbor Area and from treated sev/age 
effluent in exchange for domestic quality water being used for sugar-
cane. This is likely to occur even before some other available ground-
water is developed, partly as a result of an apparent preference by BHS 
for water from the Pearl Harbor basal supply due to the uncertainties 
involved with tapping "diked" supplies and partly due to the high costs 
of transmission from other areas to the major population centers. 
During future dry years, even with the exchange of all potable water 
used by the sugar companies, restrictions are likely to be needed in 
order to supply domestic needs unless other alternate sources are 
developed or significant conservation measure's are adopted. 
Since additional urban development is planned for the EVIa plain, 
which will call for even greater demands for water from the basal 
supply, the Board of Land and tlatural Resources is 1 ikely to someday 
classify the heavily tapped Pearl Harbor Aquifer as a "designated 
groundwater area" for the purpose of protecting the basal lens from salt 
water intrusion caused by heavy pumping during the dry summer months. 
This would probably result from indications that the use of groundwater 
in the area exceeds the rate of recharge and that some vlells in the area 
have a marked increase in chloride content. DOHALD might then determine 
that during periods of drought, over-pumping may cause serious salt 
water intrusion causing long-term damage to the city's municipal water 
supply. 
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In accordance with the provl sl ons of t he Groundwater Use Act and 
the regul ations established in accordance wi th the Act, all exi sti ng 
users would submi t a declaration to the Board of La nd and Natu ra l 
Resources; afte r determining the fac ts, the Board woul d i ss ue certi f -
icates preserving the existing uses.21/ The cert i ficate woul d describe 
the nature of the use preserved and set forth t he maxi mum da ily pumpage 
and annual days allowab le f rom each well. 
Un der the "preserved use" prov ls lons of the l aw, BWS and other 
suppliers of domestic water mi ght be permi t ted to expand thei r pumpage 
in the area up t o five percent , for exampl e , more t hat their average 
per- day use duri ng the year immedia tely prior to the dat e of the estab-
lishr:lent of t he designated area . Additional wate r use by t he BHS or 
others mi ght be allowed by permi t only (indi vidual househol d users are 
exempted from thi s prov ision), p rov idin~ that (1) there is water avail-
able, (2) the use is benefici al, and (3) i t wil l not impa ir previously 
granted "preserved" or "permitt ed" uses . 
Uses granted by "preservation" or permit could not be changed 
(e . g. , from ag ricul t ural t o urban use) or sol d, except wi t h the approval 
of the Board. In eff ec t thi s means that any additional urban use of 
water (except the pe rmitted five percent increase) would then be sub-
stant ia l ly under the control of the Board of Land and Natural Res ources . 
BHS wou ld not be permitted to develop or condemn additional sources of 
water within the deSignated area or purchase water from ot her users 
withou t t he state 's permis sion. If t he State refused to grant such 
permission, the only way of supplying add itional customers would be 
throug h importat ion from outside the des ignated area, conservati on 
meas ures imposed on exi s tin~ uses, or by usi ng alternat ive sources of 
water (e . g. , desal i nizati on ). In the extreme case t he n, the Board of 
Land and Natural Resources could exert i ndirect control over addit i onal 
urban uses of the land in "deSignated" groundwater areas by means of its 
control over changes in groundwater use. 
It i s more likely, however, that al t hough t he Board might be 
re luctan t to permit additional development or pump ing by the B\lS, it 
would cons ider permitting the BIIS to purchase or condemn wate r from 
exis ting preserved or permitted users , thus creati ng addi tional tradeoff 
situations between urban and agricultural use of water. 
Instead of pursui ng the route of declaring a "deS ignated" area , the 
Board might take ac t ion under conditions of a "s hort- t erm wa ter short-
age." A scenario leading to such act i on mig ht invol ve a two-year 
drought which wou ld cause a temporary shortage of water in the des ig-
nated groundwa ter area . Head levels woul d have dropped and i t would be 
feared t hat sal t i nt rusion might threaten munic i pal wells in the Pearl 
Harbor Area . Under these conditions , munici pa l , mi l itary , and indi-
vidual household groundwater users might be requi red to reduce t heir 
daily pumpage by a cer tai n amount , say 10 percent below t heir average 
pumpage du ring the past five years on a seasonally adj usted basis . 
Agricultu ra l users mi ght be asked to make reductions of perhaps 20 
percent for the durat ion of the shortage conditi ons . Pe rmitted users 
J 
,. 
-84-
(except permits for municipal ~Iater) could be required to reduce pumpage 
by something like 30 percent. 
Under such conditions, there would likely be general compliance 
with the mandatory restrictions and some crop loss due to the drought 
conditions and restricted pumpage conditions. When the rains returned 
and head levels began to rise, the restrictions would be then lifted. 
A more severe scenario suggests conditions of a long-term water 
shortage resulting from population growth and urban development which 
would result in increased municipal demand for water that, combined \~ith 
agricultural demand, would exceed the supply of readily developed water. 
The Board of Water Supply may have by then already arranged to exchange 
much of the sugar companies' domestic quality water for water of lesser 
quality (treated effluent, brackish water, etc.), but this source of 
additional supply, too, would be essentially exhausted. The Board of 
Land and Natural Resources might then declare a water shortage of a more 
permanent nature. Heavy restrictions might then be placed on agri-
cultural and industrial users so that heavy pumping would not threaten 
domestic quality water. 
In such a scenario, as a result of the apparent permanent restric-
tions placed on pumping and the likely preference given to municipal 
use, court actions likely would be initiated by agricultural land users 
on the basis of the taking of private property without just compen-
sation. The exact nature and extent of the shortage also might be 
challenged by the sugar companies. The state's ability to "manage" a 
scarce resource might thus be severely tested and conceivably found 
wanting in a number of areas, perhaps because the restrictions would 
have been placed on supply only with no actions taken to influence 
demand. 
In summary, the overall impacts of water resource development and 
allocation not only will be important public issues as agencies in 
Hawaii make such decisions, but the agencies as presently mandated and 
designed are not equipped to identify such impacts nor to readily 
incorporate such considerations into their decision-making processes. 
A PARTIAL FRAMHJORK FOR \IATER RESOURCE DECISIO~H1AKING 
The economic impacts of water resource decisions, as with other 
resource allocation deciSions, are not limited to the immediate, direct 
dollar costs or returns. The impacts are often widespread throughout 
society, affecting other industries, consumers, and the phYSical and 
social environment in which we live. These impacts can be positive in 
nature, such as increased employment and a higher standard of living, or 
they can be negative, e.g., increasing traffic congestion, pollution, 
and the dissipation of a cultural heritage. 
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The impacts of water allocation have hydrological, technological, 
and economic aspects. Since an economic problem deals with the allo-
cation of scarce resources to alternative uses, decisions have to be 
made concerning which ends are to be satisfied. This requires that 
value judgments must be made concerning the relative desirability of the 
alternative accomplishments. This may be distinguished from the tech-
nological and physical sciences where there may be only one end, there-
fore providing for an easier choice of alternatives. 
The allocation of water for the enhancement of either the agricul-
tural or urban sector of the society is a classic economic problem of 
resource allocation. According to the principles and standards for 
planning water and related land resources prepared by the U.S. Hater 
Resources Council, "The overall purpose of water and land resource 
planning is to reflect society's preferences for attainment of the 
objectives ... national economic development ... quality of the 
environment •.. regional development .•.. "22/ The value judgments 
which must be made can be classified into threernain categories: 
(1) environmental, (2) social effects, and (3) income redistribution or 
equity. 
Value Issues 
Public opinion polls show that people are becoming increasingly 
concerned about the deterioration of the environment. This reflects a 
perceived need for overall environmental concern to: (1) ensure that 
demands placed upon nature do not exceed its capabilities; (2) keep in 
proper perspective nature's relationship to economic concerns, i.e., the 
battle between development and preservation, and (3) develop a need for 
better environmental studies. Blind progress and rapidly changing 
conditions, such as population growth, are considered likely to have 
long-range damaging effects on the physical environment. 
Water resource development projects could have serious adverse 
effects on the environment with respect to ecological systems, aesthetic 
and scenic aspects, features of scientific value, and air, land, water, 
and noise pollution. Any plan or project which will permanently place a 
negative effect on any of the above for the purpose of a short-term gain 
or whose environmental impact is substantively unknown should, according 
to most authorities, be very critically considered. 
In a growing economy such as ours, the resources of a fixed supply 
generally appreciate in value over time, whereas resources for which 
there exist substitutes will depreciate over time relative to those that 
are unique and fixed in supply. Consequently, preserved resources tend 
to gain in value when compared to the benefits derived from development 
projects. Also, as income increases, the public is known to desire to 
consume more of certain goods and services, particularly those that are 
dependent on environmental quality. Therefore, it is understandable 
that national preferences are shifting toward becoming more protective 
of the national ecosystem. 
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Our social organizations stem fro~ basic political decisions which 
have arisen from basic conflicts in our society. If changing economic 
conditions give to some conceivable forms of organization, our society 
may well experience a serious deterioration in the basic values which 
permit a society to function effectively. Increased economic growth may 
solve only some problems and create others. 
Increasing urbanization of Hawaii, accompanied by water development 
or reallocation, creates more regulation of life and decreased flexi-
bility in social behavior. For example, we may increasingly lose the 
ability to go about the day without tension and assorted hassles, and 
our environment becomes less adaptable to any changes in plans and 
tastes. 
Another value issue is based on ideas of ideal equity and income 
redistribution. Over the past 25 years the United States has increas-
ingly embraced social welfare programs and normative social policies. 
The government has committed itself to providing services for the disad-
vantaged and to remedying social and economic inequqlities through 
programs, such as social security, unemployment insurance, medical care, 
housing and educational subsidies, welfare payments, legal aid, etc. 
Such programs are not necessarily impossible to afford, for according to 
E. J. f1ishan, "The merest fraction of America's annual expenditure on 
neogarbage - on expendables, inimicals, and on inane trivia - would 
suffice to remove all the remnants of hard-core poverty in the land."23/ 
Others claim that it is possible to alleviate poverty by switching from 
wholesale and indiscriminant welfarism to selective and discriminating 
welfare measures that benefit both taxpayers and the really poor. 
Since agricultural use of water is the predominant use in Hawaii, 
particular attention must be given to the underlying values of such use. 
Irrigation usage values are based on preserving physical environmental 
conditions, the kinds of crops cultivated, and the rural life-styles 
associated with some types of agriculture. Also, the importance of 
self-sufficiency and the "irlport substitution" and "export promotion" 
arguments which would generate jobs and income are often cited. 
As more land is converted to urban usage, one result is the loss of 
rural life-style. Cultural diversity is reduced, the agrarian creed 
which emphasizes the work ethic diminishes, as perhaps do the values of 
democracy, small enterprise, and the emphasis on personal and family 
integrity. 
Methods have been devised to estimate the value that the public 
actually places on these factors. For example, behavioral studies can 
be performed to determine responses from community members to actual or 
proposed environmental changes. Experimental studies are possible, 
which collect responses from community members who participate in 
controlled games simulating changes. Furthermore, social surveys may be 
used in which interviews and opinions are sought in response to cir-
cumstances in hypothetical states. The details of these techniques 
necessarily are not further explored in the balance of this report due 
to the limitations of the overall study efforts. 
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Environmental Impact Statements 
The existing legal mechanisms of environmental impact statements 
(EIS) call for much of this information. This requirement has evolved 
from initially being a tool of people concerned with the integrity of 
the physical environment. It subsequently has been broadened to provide 
a mechanism for the expression of a wide-ranging host of social, econo-
mic, and moral concerns. Although not a decision technique itself, it 
presently serves to require more detailed analysis to buttress, if not 
necessarily guide, many public decisions. Some of these decisions 
involve water reallocation, as discussed in the following pages. 
Chapter 343 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes mandates the imple-
mentation of EIS procedures for any action which requires the use of 
State or County lands, requires the use of State or County funds, occurs 
on Conservation lands, occurs within shoreline setback areas, involves 
historical sites, is in the Waikiki-Diamond Head area, or would involve 
an amendment to a county general plan. Of the list of items for inclu-
sion in a complete EIS, the emphasis of the analysis in an EIS directs 
itself to the impact(s) of a proposed action on the "environment," which 
is further clarified in the Environmental Quality Commission's rules and 
regulations as "natural and cultural resources," as well as the "econo-
mic [and] social welfare of the community or state."24/ (Appendix IV 
reflects the general EIS process on all actions proposed in considera-
tion for the preparation of EIS.) Parties indicating an interest in the 
preparation of the EIS must be consulted by the proposer of the action. 
Regulations as specified by the Environmental Quality Commission 
state that the EIS must contain the following:25/ 
(1) A summary. 
(2) A project description which includes a map, 
statement of objectives, use of public lands 
or funds, historic perspective and technical 
data. 
(3) A description of environment in which the 
project is to take place. 
(4) Relationship of the proposed action to land 
use plans. 
(5) Probable impacts on the environment. 
(6) Unavoidable adverse environmental effects. 
(7) Alternatives that satisfy the same objectives. 
(8) The relationship between short-term and 
long-term aspects of impacts. 
(9) Proposed impact mitigation measures. 
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(10) Identification of unavoidable and irreversible 
impacts on resources. 
(11) Offsetting benefits as indicated by governmental 
policies. 
(12) Disclosure of all organizations and individuals 
consulted. 
(13) Consultation comments and responses. 
(14) Issues left unresolved. 
(15) Necessary project approvals. 
Before an action can be undertaken, the EIS must be accepted by 
offices designated by the Governor in the case of an action using state 
1 ands or funds, or by offi ces des i gnated by the tlayor in the case of an 
action using county lands or funds but not state land or funds. The EIS 
must be accepted by the approving agency in the case of a private action 
before the approval can be given. In the assessment process by the 
Environmental Quality Commission (EQC), an action may be considered 
exempt from preparing an EIS if it is expected to have minimal or no 
significant effect on the environment or if it falls within the follow-
ing exempt classes of action:26/ 
(1) Operations, repairs or maintenance of 
existing structures, facilities, equip-
ment or topographical features, involv-
ing negligible or no expansion or change 
of use beyond that previously existing; 
(2) Replacement or reconstruction of existing 
structures and facilities where the new 
structure will be located generally on the 
same site and will have substantially the 
same purpose ... ; 
(3) Construction and location of single, new, 
small facilities or structures and the 
alteration and modification of the same 
... , [as] single family residences, 
Letc.] ... ; 
(4) Minor alterations in the conditions of land, 
water, or vegetation; 
(5) Basic data collection, research, experimental 
management, and resources evaluation activities 
(6) Continuing administrative activities 
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(7) Construction or placement of minor structures 
accessory to existing facilities; 
(8) Interior alterations ... ; 
(9) Demolition of structures, except those. 
designated [as historic] ... ; 
(10) Zoning variances [with some exceptions] . 
Regulation 1:31 of the EQC states that in determining whether an 
action may have a significant effect on the environment, the agency 
shall consider every phase of a proposed action, expected consequences, 
either primary or secondary, and the cumulative as well as the short- or 
long-term effect of the action. A significant effect on the environment 
occurs when the action:27/ 
(1) involves an irrevocable commitment to loss 
or destruction of any natural or cultural 
resource; 
(2) curtails the range of beneficial use of the 
environment; 
(3) conflicts with the State's long-term environ-
mental policies or goals and guidelines as 
expressed in Chapters 342 and 344 [HRS] .. 
(4) substantially affects the economic or social 
welfare of the community or State; 
(5) substantially affects economic or sociological 
activities; 
(6) involves substantial secondary impacts, such as 
population changes or effects on public facili-
ties; 
(7) involves a substantial degradation of environ-
~ental quality; 
(8) is individually limited but cumulatively has 
considerable effect upon the environment or 
involves a commitment for larger actions; 
(9) substantially affects a rare, threatened, or 
endangered species of animal or plant, or 
habitat; 
(10) detrimentally affects air or water quality or 
ambient noise levels; or 
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(11) affects an environmentally sensitive area such 
as a flood plan, tsunami zone, erosion-prone 
area, geologically hazardous land, estuary, 
fresh water, or coastal waters. 
Agencies submit and file a notice of determination with the EQC 
after assessing whether the action has or has no significant effect. 
The notice is considered as an EIS "Preparation Notice" if the deter-
mination requires an EIS. If the agency determines that an EIS is not 
required, the notice is considered to be a "Negative Declaration." 
After complying with the time elements and consultation require-
ments and review process, the EIS is then accepted. Acceptance means a 
formal determination that the document required to be filed pursuant to 
Section 343-4, HRS, fulfills the definition of an environmental impact 
statement, adequately describes identifiable environmental impacts, and 
satisfactorily responds to comments received during the review of the 
statement. 28/ 
Impact Analysis 
The preceding discussion of EIS requirements does not provide us 
with the analytic tools necessary to identify social and economic 
impacts. The first step in any such analytic procedure would be to 
define the impacted society, be it at a world, national, state, local, 
or community level. Interest in impact analysis among U.S. economists 
has come into prominence in recent decades, partly because there has 
been a growth of large public investment projects which use considerable 
resources and have effects on prices and outputs of other products over 
a long period of time. Accompanying this analysis has been the re-
sponsive development of techniques, such as operation research and 
systems analysis. There are, however, two general limitations to the 
performance of impact analysis. This is used most successfully only 
when making decisions within a specified framework, although the project 
may involve a wide range of considerations, many of which are political 
and social in character. Also, the technique developed so far is 
difficult to apply to large investment decisions having major effects on 
outputs and prices over the entire local economy. 
In general, as all the alternative projects are considered, impact 
analysis may enable seemingly "ridiculous" projects to look more attrac-
tive as all the various impacts are identified. On the other hand, 
decision-makers are thus forced to more rationally and concretely defend 
their decisions on projects, thus, eliminating whimsical and virtually 
unfeasible projects. 
This, however, would also serve to lengthen the decision time and 
could thus eliminate certain options that may be the best solutions. As 
more information of the effects is generated, the chances of some 
unexpected consequence is lessened. Yet, the development of this 
information costs time, money, and possibly foregone options. 
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The objective then is to maximize the value of the time stream of 
all benefits less the value of the time stream of all costs subject to 
certain constraints. Therefore, the general principle of impact anal-
ysis can be set up through the identification of the following items: 
1. The kinds of impacts that are to be 
considered. 
2. The values to be assigned to each. 
3. The interest rate at which the values will 
be discounted so that values through time 
can be compared. 
4. The relevant constraints. 
A definition of the impacts of a project is all the "goods and 
bads" that are generated. These can be broken down into the following 
categories: (1) impacts valued in the marketplace in a manner that 
correctly accounts for social values, such as most agricultural inputs 
and non-price-supported farm commodities; (2) impacts valued in the 
marketplace, but in a manner which fails to account for social values, 
such as labor that would otherwise be unemployed; (3) impacts that have 
no market price, but for which appropriate social values can be approxi-
mated, such as admission to a public park or zoo; (4) impacts which 
would be extremely difficult to determine, such as for the creation or 
maintenance of historic sites or beautiful views, or such as the main-
tenance of water quality at a higher level than would be required for 
health or commercial reasons.29/ A sound impact analysis compares not 
only the monetarily defined impacts, but it also evaluates in appro-
priate terms those that are nonquantifiable and noncommensurable. 
Also, in order to properly assess the totality of consequences of a 
decision to be made, it is necessary to consider not only the direct 
effects that will most likely occur given some change, but also the 
subsequent repercussive effects must be examined. The "input-output" or 
"interindustry" technique addresses some of the quantifiable reper-
cussive effects in a formalized mathematical model. (See Appendix I for 
a technical explanation.) 
A better understanding of this principle can be gained by examining 
Figure 2. Suppose that consumers begin to demand less sugar. Besides 
the fall in sales for sugar, this change affects the outputs of other 
industries as input suppliers and output buyers adjust to these changes. 
The reduction in consumption will reduce the output of refineries, 
transportation operations, etc., with the possibility of reducing the 
amount of labor employed in the various industries. But, because most 
of the sugar is exported from Hawaii, the reduction of demand for sugar 
would mean a reduction in exports. 
Each dollar of exports represents dollar inflows to our local 
economy, viz., money flows into our economic system from "outsiders." 
Imports to Hawaii reverse the flow, causing dollars to "leak" from the 
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local economy. Another source of "leakage" is savings. For example, 
part of the profits made by local businesses in their sales to tourists 
are used for consumption expenditures and the rest is saved. The amount 
expended becomes income to someone else, and that person spends part of 
it and saves the rest, and so on . 
Within the appropriate geographical constraints, the analysis 
should include benefits and costs without regard to whom they will 
accrue. For example, if a new irrigation project diverts water from 
users downstream, the losses they suffer become a part of the costs of 
the project in the same way as the cost of the irrigation works itself. 
However convenient the usage of market prices may be in project 
analysis, there are circumstances when these market prices cannot be 
taken as measures of the value of project outputs or inputs. One such 
circumstance occurs when the project output or input is so large that 
the project itself causes prices to change. Another set of circum-
stances occurs with market imperfections or substantial underemployment 
of labor and production capacity. 
"Sunk" costs are costs which have been incurred before the ap-
praisal of the project and therefore can no longer be avoided. These 
should not be included as part of the cost of the project in the analy-
sis. Only costs which are yet to be incurred should be considered . 
Some effects impose no costs nor confer benefits within the confines 
of the project. Yet, they affect the achievement of the objectives and 
therefore should be included. Examples are pollution, congestion, and 
other side effects on health or fisheries which are generally difficult 
to quantify. 
The project may bring about changes in prices for its inputs and 
outputs. It may also have wide-ranging effects on producers and con-
sumers other than those directly involved in the project itself. 
Whether this is a serious qualification or adjustment to make depends on 
the extent to which the project results in price changes. 
Some impacts often are "double-counted" when evaluating a project. 
For example, increases in agricultural output mistakenly may be counted 
twice as positive impacts if agricultural property value increases are 
counted in addition to the value of the increased production itself 
which gives rise to the enhanced property value. 
Another problem often encountered is mistakenly counting negative 
impacts as benefits. For example, a project often requires labor which 
could be used in other endeavors. Only if such a resource would other-
wise be unemployed would its use on the project not be counted as a 
negative impact. 
The source of financing of government investments can also have 
significant repercussive effects throughout the economy. This is 
especially true of localized economies. These projects can be financed 
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by "pay-as-you-go" cash financing through taxation or through bond 
financing. This means, then, that funds which could have been used for 
consumption expenditures are reduced, not only by the initial amount, 
but by a multiple of that amount. This, again, is a cost which must be 
recognized in the analysis. 
IJhi 1 e these repercussi ve effects are important and shoul d defi-
nitely be recognized in any ir,lpact analysis, quantification of these 
effects are less than encouraging. Each of the impacts mentioned above 
can be, in principle, incorporated within the present analytic frame-
work, but the practical problems of modifying the standard model to 
incorporate such things as identifying the contributions of the various 
sectors to the pool of tax revenues, the relative weights to adjust the 
household sector multipliers, etc., makes its use impractical. There-
fore, such considerations such as these should be explicitly recognized 
in the narrative of the analysis. 
All projects extend over time. Impacts are generally yielded 
intermittently through time. For comparison purposes different weights 
must be assigned to each value that occurs at different points in time 
in order to make them comparable. The method of "present value" incor-
porates the use of interest rates to determine the value of the weights. 
These rates may bear little relation to the interest rate on borrowed 
money. 
If the rate chosen is too low, future project impacts will appear 
high. Since benefits tend to occur more in the future than do costs, 
some projects would appear to be desirable and would thus be undertaken. 
If the rate is too high, the reverse would hold, and short run projects 
would appear relatively more attractive than long run projects. 
The incorporation of the time dimension within the input-output 
model context is somewhat limited by an industry's capacity to adopt 
changes in technology and changes in relative prices. The effort would 
also be constrained by the practical problems of data availability, 
costs, forecast reliability, etc. Additionally, the hard question must 
be asked whether the use of a more complex model would indeed provide 
substantially greater insights over sound thinking and careful analysis 
with a much simpler model. 
It is also important to give attention to who gains and who pays 
because of society's interest in the distribution of economic welfare 
among different groups of people. For example, some public efforts are 
intended to change the distribution of income as opposed to improvin9 
the economy as a whole. Even when a project is not designed to do so, 
it will have an effect on the distribution as well as the magnitude of 
economic well-being. 
At the present, certain types of impact analyses are not mean-
ingful. The complex nature of estimating impacts may result in un-
reliability. Also, it is important to be able to distinguish which 
projects are amenable to this type of analysis. tlhen there are many 
diverse types of impacts resulting from a project which accrue to many 
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different beneficiaries, it becomes enormously difficult to list them 
all and avoid double counting. It is optimistic to believe that the 
technique will be very accurate when impacts are so widely diffused and 
there is a significant difference between accounting and economic costs 
and benefits, or when projects being compared are from different branches 
of economic activity. 
Finally, there is always the problem of uncertainty. This can be 
introduced from a number of sources: (1) physical constraints which 
deal with the physical inputs and outputs of a project, (2) legal 
matters may affect matters in many different ways, such as rights of 
access, time needed for public inquiries, regulated pricing, and limits 
to the activities of public agencies, (3) administrative limits as to 
what can be handled administratively, (A) distribution and budgetary 
constraints where specific financial rules are not laid down, (5) future 
price movements of both inputs and outputs associated with the project, 
(6) possible future events, such as technical innovations, changes in 
oomestic and foreign policies, and (7) vast ranges of alternatives in 
conditions of demand and supply. 
APPL YING H1PACT ASSESSr1ENT TO HATER REALLOCATIOtl 
One of the easier ways to understand impact analysis techniques is 
to examine some of the illustrative impacts of an actual reallocation 
decision made in the public sector. A simple, useful example is pro-
vided by a recent request by the Honolulu Board of llater Supply to the 
State Board of Land and rlatural Resources for use of 4 mgd of State-
owned water presently being used by Oahu Sugar Company via the \laiahole 
Ditch. 
At present, the Haiahole Hater Company collects and transports 25 
to 30 mgd from the windward and central portions of the Koolaus to the 
dry Ewa plain for sugarcane irrigation. The State holds the right to 
withdraw its water from the l'Ja i aho 1 e Ditch, provi ded BI-IS shows areal 
need and following a two-year notice. 
The Honolulu Board of ~Iater Supply was led to its request by the 
court order to reduce its anticipated pumping from its !Jaihee wells. 
This would "force" B~'JS either to acquire the State's water at a cost of 
about $2 million for transmission lines or to develop new wells at a 
construction cost of about $4 million. 
The two alternatives involve a series of impacts. If the water is 
withdrawn from sugar production, there would be an associated loss of 
jobs, incomes, and sales. If we reasonably assume that the land with-
drawn from sugar would be placed in pasture for cattle production, an 
associated creation of jobs, incomes, and sales would also occur, as 
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would changes in types of open space and groundwater recharge rates. 
This alternative would also result in lower construction and operating 
costs for BI~S than if the new wells were developed. 
Reasonable estimates of the impacts on jobs, incomes, and sales can 
be derived by using the input-output model that is discussed in Techni-
cal Appendix I. Because of the constant proportion assumption of the 
model, it is possible to derive impacts of marginal changes in sugar 
production by using the tables (3 through 5) at the end of Appendix I, 
which are based on a $1,000,000 change in sugar production. 
The 4 mgd reduction in water supply for Oahu Sugar Company can be 
interpreted to mean that 500 acres would have to be converted from sugar 
to other use. This reduction would mean an average reduction annually 
of about 3,000 tons of sugar for export to mainland refineries. This 
amounts to a reduction of about $484,530 in sugar sales, which through 
the multiplier process would lead to a total reduction in Hawaii's 
economy of $1,921,479 in annual sales. -rATr dollar numbers are in terms 
of 1977 values.) Such a reduction in production would lead to reduc-
tions in annual incomes (wages, profits, dividends) \~ithin the State 
amounting to $684,518. Job losses would amount to about 42, including 
about 31 within the sugar industry itself. 
The consequent slight expansion in the beef industry is a reason-
able possible impact to examine, for the recent history in Hawaii 
suggests that land withdrawn from sugar is likely to be used for pas-
ture. Estimating these impacts is more difficult from a technical point 
of view, simply because there are a number of possible steps within 
Hawaii's economy between the time the product leaves the field until it 
is finally consumed. In comparison, sugar, which is an export from the 
local economy, does not have these extensive repercussive effects. The 
input-output model readily provides impact estimates for "final demand" 
products, such as sugar, but not for "intermediate" products, such as 
beef cattle, particularly if they are "import replacements." Due to its 
technical nature, discussion of the estimating procedure for changes in 
the beef industry is relegated to Technical P.npendix II. The results of 
that analysis show an increase in total sales annually in the State 
amounting to $216,606. Annual income increases would amount to $38,088. 
A total of 5 jobs would be created by this expansion in the state's beef 
industry. 
Only one slightly technical calculation remains in order to make 
comparisons of impacts more easily comprehensible. Some impacts, such 
as construction costs, are short-range in nature, but others, such as 
income from agriculture, recur over a much longer period of time. By 
use of an appropriate discount rate and time horizon, it is possible to 
convert a series of values over time (such as annuities) into a present 
value (or capitalization). The choice of a discount rate and time 
period is somewhat arbitrary, but most practitioners today would utilize 
something close to 10 percent and a 30-year time horizon, which is what 
we will use for this illustration. (A full technical discussion of the 
selection of the discount rate and time period selected is clearly 
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beyond the scope of this report. Individual agencies, however, may find 
themselves mandated by law to use particular figures.) 
Other impacts would include a possible reduction in groundwater 
recharge, if it is assumed that the water would be used for furrow 
irrigation. The extent of this change in recharge rates would be highly 
dependent on the specific location of the acreage that would be with-
drawn from sugar, and only the grossest of estimates would be possible 
in any case. 
Conversion of land from sugar cultivation to beef cattle production 
also would probably lead to the improvement of the "open space" quality 
of the acreage involved. Although theoretically possible, it is not 
practical to attempt to place a dollar value on this impact. 
For purposes of ready comparison, the "positive" and "negative" 
impacts of converting the 4 mgd in question to urban use can be listed 
in the following fashion: 
Negative 
$6.45 million (present value) 
reduction in income due to sugar 
reduction. 
$18.11 million (present value) 
reduction in sales due to sugar 
reduction. 
42 jobs lost, including 31 in the 
sugar industry. 
Less recharge to groundwater, 
assuming furrow irrigation. 
Sugar production costs would rise 
marginally. 
Positive 
$.35 million (present value) in 
income gained due to beef 
increase. 
$2.06 million (present value) 
in sales gained due to beef 
increase. 
5 jobs gained, including 3 in 
the beef industry. 
More desirable open space 
amounting to 500 acres. 
Beef production costs would go 
down marginally. 
$2 million less in capital 
costs, plus unestimated savings 
in operating costs. 
This summary of the impacts would be useful to the decision-making 
process, but the decision cannot rest on these estimates alone. Other 
factors not identified as impacts might be of considerable importance, 
such as the establishment of legal or operational precedents. Further-
more, the estimated impacts might prove to be in serious error. For 
example, the sugar industry may decline for reasons unrelated to water 
availability, which means the estimated impact shown is highly over-
stated. On the other hand, development of alternative water supplies 
might prove far more costly than anticipated. 
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These problems of vast uncertainty have been detailed in preceding 
sections, for it behooves a decision-maker to be fully aware of the 
degree of approximation involved in making the foregoinH estimates. 
Nevertheless, decisions made in the absence of considering such impacts 
are likely to be inferior to decisions based on possible scenarios 
derived from the alternatives being considered. Although the develop-
ment of such scenarios is necessarily somewhat technical, the results 
can be readily understood. The preparation of the scenarios rests with 
the technical analysts, but the decisions rest with individuals who 
often do not, and could not, command the wide range of expertise neces-
sary for the analysis of a set of society's problems. In such a situa-
tion, the people making such decisions must require the analysts to 
inform them of the likely impacts of the alternatives available. 
-99-
TECHNICAL APPENDIX I 
INPUT-OUTPUT ANALYSIS AND 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX I 
Input-Output Ana 1ys i s and \~ater 1'1anagement 
Introduction 
In general, changes in final demand will alter output which, in 
turn, will alter employment and labor income. If output changes, then 
the various inputs used in the production of that output will change, 
corresponding to the output change. But, the inputs to this sector may 
very will be outputs for other sectors, which must also adjust to the 
changes in final demand for the other sector's products. This logical 
flow of economic activity can be carried backwards to the primary 
resources and forwards to final demand. These activities and inter-
relationships among the various sectors within the economy can be 
quantitatively summarized in an input-output model, such as the State's 
interindustry model.30/ 
The Input-Output Model 
The model describes the economy through a matrix array of major 
sectors, as in Figure 1. The rows describe the sales of each of the 
sectors to the other sectors as intermediate goods and to final demand 
for consumption. The columns show the purchases of various factor 
inputs from the various sectors, including payments to households in the 
form of wages, salaries, dividends, and to governments and other contrib-
utors to the value of the output. 
Further examination of this table shows that Quandrant I describes 
the behavior of consumers in the aggregate among the various sectors. 
Quandrant II isolates the producing sectors where each element in this 
square array reflect the transactions of intermediate goods and thus, 
their dependence on each of the various sectors. Quandrant III is the 
primary inputs section of the model. It consists of the household labor 
inputs, entrepreneural capacity, imports, and other value-added items. 
The last quandrant accounts for the transactions within the economy that 
do not result in output, but that are merely transfers of purchasing 
power from one source to another, such as personal savings, personal 
taxes, welfare and unemployment payments, etc. 
Such a table fully describes the economy in terms of the accounting 
transactions which take place, and generally it is called the trans-
actions matrix or table. With this initial tableau of dollar trans-
actions, two other tables can be constructed: a technical coefficients 
or direct requirements table and an interdependence or total require-
ments table. Excluding the household sector, the interdependence table 
provides the "direct" and "indirect" requirements per dollar of delivery 
of final demand. Inclusion of the household sector in the table yields 
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FIGURE l--Schemati c of an Input-Output r'lodel 
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the additional "induced" requirements per dollar of delivery of final 
demand. 
The necessary set of assu~ptions implicit by the model include: 
(1) the relative amounts of the various input factors purchased by a 
sector from the other sectors remains constant, which further implies 
that relative prices remain constant and that no input substitution 
occurs; (2) each firm within a sector produces a single, homogeneous 
product with a single production process, although the heterogeneity of 
quality within a particular class of outputs does tend to make the 
analyses derived from this model less realistic; (3) it is assumed that 
no significant external economies or disecono~ies exist that will affect 
the relative cost structure of firms in each of the sectors. 
Given these assumptions, it is possible to derive the remalnlng 
tables of the input-output model. The technical coefficients or "di-
rect" requirements table is obtained by dividing each of the column 
entries by its column total. This indicates the amount by which each 
input factor is combined in the production process to produce a dollar's 
worth of output from that sector for delivery to final demand. Any 
change in any of these sectors will also lead to reductions of output in 
other sectors. These are the "indirect" requirements or changes in the 
economy. 
With a reduction of output and the consequent reductions in output 
of related sectors, incomes to households also will be reduced. Assum-
ing that either savings are held constant for short run changes or that 
the output reductions are permanent, consumption will decrease, leading 
to further reductions in final demand and output reductions in the 
various producing sectors. This inclusion of the household sector adds 
the "induced" effects from an initial change in final demand. 
Some Practical Problems of Input-Output f1ode1s 
In addition to the necessary assumptions implicit in input-output 
models in general, there are tremendous practical problems of a9g rega-
tion and data generation. The aggregation of non-homogeneous firms 
suppresses and averages the effective responses of firms to exogeneous 
disturbances. Furthermore, aggregation may substantially reduce the 
accuracy of the model as an analytical device, even though it may be 
necessary in order to make it useful for policy formulation. 
The accuracy and reliability of the data may be questionable, 
particularly if it is not controlled through a formal and well-documented 
collection procedure. 
Since our economy is in constant flux, the ideal model to represent 
the real world would be a "dynamic" input-output model. It would be 
dynamic in the sense that the model would incorporate or anticipate 
changes in the technological state of the various industries and changes 
in the tastes of consumers within the economy. ,l\lthough at a glance the 
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idea of forecasting with a dynamic input-output model seems appealing, 
major problems reduce the practical value of this type of model. 
The additional data requirements beyond the static model require-
ments are very demanding. Such a comprehensive model would also be more 
complex in its structure and would therefore be far more costly to build 
and update. Also, there is a very real question of whether such a model 
would really be a significant improvement over careful analysis and 
sound thinking with readily available static input-output information. 
Us i n9 the r'lode 1 
Since we know that changes in final demand lead to initial changes 
in the various sectors as well as repercussive effects, we can quanti-
tatively express these impacts by utilizing the coefficients from the 
interdependence tables, employment coefficients derived independently of 
the input-output tables, and income coefficients that can be retrieved 
from the technical coefficients table. 
Output coefficients can be obtained from the total requirements 
tables, both direct-plus-indirect and direct-p1us-indirect-plus-induced, 
by locating the appropriate column of the affected sector. An addi-
tional assumption is made to derive employment coefficients: a linear 
relationship exists between employment in a particular sector and that 
sector's output. The ratio between sector employment and output can 
then be derived to estimate the direct employment coefficients. The 
household row of the technical coefficients table yields the direct 
income coefficients. These coefficients tell us the change in personal 
income resulting from a dollar change in final demand. 
Given a change in final demand (in dollar terms), coefficients from 
the appropriate columns of the direct-plus-indirect table and the 
direct-p1us-indirect-p1us-induced tables are multiplied together to 
yield both direct-plus-indirect output changes in the various sectors 
due to the initial change in final demand and direct-p1us-indirect-plus-
induced sectoral output changes. The net difference between the t~/O 
estimates is the induced change in output. This is depicted in Figure 2. 
The direct-plus-indirect change in output and the induced change in 
output, along with the direct income and direct employment coefficients, 
can then be used to estimate the income and employment effects from the 
change in final demand. The prOcedure, shown in Figures 3 and 4, is 
simply that of multiplying both the direct-plus-indirect output change 
and the induced output change with either the direct income or direct 
employment coefficients. For the income effect, this will yield both 
the direct-plus-indirect change in personal income due to the change in 
final demand and the induced change in personal income. The employ~ent 
effect has the same kind of interpretation. Summing the direct-plus-
indirect change with the induced change yields the total change in both 
personal income and employment. 
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FIGURE 2--Methodo1ogy to Calculate Output Effects 
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FIGURE 3--Methodo1ogy to Calculate Income Effects 
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FIGURE 4--Methodology to Calculate Employment Effects 
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The input-output model currently used by the Research and Economic 
Analysis Division of the Department of Planning and Economic Development 
consists of 26 sectors and is based on 1970 dollars. This model is used 
in this report. The original Input-Output tables, developed in 1967, 
consisted of 54 sectors utilizing data from five sources: survey data 
on purchases and sales of selected industries, the 1963 National Input-
Output Study, national price indices, 1967 estimates of gross sales and 
purchases by industries, and the 1967 Gross State Product. 
Because the model was constructed primarily through secondary 
sources, qualifications must be kept in mind in interpreting the ana-
lytic results. The first qualification is the technol09Y of the various 
sectors. Because of the assumption of constant technology, it is 
important that the model, at least initially, reflect the existing state 
of technology in Hawaii. Another area of significance is the product-
mix question. This deals primarily with the problem of aggregation of 
industries subsumed in a given sector which mayor may not be valid for 
Hawaii's economy. 
Impact Analysis: An Application to Water Management 
Suppose that final demand for sugar processing changes by $1,000,000 
due to a change in one of its input factors, such as the water supply. 
What are the likely impacts on the economy due to the change in the 
final demand for sugar processing? We can estimate the impacts on the 
economy by utilizing the methodology outlined above. 
Table 1 presents the total requirements columns for the sugar 
processing sector (both the direct-plus-indirect and the direct-plus-
indirect-plus-induced coefficients). Table 2 lists the direct employ-
ment and income coefficients for each of the 26 sectors. Both tables, 
when used in conjunction with the hypothetical change in final demand, 
yield the results presented in Tables 3, 4, and 5, which show estimates 
of the changes in output, personal income, and employment, respectively, 
in the economy for each major sector. 
III I 
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TABLE 1--Tota1 Requirements Per Dollar of Delivery to Final Demand: 
Sugar Processing 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
f1i sce 11 aneous 11anufacturi ng 
Construction 
Transportation and Harehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
I~holesale Trade 
Reta i1 Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotel s 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
Direct-Plus 
Indirect 
0.59873 
0.0 
0.0 
1.00270 
0.00037 
0.00001 
0.00053 
0.00184 
0.00227 
0.00370 
0.01740 
0.06414 
0.00475 
0.02237 
0.00366 
0.00560 
0.02961 
0.00765 
0.0 
0.01462 
0.0 
0.00027 
0.01295 
0.01458 
0.02522 
0.02384 
Source: DPED updated coefficients (unpublished). 
Direct-Plus-
Indirect-Plus-
Induced 
0.59885 
0.00225 
0.00084 
1.00290 
0.00936 
0.00114 
0.02777 
0.00755 
0.00697 
0.00969 
0.02371 
0.07496 
0.01ll6 
0.03681 
0.02250 
0.02182 
0.06299 
0.07404 
0.02166 
0.13423 
0.00409 
0.01327 
0.01956 
0.05601 
0.06489 
0.03928 
P"f 
-109-
TABLE 2--Direct Coefficients 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotels 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
Employment 
46.4814 
60.9505 
35.5557 
23.6798 
31.1675 
31 .1068 
25.3773 
60.5173 
31.7384 
43.5030 
3.6234 
21.7195 
29.0228 
56.1616 
45.7225 
22.8300 
51.5974 
76.6609 
62.3659 
27.1275 
55.1663 
42.0573 
70.0595 
38.7458 
36.8857 
46.4179 
Source: DPED updated coefficients (unpublished). 
Income 
0.4096 
0.4498 
0.2746 
0.2582 
0.1121 
0.2832 
0.2423 
0.4105 
0.3295 
0.5065 
0.3419 
0.3827 
0.5039 
0.5804 
0.5430 
0.3557 
0.6094 
0.5557 
0.3792 
0.5839 
0.3965 
0.4620 
0.6141 
0.4997 
0.4632 
0.2600 
-TABLE 3--0utput Changes Due to a $1,000,000 Change in the Final Demand in Sugar Processing 
Direct-Plus-
Industry Indirect* Induced* Total* 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 598,730 120 598,850 Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 0 2,250 2,250 Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 0 8,400 8,400 Sugar Processing 1,002,700 200 1,002,900 Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 370 8,990 9,360 Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 10 1,130 1,140 Other Food Processing 530 27,240 27,770 Textiles and Apparel 1,840 5,710 7,550 Lumber and Wood Products 2,270 4,700 6,970 Printing and Publishing 3,700 5,990 9,690 I Petroleum Refining 17 ,400 6,310 23,710 ~ r~i sce 11 aneous 11anufacturi ng 64,140 10,820 74,960 0 I Construction 4,750 6,410 11 ,160 Transportati on and \Ja rehous ing 22,370 14,440 36,810 Communication 3,660 18,840 22,500 Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 5,600 16,220 21 ,820 \Jho 1 esa 1 e Trade 29,610 33,380 62,990 Retail Trade 7,650 66,390 74,040 Eating and Drinking Places 0 21,660 21,660 Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 14,620 119,610 134,230 Hotels 0 4,090 4,090 Personal Services 270 13,000 13,270 Business Services 12,950 6,610 19,560 Health and Professional Services 14,580 41,430 56,010 Other Services 25,220 39,670 64,890 Dummy Industries and Others 23,840 15,440 39,280 
TOTALS* 1,856,810 499,050 2,355,860 
TABLE 4--Income Changes Vue to a $1,000,000 Change in the Final Demand in Sugar Processing 
Direct-Plus-
Industry Indirect* Induced* Total* 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 245,239.81 49.15 245,288.96 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 0.00 1,012.05 1,021.05 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 0.00 2,306.64 2,306.64 
Sugar Processing 258,397.14 51.64 253,948.78 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 41.48 1,007.78 1,049.26 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 2.83 320.02 322.85 
Other Food Processing 128.42 6,600.25 6,728.67 
Textiles and Apparel 757.16 2,349.67 3,106.83 
Lumber and \~ood Products 747.97 1,548.65 2,296.62 
Printing and Publishing 1,874.05 3,033.94 4,907.99 I 
Petroleum Refining 5,949.06 2,157.39 8,106.45 ~ 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 24,546.38 4,140.81 28,687.19 --' I 
Construction 2,393.53 3,230.00 5,623.52 
Transportation and ~~rehousing 12,983.55 8,380.93 21,364.52 
Communication 198.74 1,023.01 1,221.75 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 1,991.92 5,769.45 7,761.37 
lJho 1 esa 1 e Trade 18,044.33 20,341.77 38,386.11 
Retail Trade 4,251.11 36,892.92 41,144.03 
Eating and Drinking Places 0.00 8,213.47 3,213.47 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 8,536.62 69,840.28 78,376.90 
Hotels 0.00 1,621.69 1,621.69 
Personal Services 124.74 6,006.00 6,130.74 
Business Services 7,952.60 4,059.20 12,011.80 
Health and Professional Services 7,285.63 20,702.57 27,988.20 
Other Services 11 ,681 .90 18,375.14 30,057.05 
Dummy Industries and Others 6,193.40 4,014.40 10,212.80 
TOTALS* 619,827.34 233,048.87 352,876.21 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
TABLE 5--Employment Changes Due to a $1,000,000 Change in the Final Demand in Sugar Processing 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, ~uts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
Iii sce 11 aneous l'1anufacturi ng 
Construction 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
l~ho 1 esa 1 e Trade 
Retail Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotels 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
TOTALS* 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX II 
The purpose of this section is to analyze the economic impact on 
the State of Hawaii of a $100,000 change in the output of the beef 
grazing industry. The Hawaii interindustry model is used in the anal-
ysis, with 1970 prices as the base year for the model. 
Beef Industry 
The output of the beef grazing industry is composed of two prod-
ucts: animals which are grass-fattened for slaughter and those which 
will be placed in feedlots for further fattening. The first task is to 
divide the change in output into the two types of products. This was 
accomplished by using 1976 physical production data and 1970 prices for 
the two types of beef. Seventy percent of the change in output ($70,000) 
is estimated to be the value of animals going to feedlots and 30 percent 
($30,000) the value of grass-fattened animals. 
The beef and hog sector of the industry includes feedlot as well as 
grazing activities. The value of the animals entering the feedlot 
($70,000) must be converted to the value at the end of the fattening 
activity to measure the true change in the output of the beef industry. 
The following figures were used to estimate the increase in value from 
the feedlot activity: 
$ .02 per animal per day feedlot charge 
5.76 pounds of feed per pound of gain 
(feed conversion rate) 
$4.90 per hundred weight of feed 
(1970 price) 
754 pounds - weight at which animal enters 
feedlot (live weight) 
1,065 pounds - weight at which animal is 
slaughtered (live weight) 
The value of a feeder entering the lot was estimated to be $192.97 per 
head and its slaughter value to be $282.23 per head. The difference 
reflects the increase in value due to the feedlot operation. Therefore, 
the $70,000 change in feeder cattle output means a $102,377 increase in 
the output of the beef industry. The total change in output of the beef 
industry is $102,377 in feedlot beef, plus $30,000 in grass-fattened 
beef for a total change of $132,377. (The $30,000 increase in grass-
fattened beef is composed of 1,336.3 cwt live weight at $22.45 per cwt. 
The typical animal weighs 300 pounds.) 
-
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novement Through the Economy 
For purposes of this analysis, it is assumed that the increase 
(decrease) in feedlot-fattened cattle will be reflected by an increase 
(decrease) in sales to the meat products industry. The meat products 
industry will in turn increase (decrease) the sales of their product to 
restaurants ("eating and drinking places" sector) which will adjust 
their imports accordingly. 
The purchases of the meat products sector from the beef industry is 
44.2 percent of the output of the meat products sector. To enable a 
$102,377 change in this transaction, the output of the meat products 
sector must change by $231,538. This change in output is then reflected 
in the purchases of "eating and drinking places" from the meat products 
and imports sectors by a magnitude of ~231,538. The changes will be of 
equal size but opposite directions depending on whether the initial 
change was an increase or decrease. 
It is assumed that grass-fattened cattle are sold directly to 
households and serve as a substitute for imported New Zealand grass-fed 
beef. Thus, a change of $30,000 in the output of grass-fattened beef 
will be reflected by a change of $30,000 in the purchases of households 
from the beef industry. The retail sector is assumed to be the importer 
of the substitute product. However, the output of the retail sector is 
valued at the margin. Standard industry practice is to use a mark-up of 
30 percent of the sales value of meat products. To reflect a change of 
$30,000 in the imports of grass-fed beef, the purchases of households 
from retail trade must be changed by $9,000 and the imports by house-
holds by $21,000. 
Adjustment of the Interindustry t·10del 
The changes mentioned in the previous section can be reflected in 
the transactions matrix to the extent that they will result in changes 
in the structure of the economy, i.e., the technical coefficients 
(dollars purchased per dollar of output) matrix. The changes which need 
to be incorporated are those in which new local purchases substitute for 
imports or in which a given sector is no longer a linkage in the dis-
tribution system of a given product. 
Specific Changes for an Increase of $100,000 in the Beef Grazing 
Industry 
The following changes are required in the transaction matrix for a 
$100,000 increase in the output of the beef grazing industry. 
1. Increase the purchases of eating and drinking 
places from meat processing by $231,538. 
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2. Decrease the imports purchases of eating and 
drinking places by $231,538. 
3. 
4. 
Increase the purchases of households from 
the beef industry by $30,000. 
Decrease the purchases of households from 
retail trade by $9,000. 
5. Decrease import purchases of households by 
$21,000. 
The interindustry model can now be mathematically manipulated to 
determine the changes in output, household income, and employment. 
These results are presented in Tables 1, 2, and 3. 
Estimates for the Kahana Valley Diversion Example 
The illustration discussed in the text incorporated the conversion 
of 500 acres into a cow-calf operation. If we reasonably assume that 
the pasture on this acreage is rated at a carrying capacity of one 
"animal-unit" per acre, it can be demonstrated by various simulation 
approaches that a "steady state" condition of production results in 
.3375 steers sold per year. This allows for deaths, replacements, non-
calving cows, and adjusts for the sales of "culls" which result in 
varying sales figures per animal.1lI 
Calculation of the effects of the Kahana Valley diversion example 
thus becomes straightforward. Total acreage (500) is multiplied by 
the "animal-unit" rating (1), which is multiplied by the price per head 
in 1970 terms ($192.97) to give total sales at the farm gate. The 
resultant figure of $32,563.69 is then used as a proportion of the 
$100,000 sales figure used in the following three tables. The dollar 
figures are then converted to 1977 dollars by use of the indexes shown 
in the table in the following appendix. The sectoral results are 
presented in Tables 5 through 7, also in the following appendix. 
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TABLE 2--Income Changes Due to a $100,000 Change in Beef Grazing, 1970 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and IJood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
['1i sce 11 aneous l'1anufacturi ng 
Construction 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
I'Jho 1 esa 1 e Trade 
Retail Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotels 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
TOTALS* 
*~"\..~ mav. nn~l.U'_~..Ll.- rnlJnn;nn 
Direct-Plus-
Indirect* 
786 
o 
o 
830 
10,963 
92 
37,656 
2 
55 
332 
127 
298 
234 
2,416 
284 
300 
3,830 
653 
o 
728 
o 
176 
903 
443 
832 
122 
62,062 
Induced* 
5 
102 
23 
5 
103 
41 
666 
235 
132 
305 
214 
410 
373 
836 
1,016 
574 
2,043 
3,702 
823 
7,256 
163 
602 
384 
2,065 
1,865 
342 
24,283 
TABLE 3--Employment Changes Due to a $100,000 Change in Beef Grazing, 1970 
Direct-Plus-
Industry Indirect* Induced* 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops n n 
Pineapple, Fruits, ~uts, and Vegetables 0 n 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 0 n 
Sugar Processing n n 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 5 n 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery n n 
Other Food Processing 4 n 
Textiles and Apparel n n 
Lumber and Wood Products n n 
Printing and Publishing n n 
Petroleum Refining n n 
~'li sce 11 aneous ~·lanufacturi ng n n 
Construction n n 
Transportati on and ~Jarehous i ng n n 
Communication n n 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services n n 
~Jho 1 esa 1 e Trade 1 n 
Reta i 1 Trade n 1 
Eating and Drinking Places n n 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate n 1 
Hotels 0 n 
Personal Services n n 
Business Services n n 
Health and Professional Services n n 
Other Services n 1 
Dummy Industries and Others n n 
TOTALS* 11 4 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
Total* 
791 
102 
23 
835 
11 ,066 
133 
38,322 
237 
187 
637 
340 
708 
607 
3,252 
1,301 
874 
5,873 
4,355 
823 
7,983 
163 
778 
1,287 
2,508 
2,697 
464 
86,345 
Total* 
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n 
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Price Index* 
Industry (1970 = 100) Notes; Source** 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 167.1 HOB, HSH 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 162.8 HOB, HSH 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 105.1 HOB, HSH 
Sugar Processing 181.8 HOB 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 172.2 HOB, HSH 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 172.2 HOB, HSH 
Other Food Processing 105.1 HOB, HSH 
Textiles and Apparel 131.5 HOB, HSH 
Lumber and ~jood Products 140.2 HOB, HSH 
Printing and Publishing 149.3 HOB, HSH 
Petroleum Refining 171 .1 HOB, HSH 
iliscellaneous r'1anufacturing 149.3 HOB, HSH 
Construction 186.3 High-rise buildings; EI 
Transportation and Warehousing 143.4 HOB, HSH 
Communication 149.3 HOB, HSH 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 171.6 HOB, HSH 
Hholesa1e Trade 177.9 US \.IPI; EI 
Retail Trade 149.3 HOB, HSH 
Eating and Orinking Places 167.8 HOB, HSH 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 149.3 HOB, HSH 
Hotels 140.2 HOB, HSH 
Personal Services 156.1 HOB, HSH 
Business Services 149.3 HOB, HSH 
Health and Professional Services 169.5 r1edical care; HOB, HSH 
Other Services 126.5 HOB, HSH 
Dummy Industries and Others 149.3 HDB, HSH 
*Conversion to 1977 dollars. 
**Sources: Hawaii, Oata Book 1977 [HDB] (Honolulu) 1977; Schmitt, Robert C., Historical Statistics 
of Hawaii [HSH] (University Press of Hawaii: Honolulu) 1977; First Hawaiian Bank, Economic Indicators 
[EI] (Honolulu) various issues. 
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TABLE 2--0utput Effects Due to a Reduction in Sugar Processing, 1977 Dollars 
Direct-Plus-
Industry Indirect* Induced* 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 484,762 97 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 0 1,775 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 0 4,278 
Sugar Processing 883,253 176 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 308 7,501 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 9 944 
Other Food Processing 270 13,872 
Textiles and Apparel 1,173 3,639 
Lumber and IJood Products 1,542 3,192 
Printing and Publishing 2,677 4,333 
Petroleum Refining 14,425 5,231 
Mi sce 11 aneous tlanufacturi ng 46,399 7,828 
Construction 4,289 5,786 
Transportation and Warehousing 15,543 10,034 
Communication 2,647 13,630 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 4,656 13,486 
Hholesale Trade 25,523 28,774 
Retail Trade 5,535 48,027 
Eating and Drinking Places 0 17,611 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 10,576 86,527 
Hotels 0 2,779 
Personal Services 204 9,833 
Business Services 9,369 4,782 
Health and Professional Services 11 ,973 34,025 
Other Services 15,458 24,315 
Dummy Industries and Others 17,246 11 ,169 
TOTALS* 1,557,839 363,64·0 
*\n"t.:.-<\~c:, ~ay ~~Qt_3ct9_.!J_t.: ~l~~ to_ round5J.lCJ..: __ 
TABLE 3--Income Effects Due to a Reduction in Sugar Processing, 1977 Dollars 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and IJood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
i1i scell aneous f1anufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation and IJarehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
IJho 1 esa 1 e Trade 
Reta il Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotels 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
TOTALS* 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
,~ -
Direct-Plus-
Indirect* 
193,558.33 
0.00 
0.00 
228,056.16 
34.61 
2.36 
65.39 
482.43 
508.10 
1,355.69 
4,931.96 
17,756.94 
2,160.60 
9,021.18 
143.78 
1,656.18 
15,553.83 
3,075.27 
0.00 
6,175.42 
0.00 
94.35 
5,752.93 
5,983.54 
7,160.19 
4,483.94 
513,013.18 
Induced* 
39.79 
798.32 
1 ,174.64 
45.49 
840.85 
267.01 
3,361.12 
1,497.11 
1,052.02 
2,194.75 
1,788.54 
2,995.48 
2,915.65 
5,823.24 
740.05 
4,797.03 
17,534.13 
26,688.46 
6,677 .89 
50,522.69 
1,101.64 
4,542.65 
2,936.43 
17,002.58 
11 ,262.69 
2,904.03 
171,504.34 
Total* 
484,859 
1,775 
4,278 
883,430 
7,809 
952 
14,142 
4,812 
4,735 
7,OlD 
19,656 
54,227 
10,075 
25,577 
16,277 
18,142 
54,297 
53,561 
17,611 
97,103 
2,779 
10,037 
14,151 
45,993 
39,773 
28,415 
1 ,921,479 
Total* 
198,598.12 
798.32 
1,174.64 
228,101.64 
875.46 
269.37 
3,426.51 
1,979.55 
1,560.12 
3,550.44 
6,720.50 
20,752.42 
5,076.25 
14,844.42 
883.83 
6,453.21 
33,088.01 
29,763.73 
6,677 .89 
56,693.11 
1,101.64 
4,637.00 
8,689.36 
22,986.12 
18,422.88 
7,387.98 
684,517.52 
I 
~ 
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TABLE 4--Employment Effects Due to a Reduction in Sugar Processing, 1977 Dollars 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and Hood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation and Uarehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
~Jho 1 esa 1 e Trade 
Retail Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotels 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
TOTALS* 
*\ota\c; may not add ~J.n due to round)_nQ. 
Direct-Plus-
Indirect* 
14 
a 
o 
12 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
1 
n 
o 
n 
a 
n 
n 
n 
1 
n 
31 
Induced* 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
1 
2 
n 
1 
n 
n 
n 
1 
1 
n 
13 
TABLE 5--0utput Effects Due to an Increase in Beef Grazing, 1977 Dollars 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hotels 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Servi ces 
Dummy Industries and Others 
TOTALS* 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
Direct-Plus-
Indirect* 
1,563 
o 
o 
2,848 
74,862 
164 
83,812 
4 
91 
478 
309 
687 
422 
2,888 
381 
707 
5,452 
855 
o 
1,013 
o 
290 
1,071 
733 
998 
755 
180,381 
Induced* 
10 
179 
43 
18 
764 
95 
1 ,401 
367 
323 
439 
522 
788 
672 
1,023 
1,362 
1,350 
2,907 
4,849 
1,776 
8,645 
280 
992 
456 
3,414 
2,454 
1,097 
36,226 
Total* 
14 
n 
n 
12 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
1 
n 
1 
1 
n 
2 
3 
n 
2 
n 
n 
1 
1 
2 
1 
42 
Totai* 
1,573 
179 
43 
2,866 
75,626 
259 
85,213 
371 
414 
916 
830 
1,476 
1,094 
3,911 
1,744 
2,056 
8,359 
10,746 
1,776 
9,658 
280 
1 ,281 
1 ,526 
4,147 
3,453 
1,852 
216,606 
I 
N 
-I'> 
I 
I 
N 
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TABLE 6--Income Effects Due to an Increase in Beef Grazing, 1977 Dollars 
Direct-Plus-
Industry Indirect* Induced* 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 427.70 2.72 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 0.00 54.07 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 0.00 7.87 
Sugar Processing 491.38 2.96 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 6,147.56 57.76 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 51.59 22.99 
Other Food Processing 12,887.76 227.94 
Textiles and Apparel 0.86 100.63 
Lumber and Wood Products 25.11 60.27 
Printing and Publishing 161.41 148.29 
Petroleum Refining 70.76 119.24 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 144.88 199.34 
Construction 141.96 226.29 
Transportation and Warehousing 1,128.20 390.39 
Communication 138.08 493.96 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 167.64 320.75 
Wholesale Trade 2,218.79 1 ,183.54 
Reta il Trade 317.48 1,799.85 
Eating and Drinking Places 0.00 449.71 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 353.94 3,527.75 
Hotels 0.00 74.42 
Personal Services 89.47 306.01 
Business Services 439.02 186.70 
Health and Professional Services 244.52 1,139.80 
Other Servi ces 342.73 768.26 
Dummy Industries and Others 59.31 166.27 
TOTALS* 26,050.15 12,037.78 
*'<,'t..a"\'=; n"Cl'l 'C\.,-""T ""rlrt U\~ ,h .. =. + .. v- ....... llnr\ino 
TABLE 7--Employment Effects Due to an Increase in Beef Grazing, 1977 Dollars 
Industry 
Sugarcane and Other Field Crops 
Pineapple, Fruits, Nuts, and Vegetables 
Canned Fruits, Vegetables, and Sea Foods 
Sugar Processing 
Beef, Hog, Poultry, and Dairy Farms 
Other Agricultural Products and Fishery 
Other Food Processing 
Textiles and Apparel 
Lumber and Wood Products 
Printing and Publishing 
Petroleum Refining 
Miscellaneous Manufacturing 
Construction 
Transportation and Warehousing 
Communication 
Electricity, Gas and Sanitary Services 
Wholesale Trade 
Retail Trade 
Eating and Drinking Places 
Banking, Finance, and Real Estate 
Hote 1 s 
Personal Services 
Business Services 
Health and Professional Services 
Other Services 
Dummy Industries and Others 
TOTALS* 
*Totals may not add up due to rounding. 
Direct-Plus-
Indirect* 
n 
o 
o 
n 
2 
n 
1 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
o 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
3 
Induced* 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
Total* 
430.42 
54.07 
7.87 
494.33 
6,205.32 
74.58 
13,115.69 
101 .49 
85.38 
309.70 
189.44 
344.22 
368.25 
1,518.59 
632.53 
488.39 
3,402.33 
2,117.33 
449.71 
3,881.20 
74.42 
395.48 
625.72 
1,384.33 
1 ,110.99 
225.59 
38,087.36 
Total* 
n 
n 
n 
n 
2 
n 
1 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
n 
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TECHNICAL APPENDIX IV* 
EIS PROCESSES AND PROCEDURES 
*Taken from the Hawaii Environmental Quality Commission's publication. 
FIGURE 1-- G ENE R A LIZ E D ~ I S PRO C E S S 
Actlon is EXEMPT 
NO 
NO 
~ NO ~ File ~egative 
Declaration 
FILE EIS Preparation ·Notice 
YES 
******1l****** 
Change 
determination 
NO 
• 
PROCEED :~. ________________________________ ~ 
• 
***********.* 
June 18, 1975 
Chapter 343, HRS 
FIGURE 2-- !:IS rnOCf.DUR .. fOR ACt:HCT .. , l'oSr.D ACTIO.S 
'"RorOSUH. J CEt:CY 
aubjl!ct to 
t clan of T-.1,,0::;:n"'s'-_____ --' 
t:01' l:XEMl'T. ASSESS ac:tiou to determiDe 
vhether ~a EIS b requi~ed: 
1. identify :lJrpae:. 
2. evaluate aisrHlcance of 1;:pacta 
3. provUe for studied 
4. (opt!::!) cons lIt with agendes t 
c1i..izpn CrOUP3. individuals 
S. (option) publish documentation of 
•• SI!!:81!m2'ct anJ 801ic1 t· cOf:ltllcnte 
PROPGSIPt: AGE}'CY J 
L~~~~.~~;;d ::~c::;r::~1:::u::!~~1!: b. 
~ 
R,tl~:"£ST c:onneot:s and provide copy of 
[IS Preparatiou t;otJce and other 
lnf ol"Clatlon (coPy Co accepting authority) 
I 
nLl EIS ( Sth/2Gth doy of uch ",onth) 
o-..,°1gl1al .M S copl~g to accepting authority: 
bO C,'jlh. to EO: 
ItESPON"D to co.>eenta; incorpOrAte 01:' 
append co-..entli/responae. within 14 
day. (ILlY be extended by .cccptlng 
authority) 
Ace£ "·n Nr. AlTTIIORITT 
tMo~ or or Gov~rnor, 
or eutho .o1zed representa.tivo) 
[ Receive c:~y .1 
Evaluate cOfIlIIenU aDd 
8dv18~ 8Rene..,.. 
r R.e.1v_~C()py J 
ACCEPTING AUTHORITY 
'I Reed VI!!: copy I 
!S.£ 
~ 
DISTRlBUn aucl 
pUBLISH £IS 
availability 1D 
newsletter 
PlOPOSINr. AGENCT 
FILE Reviled liS (at h ... t two eop1e. 
vtth acceptina .uthority and 20 cophl 
to EQC) 
(option: I"equelt EQC recommendation 
on acceptability) 
IF ACCEPTED, FltOCn:!> IIITB ACTION I .... 
-131-
~CClPTINC AUTHORITY !Q£ 
~ Receive rDvhed lts J 
1---------
------- ... ' 
IReceiVe EQC reoo""endaUon, J. 
if ,any 
I ACCEPT or NOT ACCEPT lIS 1 
, 
.; FILE Notice of Aceeptance/ I 
Ce:;;C~:P!.:~~y) J ,I PUBLISH DOtieo I ~ lin newsletter 
.. 
\~ 
ArrltCANT 
FIGURE 3-- [IS ,.OCt:o"",,, FOR APHICANT P.O'OSED 1CTJONS 
~~ ACI:NC'i 
RJ:QU£::T Al'rIWVJ\L (com uppcov1n& 
_Itene)" auilDtt aaaellEll'llent Information 
PJtOVlDE additional aese&8lIIent 
lafonD.tion a. required 
[1tec.-~i;; copy of negative decla_raUoD 
subject 
DETER}-IWE W'hether action 1. in an 
1 EX DU''f • Pcoceed with .pprovd 
~ecst; :lnd t:lointa1n record. 
NOT DDW!. Aoceaa action to determine 
",hethcr an EIS 18 r~qutred: 
1. Jdcntify potential tmpacU 
2. eval U8 te 81801£ icanee 
3. indjeate study areas 
REQUEST additional asseU1Dent 
information deemed necessary 
IRecetve copiEs of comments I~ rf1...t Receive comme:u from public: 
u:qUEST comments and provide copy of EIS 
Preparation Notice and other infonation 
(provide copy to approv1np" 8Il:enc:v) 
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I NTRODUCTI ON 
It does seem a bit quaint in this age to 
be determining water rights on the basis of what 
land happened to be in taro cUltivation in 1848. 
Surely any other system must be more sensible. 
Nevertheless, this is the law in Hawaii, and we 
are bound to follow it. I~e invite the legisla-
ture to conduct a thorou h re-examination of the 
area. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 
174, 189 n. 15. 504 P.2d 1330, 1340 n. 15 (1973) 
(emphasis added).) 
Water rights have long been a source of controversy in Hawaii. 
because the limited water resources of the islands have had to be 
divided up among competing users. The native Hawaiians developed a 
sophisticated irrigation system before Westerners arrived and allocated 
water according to the agricultural needs of the farmers and according 
to the amount of labor each farmer contributed toward building and 
maintaining the system of ditches or auwais. Frequently. water was 
rotated to different agricultural plots at different times of the day, 
so that all could share the limited resource.lI 
When Westerners came to Hawaii and saw the economic potential of 
sugar, the demand for water increased dramatically because of the 
enormous amount of water required to grow sugar. The Western entre-
preneurs quickly acquired land in the rainy parts of the islands and 
constructed ditches for transporting water that were engineering marvels 
of their day. The sugar industry required this extensive irrigation 
system, and no major obstacles were put in the path of transporting the 
waters across the islands to the dry areas. Those persons who might 
have objected were either uncertain of the implications of these irriga-
tion efforts or were powerless to act. r~any viewed these water diver-
sion projects as economically beneficial to the islands. 
Subsequently, the wealth brought by the sugar crops gave persons 
with investments in sugar a major role in the politics of the islands. 
The power of the Hawaiian monarchy was first reduced in the 1880's; then 
in 1893 the monarchy was overthrown. Westerners first established their 
own government and then in 1898 annexed the islands to the United 
States, conveying to the United States the government and crown lands 
that had previously been controlled by the Hawaiian governments. One 
purpose behind this action was to ensure that sugar grown in Hawaii 
could be sold freely in the markets of the United States.£! 
After annexation, the ~Iestern oligarchy continued to dominate 
local politics in Hawaii until World I~ar II. t1any questions about water 
rights were still unsettled at the turn of the century. and the Hawaii 
Supreme Court was quickly faced with serious litigation on these issues. 
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Everyone agreed that persons who owned land that had received water 
under the traditional Hawaiian water distribution system in use prior to 
1848 had a right to continue to receive water for their lands. This 
water right was called an "appurtenant" water right, because the right 
to use water was appurtenant to land that historically had used and 
needed the water.3/ The cases also occasionally referred to "riparian" 
water rights, which are the water rights of landowners whose land is 
adjacent to a running stream.1j 
Left unresolved, however, was the question of control over the rest 
of the stream water, which has become known as the "surplus" water. 
Although the native Hawaiians had occasionally transported waters 
through their auwais to dry areas, especially during years of heavy 
rainfall, they had not engaged in the massive irrigation projects 
required by the sugar industry. The Hawaiian approach to water use had 
been one of sharing the resource to promote agriculture. The sugar 
companies, however, demanded a secure supply of water and insisted on 
the right to control and own the waters that originated on lands they 
owned. The sugar compani~a1so insisted on the right to transport 
water out of its original watershed area, even if such transportation 
greatly depleted the stream flow to the detriment of persons who owned 
the downstream land. Many of these diversions turned uninhabited and 
unproductive lands into flowing fields of sugarcane. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court's responses to these claims were somewhat 
uncertain and inconsistent, but the three-member Court tended to uphold 
the position of the sugar companies.5/ Perhaps because of the impor-
tance of sugar to the islands' economy, the justices tended to permit 
private ownership of these "surplus" waters. The justices dyring this 
period were all Westerners, and the native Hawaiians had little oppor-
tunity to participate in these disputes. Even so, however, the cases 
are confused. The 1904 case 6/ first establishing private "ownership" 
over the "surplus" waters was-not directly followed by the next case 
dealing with this question in 1917.7/ And the key 1930 case 8/ re-
affirming private rights to the "surplus" waters was decided by a 
divided court with the three justices issuing three separate opinions. 
This 1930 case adjudicating rights in the "surface" or stream waters 
also seemed suspicious as an expression of neutral principles of law, 
because the principles it relied on differed so dramatically from those 
used just one year earlier in 1929 9/ to adjudicate rights in the 
"groundwaters" of the state. The 1929 case involving the artesian well 
waters on Oahu adopted an approach of sharing this limited resource, an 
approach now called the "correlative rights" doctrine. The 1930 case 
permitted the upstream landowner to control the "surplus" water totally 
and to divert it without concern for the uses that downstream landowners 
and others might have had for this water.lQ/ 
The next time the Hawaii Supreme Court looked at this question was 
in 1973 in the case of McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson.llI During the 
years since 1930, the political make-up of the islands had changed, and 
the sugar industry's economic importance had declined: Many residents 
had rediscovered the native Hawaiian values of cons~rvation, sharing, 
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and reverence for the land. The majority justices of the 1973 Hawaii 
Supreme Court saw a conflict between the traditional Hawaiian values and 
laws, on the one hand, and the Western approach which had guided the 
Hawaii Supreme Court in 1904 and 1930, on the other hand. They may also 
have been influenced by the approaches of other states to water rights, 
and they may have discovered that no other state in the United States 
appears to permit private ownership of water in the manner that the 
Hawaii Supreme Court had apparently approved.J1j 
After considerable argumentation and a rehearing, the 1973 Court 
stated (with two of the five justices dissenting) that the Hawaiian 
monarchs had not intended to give away all water rights when the lands 
were distributed beginning in 1846, and that the stream waters belong to 
the State, subject to appurtenant and riparian rights.13/ They did not 
rule, however, that these waters could not be used by private parties. 
The court based its ruling on nineteenth century statutes and invited 
the Hawaii legislature to consider this question more fully.l1! 
The private landowners viewed this ruling as a "taking" of their 
private property and turned to federal court for help. Although the 
U.S. Supreme Court declined to review the matter,15/ the U.S. District 
Court in Hawaii asserted jurisdiction over the dispute and ruled that 
the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision did deprive the landowners of 
property interests in the water.1§! This federal court ruling raises 
serious procedural questions which will be reviewed by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 
Our analysis of these procedural questions leads us to conclude 
that the Hawaii Supreme Court decision should survive federal court 
scrutiny because this issue involves property laws which are tradi-
tionally interpreted by state courts rather than federal courts.lZJ 
Even if the decision of the U.S. District Court should prevail, however, 
the water situation in Hawaii would still require legislative action, 
and we recommend several changes in our concluding section. 18/ 
The report that follows analyzes the changes in Hawaii's water laws 
during the past 200 years in the context of the changes that have 
occurred in the economy, political structure, demography, and social 
make-up of Hawaii. The report also includes a concise overview of the 
laws of other states, to help put Hawaii's situation in the proper 
context. 
Many others have studied this problem, and its solution will 
require a consensus of agreement from Hawaii's many communities and 
interest groups. We feel that all parties to this dispute may have 
overstated the areas of their disagreement and that it may be possible 
to achieve a solution that is fair to all. We hope that this report 
will provide sufficient back~round to aid in the achievement of this 
consensus and that our recommendations will provide a beginning frame-
work to enable the people of Hawaii to resolve their differences. 
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THE ANCIENT HAWAIIAN WATER SYSTEM 
Introduction 
Before the arrival of the Westerners to the Islands, the Hawaiians 
had a hierarchical society and a subsistence economy. 19/ A carefully 
planned system of water rights supported this ancient-Society. 
The Western conception of private property ownership did not apply 
to land in ancient Hawaii. Taro (kalo) was the staff of life for the 
ancient Hawaiian people, and its life and productivity depended pri-
marily upon water. The right to use water was, therefore, probably more 
important than the right to use or possess land. The Hawaiian word for 
law, kanawai, originally referred to regulations concerning the water. 
This word choice illustrates the intimate relationship between the law 
and water during the ancient period.20/ 
Moreover, water symbolized wealth to the Hawaiians because it was 
used to perpetuate the taro culture. The Hawaiian word waiwai means 
wealth, prosperity, ownership, possession. Translated literally, waiwai 
means water-water.~ 
The Tenure System 
The idea of private ownership of land had no place in early Hawaiian 
thinking.22/ Some Western scholars and judges have, however, described 
Hawaiian land divisions as if the land had been personally lIownedll in 
the Western sense. One leading scholar on Hawaiian water rights wrote, 
for instance, that: 
Under the ancient Hawaiian system all land 
belonged to the king, the ruling chief. The 
sovereign allotted tracts of land from time to 
time to the principal chiefs, subject to revoca-
tion at will, retaining the remainder under his 
immediate control. 
'Each principal chief divided his lands anew, 
and gave them out to an inferior order of chiefs, 
or persons of rank, by whom they were subdivided 
again and again, after passing through the hands 
of four, five or six persons, from the King down 
to the lowest class of tenants. '23/ 
Ralph Kuykendall, professor of Hawaiian history, also stated that lithe 
land belonged to the conquering king."~ 
These descriptions, however, oversimplify and distort the ancient 
Hawaiian system.25/ Under the ancient system, a high chief (alii nui or 
moi) controlled one island or a section of an island. For instance, the 
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great moi of Maui in historic times was Kahekili (said to have been the 
father of Kamehameha I). Kamehameha I aJso established his right to 
title as moi of the island of Hawaii when in 1805 he slew the alii nui 
of Kau, Keouakuahuula. In the fifteenth century, the great Umi ruled 
the whole island of Hawaii.26/ 
Although larger divisions of land existed,27/ the basic landholding 
units were the ahupuaas. They ranged in size from 100 to 100,000 acres 
and normally had natural boundaries. Ideally, an ahupuaa extended from 
the mountains to the sea and was economically self-sufficient.28/ 
At the top of the hierarchy, a chieftain (alii) controlled the 
ahupuaa through a supervisor, or land agent (konohiki). Because water 
rather than land was the primary consideration for the taro planters, 
the konohiki was normally responsible for the fair allotment of water. 
The control of the water by the land agent is discussed more fully in 
the next section. 
The ahupuaas were generally divided into subdivisions called ilis. 
The chief or konohiki often designated an ili of an ahupuaa for his own 
convenience. 29/ An ili was usually a long narrow strip of land running 
from the mountain to the sea through the ahupuaa.30/ 
Upon granting an ahupuaa to a chief, the king would sometimes 
reserve a small tract of land or ili kupono (or simply ~) that stood 
independent of the ahupuaa within which it was situated. The king 
usually retained the ku for himself or gave it to a loyal follower. The 
residents of the ili kupono owed no tribute to the chief of the ahupuaa. 
In addition, the transfer of an ahupuaa did not necessarily include the 
ili kupono within its limits.]1/ 
At the lowest level, the maka'ainana (people of the land) mainly 
worked the land for the chiefs' personal benefit.~ The commoners also 
had small tracts of land called mooainas (later called kuleanas) for 
their own use and had gathering rights within the boundary of the 
ahupuaa.33/ 
Within this hierarchy, the alii nui or high chief had a supreme 
role, but one that also had limits. The Hawaiian scholar David Malo 
wrote that "the king was over all the people; he was the supreme execu-
tive, so long, however, as he did right."34/ At the initial stages of 
becoming a ruler: 
The [young prospect for king] had first to be 
subject to another chief, that he might be dis-
ciplined and have experience of poverty, hunger, 
want, and hardship, and by reflecting on these 
things learn to care for the people with gentle-
ness and patience, with a feeling of sympathy 
for the common people, and at the same time to 
pay due respect to the ceremonies of religion 
and the worship of the god, to live temperately, 
not violating virgins, conducting the government 
kindly to all. 
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This is the way for a king to prolong his reign 
and cause his dynasty to be perpetuated, so that 
his government shall not be overthrown.35/ 
From a religious viewpoint, the ancient Hawaiians saw the alii nui 
as a person vested with divine powers and authority. This investment, 
however, provided "only a channeling of power and authority, not a 
vested right."36/ The alii nui was sacred (kapu) as though he was a god 
(akua). Nevertheless, his authority was not to exercise a personal 
dominion, but a channeled dominion (from the gods, Lono and Kane).37/ 
In other words, the alii nui was a trustee.38/ 
Further down in the political hierarchy, a chieftain or his land 
agent (konohiki) also had only a limited authority throughout the 
ahupuaa or ili kupono. Although the maka'ainana owed a work obligation 
to their superiors in the societal structure, the commoners were free to 
leave their ahupuaa if unhappy with their particular chief or konohiki 
and seek land elsewhere. In short, the maka'ainana were not bound to 
the land.39/ This situation apparently played a significant role in 
ameliorating abuses by the chiefs, who were anxious to keep sufficient 
work forces on their lands.40/ Should the high chief find that the 
konohiki had ill-treated the-maka'ainana and caused them to move to 
another district, he would be inclined to remove the konohiki and place 
another person over the ahupuaa.~ 
On the other hand, the konohiki would not have acted unreasonably 
if he had dispossessed a maka'ainana who had failed to render a plot 
productive. Under ancient customs, beneficial use of the land, as well 
as water, was essential for the continued use thereof. 
This ancient land system was thus sharply different from Western 
ideas of private land ownership. The alii nui (or moi) himself enjoyed 
no absolute ownership of all the land. The alii nui was a trustee of 
all the people within an island (moku) or some other larger district. 
The konohiki also maintained a similar tentative position because the 
maka'ainana were free to leave the ahupuaa if they were unhappy with a 
particular chieftain (alii) or konohiki. In short, the members through-
out the political hierarchy shared a mutual dependence in sustaining 
their subsistence way of life. 
Ancient Hawaiian Water Rights 
Agriculture in the ancient society existed as a highly organized 
and productive system. David Malo expressed the importance of agri-
culture in his manuscripts from the 1830' s: "Agriculture was a matter 
of great importance in Hawaii, because by it a man obtained a means of 
supporting himself and his wife, his children, friends, and domestic 
animals."42/ Samuel Kamakau asserted that the "[Hawaiians] have been 
cultivators from very ancient times; it was by agriculture that they 
made a living for themselves, for their families, and for those depen-
dent on them."43/ Paul Chun, in his study of liaihe'e Valley on windward 
Oahu, wrote of~awaiian agriculture: 
~ 
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The highly advanced agricultural practices of the 
natives plus the rich valley bottoms and the adequate 
water supply provided an abundance of food for both 
commoners and chiefs. Boundaries were well established 
and the valley possessed almost all of the economic 
resources necessary for the natives.44/ 
Of the various agricultural products that the natives cultivated 
(which included sweet potatoes, yams, bananas, sugarcane, and bread-
fruit), taro was the primary crop. The ancient Hawaiians farmed the 
taro on the flat lands near the sea, in the valley bottoms, and on 
terraced sections where water could be made available. None of the 
other products were cultivated as intensively as taro.45/ Superimposed 
on this agricultural preference of the ancient Hawaiians was a highly 
effective system of water rights. 
The concept of inalienable title to water rights in relation to 
land did not exist in the ancient Hawaiian culture.46/ The ancient 
people believed that water, whether for irrigation,-ror drinking, or for 
other domestic purposes, "was something that 'belonged' to Kane-i-ka-
wai-ala (Procreator-in-the-water-of-life) and came through the meteoro-
logical agency of Lono-makua the Rain-provider. "47/ The Hawaiians 
further worshipped the alii nui (moi, high chiefr-as the descendant of 
Lono and Kane. As such, the alii nui was instrumental in bringing forth 
the rain and the flowing of water that gave life to the staff of life--
taro. Hence, as mentioned earlier, the high chief held a channeled 
dominion from the gods and not a personal dominion over the water. The 
alii nui was the trustee in control of the water with the people as the 
beneficiaries. If the alii nui tried to assert personal dominion over 
the water, he risked being rejected or even killed by the people.48/ 
Water, like the air and sunlight as a source of life to the land 
and people, belonged to no person, not even the alii nui. The right to 
water depended solely upon the use of it. So long as the maka'ainana 
cultivated the land and contributed their share of labor to maintain the 
water system, the "right" of the maka'ainana to water would continue. 
The building and maintenance of the flood taro patches (lois) and of the 
irrigation ditches (auwais) were community projects. --
On lands with a sufficient supply of running water, the natives 
built wet patches that were planted with taro. The farmers would first 
raise banks of earth about the patch. They would beat the banks hard 
and then let water into the patch. When the loi had become nearly dry, 
the laborers reinforced the four banks with stones, coconut leaves, and 
sugarcane tops, until they were water tight. The soil in the patch was 
then broken up, water let in again, and the earth was mixed and trampled 
with the feet. The trampling made the ground waterproof to stop the 
water from soaking entirely away.49/ 
The farmers often stretched lines to mark the rows in which the 
huli, or taro tops, were to be planted. The natives then kept water 
constantly running into the patches (except in times of shortages when 
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the water was rotated among the patches).50/ Although the taro may 
have attained full size earlier, it was usually not until after twelve 
months that the taro roots or tubers were ripe and ready to be made into 
food.~ 
The water that supplied these patches flowed through the auwai 
system. The ancient people frequently dug these ditches from the ocean 
upward to the mountains. 
The dams (manos) in the ancient system were usually temporary low 
loose walls of stones. The natives made the dams high enough only to 
raise a sufficient amount of water to flow into the auwai. "No auwai 
was permitted to take more water than continued to flow in the stream 
below the dam. It was generally less, for there were those living makai 
or below the same stream, and drawing water from it, whose rights had to 
be regarded.52/ 
The type of work that went into the lois, auwais, and manos could 
not have been done without the planning and direction of the chief 
(alii) of the ahupuaa or ili kupono. The chief, or his agent, the 
konohiki,53/ administered and distributed the water within the ahupuaa. 
The chief-also granted homesites and taro patches, called kuleanas, to 
the maka'ainana. As mentioned earlier, the chief or konohiki could 
dispossess at his pleasure the commoners of their kuleanas and deprive 
them of their water privileges.54/ However, because the chief and 
commoners shared a common bond Tn the development of their subsistence 
economy, such dispossessions were rare and usually only for good cause. 
Working together, the ancient Hawaiians constructed an efficient irri-
gation system. 
All the auwais (artificial ditches, watercourses) that tapped the 
main stream were under the authority of the konohiki of the ahupuaa or 
ili kupono. Whenever a single auwai served two or more ahupuaas, water 
was distributed in accordance with the number of persons who worked on 
its construction. The konohikis of the two or more independent lands 
usually united in the building of the auwai. The konohiki controlling 
the most men supervised the work and often became the water master of 
the canal.55/ 
The number of laborers any land might furnish was not limited to 
any extent. It often occurred that more laborers represented a small ku 
or ili in the auwai-making than the laborers who represented the larger 
ahupuaa. Thus, the ku or ili would become entitled to as much or more 
water than the larger land.56/ The quantity of water awarded each 
kuleana was also according to the amount of work expended on the auwai 
and mano (dam) by the occupant of the kuleana. 
The obligation of maintaining the ditches fell upon those whose 
lands received water. Should the maka'ainana fail to contribute their 
appropriate share of service, they would risk temporary suspension or 
entire deprivation of their water rights, or even total dispossession of 
their lands.57/ The maka'ainana who failed to render their plots 
productive aTSo risked dispossession of their lands and water rights. A 
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type of beneficial use of water by the maka'ainana apparently was 
essential for the continued delivery of water under the ancient code.58/ 
The methods of distribution differed at different times and at 
different places. One common method of distribution was on the basis of 
time. The time flow varied among the various land units (i.e., kuleanas, 
ilis, kus, and ahupuaas) from a few hours to as much as three days. The 
konohiki regulated the divisions of the day by the position of sun and 
the stars. The konohiki of each independent land unit subdivided the 
water time among the tenants. Again, the amount of work the commoners 
expended on the water system determined the quantity of water to which 
they were entitled.59/ In the case of large neighboring lands, the 
water master allotted water at night to one land and during the day to 
the other. This rotation continued until all subdivisions of each 
neighboring tract received their water. The water master then exchanged 
the night and day use between the tracts.60/ Some patches were supplied 
by overflow and seepage from higher lands-and not necessarily from any 
watercourse.61/ Still another method apparently occurred under condi-
tions of abundant water supply and limited demand. The operator of an 
upper patch received as much water as needed without any reference to 
time. When the operator of this upper patch was satisfied, the next 
lower patch received water in the same manner. This procedure continued 
until all the areas along the auwai had been supplied. The process was 
then repeated.62/ 
One writer in the 1930's, H. A. Wadsworth, noted the many parallels 
between the ancient Hawaiian approach and the water allocation schemes 
in use in most Western states under the "appropriation" system (which is 
explained in detail below at pages 222-26): 
Beneficial use of water in the hands of the 
commoners was essential to continued delivery 
under the early Hawaiian code as it is among 
western states operating under the doctrine 
of appropriation. Compulsory maintenance work 
on the auwais under the direction of the kono-
hiki, with the threat of refusing delivery, 
with possible dispossession, is at least analo-
gous to maintenance assessments or water tolls 
in modern irrigation development, while the 
powers of the konohiki in rationing water dur-
ing periods of scarcity are parallel to those 
of water masters on some important streams in 
western America. Furthermore, the delivery of 
water upon the basis of labor contributed in 
the construction of the auwai is suggestive of 
the distribution of modern costs upon the basis 
of benefits received, a method frequently used 
in drainage ventures.63/ 
Little has been written about the use of "surplus" waters (waters 
beyond that required for the irrigation of taro) among the ancient 
Hawaiians. One writer on ancient Hawaiian water rights has said that 
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when the summer brought plentiful rainfall, surplus water was sometimes 
diverted to dry kula lands and a second crop of potatoes planted. 
Waters were never diverted, however, if any taro patches still needed 
water.64/ Wadsworth attributed the lack of attention given to the 
surpluS-water to the technical difficulties that limited early irri-
gation: 
Since water in Hawaiian streams was usually 
sufficient for the irrigation of valley and 
flood-plain lands in taro, even at low-river 
stage, the surplus waters find scant notice 
in the early water code. The heavy construc-
tion required for the utilization of these 
waters upon nearby slopes was beyond the 
engineering resources of the time, resource-
ful as the natives may have been. Apparently 
such water was allowed to follow its natural 
course to the sea.65/ 
An opinion rendered by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1904 did assert 
(without citation) that all waters originally belonged to the King and 
that no limitation existed to his power to use the "surplus waters" as 
he saw fit.66/ The Hawaiians probably did not view this matter in that 
way. Because such waters generally followed their natural course to the 
sea, the question of who had the power to control the waters was irrele-
vant. The 1904 opinion, furthermore, ignored the basic custom of 
cooperation and mutual dependence that existed among the ancient Hawaiians 
in maintaining their subsistence culture.67/ 
In any event, disputes concerning water were extremely rare among 
the ancient Hawaiian people.68/ The Hawaiians accepted the water as 
sacred, and no believing Hawaiian would tamper with that which was 
identified with Kane, the source of 1ife.69/ 
The ancient people took much care not to pollute the streams. The 
Hawaiians bathed ('au'au) low down in the stream. The washing of 
utensils and calabashes took place farther upstream. Still farther 
upstream were the dams for the auwais. And finally the natives took 
drinking water from a place above the dams.70/ 
Conclusion 
Perhaps the essential feature of the ancient water system was that 
water was guaranteed to those persons who needed it, Rrovided they 
helped in the construction of the irrigation system. ~ecause agri-
culture was a matter of great importance to the Hawaiians, they were, in 
general, willing to contribute their efforts to the water system. The 
konohikis aimed to secure equal rights for all the maka'ainana and to 
avoid disputes. Beneficial use of water by the maka'ainana was also 
essential to the continued delivery of the water. The natives were 
subject to compulsory maintenance work on the auwais under the super-
vision of the konohiki. The konohiki, on the other hand, was reluctant 
r 
l 
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to impose unreasonable burdens on the tenants because they were 
free to leave the particular plot if unhappy with the konohiki. 
a "spirit of mutual dependence and helpfulness prevailed, alike 
the high and the low, with respect to the use of the water. "?Jj 
Introduction 
HOW ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND POLITICAL CHANGES 
AFFECTED WATER RIGHTS 
normally 
Hence, 
among 
Water rights in Hawaii are historically related to the lands 
adjoining the water. As land became consolidated into the hands of a 
few wealthy owners, so too were water rights claimed. Therefore, it is 
necessary to understand the history of land acquisition and ownership 
patterns in Hawaii to understand how water rights came to be controlled 
in the hands of a few. 
As the previous section indicates, land in ancient Hawaii was 
controlled by the central chief who held it as trustee for the gods and 
people and who shared it with lower chiefs and commoners for their 
mutual benefit. Even though the maka'ainana were in a sense merely 
tenants on the king's land, they did possess rights. "Thus possession 
of allotted land, though baSically temporary and insecure even during 
the life of the holder, carried with it water rights, fishing rights, 
and the right to use forest products. "72/ Although a tenant could be 
dispossessed without cause by the king-or a chief of higher status, such 
dispossessions were probably infrequent. "The tenants as a rule did not 
migrate and lived on the same lands for generations. The fact that the 
landlord was dependent on them for service both in peace and war tended 
to render their tenure more stab1e."73/ 
The boundaries and names of various landholdings were maintained by 
oral tradition and passed from generation to generation through specific 
persons selected as repositories of this information. Boundaries were 
identified by geographical features: streams, ridges, hills, or other 
prominent features.74/ 
The question of land ownership became complicated as more and more 
foreigners settled in Hawaii. Foreigners pressured the king to grant 
fee simple ownership of land, thereby securing their capital invest-
ments, and "foreigners were aided in some cases by diplomatic agents of 
the governments to which they owed allegiance .... "75/ The mission-
aries, intent on improving the welfare of common people, also influenced 
the king's thinking on tenure patterns. 
The first effort to adapt land patterns in Hawaii to Western 
perspectives occurred in 1825 when Kamehameha III acceded to the throne. 
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The council of chiefs approved a formal policy, later characterized as 
the Law of 1825, that permitted the hereditary succession of lands at 
the death of their occupants. Kalanimoku, the guardian of the young 
king, had ridiculed the reversion of lands to the king upon the death of 
the occupants. The guardian instead proposed the system of hereditary 
succession, an objective of Kamehameha 1.76/ In short, the Law of 1825 
formalized the law of inheritance that Kamehameha I had recognized. 
The next changes came with the Bill of Rights in 1839 and the 
Constitution of 1840. The Bill of Rights "declared, among other things, 
that the chiefs and the people were entitled to the same protection 
under the same law; that all persons should be secured protection in 
their lands, building lots, and all property; and that nothing should be 
taken from any individual except by express provision of law."n/ The 
following year, the Constitution formally declared that the land be-
longed to all, with the king named as trustee for the people: 
Kamehameha I, was the founder of the kingdom, 
and to him belonged all the land ... though 
it was not his own private property. It 
belonged to the chiefs and people in common, 
of whom Kamehameha I was the head, and he had 
management of the landed property.78/ 
These provlslons codified ideas that Hawaiians were familiar with. 
Arbitrary evictions and seizures of lands occupied by native tenants 
were outlawed, and the trust relationships among the ~ing, the chiefs, 
and the people were explicitly declared. 
In order to limit the Westerners' claims to land, the 1840 Consti-
tution further expressed that the king could lose no land without his 
consent.79/ Foreigners disliked this latter provision because it 
reaffirmed the general rule that no one, native or foreigner, could 
convey lands without authorization by the king. 
The Westerners did receive some benefits from the 1840 Consti-
tution, however, giving them a foothold on the island lands. Fearing a 
confrontation with the Westerners, the king also provided in the Con-
stitution that he would refrain from reclaiming any property already 
held by Westerners.80/ 
The M~hele Period (1845-1855) 
By 1845 the land tenure system would no longer accommodate itself 
to the wishes of the Westerners. R. C. Wiley published his notes in the 
Friend that advocated a "liberal policy in order to encourage industry, 
awaken the energies of the people, and develop the agricultural re-
sources of the country."81/ Another instance occurred when several 
British subjects a11eged-'nterference with their long held lands.82/ 
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Consequently, the government presented the legal foundation for a 
system of private ownership in real property. The legislative council 
in 1845 adopted the "Law Creating the Board of Commissioners to Quiet 
Land Tit1es."83/ Dr. Gerrit P. Judd, as Minister of the Interior, had 
initiated thei:reation of this Board or Land Commission.84/ The Land 
Commission Act established a five-member board: --
. .. for the investigation and final ascer-
tainment or rejection of all claims of 
private individuals, whether natives or 
foreigners, to any landed property acquired 
anterior to the passage of this Act; the 
awards of which board, unless appealed from 
as hereinafter allowed, shall be binding 
upon the Minister of the Interior and upon 
the applicant.85/ 
The Minister of the Interior issued patents or leases to the 
claimants of land after the Board had confirmed their respective claims.86/ 
The Minister, in concurrence with the Privy Council, also issued patents--
in fee simple upon payment of commutation.87/ One must note that the 
Land Commission could not divide the landslJr change the tenures by 
which the lands were held. The Commission was not empowered to grant 
patents. It only decided whether claims submitted were valid. 
The Land Commission initially lacked guidelines to reorganize the 
intertwined land tenure system among the king, chiefs, and commoners. 
The board therefore adopted a set of principles in 1846 88/ to "guide 
its work with land still under the traditional system."39/ The Western-
dominated Commission 90/ projected its goal to be a "total defeudali-
zation and partition of undivided interests."91/ The Principles essen-
tially discussed a fair and equitable division-of land between the king, 
chiefs, and tenants: 
If the King be disposed voluntarily to yield to the 
tenant a portion of what practice has given to him-
self, he most assuredly has a right to do it; and 
should the King allow to the landlord one third, to 
the tenant one third and retain one third himself, 
he, according to the uniform opinion of the witnesses, 
would injure no one unless himself; ..• According 
to this principle, a tract of land now in the hands 
of a landlord and occupied by tenants, if all parts 
of it were equally valuable, might be divided into 
the three equal parts .... 92/ 
For two years the king and chiefs debated over the division of 
land. The chiefs on the Privy Council initially were reluctant to adopt 
the Principles concerning the division of land without knowing what 
lands the king intended to take for his own.93/ Finally, on Decem-
ber 18, 1847, the Privy Council adopted these Principles 94/ and the 
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following year they set in motion the division of land now known as the 
Great r1ahele. 
The "Principle" quoted above at footnote 92 seemed to envision a 
, division of the lands into three categories: the King's lands, the 
""chiefs' lands, and the lands of the maka'ainana or commoners. The 
" mechanics of the Mahele were more complicated, however, and ultimately 
the maka'ainana did not receive their share. For 41 days in early 1848, 
King Kamehameha III signed agreements with the 251 major chiefs to 
divide the lands of the islands between the King and the chiefs. The 
day after these divisions were completed, 11arch 8, 1848, the King 
divided his lands into two parts--crown lands and government lands.~ 
The land of the commoners was held in trust by the King and the 
chiefs, and it was not originally clear what the commoners needed to do 
to obtain thei r 1 and. r1any of the commoners were, of course, unaware 
that they needed to do anything to obtain their lands, because they had 
always had access to whatever lands they needed. 
In 1850, a statute was enacted to clarify this problem. This 
statute, formally called the "Enactment of Further Principles," but more 
commonly referred to as the Kuleana Act, provided for commoners' claims 
to land which they lived on and cultivated. t10st of those eligible to 
claim land did not, however, do so. Estimates of those who actually 
claimed and were awarded land range from 8,205 to 11,132 persons.961 
Numerous reasons help explain why the maka'ainana did not secure 
more kuleana grants. Most people believed they were protected from 
dispossession by the Constitution, so many owners saw no need to apply 
for the patents which secured their claim. Many people did not under-
stand the concept of fee simple ownership, so they remained unconcerned 
with the patent.971 In addition, many Hawaiians were being attracted to 
the cities and to-an easier life-style than taro cultivation. Fewer 
people had an interest in farming as a livelihood.981 
Perhaps most important were the diseases that were ravaging the 
Hawaiian people. Four devastating epidemics occurred in rapid suc-
cession in 1848 and 1849. Low Hawaiian resistence to measles, whooping 
cough, diarrhea, and influenza resulted in appalling mortality levels.991 
By 1878, a century after Captain Cook arrived, the Hawaiian population--
had gone from an estimated 300,000 to 50,000.1001 
The end result was that kuleana grants amounted to less than 1% of 
the total land area of the Kingdom. Table 1 below indicates the amounts 
awarded each of the groups. 
A second major piece of land legislation was passed in 1850. The 
Penal Code and Laws of 1850 gave foreigners the right to acquire free-
hold land. A foreigner could also dispose of 'the same to any resident 
of the Kingdom, whether native or foreigner.~ 
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TABLE l--Approximate Division of Lands, 1848 to 1855 lQlJ 
(Acres) 
Category Acres 
Total area of kingdom ~ 
Crown lands (as of 1893) al 
Government lands (as of 1848) 
Land sales (or grants) to 
June 8, 1893 667,317.4 
Held by government as of 1893 828,000 
Chiefs' lands al 
Bishop Estate (as of 1893) 
Other chiefs' lands, surveyed 
420,000 
before 1855 133,012.6 
Other chiefs' lands, not surveyed 
before 1855 1,018,329 
Kuleanas '!Y 
4,010,000 
915,000 
1,495,000 
1,571,341.6 
28,658.5 
~ Variant estimates appear in Report of the Governor ... 1901, 
p. 7: total area, 4,126,000 acres; crown lands, 984,000 acres; chiefs' 
lands, 1,619,000 acres. 
'!Y Land Commission awards to the common people, including a few lots 
awarded to foreigners (mostly in Honolulu). These were generally 
either house lots or small pieces of cultivated land. The number of 
Land Commission awards was 11,309, including 177 to chiefs or konohikis; 
for the remaining 11,132 kuleanas, the average award was 2.57 acres. 
Source: 53d Congress, 2d Session, House of Representatives, Ex. Doc. 
No. 47, President's Message Relating to the Hawaiian Islands. December 18, 
1893 (Government Printing Office, 1893), pp. 639-641. 
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_~ The Penal Code of 1850 completed the basic transition of the 
Hawaiian tenure system to a system of private ownership of land. The 
Great Mahele of 1848 and the Kuleana Act of 1850 had concerned mainly 
native Hawaiians. The Penal Code finally allowed aliens to enjoy the 
same rights as the Hawaiians in the ownership and use of land. 
Subsequent large sales of land by chiefs and the government, 
through the Minister of the Interior and the Land Commission, trans-
ferred much of the land to the wealthy and non-indigenous population. 
The government did not do much to help the common people acquire land 
after 1855. Sanford B. Dole, President of the Hawaiian Republic between 
1893 and '1898 and subsequently the first territorial governor of the 
islands, explained this phenomenon as follows: 
Afterwards [after the r~ahele] the Government 
drifted away from this liberal attitude toward 
the people [granting common people the opportu-
nity to obtain title] and for a long time its 
land policy was of a character most unfavorable 
to the development of a prosperous rural popula-
tion. Large areas of arable and grazing land 
were leased for long terms or sold outright for 
cash. The crown lands being inalienable were 
leased in large areas for long terms. The rich 
easily obtained the control of extensive tracts 
while it was a difficult and discouraging enter-
prise for the poor man to secure the few acres 
that he needed for a home and for cultivation.lQ1j 
This story is thus a sad one from the perspective of the native 
Hawaiian people, because it is the story of how they lost their lands. 
Whether they intended to transfer their water along with their land is, 
however, less clear. Certainly, one can point to efforts on the part of 
Kamehameha III to preserve his authority over water and to retain his 
sovereign rights as trustee for the people to ensure their overall well-
being. Significantly, the King emphasized in the Laws of 1842 his 
continued authority to allocate the rights to water. The Law stated: 
In all places which are watered by irrigation, 
those farms which have not formerly received 
a division of water, shall ... be supplied 
in accordance with this law, the design of 
which is to correct in full all those abuses 
which men have introduced. All those farms 
which were formerly denied a division of the 
water, shall receive their equal proportion. 
Those bounties which God has provided for 
the several places should be equally distri-
buted, in order that there may be an equal 
distribution of happiness among all those 
who labor in those places. The allowance of 
water shall be in proportion to the amount 
of taxes paid by the several lands. 104/ 
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This language seems to indicate that Kamehameha III intended to preserve 
the power to regulate water for the com~on good. The land would be 
divided into private parcels, but the king would retain control of the 
water for the purpose of ensuring that it was divided equitably among 
those who used the water and contributed beneficially to the community's 
economy. This formula was consistent with the earlier Hawaiian ap-
proaches to water distribution. 
Another example of the King's concern for his sovereign powers over 
the waters occurs in the Principles adopted by the Land Commission in 
1846. One of these Principles stated that the King was authorized to 
dispose of his proprietary rights in the lands, but not his "sovereign 
prerogatives as head of the nation"--which include his duties as trustee 
to promote the beneficial uses of the land: "To encourage and even to 
enforce the usufruct of lands for the common good. . . . These pre-
rogatives, powers and duties, His t~ajesty ought not, and ergo, he 
cannot, surrender. "105/ The majority justices in the 1973 fkBryde 
decision viewed water as one of the most important usufructs of land, 
and thus decided that the King intended to maintain his sovereign 
dominion over the fresh waters of the Kingdom.lQ§j 
The 1850 Kuleana Act, or Enactment of Further Principles, also 
contains language concerning the water rights of the common people 
against the landlords (konohikis) who had taken allodial titles to their 
lands (ahupuaas and ili kuponos). The statute stated: 
The people also shall have a right to drinking 
and running water, and the right of way. The 
springs of water, and running water, and roads 
shall be free to all, should they need them, on 
all lands granted in fee simple: Provided, that 
this shall not be applicable to wells and water-
courses which individuals have made for their 
own use.lQZ/ 
The McBryde majority interpreted this part of the provision as guaran-
teeing riparian rights in the surface waters of the islands: 
the term "running water" must mean 
water flowing in natural watercourses, such 
as streams and rivers. We also believe that 
the right to "running water" as contained 
therein guarantees a land owner the same flow 
of water in a stream or river as at the time 
of the Mahele, without substantial diminution, 
or the right to flow of a stream in the form 
and size given it by nature. This right may 
be in connection with his right of laundering, 
canoeing, swimm1ng, bathing, etc. 108/ 
The dissenting justices, however, disagreed with this interpretation.lQ2j 
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Although the statutes seem to have tried to distinguish between 
water rights and land ownership, that distinction was lost in the case 
law prior to the 1973 McBryde decision. In the 123 years between the 
Kuleana Act and the McBryde interpretation, private landholders had 
increasingly claimed the surface waters as their own and had exercised 
control over these waters. 
The Rise of Sugar and the Transfer of Land to Private Hands 
The Land Commission, charged with granting awards based upon Mahe1e 
divisions, finished its labors and was dissolved in March of 185~. All 
unadjudicated claims became the responsibility of the Minister of the 
Interior, as did the sale or lease of all government lands. By the Act 
of January, 1865, all crown lands were made inalienable and could not be 
sold. This same act, initiated at the time of Kamehameha V, took 
administration of these lands away from the monarch and placed it in the 
hands of a newly created Board of Commissioners of Crown Lands.llO/ By 
1865, the ownership of all lands rested predominately in three places: 
(1) the large tracts awarded chiefs during the Mahele; (2) the vast 
amounts of government lands under the administration of the Minister of 
the Interior; and (3) the remaining crown lands under the administration 
of the Commissioners of Crown Lands. The king had no administrative 
control over the disposition of land. 
At this point, the sugar industry began playing a prominent role in 
the life of the islands. Twelve sugar plantations were operating here 
in 1860, but by 1866 the number jumped to 32.111/ The Civil War made 
sugar production so profitable that Hawaiian growers could afford the 
high U.S. tariffs. However, it was the Reciprocity Treaty, negotiated 
with the United States in 1876, which removed the tariffs and made sugar 
production in Hawaii very profitable. 
As Table 2 below indicates, sugar became Hawaii's big business and 
growth in the industry over time is apparent. 
TABLE 2--Capital Invested in Sugar Production l!f/ 
1867 to 1929 
Year ~1i 11 ion $ 
1867 2 
1880 9 
1892 32 
1900 85 
1929 150-175 
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Sugarcane production required large-scale plantation operations and 
tremendous amounts of capital. Both requirements contributed to an 
aggregation or consolidation of land and consequently power in the hands 
of a few wealthy and influential Western entrepreneuers. As techno-
logical innovations made the sugar market more competitive, independent 
growers were forced to sellout to the large-scale sugar corporations. 
The corporations, factors, or fiscal agents, operated by providing 
needed capital to the plantations and eventually expanded their services 
to include exporting products and importing commodities and labor. The 
factors had the financial stability to weather price fluctuations that 
the independent growers lacked. The result was a consolidation of 
independent sugar operations into large factor-operated plantations. In 
1885, 90 plantations were in operation. Five years later, the total 
acreage in cane production had increased greatly but the number of 
plantations dropped to 60.ll1I 
The factors, known as the Big Five, included the companies of 
Alexander and BaldWin, American Factors, C. Brewer, Castle and Cooke, 
and T. H. Davies. By 1933, the Big Five controlled 96% of the sugar 
crop and most of the banking, insurance, railroads, utilities, merchan-
dising, and shipping concerns in Hawaii.114/ They also acquired enor-
mous parcels of land through purchase or-;E!ase and exercised control 
over much of the surface waters on the islands. 
After the Land Commission expired in 1855, the Minister of the 
Interior was empowered to sell building lots and tracts of land of all 
sizes, at prices ranging from twenty-five cents to one dollar an acre.115/ 
A new Land Commission took over the duties of the Minister of the ---
Interior in 1900 and, like the Minister of the Interior, could lease as 
well as sell government lands. Both administrators of public land had a 
strong predisposition to lease large amounts of land to the sugar 
companies, because the return on the lease revenue was far more pro-
fitable than if the land was used for small-scale farming or homestead-
ing. "A special effort has been made by the Land Commissioners Office 
in renewing cane land leases, to the end that the Territory share in the 
profits derived from the leased areas."ll.§! Frequently, leases nego-
tiated with sugar companies based the amount of rental on the price of 
sugar.117/ The Territory benefited when the industry prospered, and 
sugar interests were not unduly harmed when the price of sugar fell, for 
so did their rental with the government. 
~ Much of the land that had been transferred to the chiefs after the 
Mahele quickly moved into the hands of the Western sugar interests. The 
great majority of the Hawaiian upper class was heavily in debt by the 
1840's. The sandalwood was gone and local commerce was in the hands of 
foreigners. The land was the only thing left of value. One commentator 
has explained the Mahele along these lines: "One of the main reasons 
for instituting the Great Mahele was to provide the chiefs with an 
alternative source of income. ".l.lW 
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The chiefs were eager in most cases to sell their entire Mahele 
award to another single landowner. These practices kept ownership of 
land consolidated while transferring control of it out of the hands of 
the native population. The result of this predisposition toward large 
landowners was that after the r1ahele, in 1890, 3 out of 4 landowners 
were Hawaiian, but 3 out of every 4 acres belonging to private owners 
were held by l1esterners.lJ1I 
The process of consolidation continued, so that by 1909 five-sixths 
of all the land in Hawaii was controlled by I!estern interests.llQJ By 
1967 Hawaii's 72 largest landowners in combination with the state and 
federal governments owned 95.36% of the total land area. All other 
private owners taken together hold less than 5% of the land in Hawaii.l£lI 
Some persons who held positions as ~1inister of the Interior or as a 
Commissioner of Crown Lands were decidedly inclined toward sugar in-
terests. (See Appendix I for listing of office holders.) 11any of the 
ministers and commissioners between 1875 and 1893 had an active role in 
the overthrow of the monarchy. 
Record keeping by the Minister of the Interior was poor and lacking 
in specificity, and it is probable that the ~1inisters may not have 
always had the public interest at heart during certain sales. One early 
example involves sales of land to Gerrit Judd who held positions in the 
1840' sand 1850' s as Secretary of F orei gn Affairs, ~li r, is ter of the 
Interior, and ~1inister of Finance in the Kingdom. According to one 
wri ter, Judd's ". . . purchases and grants of 1 and were imr.Jense, and, it 
is a matter of record, in the Government House, that he purchased at one 
time 17,000 acres of land for 50 cents.".J1Y 
Examination of the records of government land sales from 1886 to 
1888 reveals other large-scale land sales for what does not seem to be a 
great deal of money. 
TABLE 3--Selected Government Land Sales, 1886-1888 
Purchaser Island Size Price 
Patent No. 3416 Trustees of Hawaii 2,200 acres $250.00 
B. P. Bishop ($.ll/acre) 
Estate 
Patent No. 3396 Ka lama K. Hawaii 5,500 acres $100.00 
3397 Kumuloa ($.02/acre) 
Patent No. 3409 Samuel Hawaii 72 acres $1,104.00 
3410 Parker ($15.33/acre) 
3414 
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The exact location of these lands has much to do with their proper 
value. Unfortunately, the records are not specific enough to compare 
them further. A complete listing of government land sales for 1886-1888 
is presented in Appendix II. However, it is clear that the government 
sold great amounts of land at very "reasonable" prices, which seem far 
below the comparable figures for private sales during this period. In 
1886 James Campbell offered Honouliuli lands on Oahu (suitable for 
sugar, rice, and fruit production) for from $100 to $200 per acre for 
the best land, while grazing land was offered for $25 an acre.l11I 
Creation of the offices of Minister of the Interior and the Com-
mission of Crown Lands was originally a response to the general lack of 
understanding of land values on the part of the king. For example, in 
1855 Kamehameha IV granted the entire ahupuaa of VJaihe'e on Oahu to Ben 
Parker for $48.00.124/ Yet the Ministers of the Interior themselves 
encouraged land saTeS which placed a great deal of land in the hands of 
a few people (conducive to sugar operations) and consequently left most 
common people without the opportunity to own land. 
The common people who were able to secure their kuleana grants also 
saw much of their land fall into the hands of large landowners for two 
reasons: (1) the changes in the economy and the nature of sugarcane 
operations, and (2) their lack of understanding of the new Western legal 
and institutional system. The inauguration of the sugar industry and 
commercial activities in the cities afforded the maka'ainana employment 
opportunities, a certain income, and an easier life-style than the 
kuleana. Often the kuleana was deserted or leased to neighboring sugar 
plantations. 
Once having passed into the possession of 
the plantation, whether by lease or purchase the 
bounds and identity of the Kuleana were gone. 
The boundary hedges, or fences, were cut down, 
the Ku-aunas or dykes, were levelled off, the 
ditches were filled up, the fruit trees sacrificed 
and when the middle-aged owner came back from 
Honolulu to see the place which was dear to him 
from childhood, he simply couldn't find it!~ 
It was a lengthly and cumbersome process for the owner of a kuleana 
to regain it after it had been leased to a sugar company. More often 
than not, after a small payment from the plantation, he did not want it 
back. Eventually many kuleanas came to be owned by neighboring sugar 
plantations. 
The Water Commission 
What became of the rights to water during these periods? The sugar 
industry increasingly sought access to additional water sources. 
Because sugar appeared at the time to be the most viable economic base 
for the islands, the Hawaiian governments tended to support the needs of 
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the sugar industry. Some observers have interpreted the government 
action as acknowledging the private ownership of the "surplus" waters. 
Federal Judge Martin Pence, for instance, wrote in 1977 that: 
For a period in excess of seventy-five years, the 
several governments of Hawaii have executed the 
laws of the Kingdom, the Territory and the State 
of Hawaii in a manner which has been guided by 
court decisions on the question of surplus water, 
which expressly or implicitly acknowledged the 
title to surplus water rests in the owner of the 
ahupuaa or ili kupono (konohiki) in which it 
originates •... ~ 
An equally reasonable interpretation of these governmental actions, 
however, would be that they were attempts to maximize beneficial use of 
the water by allowing the sugar industry access to the water, but that 
they did not imply that the sugar companies "owned" the surplus water. 
Although water rights were taxed by the government at different peri-
ods,127/ no konohiki was ever given any specific title to the surplus 
waters-by any governmental agency. The claim to title to these waters 
is thus based solely on 20th century cases that are discussed below at 
pages 185-91. 
In 1860 the legislature created a Commission of Private Ways and 
Water Rights to settle the inevitable controversies over the use of 
water. The duty of the commission was to settle all controversies 
respecting water rights between individuals and between individuals and 
government. In 1888 the commission was reduced to a single member with 
the right to Supreme Court appeal. In 1907 the office of commissioner 
was abolished and its duties were transferred to the circuit court 
judges. 128/ 
An examination of commission records 129/ reveals that the earliest 
commission hearings involved only oral testimony. No written documents, 
such as deeds or titles to land or water, were presented. In each 
dispute testimony concerning customary water uses was taken from numer-
ous persons who had resided in the area and were familiar with the 
dispute. The length of residence is important, for it is given in the 
testimony of each witness and in every dispute. This oral or "kamaaina" 
testimony was given great weight by law, for long term residence re-
flected better knowledge of customary water rights. 130/ 
In these early disputes the commission did not define ownership per 
se, but rather determined the duration and time of day in which each of 
the claimants could divert the stream onto their fields. In fact, the 
"water right" meant the right to divert and use water for a specified 
time. 
The commissioners apparently did not establish specific principles 
to determine water rights. Instead they attempted to adjudicate the 
dispute based on historical usage and maximizing beneficial uses. The 
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records often do not specifically acknowledge whether appurtenant, 
prescriptive, or riparian rights were in dispute, although appurtenant 
and prescriptive rights were recognized. 
The commiSSion records are confUSing because they lack the complete 
details of each dispute, but the following general observations are possible: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
The commissioners recognized other rights to stream water than 
ancient appurtenant rights and for other purposes than taro 
cultivation. This distribution of rights may have been based 
on the principle of maximizing use. The commissioners recog-
nized the principle of water rights in proportion to land 
based on the tax law of 1842.131/ "They [the commissioners] 
further decree that the water-shall be divided among these 
lands in quantities proportionate to the acreage .... "lli/ 
The government was treated as any other landowner in water 
rights disputes. 
Private citizens could acquire prescriptive water rights. 
All new diversions of stream flow were only possible after 
satisfying appurtenant rights. 
Appurtenant taro rights were preserved against all other 
claims and could not be lost by disuse. 
No case was discovered that specifically involved the control or 
ownership of surplus water or the transfer of large amounts of water out 
of its original watershed area. It is questionable if a statutory basis 
for this control ever existed. But the government's apparent acqui-
escence to private control was a necessary condition for the growth of 
the sugar indus try. "A 1 arge part of modern [sugar indus try] deve 1 op-
ment has been made by securing such rights [to surplus water] by pur-
chase of the ahupuaa and the subsequent transfer of available water to 
areas which in early days had never been irrigated. "ill! 
As large landowners purchased entire ahupuaas suitable for growing 
sugarcane, but only if vast portions of neighboring streams could be 
diverted for irrigation, it became in the government's economic interest 
to recognize private control. 
On September 25, 1876, King Kalakaua Signed a legislative act 
creating a commission to report on lands suitable for the growing of 
sugarcane and on the cost of water, harbor, and other improvements 
necessary to develop suitable lands. The 11inister of Finance was 
authorized to issue bonds to finance necessary improvements and to make 
government water and land available for new enterprises "without com-
pensation to the government."134/ The Minister of the Interior was also 
authorized to apportion the government water to the various interested 
landowners. Finally, in the same 1876 legislative session, an act, 
Signed September 18, provided the means by which persons having water 
II 
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rights distant from land proposed to be developed could acquire neces-
sary rights of way across intervening land owned by others.135/ Hawaii's 
water resources were thus made freely available to the sugar industry, 
which developed the resource. 
The Irrigation Ditches on the Four Larger Islands 
Introduction. 
The ancient Hawaiian ditches diverting streams for irrigation 
purposes were short and of small capacity.136/ But as land tenure 
patterns shifted to large-scale private holdlngs and the economy turned 
to plantation sugar production, the method of diversion and amount of 
water taken from streams changed radically. 
Owners of ahupuaas (whi ch by the 1880' s were frequently Hesterners) 
with large unirrigated acreage suitable for sugar production claimed and 
diverted waters from neighboring streams, making many of these lands 
productive for the first time. A second method used to acquire water 
when no neighboring streams were available was to obtain a water license 
from the kingdom to collect and transport waters. 
The kingdom had a strong economic interest in assisting sugar 
companies in many of these operations. Some members of the Hawaiian 
royalty viewed the development of the sugar industry as a means of 
helping the economy of their people. In addition, some members of the 
royalty were personally indebted to Western sugar producers and often 
granted favorable leases of land and water as a method of keeping their 
creditors happy.137/ Many of the early leases between the kingdom and 
the irrigation developers based the price of water on the price of 
sugar. A good sugar crop would mean extra revenue for the kingdom. 
The diversion of waters to sugar lands sometimes created a hardship 
on downstream water users, but because of the government's economic 
alliance with sugar growers, the interests of these small farmers t~nded 
to be ignored. The profitability of the sugar industry depended on the 
ability to transport and use water cheaply; and the government assisted 
these efforts with some enthusiasm. The first of these projects was the 
Hamakua Ditch on Maui. 
Hamakua Ditch on East Maui. 
In 1876, Samuel Alexander and Henry Baldwin obtained a lease 
from the Hawaiian government to construct an aqueduct and collect the 
waters of East Maui. The kingdom apparently granted this water license 
because the government could not afford to finance the project itself.138/ 
The project captured mountain water from Nahiku on East Maui along the---
coast to Honopou and transported it to the dry lands of Central Maui. 
Before the project was built, waters from these East Maui streams 
generally flowed back into the sea. Alexander and Baldwin estimated the 
ditch would take a year to build at a cost 0~$25,000, but the ditch 
actually required $80,000 and two years to complete.l12I Had the ditch 
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not been completed within two years, all construction would have re-
verted to King Kalakaua who had a secondary agreement with Claus Spreckels 
for completion of the ditch should Alexander and Baldwin fail and thus forfeit. 
Alexander and Baldwin worked strenuously and creatively with the 
help of imported laborers to complete this engineering feat within the 
time limit. The finished product was 17 miles long with a capacity of 
60 million gallons per day, supplying the Haiku, Paia, Kalialinui, 
Puulehu, and Kula plantations, which used water in proportion to their 
share in the cost of construction. 140/ 
Other ditches were added to the system as Central Maui's sugarcane 
development demands expanded - the Haiku, Spreckels, Center, Manuel 
Luis, and Lowrie ditches before the turn of the century; the New Hamakua, 
Kauhikoa, and Koo1au ditches before World War I; and the last major 
construction, the Wailoa ditch, completed in 1923.141/ Each of these 
new ditches either paralleled or extended the Hamakua ditch, moving 
water from East to Central Maui for cane irrigation. 
By 1948 Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Company had incorporated all 
the surrounding plantations, becomin~ the sole user of water supplied by 
the East Maui Irrigation System (EMI). Today the East Maui Irrigation 
Company, a wholly owned subsidiary of Alexander and Baldwin, Inc., 
operates a vast waterworks system incorporating 75 miles of ditches and 
tunnels, reservoirs, and numerous other support facilities. The system, 
with a delivery capacity of 455 million gallons a day, would cost over $100 million to construct today.~ 
The licenses and leases between the government and EMI are re-
negotiated in four separate agreements for four geographic zones. Each 
lease lasts for 20 years, but each of the four leases begins and ends at 
a different year, and so they are not renegotiated together. The 
Honomanu license is computed upon the basis of an assumed average annual 
yield of 5,300 million gallons at $2.92 per million gallons; Huelo 
assumes an annual yield of 14,060 million gallons at $3.50 per million 
gallons; Nahiku assumes a yield of 7,143 million gallons at $1.26 per 
million gallons; and Keanae assumes 18,296 million gallons at $1.95 per 
million gallons. 143/ 
For these amounts, EMI is entitled to divert by means of aqueducts 
government-owned surface water from all streams in the license area. 
EMI is also entitled to develop groundwater sources within the license 
area. The variations in the amounts charged for water in the four zones 
result from a complex computation regarding the quantity of water taken 
under various conditions.144/ Although previous leases had also varied 
the price of water according to fluctuations in the price of sugar,145/ 
in recent years the amount charged for water has been negotiated at--a--fixed rate. 
Dividing EMI System into four separate lease agreements--each of 
which expires in different years--seems to provide an inherent advantage 
for EM!. The staggered leases have made it all but impossible for any 
I' 
I 
I 
II 
-168-
competitive users to bid at public auction for parts of the EMI license. 
In addition, the value of each piece of the system separately is far 
less than its value as part of the system as a whole. These two factors 
have almost guaranteed EMI use of the system at a cost far below actual 
value. To correct these unbalances, the Department of Land and Natural 
Resources (DLNR) plans to renegotiate each lease so they all will 
terminate at a common point in the future. This change would allow DLNR 
to negotiate a lease with EMI, or with a competing bidder, that would 
recognize the full value of the water.146/ 
One problem that remains, however, is that under the East Maui 
Water Agreement of 1938, the Territory of Hawaii granted EMI a perpetual 
easement through government land in the license area for the collection 
and transmission works in return for use of the works between Nahiku and 
Honopou.liZ/ This agreement also seems to make it impossible for anyone 
but EMI to bid for the license. Consequently, EMI has obtained the 
license in the past for $10.00, plus the cost of the sale or public 
auction, amounting to less than $200.00. 148/ 
Beginning in 1961, the County of Maui, needing water for economic 
development and growth, requested a re-evaluation of the state's agree-
ments with EMI. Of particular concern to Maui County is the legality of 
the State granting easements and rights in perpetuity that have pre-
vented Maui from bidding for the water it needs. The county's per-
spective was stated in 1961: 
There is adequate water for all concerned, however, 
no one party should control its sale or usage as to 
be detrimental to others. The County being a sub-
division of the State should have as much rights to 
the usage of State water as the present licensee.l12/ 
E~lI's monopoly of East Maui water continues to place a heavy financial 
burden on Maui County. In 1961, the Honomanu license between the State 
and EMI was due for renegotiation. Maui County requested that the State 
grant the license to the county, enabling the county to purchase water 
directly from the State instead of through the EMI "middle-man." The 
cost savings for Maui County would have been significant: 
The water sales revenue from this area amounts to 
only $9,000 yearly for the state as compared with 
the cost to the County of $7,400 for only 11% of 
the volume.~ 
The county's plea was rejected, however, and the Honomanu license 
was once again renegotiated between the State and EMI. The county and 
EMI then entered into a Master Water Agreement in December, 1961, for 24 
years. This Agreement states that rates can be renegotiated every five 
years, but shall not be less than rates for the preceding period.!§l! 
EMI's monopoly allows it to purchase water cheaply from the State 
and forces the county to repurchase the water from EMI to provide water 
for public purposes on Maui. The difference between what EMI pays for 
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water and what it charges for water is great. Under the Honomanu 
license, the State of Hawaii is selling water to EMI at a rate of 
approximately $2.90 per million gallons. After transporting the water 
out of the watershed area, EMI sells it to the Maui County Water Depart-
ment at a rate of $10.00 per million gallons.~ 
Samuel Alexander and Henry Baldwin's construction of the Hamakua 
Ditch, ancestor to the East Maui Irrigation System, turned hundreds ot 
barren acres in Central Maui into productive sugarcane land. Yet today, 
the monopoly of water controlled by EMI raises questions that need 
resolution. 
Hanapepe River on Kauai. 
Three major landowners now divide the land adjoining the 
Hanapepe River--Gay & Robinson Co., McBryde Sugar Co. (a subsidiary of 
Alexander and Baldwin), and the State of Hawaii. These three parties 
have been fighting since 1918 over control of the waters in this area. (See pages 187-91 and 194-99, below.) 
The six major geographical areas of importance in the Hanapepe 
region are the ahupuaas of Makaweli and Hanapepe and the four major ilis 
kupono in the ahupuaa of Hanapepe--Koula, Manuahi, Eleele, and Kuiloa. 
Mrs. Elizabeth Sinclair purchased the ahupuaa of Makaweli and the 
ili of Koula in 1865. In 1878, she also acquired the ili of Manuahi. 
Mrs. Sinclair's son-in-law Francis Gay formed the partnership of Gay & 
Robinson in 1888 and made plans for a sugar plantation. The crown 
retained the ahupuaa of Hanapepe and today the State of Hawaii owns this 
area. The McBryde Sugar Company purchased the ilis of Kuiloa and Eleele 
in 1915 and 1884, respectively.153/ The ilis of Manuahi and Koula, 
which contain the principle sources of the Hanapepe River, have been 
used by Gay & Robinson to secure water rights for sugar activities in 
the arid ahupuaa of Makaweli.~ 
Henry Baldwin organized the Hawaiian Sugar Company in 1889 and 
after securing a lease from Gay & Robinson for lands in Makaweli began 
sugarcane production there. As in Maui, Baldwin was responsible for the 
first major diversion of water in Kauai from the Hanapepe River to the 
cane lands in Makaweli. The ditch, constructed in 1891-1892, was 
capable of delivering 60 million gallons of water a day. Its 13 1/2-
mile length consisted of tunnels, open ditches, flumes, and siphons. 
The reported cost was $152,000.~ 
The Hanapepe Ditch was difficult to maintain and was finally 
abandoned in 1948, when the new Koula Tunnel was completed. This tunnel 
diverts water directly from the Koula Stream tributary, before it 
reaches the Hanapepe River, keeping the tunnel entirely within Gay & 
RObinson's Manuahi and Makaweli land.l2§I 
The only other major ditch in the area is the r1cBryde Intake Ditch 
or Pumpditch which diverts water from the Hanapepe River at an elevation 
of 50 feet for use by the r'1cBryde Sugar Company. The water is mi xed 
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with well water and pumped to cane fields in the eastern portion of the 
Hanapepe Valley.l§lj 
The Hanapepe River once flowed to the sea with a great volume of 
water and supported a large indigenous population in the Hanapepe 
Valley. The large-scale diversion of water to irrigate kula sugarcane 
lands has significantly affected the flow of the river. In some years, 
the mouth of the river is almost dry for many months.~ The eco-
logical equilibrium of the Hanapepe Valley has been significantly upset 
by these major diversions. 
Water diversions in the Hanapepe area illustrate how large land-
holders acquired lands for the purpose of sugarcane production on the 
assumption that by the purchase of the land they also acquired ri~hts to 
excess waters. At the time of these early purchases and diversions, 
however, no statutes or judicial precedents provided a secure basis for 
this assumption. 
Kohala Ditch on the Island of Hawaii. 
On June 11, 1906, Samuel Parker opened the Kohala Ditch to 
provide water to the thousands of empty acres of land at the north end 
of the Big Island. The ditch has its origin at the Honokane Stream 
1,030 feet hi9h in the Kohala tlountains.159/ This system is fairly 
unique in Hawaii because it is comprised-predominately of tunnels and 
only the last few miles are really ditches. When completed, the ditch 
accomodated 70 million gallons per day. 160/ 
The ditch provided water for over 13,000 acres of existing sugar-
cane lands and increased the productivity of this region from 2 to 4 
tons per acre. In addition, the project allowed the cultivation of over 
10,000 additional acres that would have remained idle without water. 
Construction costs amounted to $600,000.161/ A contemporary author 
described this project as "a clear development in the savings of waters 
which were going to waste in the ocean."lm 
The Kohala Ditch Co., Ltd., was organized in 1904 to develop and 
furnish these waters for domestic and agricultural purposes in Kohala. 
The Kohala Ditch Company is currently owned by the Kohala Corporation, a 
subsidiary of Castle and Cooke, Inc.163/ The company acquired its 
rights to the water from two sources--. --The first involved a water 
license from the Territory of Hawaii in 1904 for a period of 50 years to 
"enter upon, confine, conserve, collect, impound and divert all the 
running natural surface water on that portion of the island of Hawaii 
.... "164/ In addition the company negotiated certain other leases from 
the trustees of the Bishop Estate.165/ One of the conditions of the 
water lease with the Territory required the company to provide domestic 
water for use in the Kohala area "and deliver water to all consumers for 
any purpose at reasonable rates. "lEY 
In 1921, the Public Utilities Commission determined that the Kohala 
Ditch Company was a public utility subject to the control of the PUC. 
"Kohala Ditch Company is a public utility as to all water furnished and 
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supplied by it and ... as such a public utility its rates are subject 
to the control of the Commission as to its entire water supply and so we 
hold."167/ After that ruling, however, most of the Kohala Ditch Company 
water continued to be sold to Kohala Sugar Plantation, its parent, for 
irrigation purposes. A very small proportion has been sold to the 
County of Hawaii for domestic purposes.~ After the shutdown of the 
Kohala Sugar Plantation, the major users of the water became Hawaii 
Biogenics (for feedlots and corn irrigation), Kohala Nursery, and 
Pacific Hay (for cattle feed production). Their combined consumption 
ranges from 6 to 10 million gallons per day.l§2j 
Waiahole Tunnel on Oahu. 
Oahu Sugar Company, located on the leeward coast of Oahu, 
began operations in 1896, initially using water pumped from wells for 
irrigation purposes. The cost of pumping water to lands at higher 
elevations limited the plantation's operations to lands below 650 feet 
above sea level. 170/ For many years, however, the idea of transporting 
water from the rainswept slopes of the windward side of the island to 
these potentially productive but arid lands in Central Oahu was toyed 
with by various interests in Oahu. Many reports on the feasibility of 
the project determined that such an undertaking was possible but costly. 
The original estimate was $1,500,000.lZlI 
The demand for water was so great that in 1912 the IJaiahole Water 
Company was formed to combine the water sources of the Waiahole, Waikane, 
and Kahana Streams into a single aqueduct for transport to the leeward 
p 1 a in through the Koo 1 au ~lounta ins . ~10s t of the work done by the 
company in 1912 involved acquiring water rights from the government and 
other small landowners to take the water from the valleys, as well as 
securing easements and access routes.172/ From its various leases, the 
~Jaiahole Hater Company claimed title tclthe konohiki rights to water. 
The ~Jaiahole IJater Company also took advantage of government policies 
that provided private security for water development by offering access 
to public land and water. A listing of Waiahole Water Company's private 
and public water licenses is presented in Table 4. 
The Waiahole system consists of a number of connecting tunnels on 
the windward side, which divert surface water from the many streams on 
the slopes of the Koolau Range, and four development tunnels from which 
groundwater is obtained. The main trans-mountain tunnel serves both as 
an interceptor of dyke water and a conveyance tunnel to transport the 
water from the windward to leeward side. A series of ditches on the 
leeward side then conveys water to the reservoirs and ditches of Oahu 
Sugar Company. The original length of the system from Kahana Valley to 
the terminal reservoir in Honouliuli was approximately 21.9 miles. The 
ditch system has been expanded westward an additional 3.4 miles in 
recent years.J1lj 
The system was an engineering and technological marvel in its day, 
and problems involved in its construction were of no small scale. Yet, 
the tunnel provided a boon to Oahu Sugar Company that none of the early 
engineering reports had anticipated. 
-====---..=--= 
TABLE 4--Waiahole Water Company Water Licenses 
Area Lessor 
1. Kahana Kahana Hui 
Lease Period 
5/27/16-5/26/66 
[acquired 12/21/12J 
Renta 1 Pri ce 
$40,000 a year 
Included right of way for facilities for the length of the lease. 
--development tunnel 
2. ~iaikane ~1cCandl ess 
4/15/29-5/26/66 
12/30/l2-now 
[acquired 12/30/12J 
$6.00 per mg 
Included permanent right of way for facilities and water rights. 
3. Waiahole Territory 
(General Lease 810) 
5/27/16-5/26/46 
[acquired 12/12/12J 
Included permanent right of way for facilities. 
--first extension 5/27/46-5/26/56 
--second extension denied but water still being used. 
4. Kahana State 
and 
Waiaho1e 
(General Lease 4329) 
TABLE 4--Contfnued 
Area 
5. Waiawa 
Lessor 
Bishop 
Estate 
1/1/71-12/31/2000 
[acquired 12/30/70J 
Lease Period 
5/27/16-5/26/66 
[acquired 1/1/13] 
Included a permanent right of way for facilities. 
--revised 7/1/23-3/1/57 
--renewed 4/1/57-3/31/79 
$15,000 a year 
Water up to 3 mgd 
From 3-5 mgd 
Over 5 mgd 
Pump water 
-For first 15 years: 
Fixed min. rent 
Camp site 
Aqueduct system 
First 2160 mg/yr. 
Over 2160 mg/yr. 
Pumn water 
Rental Price 
$8 per mg 
$6 per mg 
$2 per mg 
$1 per mg 
$32,600/mg 
$1 ,OOO/mg 
$10,000/mg 
$10/mg 
$8/mg 
$) . SO/rna 
-For remaining 15 years: 
All above at reappraised 
price not less than the 
first 15 years 
$5.14 per mg with 
$22,500/yr. minimum 
$8.50 per mg with 
$16,000/yr. minimum 
First 1825 mg/yr. $12/mg 
Over 1825 mg/yr. $6/mg 
Ahrens ditch water $6/mg 
with $24,000/yr. minimum 
Source: Karen Yamashita (Department of Agricultural Economics, University of Hawaii), Native 
Hawai ian Uater Ri ghts: The Integrati on of Laws and Economi cs 25 (May, 1977). 
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Work on the project began from both sides of the Koolau Mountains 
in early 1913. While tunneling in from the south (leeward) side, the 
drillers tapped unexpected dyke water held in the volcanic formations of 
the mountains. These waters were fed into the disbursing ditches, 
providing Oahu Sugar Company with water sooner and in greater amounts 
than expected.lli! This dyke water percolated down from the publicly-
owned watershed areas of the Koolau Range; the rights to these waters 
were never formally purchased by the Ditch Company. Approximately 17 
million gallons per day began flowing to fields on the leeward coast 
before the tunnel was even completed. 
Dyke water was also encountered by the drillers entering from the 
north and thi s slowed constructi on cons i derab ly. ~Jhen the two sides of 
the tunnel met in December, 1815, 80% of the length of the tunnel was 
driven from the south entrance. The final cost of construction was 
$2,000,000, not including the cost of water rights.~ 
The diversion of the three major windward streams seriously affected 
lower-level stream flow but the issue of depleted flow was not seriously 
raised in the early 1900's. Today the lost stream flow on the windward 
side is taking on greater importance to residents of those valleys who 
find that the low stream flow places severe constraints on the possi-
bility of developing small diversified agricultural operations. The key 
issues center around whether all the water rights acquired by I-Iaiahole 
Water Company are legitimate and whether such water rights can be 
severed from the land and transferred from the watershed. Another 
important issue is the amount of water taken from the stream. The 
Waiahole tunnel system has seriously affected the flow of the Waiahole, 
Waikane, and Kahana Streams because most of the water is diverted above 
the 800-foot level. A 1969 study of the water resources of Windward 
Oahu stated that the Waiahole Ditch tunnel system caused two Waiahole 
Valley springs to dry up, resulting in a loss of a substantial amount of 
wa ter . .lZ.§! 
Conclusion. 
All of the ditches examined in these case studies have di-
verted great quantities of water to irrigate sugarcane lands that would 
have remained unproductive without the water. That the Territory and 
State of Hawaii benefited by the pro~perity of the sugar industry, made 
possible by such diversions, is unquestioned. However, recent changes 
in the economy and growth in the population have caused observers to ask 
whether the interests of the people of Hawaii in common are currently 
properly protected in the management and allocation of this natural 
resource. 
Overthrow and Annexation 
The economic impact of the sugar industry played a role in changing 
the political control of Hawaii, as well. James Blount, a special 
federal investigator sent to Hawaii in 1893 by President Cleveland to 
research the causes of the overthrow earlier that year reported: 
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The undoubted sentiment of the (Hawaiian) 
people is for the Queen, against the Provisional 
Government and against annexation. A majority 
of the whites, especially Americans, are for 
annexation. 
* * * 
The controlling element in the white population 
is connected with the sugar industry. 
* * * 
The repeal of the duty on sugar in the McKinley 
Act (a reversal of the Reciprocity Treaty in 1890) 
was regarded as a severe blow to their interests 
... Annexation has for its charm the complete 
abolition of all duties on their exports to the 
U.S.lZZ/ 
Sugar was the hub of the Hawaiian economy in 1900 and "at the top 
of (the) power structure were the men who ran the great sugar agen-
cies."lZ.W The cohesiveness of this oligarchy kept sugar interests and 
government interests compatible: 
At nearly all times during the period (1900 
through 1940) of elite rule, the governor and 
a substantial number of legislators were men 
who had held administrative or policy posi-
tions in the major sugar agencies or their 
subsidiaries.lZ2Y 
Every governor aPPointed to the Territory was Republican and as his-
torian Gavin Daws says, "was beholden in some way or other to one or 
another of the Big Five, and the agencies were well represented on 
governmental boards that dealt with tax appraisals, land leases, and 
other items of interest."180/ This oligarchy of business and government 
constituted only 5% of Hawaii's population, yet its control of social, 
economic, and political events in Hawaii was unchallenged until after 
World War II. 
After annexation, the new government adopted the Western land 
registration system to secure land titles. Thus, 1904 marked the final 
major transition in landholding patterns in Hawaii with the introduction 
of the Torrens Land Registration System. From the time of the Mahele 
through the early 1900's, land titles were in a very confused state. 
Deeds were missing, boundaries lost, surveying was inaccurate, and 
kuleana holders continued to die in disproportionate numbers.18l/ In 
addition, Hawaiian children frequently did not take their parents' name 
or used multiple names in business matters. Land transactions were 
bogged down by the problems of establishing certain ownership, making it 
almost impossible to buy land safely. 182/ 
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Investments were hampered by the lack of security in the titles. 
The Torrens System and the land court were established to settle all 
claims or titles to property for all time. Claims were brought before 
the court where controversies were adjudicated and uncontested claims 
taken as confessed. A registered title was issued to the successful 
applicant. Once registered, no one else could challenge the title: 
"title (is) good against the world even if the register is incorrect."183/ 
The use of the Torrens System effectively shut out many Hawaiian 
kuleana claimants.184/ To file a Torrens claim required the services of 
an attorney, an abstractor, and a surveyor. Preparation of some claims 
cost $2,000. But the more devastating effect for small Hawaiian land-
holders was that unchallenged claims were taken as confessed or valid. 
Appeals of a land court decision were not permitted. 
Although all claims were required to be published in a newspaper of 
general circulation for three consecutive weeks, in the early 1900's the 
newspapers only reached outlying rural areas once a month. 185/ In 
addition, "only a few could read well enough to understandlegal ver-
bi age. "186/ Many rural Hawai i ans lost thei r 1 and because they were 
unaware-of a challenge to the title they assumed was secure. 
THE DECISIONS OF THE HAWAII SUPREME COURT ON WATER RIGHTS 187/ 
Introduction 
The Hawaii Supreme Court stated in 1930 that "our system of water 
rights is based upon and is the outgrowth of ancient Hawaiian customs 
and the methods of Hawaiians in dealing with the subject of water. "188/ 
The justices of the Hawaii Supreme Court--who until recently were a~ 
Westerners--have, however, disagreed over the years on how Hawaiian 
customs should apply to modern water disputes. Numerous Hawaii Supreme 
Court decisions have asserted that the king in ancient Hawaii owned all 
the land and water and could do with either or both as he p1eased.189/ 
Yet most Hawaiian scholars have found that in ancient Hawaii the water, 
like the air and sunlight, belonged to no one, not even the ru1er.190/ 
This disagreement affects many of the cases that will be examined ~ 
this section. 
The case law in Hawaii has historically made a distinction between 
surface waters flowing in streams, on the one hand, and groundwaters 
which percolate from artesian wells, on the other hand. Most water 
engineers find this distinction odd, because both waters are part of the 
same overall ecosystem.l2lI Yet the major 1929 case on groundwaters ~ 
made this distinction apparently because the ancient Hawaiians did not 
utilize well drilling as a source of water, the surface waters being 
sufficient for their subsistence economy.l21! The 1929 supreme court 
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presumed that Hawaiian customs and methods in dealing with water were 
not applicable to the use of groundwater and adopted the doctrine of 
correlative rights for these waters. 194/ 
In fact, however, although the doctrine of correlative rights 
originated from ~Jestern jurisprudence, its several principles are 
similar to ancient Hawaiian customs concerning water. A fundamental 
conception that water may be taken only after considering its impact on 
other water users underlies both the doctrine of correlative rights and 
the ancient Hawaiian customs regarding water. 
In contrast, the doctrine that emerged for surface waters--which 
permitted the landowner owning the highest parcel to claim all the 
"surplus waters" without regard for the downstream impact of such a 
claim 195/--seems to be opposed to the Hawaiian approach of sharing, 
even though the court purported to be applying Hawaiian concepts.196/ 
The full examination of these cases that follows tries to explain 
the jurisprudence of the Hawaii Supreme Court on water in the context of 
the economic, social, and political conditions of the times. 
"Appurtenant" Water Rights 
The ancient Hawaiians diverted water from natural streams for 
domestic and agricultural use by means of artificial ditches or auwais. 
The konohikis ensured the continued delivery of water to taro lands for 
the services that the commoners had contributed to the building of the 
water system. The konohikis, as well as their tenants, shared an 
interest in the continued cultivation of the lands. When waters flowed 
normally, the konohiki distributed the water to subunits of taro patches 
as an established procedure, and the food that was produced was then 
shared with the konohiki and other chiefs.l2Z! 
The ancient ditches connected with the streams "became a permanent 
feature of the topography of the localities where they were construc-
ted. "198/ The water that usua lly flowed through the system attached as 
a custom to the irrigated tract, even though the konohiki could still, 
for cause, revoke such customary right.199/ This ancient use of water 
evolved into a "legal appurtenance, or easement, or incident to the 
land" during the land reform period of the 1840's. The use of water on 
a tract at the time title was obtained, though not an actual ancient 
use, also became the basis of a valid water right. These rights are 
included in the term "appurtenant rights."200/ 
The justices of the Hawaiian Supreme Court interchangeably used the 
term "prescriptive rights" and "appurtenant rights" in their early 
decisions concerning water rights. Prescriptive rights, which are 
examined in the next subsection, are rights acquired by a person without 
actual title who has used the water against the wishes of the actual 
owner for the statutory period of time. The konohikis, prior to the 
1840's, gave the tenants rights to use specific quantities of water 
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based on their labor in helping to construct the irrigation ditches. 
The tenants' use of water was not adverse to the konohikis. The tenants, 
therefore, did not acquire prescriptive rights in the technical sense of 
the term. The l~estet'n judges in the late nineteenth century nonetheless 
characterized the right to water by virtue of being appurtenant to a 
stream or ditch as a prescriptive right..£Q.lj 
Chief Justice Allen, in the first reported water rights case of 
Peck v. Bailey 202/ in 1867, stated: 
By the deed, the water courses were conveyed and 
a right to the water accustomed to flow in them. 
The same principle applies to all the lands con-
veyed by the King, or awarded by the Land Commis-
sion. If any of the lands were entitled to water 
by immemorial usage, this right was included in the 
conveyance as an appurtenance.203/ 
According to Peck v. Bailey, the taro lands conveyed by the King or 
awarded by the Land Commission thus carried with them the appurtenant 
rights to water sufficient for taro growing.204/ Appurtenant water 
rights in Hawaii are frequently referred to as taro water rights. 
On the question whether appurtenant waters could be transferred to 
kula lands (uncultivated arid lands), the Peck court held that the 
defendant had the right to use the taro water on other lands if no 
injury was done to others. The court limited the quantity of water that 
could be transferred to kula land to that amount the defendant was 
entitled to on his taro lands by immemorial usage.205/ 
A later case ruled that the discontinuance of irrigating lands that 
were entitled to appurtenant water rights did not amount to an aban-
donment of those rights. Justice Antonio Perry, in Hawaiian Commer-
cial and Sugar Co. v. ~lailuku Sugar Co. (1904),206/ stated this prin-
ciple as follows: 
It does not necessarily follow from the discon-
tinuance of irrigation of land to which water 
rights are appurtenant that the right to the 
water is abandoned. It may be and often is the 
fact that the discontinuance is merely for the 
purpose of using the water on other lands.207/ 
As had the Peck court, Perry condoned the transfer of appurtenant waters 
to ku 1 a 1 ands withi n the same ahupuaa (of Ha il uku) . The ques t ion 
whether appurtenant waters can be transferred to lands outside the 
Wailuku ahupuaa was not addressed in these cases. 
Although Peck v. Bailey confirmed the transferability of appur-
tenant waters, the fact that the transfer imposed no injury on other 
parties might limit the court's holding to similar situations without 
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resulting injury. The Peck court's view allowing transfer of "appur-
tenant" waters departs from the basic meaning of the word--something 
that belongs to, is an accessory or incident to a principal 208/--
without a complete justification for this departure. 
Prescriptive Rights to Hater by Adverse Usage 
Although the terms are sometimes used i nterchangeab ly, "prescri p_ 
ti ve" ri ghts differ fundamentally from "appurtenant" water ri ghts 
(which are the ancient taro rights). "Prescriptive" rights are those 
obtained adversely from a previous owner, through "actual, open, noto-
rious, continuous, and hostile use" of the water for the statutory 
period of time.209/ Appurtenant water rights have been based upon a use 
that was permissive at its inception and later ripened into a legal 
appurtenance. This ancient right has no element of hostility because 
the konohiki originally gave permisSion for the use of water.~ 
Uses of the Term as Connoting Ancient Appurtenant Hater Rights. 
In several of the early water rights cases, the term "pre-
scriptive" implied ancient appurtenant rights as well as rights obtained 
by adverse use. 
In dealing with appurtenant rights, the oplnlon in Peck v. Bailey 
(1867) indiscriminately refers to such rights as vested by prescription 
and vested by immemorial use. Chief Justice Allen asserted "that the 
complainants were entitled to all the water rights which the lands had 
by prescription at the date of their title. "m; In the same context, 
Allen said, "If any of the lands were entitled to water by immemorial 
usage, this right was included in the conveyance as an appurtenance.".lli! 
More confusion over "prescriptive" rights emerged in Lonoaea v. 
Wailuku Sugar Co. (1895).£J1! The opinion of Chief Justice Judd dis-
cussed only prescriptive rights although both appurtenant and prescrip-
tive rights were involved in the case. The plaintiff, one of a number 
of taro growers in Hail uku, alleged that the Wail uku Sugar Company, the 
defendant corporati on, took more water than its share from the Hai 1 uku 
River. The defendant claimed prescriptive rights to the whole flow of 
Kalaniauwai, Kamaauwai, and the mill stream from 4 o'clock a.m. to 
4 o'clock p.m. of each day from ~londay to Saturday, and on Sunday the 
right to run the water into its reservoirs from 4 o'clock a.m. to 
10 o'clock a.m. 
Historical evidence showed that Wailuku was once thickly settled; 
over 400 kuleanas were granted to natives and others.214/ Kalaniauwai 
and Kamaauwai supplied most of the water to these kuleanas. Kameha-
meha III cultivated cane on a small scale in the ahupuaa in the early 
1850's. In subsequent years, two sugar mills were constructed in 
Wailuku, which combined with several independent planters to become one 
corporation, the Wailuku Sugar Company. 
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The cane growers apparently had irrigated their fields by day for 
thirty years or so because of the inconvenience of watering cane at 
night. The taro growers--who had appurtenant rights--took water by day 
and night. In times of drought, the cane lands drew the water exclu-
sively by day and the taro growers diverted water at night. Hhen the 
scarcity of water had passed, the taro growers again took water by day 
and by night. This system continued to the date of the case. 
The court found sufficient evidence to sustain the view that the 
Hailuku Sugar Company had prescriptive rights to all the water by day as 
against the majority of the taro growers.215/ This result seems sur-
prising because it was unclear how "hostiW the sugar company's use 
actually was. (See the next subsection, below.) The result also seems 
contrary to the holding in the later 1904 case of Hawaiian Commercial 
and Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co. 216/ which held that appurtenant taro 
water rights cannot be lost by abandonment or disuse.~ 
In spite of the distinctions between the concepts "appurtenant 
water rights" and "prescriptive rights," the early Hawaiian decisions 
tended to use the two terms interchangeably. This behavior by the early 
courts illustrates the difficulty of transforming the ancient Hawaiian 
water code into 11estern legal principles. 
The Courts Outline Prescriptive Rights in the Technical Sense. 
The principles that govern the acquisition of properties by 
adverse possession (actual, open, notorious, continuous, hostile, and 
exclusive use) also govern prescriptive acquisition of water rights. 
Actual, open, and notorious uses have always been essential elements in 
obtaining a prescriptive right to use water. The adverse party must use 
water in the manner that would give notice of such adverse use to the 
actual owner or party who has the right to use said water.~ 
Another essential element has been the continous use of water for 
the statutory period of time.219/ The first statute in Hawaii autho-
rizing claims by prescription-or adverse possession was enacted in 1870, 
establishing 20 years as the statutory period over which the adverse use 
must continue.220/ Interestingly, this statute was passed exactly 20 
years after foreigners were permitted to purchase private property. 
In 1898, after ~esterners had solidified their control over the 
lands and had taken over political power as well, they lowered the 
statutory period to ten years,221/ thus further accelerating the move-
ment of lands into Ilestern control.. The most recent statutory period 
has been twenty years,222/ but a 1978 amendment to the Hawaii Consti-
tution 223/ imposes limits on all claims of prescriptive rights. 
Lonoaea v. Wailuku Sugar Co. (1895) 224/ was described in the 
subsection above as a case where the court confused the terms prescrip-
tive and ap~urtenant rights. The court may also have misapplied prin-
ciples normally governing prescriptive rights, because the "hostility" 
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of the use by the sugar company remained unclear. Hostile use has been 
a fundamental prerequisite for the adverse use against the holder of a 
legal claim. In other words, the adverse party must claim the use of 
water as his or hers by right. 
Lonoaea ruled that a change in the use of water was adverse because 
of the fact that the changed use was "enforced."225/ The taro growers 
ori gi na lly had ri ghts to the water in the \Ja il ukURiver by day and 
night. With the advent of large-scale sugar growing in the district, 
the Wailuku Sugar Company began using the water by day while the taro 
growers used it by night. Although the taro growers acquiesced in this 
system, the court still ruled the use by day adverse. 
To be hostile, a use must deprive the legal owner of water to which 
he or she is entitled or, as in Lonoaea, compel the owner to change the 
accustomed manner of usage. In short, the rightful owner must be injured. 
The element of exclusiveness has not frequently appeared in liti-
gation that has reached the Hawaii Supreme Court. This element is so 
closely related to the element of hostility that exclusiveness is 
included therein.226/ 
Hawaii has recognized the general law that the statute of limita-
tions does not run against the State.227/ If the State should acquire 
rights to certain waters, according to-the general law, no private party 
would be able to obtain prescriptive rights to those waters. The 
question whether prescriptive rights already vested in private parties 
would revert to the State remains to be resolved. 
The Evolution of Riparian Rights 
The Riparian Doctrine. 
The word "riparian" comes from the Latin word "ripa" which 
means bank.228/ A general understanding of the doctrine has been that: 
. .. owners of lands adjacent to a natural 
stream are entitled to correlative rights 
in the water of that stream,--that each is 
entitled to a reasonable use of those waters 
and to so use them that other owners on the 
banks of the same stream may have a like 
reasonable use of the same waters, unaffected 
in quality and undiminished in quantity 
except in so far as made necessary by the 
reasonable use of others above.229/ 
In other words, the riparian rights under common law have depended 
upon the fact that the land is on the bank of a natural watercourse. It 
has been a right to use first for domestic reasons, and then second for 
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"artificial" purposes. The latter purposes have included mining, me-
chanical uses, and irrigation. The use must be reasonable and correla-
tive for the artificial purposes. As for domestic purposes, or "the 
drinking purposes of men and animals,"230/ all the water in the stream 
may be taken if necessary.ill! -
The riparian owner must return all unused water diverted from the 
stream. He does not own the water, but merely has a usufruct 232/ while 
it passes his property. The owner of the riparian land cannot transfer 
the water from the land, for use on nonriparian land. Should he sell 
part of his property that does not abut the stream, such conveyed land 
would not carry any riparian right to water.233/ 
These principles of riparian rights evolved from the English rule 
of natural flow. Under the strict English rule, each riparian landowner 
had a right to have the water flow past his or her lands undiminished in 
quantity and unimpaired in quality. This strict interpretation of the 
rule has proved to be almost completely unworkable, because it deprives 
every riparian proprietor of applying the water to domestic, agricul-
tural, and manufacturing purposes.234/ 
The riparian doctrine was adopted in many jurisdictions in the 
United States, but they have modified the common law in two ways. 
First, damages have become essential to maintain an action against a 
user of the stream. Second, use of the water on non-riparian land is 
permitted, subject to the criteri on of "reasonableness. "235/ The mai n 
factors that caused these changes in the common law include the rapid 
industrialization of the Eastern states and the mass migration of people 
to the ~Jest. In short, water became too precious to permit the Engl ish 
rule of natural flow that allowed water to be wasted.236/ 
The doctrine of "correlative rights," which is applied to ground-
water (or specifically, artesian waters) in Hawaii 237/ is similar to 
the riparian doctrine in certain respects. The correlative doctrine 
permits a landowner above an artesian basin to draw a reasonable share 
of the water therefrom so long as he does not injure the rights of 
others to the water.238/ This groundwater principle does not specifi-
cally categorize thelUSe of water between domestic use and artificial 
use as does the riparian law. The correlative principle suggests, 
however, that under certain circumstances larger uses, such as for 
industrial purposes, might not be permitted.239/ This suggestion 
perhaps would mean that domestic purposes would receive higher priority 
than industrial uses in times of scarcity. Moreover, in times of 
threatened deterioration in the quality of the groundwater, the cor-
relative rule would require all landowners above the artesian basin to 
conduct themselves so as not to take more than their reasonable share.24D/ 
Because the riparian owner merely has a usufruct to the surface water--
course, the riparian use of the water also must not alter the substance 
or quality of the stream. 
One of the appeals of the riparian doctrine is thus that it is 
similar to the correlative principle in certain significant respects. 
II 
l 
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It would seem logical for these two doctrines to co-exist in a water 
system comprised of surface and groundwaters that come from the same 
sources and service the same population. The Hawaii Supreme Court, 
prior to 1973, did not follow this approach. (Pages 191-94, below, deal 
specifically with the correlative rights doctrine.) 
Judicial References to the Riparian Principle. 
In three cases between 1867 and 1917, the Hawaii Supreme Court 
apparently assumed that riparian rights existed in Hawaii. In the 
Peck v. Bailey (1867) decision, Chief Justice Allen discussed riparian 
rights in some detail in spite of the fact that the "principles which 
govern them have very little practical application to this case."24l/ 
Allen stated that all riparian proprietors are "subject to the rights of 
others enjoyed by prescription. . . . So if a riparian proprietor 
should interfere with an ancient auwai, by which other lands had been 
watered from time immemorial, he would be liable in damages .... "242/ 
In short, appurtenant taro water rights are paramount over riparian-
rights. Allen also mentioned that the rights of irrigation, watering 
cattle, and using water domestically were incident to the estate adja-
cent to a natural flow, "provided [the adjacent landowner] does not 
materially diminish the supply of water or render useless its applica-
tion by others."243/ 
The king' s conveyance of the 1 and in the ahupuaa of Ha il uku wou 1 d 
normally include those auwais used from time immemorial. The Peck 
court, in dicta, also states that the king's "conveyance of lanabor-
dering on the Wailuku River will include the rights of water in said 
river, which had not been before granted. "244/ r10reover, the court 
recognized that the kula lands, or lands n~bordering on the river, had 
no riparian rights.245/ 
The Peck court did not specifically describe the type of water 
governed by riparian law. The language outlined above strongly indi-
cates, however, that the common law rule would apply to those waters in 
the natural streams that are not claimed by ancient appurtenant rights. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court in Davis v. Afong (1884) 246/ included a 
holding implicitly based upon the riparian doctrine. 247--/ --It was not 
until Carter v. Territory in 1917,248/ however, that~e Hawaii Supreme 
Court finally explicitly adjudicated a dispute involving the riparian 
doctrine and based its decision on that doctrine. The Waikoloa Stream 
in the Carter case originated on the ahupuaa of Waimea in the district 
of South Kohala, on the island of Hawaii. The Territory owned the 
ahupuaa of Waimea. The stream also flowed partly onto the ahupuaa of 
Duli, land owned by the petitioner who was a private owner.249/ 
Chief Justice Robertson's opinion for the court gives no extended 
discussion of the riparian doctrine. He does not refer to previous 
Hawaiian decisions that apparently acknowledged the riparian principle. 
The Chief Justice does, however, state that: "Private water rights in 
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this Territory are governed by the principles of the common law of 
England except so far as they have been modified by or are inconsistent 
with Hawaiian statutes, custom or judicial precedent."250/ The riparian 
doctrine was considered to be part of the common law of England at that 
time. At one point in the opinion, the court mentions that the right to 
ancient ditches for domestic and irrigation purposes "passed with the 
conveyance of the land as an incident, like a riparian right at common 
law, though it was by public grant."251/ The Carter court also states 
that: - --
\~hile the Territory is the riparian proprietor 
both above and below the points at which water 
is diverted to the lands of the petitioner it 
is obvious that the diversion by it of water to 
sell to the homesteaders is not the exercise of 
its riparian right. Such use, though a highly 
beneficial one, is a new and different use which 
could not be exercised to the detriment of the 
pre-existing vested rights of others.252/ 
The above passage suggests that the Carter court felt bound by the rule 
that riparian waters shall not be transported to non-riparian lands if 
such a transfer injures other users. 
Finally, after disposing of the many other questions raised by this 
case, the court addressed the issue concerning the petitioner's "right 
to storm or freshet waters of the \ja i ko loa Stream on the ahupuaa of 
Ouli."253/ The court phrased this issue as follows: "The question here 
presented, as to the rights in the surplus waters of a stream which 
flows from one ahupuaa into another, is one of first impression."254/ 
The court's answer came from principles applicable to the riparian 
doctrine: 
That is to say, each ahupuaa is entitled to a 
reasonable use of such water, first, for domestic 
use upon the upper ahupuaa, then for the like use 
upon the lower ahupuaa, and, lastly, for artificial 
purposes upon each ahupuaa, the upper having the 
right to use the surplus flow without diminishing 
it to such an extent as to deprive the lower of its 
just proportion under existing circumstances.255/ 
The common law rule permitted an upper riparian owner to use the 
enti re stream if necessary for "natural" or "ordi nary" uses--i.e., 
domestic, household, and watering of domestic animals, and probably 
irrigation of family gardens.256/ A modified version of the rule en-
titled each riparian proprietor-to a reasonable use of the water for 
"artificial" purposes--such as large scale irrigation--but only if such 
use did not injure other lower proprietors.257/ In short, artificial 
uses have been considered inferior to domestic uses at common law. 
Carter seems to have adhered to this distinction by stating that both 
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ahupuaas have rights to use the waters for domestic purposes before 
either can use it for artificial purposes. Carter does not, however, 
grant the upper ahupuaa the privilege, which appears to have existed at 
common law, of exhausting, if necessary, the supply for domestic pur-
poses. The court thus seems to be fashioning a correlative rights 
approach to these waters, requiring a sharing of the resource, along the 
lines followed by the native Hawaiians. 
The 1917 Carter case was the first reported Hawaii Supreme Court 
case specifically adjudicating riparian rights. The court focused on 
riparian rights with respect to storm and freshet surplus waters of the 
Waikoloa Stream as it flowed from the ahupuaa of Waimea, owned by the 
government, and the ahupuaa of Ouli, owned by the petitioner. The 1930 
case of Territory v. Gay 258/ restricted Carter by finding that it had 
not adjudicated riparian rights with respect to the normal surplus flow 
of the stream. 
Rights to "Surplus Waters" 
Although rights to "surplus waters" would seem to be related to 
riparian rights, an adequate discussion of the subject requires a 
separate section because the 1930 decision of Territory v. Gay ~ 
treated such waters as a special category. The use of surplus water 
apparently was not unknown to the ancient Hawaiians. When the rains 
were plentiful, providing substantial water during the summer months, 
the Hawaiians transferred the surplus waters to the dry kula lands, 
which were normally uncultivated, for a second crop of sweet potatoes. 
The native Hawaiians never diverted this surplus water, however, if any 
taro patches still needed water.260/ The references to surplus waters 
prior to the landmark decision or-Territory v. Gay,~ had not provided 
a consistent treatment of these waters.262/ 
The first case that seemed to address this question was the 1895 
case of Lonoaea v. Viailuku Sugar Co. ,263/ which was one of the first 
cases to be decided after the major irrigation ditches began serving the 
sugar plantations. This case was also the first water case to be 
decided after the monarchy was overthrown. Although the dispute specif-
ically involved prescriptive rights, the court, in the introductory 
paragraphs of the opinion, stated: 
So, also, when the rains, either those falling in 
the mountains only, or when they were general, 
made freshets in the river, the Wailuku plantation 
would run off into reservoirs surplus water that 
otherwise would run into the ocean. This conser-
vation of storm water was free to all who desired 
to appropriate it and we see no valid objection 
to its practice being continued.264/ 
Significantly, however, the Lonoaea court limited the right to use 
surplus water by emphasizing the rights of others to these waters. The 
court's opinion seemed to adopt a correlative rights approach by stating 
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in dicta that "It would become objectionable if ... any party ... 
should take all the storm water and deprive others of an opportunity to 
do the same."265/ In this situation, one may reasonably infer that the 
court has applied the concept of riparianism to the surplus waters. 
Subsequently, shortly after Hawaii was formally annexed to the 
United States, a claim was raised in Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar 
Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co. (1902) 266/ testing whether the Lonoaea 
decision related to the rights o~he parties in the surplus waters of 
the Wai 1 uku Ri ver. "In other words, did that deci s i on settl e the 
question as to so-called surplus water; that is, the water, whether 
storm water or not, that was not covered by prescriptive rights."267/ 
The plaintiff's predecessor in title was Claus Spreckels, a co-
defendant with the I~ailuku Sugar Co. in Lonoaea. The plaintiff in 
Hawaiian Commercial (1902) therefore was bound by the decision in 
Lonoaea to the extent that Claus Spreckels had been bound. Hence, the 
question on appeal in Hawaiian Commercial (1902) was how decisive was 
the Lonoaea opinion. 
The 1902 Hawaii Supreme Court concluded that only prescriptive 
rights had been adjudicated in Lonoaea v. ~Jailuku Sugar Co. and ex-
pounded on the policy reasons for holding that Lonoaea could not have 
adjudicated rights to so-called surplus water. The Hawaiian Commercial 
court argued that it would have been strange if the court in Lonoaea 
intended to adjudicate surplus waters without more explicit language. 
Surplus waters involved questions of great difficulty. The Hawaii 
Supreme Court had apparently avoided passing upon such rights until 
specifically compelled to do so. The court had always regarded surplus 
waters as an unsettled issue.268/ 
The issue of the ownership of surplus waters was finally confronted 
directly in a subsequent ruling in the same case, Hawaiian Commercial 
(1904).269/ In a bold opinion written by Justice Antonio Perry, who was 
first appointed to the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1900 and who later wrote 
the governing opinion in Territory v. Gay (1930),270/ the court per-
mitted private ownership over these surplus waters. The controversy 
arose between two sugar plantations that together owned 99 percent of 
the ahupuaa of Wa il uku, r~aui. The Wa il uku Stream emerged from the lao 
Valley. It flowed out of the valley through a narrow defile. The 
course continued down a gulch through low hills and plains to the sea. 
The defendant had constructed a dam at the narrow defile and diverted 
water to kula lands in the ahupuaa. The ancient ditches, ~alaniauwai 
and Kamaauwai, also diverted water from the ~Jailuku Stream. 
The 1904 court divided the controversial waters into three cate-
gories: "(1) those of the ordinary flow of the Wailuku Stream; (2) those 
of ordinary (small) freshets, which come about once in ten days; and 
(3) storm waters (large freshets)."271/ The court then re-divided the 
waters into two classes: "(a) surplUs water, meaning thereby, ... the 
water, whether storm water or not, that is not covered by prescriptive 
rights and excluding also riparian rights, if there are any, and (b) water 
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which is covered by prescriptive rights."272/ The term "prescriptive 
rights" in the foregoing passage included----;q-he right of taro lands to 
water" or the ancient appurtenant rights.273/ 
After establishing these various categories, the court held that 
"surplus water" was the property of the konohiki, meaning, in this case, 
the owner of the upper watershed area of the lao Valley--the Hawaiian 
Commercial and Sugar Company. According to Justice Perry's opinion, the 
konohiki could use this water without limitation; the surplus water was 
not appurtenant to any specific portion of the ahupuaa. The Hawaiian 
Commercial (1904) decision derived this holding from its interpretation 
of ancient Hawaiian customs,274/ an interpretation that conflicts with 
other views of these customs.~ Although Justice Perry quotes exten-
sively from earlier cases for other parts of this opinion, he cites no 
decision or historical source for this conclusion, relying instead on 
his own views of ancient Hawaiian customs and the practical advantages 
of permitting private ownership and diversion for irrigation.~ 
Justice Perry was off the bench in 1917 when Carter v. Territory 277/ 
was decided, and, in fact, was Attorney General arguing for the Terri-
tory's claim to exclusive control over the surplus waters originating in 
watershed areas owned by the Territory. Perry argued that Hawaiian 
Commercial (1904) had held that the landowner of the source of the water 
could use the "surplus" water without restriction. Although one would 
think that a court would normally defer to the interpretation of a prior 
case offered by the person who wrote the opinion, in fact, the 1917 
court rejected Perry's interpretation in favor of a sharing approach 
based on the principles of the riparian or correlative rights doctrines 
and on the traditional Hawaiian practices. The Carter court did not 
view the 1904 Hawaiian Commercial case as a governing precedent because 
that case had involved waters within the same ahupuaa while Carter 
involved waters that flowed from one ahupuaa to another.278/-----
Territory v. Gay: Perry was back on the court in 1930 for Terri-
tory v. GaY,279/ however, this time as Chief Justice, and was then able 
to reaffirm his earlier view in favor of exclusive private ownership of 
"surplus" water. The decision divided the court, however, and each justice had a different view of the proper result. In particular, the 
1930 justices disagreed on how the Hawaiian Commercial (1904) and Carter 
(1917) precedents should be interpreted and applied. 
The three 1930 justices also disagreed on whether a distinction 
should be made between "normal surplus waters" and "storm-and-freshet 
surplus." As a result, they disagreed on whether the diversion of water 
was proper. 
Chief Justice Perry explicitly applied his ruling in Hawaiian 
Commercial (1904), that the surplus water of the ahupuaa was the pro-
perty of the konohiki by ancient custom, to the surplus waters of the 
key ili kuponos where the Hanapepe watershed originates. In his opinion, 
Perry included storm and freshet waters in the general term "surplus 
waters," and, therefore, advocated the overturning of the Carter 
decision on the riparian rule.280/ -----
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Justice Parsons concurred in the Perry opinion insofar as it held 
that surplus waters belonged to the konohiki of the ili kupono. Parsons, 
on the other hand, disagreed with the overturning of Carter, claiming 
that ~ did not concern storm and freshet water, and that the riparian 
principle could apply to these waters.281/ 
Justice Banks dissented in full. Banks asserted that the riparian 
doctrine ought to be applied to both surplus and storm and freshet 
waters. 282/ 
The Carter court had not meant to make a distinction between 
"normal surplus" and "storm-and-freshet surplus," although some language 
in the opinion is confusing.283/ The court seems to use the term 
"storm-and-freshet waters" torefer to the same waters that the ~ 
court was covering by the term "normal surplus." Nonetheless, these 
terms become the basis for considerable confusion in ~. 
Two of the ~ justices (Perry and Banks) saw no distinction 
between "normal surplus" and "storm-and-freshet surplus." These same 
two justices agreed that the principles of Carter should apply to both 
waters (Banks favored this approach) or to neither (this was Perry's 
view). Nonetheless, the two votes necessary for the result in ~ 
(Perry and Parsons) agreed only that Carter should not apply to "normal 
surplus" and left open the question of "storm and freshet" surplus. It 
is because of these ambiguities and inconsistencies that the ~ case 
has been treated as an uncertain precedent. 
The Facts: The ~ case (1930) began as a suit in equity insti-
tuted by,the Territory of Hawaii to enjoin the private landowners from 
diverting waters from Koula Valley to arid lands in the ahupuaa of 
Makaweli, on the island of Kauai. The Koula and Manuahi Valleys reach 
into the Alakahi Swamp on top of Mt. Waialeale. Both valleys share in 
the heavy rainfall on the summit of this central dome. Manuahi and 
Koula form the larger part of the upper part of the ahupuaa of Hanapepe. 
Their streams would flow into the Hanapepe Stream that flows through the 
ahupuaa of Hanapepe to the sea. The Territory, as representative of the 
United States, controlled Hanapepe ahupuaa. Koula and Manuahi Valleys, 
and a third parcel called Kano, belonged to the respondents, Aubrey 
Robinson and Alice Robinson. 
A general principle important to the 1930 ~ decision was that an 
ili kupono was independent of the ahupuaa in whose outer boundaries it 
was situated. The konohiki of the ili kupono thus owed no tribute to 
the konohiki of the ahupuaa and was subservient directly to the king.284/ 
Note how similar the facts of ~ (1930) are to those of Carter 
(1917).285/ Both involve surface waters travelling from one land unit 
to another, and both raise the question of whether the upper landowner 
can divert all the water not claimed by owners of appurtenant and 
riparian rights. The Carter court, noting that this question was "one 
of first impression," ruled that the upper landowner's right to divert 
was limited by the requirement that the water flow not be diminished "to 
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such an extent as to deprive the lower [landowner] of its just pro-
portion under existing circumstances."286/ The ~ majority (1930) 
rejected this analysis and held, in contrast, that the upper landowner 
could divert the "normal surplus waters" without such a limitation. 
The Opinions: Chief Justice Perry, who served on the Hawaii 
Supreme Court from 1900 to 1904, 1909 to 1914, and 1922 to 1934,287/ 
asserted in ~ (1930) that there was "no distinction in history-;-Tn 
principle, or in law between surplus waters of the normal flow and 
surplus waters which come in freshets as a result of storms."288/ The 
term "surplus waters" was used to designate all waters not required for 
the satisfaction of prescriptive or appurtenant rights in the lower 
kuleanas or other lands. Perry supported his claim with reference to 
Hawaiian Commercial (1904). In that case, Justice Perry had defined 
"surplus water" as water, "whether storm water or not, that is not 
covered by prescriptive rights and excluding also riparian rights, if 
there are any. . . . "289/ The term "prescri pti ve ri ghts ," as used here, 
included appurtenant rights. Chief Justice Perry's opinion in ~ also 
maintained that Carter was in accord with the finding in Hawaiian 
Commercial (1904~far as the 1917 case stated as one of its con-
clusions that "the Territory is the owner of all the waters of the 
Waikoloa stream to the extent of the ordinary or normal flow ... " and 
subject only to prescriptive rights and appurtenant rights.290/ This 
reference to Carter appears to be a misreading of the Carter-Dpinion, 
because language later in that same paragraph in Carter 291/ indicates 
that the Carter court was not referring to the "surplus waters" in 
Perry's sense when it used the quoted language.292/ 
Perry, of course, had seen his arguments, as Attorney General, 
rejected by the Carter court, and so he set about to dismember the 
Carter holding as best he could now that he was back on the court. 
Although Perry refers to ancient Hawaiian customs and prior case law, 
his decision was based primarily on policy reasons related to the needs 
of the sugar industry for irrigation. Chief Justice Perry's primary 
goal was to limit the riparian doctrine, and his language on this 
subject was the final word on riparianism in Hawaii until 1973: 
Our system of water rights is based upon and is 
the outgrowth of ancient Hawaiian customs and the 
methods of Hawaiians in dealing with the subject 
of water. No modifications of that system have 
been eng rafted upon it by the application of any 
principles of the common law of England. To 
apply the principle of riparian rights to the 
matter of surplus freshet waters as was done in 
the Carter case is entirely at variance with 
preceding history and judicial precedents.293/ 
This important language can be criticized on several grounds. As 
discussed earlier in this text,294/ early Hawaiian decisions assumed 
that riparian rights existed inlHawaii. As an example, Peck v. Bailey, 
the first reported Hawaii decision on water rights, explained in dicta 
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that the king's conveyance of land bordering on the Wailuku River would 
include the rights in the river that had not been granted before. The 
implications seem to be clear. The Peck decision recognized the ri-
parian rule. --
Moreover, the language in the Enactment of Further Principles of 
1850 (Kuleana Act) 2951 could also reasonably imply that the doctrine of 
riparian rights had-seen codified in Hawaii. The 1850 Act reserves to 
tenants and landowners the "right to drinking water and running water."2961 
Chief Justice Perry, however, did not want to apply the common-law 
riparian doctrine to Hawaii's situation because of public-policy and 
logistical reasons. The Chief Justice asserted that riparian law was 
not suited to the conditions in Hawaii.2971 He confirmed that riparian 
waters could not traditionally be diverted for use on non-riparian land 
or lands beyond the primary watershed,2981 and he felt that because of 
this general principle the surplus waters would go "unused and wasted" 
as they flowed into the ocean.2991 Perry illustrated that if the 
riparian doctrine applied to t~Koula Stream and the Hanapepe River, 
the practical result would be "the discontinuance of the use of [their] 
waters on the 5,200 acres or more of t~akaweli lands and the substitution 
of a use on 1,900 acres of cane lands in Hanapepe ..• . "3001 
The Perry opinion in §3l (1930) thus contended that riparian law 
posed a major danger to the whole economic and political system in 
Hawaii. The Chief Justice said that Carter would "upset the unvarying 
decisions concerning normal surplus a~ . endanger the foundations 
of the whole Hawaiian system and perhaps eventually the system itself. "3011 
Chief Justice Perry acknowledged that his decision favored the agricul----
tural interests and conflicted with the doctrine of stare decisis, which 
normally requires courts to follow their earlier decisions: 
It is far more logical and more desirable to 
correct now the one partial error of the Carter 
case in respect to freshet surplus, thus leaving 
the whole body of our decisions consistent and 
favorable to the best interests of our agricul-
tural lands and giving due recognition to the 
principle of stare decisis ... . 3021 
The efforts of Chief Justice Perry in deciding ~ (1930) failed to 
convince his associate Justice Banks, who handed down a strong dissent-
ing opinion. Banks claimed that the Carter ruling was not inconsistent 
with preceding Hawaiian decisions. He further asserted that the ri-
parian rule should be applied to normal as well as to storm surplus: 
"This rule [has been] so inherently just in its regulation of the use of 
an element that is vital to the well-being of mankind and is so con-
sonant with natural rights and human necessities that I think it should 
be finally adopted as the law of this Territory."3031 
In his dissent, Justice Banks rested his assertions upon basic 
reasoning. He stated that under Perry's ruling the owner of land upon 
which surplus waters originated was at liberty to squander and waste 
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such water, while those downriver may be in dire need of a sufficient 
quantity of water for irrigation. 
Banks further showed a significant discrepancy between Territory 
~ (1930) and City l'lill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and llater COfT!. ,3041 
an opinion decided in 1929 by the same three justices and written by the 
same Chief Justice Perry. In City f1ill, which concerned a private 
party's right to waters in an artesian basin below the City of Honolulu, 
Perry applied the doctrine of correlative rights to artesian waters. 
The correlative doctrine permitted the property owners of tracts above 
the basin to a reasonable use of the water therein. Each property owner 
must exercise this right so as not to injure the rights of the others. 
Banks could "perceive no just reason for applying the correlative rights 
rule •.. to subterranean waters upon which all superjacent lands [have 
depended] for necessary moisture and not applying [the correlative rule] 
to surface waters, that flow through natural channels, and to which 
lower adjacent lands must look for necessary moisture. "3051 It seemed 
unreasonable to Justice Banks that so long as the water-remained in the 
artesian basin the owners of the lands above only had correlative rights 
to the waters, but if perchance the artesian waters broke to the surface 
and formed a pond or spring upon a privately-owned tract the owner of 
the property would then have absolute ownership of the water subject to 
appurtenant and prescriptive rights.3061 
Finally, Banks emphasized that Carter was not incompatible with 
Hawaiian Commercial (1904), another opinion written by Perry as a 
justice. The ruling in Carter involved the ~Iaikoloa Stream that flowed 
from one ahupuaa into another ahupuaa. The plaintiff in this 1917 case 
explicitly asserted rights to storm waters that would flow onto his 
lower ahupuaa. Hence. the Carter court thou9ht the application of 
riparian law a sound practice. Hawaiian Commercial (1904) concerned 
conflicting rights in the waters in the Wailuku River, which rises and 
flows to the sea in the same ahupuaa. The dispute arose between the 
owners of different portions of the same ahupuaa and concerned their 
proportional interest in the water.3071 
Thus, we have three separate opinions in what apparently has been 
the landmark case on surface waters in Hawaii. Although Justice Parsons 
concurred with Chief Justice Perry on the issue of surplus water belong-
ing to the konohiki of the ili kupono, the Justice also wrote a con-
vincing partial dissent against Perry's attempt to overturn the Carter 
case. Justice Banks dissented from the Chief Justice in full. Banks 
favored the'application of the riparian doctrine to all surplus waters. 
Under these circumstances, the opinion by Chief Justice Perry in §3l 
(1930) would seem to carry less weight because he failed to convince the 
other learned justices of his theories on surplus water. 
Correlative Rights in Artesian Groundwaters 
Up to this point, this section has concerned surface water rights. 
Groundwater rights, ~, a property owner's right to artesian waters, 
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have been treated separately by the Hawaii Supreme Court. These rights 
are discussed most fully in the case of City r1ill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer 
and Water Commission.308/ 
Groundwater. like surface water. originates from precipitation upon 
the islands. Rainfall percolates d~wn through the permeable rock of the 
island until it reaches a zone of salt water. Because fresh water is 
lighter than salt water. the fresh water moves laterally over the top of 
the salt water until it escapes at the coastline. As Oahu grew higher 
and wider by volcanic action. the increasing friction in the rock 
retarded the lateral movement of the fresh water. Continuous erosion 
formed an impervious caprock along the sea coast. The caprock also 
confined the underground fresh water. The weight of the fresh water 
gradually forced the salt water down. The fresh water displaced a 
portion of the salt water until an underground lens was formed.309/ for 
thousands of years this natural process continued without interference 
by humans. 
In 1879, James Campbell drilled the first artesian well in the 
islands on his Ewa plantation on Oahu.310/ From this time on, numerous 
landowners and municipal governments began tapping this vast source of 
water. which was permitted without regulation for many years. The 
Hawaiians had no customs or regulations concerning the use or ownership 
of artesian waters.311/ When a dispute over rights to artesian waters 
finally arose in 19~ the Hawaii Supreme Court looked elsewhere for an 
applicable principle of law. but nonetheless adopted the sharing prin-
ciples of the correlative rights doctrine which are similar to the 
ancient Hawaiian approach toward surface waters. 
The Hawaii Legislature created the Honolulu Sewer and Water Com-
mission in 1925 312/ to plan and construct an adequate sewer and water 
system for the dlStrict of Honolulu.313/ By Act 222. 1927 Hawaii Laws. 
the legislature conferred certain additional powers upon the commission. 
The issue in City Mill emerged from conflict over Section 5 of this Act. 
regarding permits for new wells: 
... If. in the oplnlon of the commission. 
the proposed work would threaten the safety 
of the water of the artesian area or basin 
which would be drawn upon by such well. by 
lowering its level or increasing the salt 
content of any existing well or wells, the 
application therefor may be denied.314/ 
Pursuant to this Act. City r1ill Co. filed an application with the 
commission and requested permission to drill an artesian well on its 
property. The property owned by City ~1ill was situated above the 
Honolulu water basin. The commission denied the application of the 
company for several reasons: (a) the drawin~ of water from the basin 
was larger than the supply of infiltration, (b) salt content of the 
basin was already high, (c) the city's water system already supplied 
water to the property owned by petitioner. and (d) the salt content in 
-193-: 
the artesian water was increasing and moving inland. In the meantime, 
the commission continued to allow users of existing wells to draw water 
from the basin without restrictions. 
The central question in City Mill thus became whether the com-
mission could "without compensation to the applicants prohibit the 
boring of any new well while at the same time leaving all users of 
existing wells at liberty to draw water therefrom."315/ 
Because this case was one of first impression. Chief Justice Perry 
examined several alternatives by which the parties could assert their 
rights. In the end. the supreme court held that: 
Their rights are correlative. Each should so 
exercise his right as not to deprive others 
of their rights in whole or in part. In times 
of plenty greater freedom of use probably can 
be permitted and ordinarily would be permitted 
without question. In times of greater scarcity 
or of threatened scarcity or deterioration in 
quality of the waters, all would be required 
under this view to so conduct themselves in 
their use of the water as not to take more 
than their reasonable share.11§! 
This doctrine of correlative rights to subterranean waters whose chan-
nels were undefined modified the common law maxim of cujus est solum, 
ejus est usgue ad inferos ("he who owns the soil owns it to the lowest 
depths below"). by the ci vil 1 aw maxim of sic utere tuo ut ali enum non 
laedas ("so use your own as not to injure another's property").I!1! 
The Chief Justice wrote at length to justify rejecting the common 
law maxim for public policy reasons. The common law maxim essentially 
would convey to the proprietor of property absolute ownership of all the 
water that naturally flows from the artesian well on the property. If 
the artesian well is drawn therefrom by any pump, the proprietor would 
still enjoy absolute ownership and could "use the water as he pleases 
and may conduct it to supply lands and communities at any distance from 
his own piece or parcel of land and may even waste it."3l8/ Perry 
claimed that this maxim proceeded upon the assumption that the water 
found in the land is part of the land. 
He then pointed out that this assumption runs counter to the basic 
facts of an artesian basin. Artesian waters flow freely through broken 
rock or other substances permitting easy passage. No artesian basin is 
ever found complete in itself, within the boundaries of a particular 
tract of land. The water of the entire basin inevitably flows toward 
the lowest level.319/ 
Chief Justice Perry thus preferred the doctrine of correlative 
rights to the common law maxim. Under this doctrine, each landowner 
cannot extract more water than a proportionate share. Perry stated that 
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under some circumstances, the landowner may divert water to lands other 
than that of origin.320/ The Chief Justice did not expand on this 
statement. In any event, Perry permitted only the correlative use, and 
not the absolute ownership, of artesian wells situated upon private 
properties. 
City fli 11 also held that the Territory was not the owner of all 
artesian waters in the islands. The court believed that prior to 1845, 
the king was the sole owner of all the lands. Then in the late 1840's, 
the king "voluntarily" abandoned his total ownership, and land tenures 
became vested in individuals. In the transition, "all mineral or 
meta 11 i c mi nes" were reserved to the Hawai i an government, but the 
groundwater was not similarly reserved.321/ 
Under the prevailing doctrine of correlative rights, and the ruling 
that the Territory did not own all artesian waters, the Hawaii Supreme 
Court held that the Territory, in times of peace, could not deliberately 
confiscate the water rights of the petitioner simply because the com-
munity as a whole needed the water. Such action would deprive an owner 
of his property right without just compensation in violation of the 
Constitution of the United States.322/ 
Chief Justice Perry never reconciled his 1929 opinion in City tli11 
adopting the correlative rights doctrine for groundwaters with his 
opinion the next year in ~ (1930) giving private property owners 
exclusive rights to surface waters. Justice Banks stated in his dissent 
that it was unreasonable to limit owners of lands above artesian basins 
to correlative rights while giving owners of land containing surface 
waters, ponds, or springs absolute ownership of the water subject to 
appurtenant and prescriptive rights.323/ 
v. Robinson (Hawaii 1973) 
Introducti on. 
We believe that the doctrine of stare 
decisis is subordinate to legal reasons 
and justice and we should not be unduly 
hesitant to overrule a former decision 
when to do so would bring about what is 
the considered manifest justice.324/ 
As the previous section discusses, several key Hawaiian decisions 
early this century authorized the private ownership of surface waters 
and several cases allowed the transfer of such waters to non-appurtenant 
lands or kula lands.325/ The distinction between water rights and land 
ownership was virtuallY lost in these early cases. In t1cBryde Sugar 
Co. v. Robinson (1973),326/ the Hawaii Supreme Court rejected these 
jud1cial precedents and-rnstead looked for guidance to two early Hawaiian 
statutes: (1) The Principles Adopted by the Land Co~mission in 1846, 
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and (2) the "Enactment of Further Principles" in 1850. These two 
statutes, which are described in detail on pages 154-60, above, seem to 
reserve to the people some rights to water, even after land has been 
conveyed to private owners in fee simple. Justice Abe, speaking for a 
3-2 majority, held that these statutes govern the situation despite the 
earlier contrary judicial decisions. 
- The Facts of tkBryde. 
The case arose out of a dispute among owners of land in 
Hanapepe Valley, Kauai, respecting their rights to the surface waters in 
the valley. f1cBryde Sugar Company, Ltd., a subsidiary of Alexander and 
Baldwin, owns the ilis kupono 327/ of Eleele and Kuiloa, situated in the 
southeastern portion of the vaTTey. Gay & Robinson owns the ilis kupono 
of Koula and f'lamahi, located in the northeastern and northwestern 
portion of Hanapepe Valley. The State of Hawaii owns the ahupuaa of 
Hanapepe, located in the southwestern portion of the valley. Small 
owners of property are also situated in the valley. 
The two principal users of water in Hanapepe are tlcBryde Sugar 
Company and the partnership of Gay & Robinson. Both have long used 
substantial amounts of surface waters of the valley for sugarcane 
irrigation within and without the Hanapepe watershed. In 1948, Gay & 
Robinson introduced an improved ditch and tunnel system to transport 
water to the arid lands of Makaweli, west of Hanapepe. The new water 
system increased the amount of water taken from the Koula Stream, to the 
detriment of downstream landowners, such as the McBryde Sugar Company. 
(See page 169, above.) 
After several years of attempted negotiation, f1cBryde went to court 
in 1959, and the circuit court for Kauai adjudicated the relative water 
rights of the landowners in the region. This decision did not satisfy 
the parties, however, and Gay & Robinson, f1cBryde, and the State all 
appealed to the Hawaii Supreme Court. 
The Ownership of Surface vlaters. 
Writing for the majority, Justice Abe acknowledged that all 
the landowners have appurtenant and riparian rights to some water. He 
relied, however, on the statutes of 1846 and 1850 to rule that "surplus 
waters"328/ could not be privately owned. 
The 1846 "Principles" and the Great ~1ahele. 
Justice Abe looked to the Great f1ahele of 1848 329/ and 
the laws that implemented the Mahele to examine what the king actually 
intended to convey in his division of the kingdom's lands. One of the 
"Principles" adopted by the Land Commission (and approved by the Legis-
lative Council) stated that a "sovereign prerogative" of the king was 
"to encourage and even to enforce the usufruct of lands for the common 
good."lW The Principles also stated that these prerogatives could not 
be surrendered by the king.11lJ 
I 
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In light of the foregoing provlslons, the majority logically 
believed that the most important "usufruct" of land was water, and that 
the right to water was reserved for the people of Hawaii for their 
cromon good.332/ Thus, the court maintained that the Hahele could not 
have transferred all rights to water to private hands, and that: 
... the ownership of water in natural watercourses 
streams and rivers remained in the people of Hawaii 
for their common good. Therefore, we hold that as 
between the State and McBryde, and between tkBryde 
and Gay & Robinson, the State is the owner of the 
water in the Koula Stream and Hanapepe River.333/ 
Justice Levinson dissented from this interpretation of the 1846 
Principles. He argued that "the Land Commission was given the authority 
not only to confirm private allodial titles to land, but also to do so 
'in accordance with ... native usages in regard to ... water privi-
leges. '''334/ Justice Levinson then examined ancient Hawaiian uses, 0'" 
water, relying mainly on the views of Western commentators who wrote 
that the konohiki had the absolute right to control the disposition of 
surplus waters.335/ Levinson ignored the views of other knowledgeable 
commentators (examined on pages 146-53, above) who explained that neither 
the konohiki nor the king had absolute rights to the water, but rather 
that water was a public commodity held in trust for all. 
Justice Levinson also argued that an absurd result would follow if 
all usufructs to land were retained by the king after the t1ahele because 
then only "bare legal title" would have passed by the Land Commission 
awards.336/ He quoted extensively from the cases pri or to tkBryde, some 
of whichi{as explained above) concluded that rights to water and land 
were not separable.337/ He then introduced the 1917 Report of the 
Water Commission of the Territory of Hawaii to the Governor.338/ The 
Commission was apparently asked to revise the water laws of the Terri-
tory should such a change be found necessary. The Commission ultimately 
recommended the adoption of a detailed code relating to underground 
artesian waters. Levinson pointed out that the 1917 report declined to 
recommend any legislation concerning surface waters because it was 
determined that "we already [had] a very good workable method for the 
determination of rights to surface waters ..•. "339/ 
Justice Levinson's final argument was that the doctrine of equi-
table estoppel should be applied against the State in its claim to 
ownership of surplus waters. Gay & Robinson had presented evidence that 
included: (a) the government's silence while Gay & Robinson spent large 
sums of money to develop surplus waters, and (b) the government's 
taxation of surplus waters as privately owned by Gay & Robinson.340/ He 
thus asserted that the equities are with the private parties who-aGted 
in reasonable reliance on the government's action or inaction, and that 
the government ought not to reverse previous policies with resoect to 
property.~ . 
-197-
Justice Levinson argued that precedents prior to /kBryde on the 
issue of private ownership of surplus waters were based on "long estab-
lished" principles 342/ and that the majority's opinion was a "radi-
cal" 343/ and "unforeseeable" 344/ departure from these prinCiples. The 
review of these cases earlier in this section, however, seems to indi-
cate that the water law prior to 11cBryde was hotly contested over the 
years and was not settled or secure. Thus Justice Abe may not have been 
unreasonable in introducing what he believed to be the controlling 
statute on water rights in Hawaii. 
The 1850 Enactment of Further Principles. 
Justice Abe's second attack against the private ownership 
of surplus waters was grounded in the Enactment of Further PrinCiples, 
adopted in 1850. That statute, also called the "Kuleana Act," states 
that "the people also shall have the right to drinking water, and 
running water, and the right of way. "345/ This provision now appears in 
Hawaii Revised Statutes, Section 7-1.346/ 
Justice Abe argued that this enactment codified the riparian 
doctrine in Hawaii. He maintained that "running water" must have meant 
water flowing in natural watercourses, because running water in arti-
ficial watercourses was excepted from the statute.347/ He also referred 
to the missionaries who came from 11assachusetts andbrought with them 
the English common law as recognized in ~1assachusetts. The ~lew England 
state courts considered water in natural courses to be publici juris, 
meaning that it was public and common and that all who have right of 
access to the water may reasonably use it.348/ (See page 216, below.) 
The IkBryde court thus held that the State, McBryde Sugar Company, 
and the partnership of Gay & Robinson, as owners of property adjOining 
Koula Stream and Hanapepe River, had riparian rights to those natural 
streams. In other words, they had "the ri ght to use water fl owi ng 
therein without prejudicing the riparian rights of others and the right 
to the natural flow of the stream without substantial diminution and in 
the shape and size given it by nature. "349/ 
Justice Levinson asserted in his dissent that the majority erred in 
concluding that the doctrine of riparian rights had been codified in 
Hawaii. Although he acknowledged the policy arguments against the 
riparian system in the islands,~ Levinson based his conclusion on 
statutory construction, an analysis of ancient usage, and judicial precedent. 
Levinson argued that Section 7 of the Enactment of Further Prin-
Ciples guaranteed the hoaainas or tenants the right to water only for 
irrigation and other domestic purposes.~ This limitation on the 
provision would weaken the majority's interpretation of it as the 
codification of the riparian doctrine. Justice Levinson asserted that 
the right to use water for irrigation is antithetical to the doctrine of 
riparianism as it existed in mid-nineteenth century England and 11assa-
chusetts,352/ and he argued that the majority's reliance on the 1850 
statute was-misplaced. 
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The dissent then turned to whether Hawaiian judicial precedent and 
ancient usage established a water system different from the riparian 
doctrine and argued that the earlier cases had departed from the ri-
parian approach (see below).353/ 
The Transferability of Water. 
Although the court's majority held that the state owned the 
excess surface waters, they recognized that private parties had certain 
vested rights to water. They acknowledged the ancient appurtenant 
rights of the principal parties in McBryde.354/ The majority held that 
appurtenant water rights pertained to particular parcels of land con-
veyed by the original grant from the king and could not be transferred 
to another watershed. 355/ The majority also recognized the existence of 
riparian water rights~t adhered to the strict rule of riparianism that 
prevented the transfer of riparian waters to non-riparian land.356/ 
Justice Levinson dissented from the court's holding regarding the 
non-transferability of appurtenant and riparian water rights. He quoted 
from 14estern commentators who wrote that traditionally the ancient 
Hawaiians did transfer water to non-appurtenant or non-riparian land.357/ 
Levinson failed, however, to acknowledge the trust relationship that ---
existed in the ancient Hawaiian system. Taro growers along streams 
enjoyed a higher priority than farmers on kula land and water was not 
diverted if taro farmers would be injured as a result.358/ Justice 
Levinson also stressed that the transfer of water had become important 
in Hawaii because of large-scale sugarcane cultivation in the islands.359/ 
Finally, Justice Levinson emphasized the Hawaii judicial precedents thar-
permitted the transfer of water to non-appurtenant lands, relying 
heavily on Chief Justice Perry's opinion in Territory v. Gay (1930).360/ 
In sum, Justice Abe for the majority in t-1cBryde strictly construed 
the term "appurtenant" and 1 imited appurtenant ~Iater rights to the 
particular parcel that originally had water rights. Abe also used the 
strict interpretation of the riparian doctrine which rejected any sub-
stantial diminution of the natural flow of the stream. Waters in excess 
of appurtenant and riparian rights belong to the state as trustee for 
the people. Justice Levinson, in contrast, interpreted ancient Hawaiian 
usage as understood by Western commentators and relied upon judicial 
precedents prior to 1973, particularly Territory v. Gay (1930), to argue 
that private ownership of "surplus" waters should continue to be rec-
ognized. 
Robinson v. Ariyoshi (D. Hawaii 1977). 
The private landowners involved in the Hanapepe litigation 
appea 1 ed the t1cBryde rul i ng to the U. S. Supreme Court after the Hawai i 
Supreme Court affirmed its original decision on rehearing, but the U.S. 
Supreme Court dismissed the appeal "for want of jurisdiction. "361/ The 
landowners then turned to the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Hawaii, and Senior Judge Martin Pence issued an opinion on October 26, 
1977, declaring the opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court's majority to be 
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"untenable and void."362/ This decision raises serious procedural 
questions analyzed on-pages 200-18, below. On the substantive issues, 
Judge Pence relies heavily on Justice Levinson's dissenting opinion. 
Judge Pence described Justice Levinson's dissent as "probably the finest 
opinion of his judicial career" and stated that "this court in substance 
adopts his analysis of those principles as a component part of its own decision."363/ 
The federal judge described the majority's holdings in t1cBryde as 
"completely revolutionary. "364/ "It was strictly a 'public-policy' 
decision with no prior underlying 'legal' justification therefor. "365/ 
"The entire rationale of the majority is one of the grossest examples of 
unfettered judicial construction used to achieve the result desired--
regardless of its effect upon the parties, or the state of the prior law 
on the subject."366/ The State of Hawaii has appealed this ruling to 
the U.S. Court oTAppeals for the Ninth Circuit, and a decision on 
appeal can be expected in 1979 or 1980. 
Summary and Conclusions 
This section is unusually long because the litigation over water in 
Hawaii has been hotly contested and the judicial decisions have been 
convoluted and erratic. Many issues remain unsettled. The views of the 
Hawaii Supreme Court have changed when the membership of the court has 
changed. Doctrines were frequently overruled within a few years after 
they were announced in earlier decisions. The economic, social, and 
political conditions of the islands have had a profound effect on the 
law that has been articulated by the justices. Although many opinions 
purport to rely on anci ent Hawaii an usages, ties tern cOf1lmentators and justices appear frequently to have recast those ancient usages to serve 
their modern purposes. No doubt the fact that most justices until 
recently were liesterners affected thei r i nterpretati ons of the 1 aw. The 
rapid changes in the law may also have resulted from the fact that the 
highest court for years consisted of only three justices. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court did in 1904 and 1930 permit private 
ownership and transfers of surplus waters, but the court in 1917 and 
1929 decided related cases on different principles. Even in the impor-
tant 1930 case of Territory v. Gay, the three justices could not agree on 
the governing principles and each wrote separate opinions. 
It seems surprising, therefore, to find the federal district court 
describing Hawaii's water rights law as "generally, well settled and 
stable prior to r'1cBryde I," as the court did in Robinson v. Ariyoshi.367/ 
The water rights law appears instead to be highly confusing, an amalgam 
of Hestern ideas imposed on traditional Hawaiian practices. 
The Hawaii Supreme Court's majority decision in McBryde is a good 
faith attempt to sort through this confusion and return to the his-
torical roots of the islands. The court bases its interpretation 
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squarely on statutes and specifically invites the state legislature to 
re-examine these issues in order to bring them in line with modern needs 
of the community.368/ 
Introduction 
THE PROCEDURAL FEDERAL-STATE ISSUES RAISED BY 
ROBINSON V. ARIYOSHI AND THE PROBABLE 
RESOLUTION OF THIS CONFLICT 369/ 
As explained on the preceding pages, the federal district court's 
1977 decision in Robinson v. Ariyoshi 370/ directly contradicts the view 
of the Hawaii Supreme Court's majority in its 1973 decision of McBryde 
v. Robinson 371/ on the rules that govern water rights in Hawaii. 
Senior Federal District Judge Martin Pence felt that the reasoning and 
scholarship of the dissenting justices of the Hawaii Supreme Court 372/ 
were superior to that of the majbrity justices and that the majoritY'S 
decision amounted to a "taking" of property in violation of the United 
States Constitution.373/ Judge Pence thus "voided" 374/ the McBryde 
decisions and enjoinea-the State from carrying out orlenforcing any of 
the rulings in McBryde. 
The dispute over the reasoning and scholarship of the Hawaii 
Supreme Court justices is, of course, an important controversy, which 
this report examines in the previous section. Equally important is the 
question of the power of a federal district court to intervene in this 
controversy. This section analyzes the procedural issues raised by 
Judge Pence's action to help predict what will happen to the federal 
case on appeal. This section also addresses the question of whether the 
State can act now to clarify water rights despite the fact that federal 
litigation is continuing. 
Hawaii's sugar companies were greatly disturbed by the 1973 t,lcBryde 
decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court, because they interpreted the 
decision as denying them access to the water they had been using for 
years to irrigate cane lands and as denying them the ability to trans-
port waters from one part of an island to another. Their first step was 
to seek review before the United States Supreme Court. Such review was 
ultimately denied.37S/ Meanwhile, the sugar companies filed suit in the 
Federal District Court for the District of Hawaii and in October, 1977, 
Judge Pence ruled in their favor.376/ 
The State subsequently filed an appeal of Judge Pence's decision in 
the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The last 
briefs on the case were scheduled to be filed December 29, 1978, and a 
decision could be rendered in the middle of 1979 or later. If an 
appeal is taken to the United States Supreme Court from the Ninth 
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Circuit's decision, that would delay the final ruling on Robinson until 
after 1980. The uncertainty caused by this litigation and the prolonged 
nature of this uncertainty has been a major obstacle to the formulation 
of a clear water management policy. The impact of this litigation on 
legislative or constitutional action over water rights has not been 
clarified. Thus, many observers have taken the position that nothing 
can be done in terms of water management until the McBryde-Robinson 
litigation is completed. This issue is addressed below. 
It is also necessary to determine the meaning and effect of tk13ryde 
if Robinson is reversed on appeal. Does McBryde foist upon the State an 
"unwanted bill of goods" in terms of water ri ghts doctri nes whi ch the 
State will be powerless to modify? The purposes of this section are 
thus to (a) delve into the nature of the legal uncertainty caused by the 
McBryde-Robinson litigation, (b) determine the likely outcome of the 
Robinson appeal, and (c) analyze the propriety of legislative action now 
in light of the continuing federal litigation. 
Robinson on Appeal 
If Robinson is affirmed on appeal, then (because it "voided" the 
McBryde decision) the State of Hawaii's water law will be returned to a 
pre-McBryde status. In other words, the surface waters will be essen-
tially controlled by the landowner of the water's source.377/ 
If Robinson is reversed, then t1cBryde will be allowed to stand. 
The task would then become one of interpreting the force and effect of 
McBryde's two apparent rulings, i.e., (1) that the State is the "owner" 
of the surplus waters 378/ and (~hat the private landowners cannot 
transport the surplus waters from one watershed to another.379/ The 
decision of the appeals court may not, however, turn on theimerits of 
these issues, but rather on the procedural propriety of the federal 
district court's intervention at this stage of the litigation. 
Federal Courts Cannot Act as the Appellate Courts of the State. 
One basis for predicting a reversal of Robinson is that the 
federal district court was, in Robinson, improperly acting as an appel-
late court of the State. The issues 380/ in Robinson and I1cBryde appear 
to be the same. Both cases involve a determination of the ownership 
rights of various parties to the surplus waters of the Hanapepe River. 
The Supreme Court of Hav/a iii n I1cBryde held that the State was the 
"owner" of such waters. The court in Robinson, however, ruled that the 
State could not be the owner, insofar as such a decision would result in 
an unconstitutional "taking." The court ruled that either of the two 
private landowners before the court was the owner of the water and 
remanded this issue to the state trial court.~ 
Hence, the "ultimate practical question" 382/ was the same in both 
cases. The federal court, however, characterized the Robinson action as 
"original" and as one arising out of the t1cBryde decision itself. But, 
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if the "correctness" or constitutionality of every appellate decision 
were to create a new cause of action, then there could be no end in 
resolving disputes. Every appellate decision could be collaterally 
attacked in a state or federal trial court. If judicial decisions 
create causes of action, there would be no "finality" and the appellate 
process would be totally undermined. 
For example, an agrieved party, such as the State, might after 
Robinson bring a cause of action in state court alleging that the 
Robinson decision "took" property. Because state courts have concurrent 
jurisdiction over constitutional questions, nothing would prevent the 
state court from assuming jurisdiction and enjoining federal officials 
from enforcing Robinson. 
A second reason which the Robinson court may have used to charac-
terize the action as "original" was that new parties were added as 
defendants. These "new" parties were the governor and other state 
officials responsible for carrying out the McBryde decision. 
However, the addition of these parties does not make the Robinson 
action an "original" one.383/ The sugar companies are still, in es-
sence, s~eking an appeal or-redetermination of the McBryde case. The 
effect of adding state officials who are responsible for enforcing state 
judicial decisions cannot disguise the true nature of Robinson as an 
appeal. Petitioners are attempting to accomplish the effect of an 
appeal by enjoining the State from acting, the precise effect of an 
appeal. Quite simply, a redetermination of the validity of McBryde in 
order to avoid the direct consequences of the decision is an appeal of 
McBryde. The Robinson court has allowed form to prevail over substance. 
Although Congress may have the power to grant federal district 
courts the right to review state court decisions,384/ they clearly have 
not done so.385/ Only the United States Supreme Court has jurisdiction 
to review state supreme court decisions,386/ and in this litigation, the 
United States Supreme Court decided not ~exercise that power.387/ 
Moreover, the United States Supreme Court has stated in Rooker ~ 
Fidelity Trust,388/ that the federal district courts do not have the 
power to review state court decisions. In Rooker, the Court stated that 
the lower federal courts may not choose to act "directly," or, as the 
Robinson court has attempted to act, "indirectly" to review state court 
decisions.389/ 
A number of reasons can be offered to explain why the lower federal 
courts cannot and should not act as the appellate courts of the state: 
First, allowing federal court review like that of Robinson would 
substantially diminish the authority and sovereignty of the state court 
system. It is an established principle that state court decisions are 
"controlling on issues of state law.390/ However, if federal courts 
could assert jurisdiction every time-a litigant argued that a state 
supreme court decision was unconstitutional on the grounds that it 
modified prior state law, then we would have little need for a state 
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judicial system. State courts would be largely useless and impotent, 
because they could not speak with finality on any issue. Few would be 
interested in bringing suit in state court because any losing party who 
argues that the result was unexpected or "unpredictable" 391/ could 
conceivably obtain jurisdiction for review in federal cou~ 
Second, because federal courts could assert jurisdiction whenever 
state law changed, state courts would be deprived of their primary 
responsibility for fashioning state law. By voiding a decision, as in 
Robinson, federal courts would in effect determine state law by de-
claring what state courts could not do. The state court could never 
reconsider or alter prior law without fear of reversal. 
Third, not only would this assumption of appellate power by lower 
federal courts be without the necessary congressional authorization, but 
it would also increase the workload of the federal courts in contra-
vention of the express desire on the part of Congress and the Supreme 
Court to reduce the workload of the federal courts.392/ 
Fourth, the jurisdiction of the federal courts, as expressed in the 
relevant jurisdictional statutes, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331 and 28 U.S.C. 
sec. 1343, is strictly "original." The grants of jurisdiction embodied 
in these sections should not be read to undermine the exclusiveness of 
United States Supreme Court review of state court decisions as expressed in 28 U.S.C. sec. 1257. 
Fifth, allowing federal courts to review state court decisions as 
in Robinson would undermine Section 1257's reqUirement that an appeal 
from a state court be from the highest court of the state 393/ and that 
such an appeal be timely filed.394/ Moreover, Robinson-ty~review 
where a new trial is granted would undercut the Supreme Court's re-
quirement that review of state decisions be limited to the facts on the 
state court record.395/ 
Thus, it seems clear that the doctrine expressed in Rooker, that 
lower federal courts may not, under any circumstances, act as the 
appellate court of a state, serves an important purpose in maintaining 
the balance between the state and federal courts. The fact that federal 
court intervention as in Robinson creates so many of these problems 
points toward reversal on appeal. 
The Court in Robinson Lacked Jurisdiction Because the Case 
Presented No Substantlal Federal Questlon. 
The court in Robinson assumed jurisdiction based on the 
existence of a "federal question," that is, a cause of action raiSing an 
issue under federal statutory or constitutional law.396/ The federal 
question asserted in Robinson was that the f1cBryde decision "took" 
petitioners' water rights without compensation, as prohibited by the 
fifth amendment. 
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In large part, the argument that courts can "take" property is 
based solely on the unsupported reasoning of Justice Stewart's con-
curring opinion in the 1967 case of Hughes v. l~ashington.397/ In a 1946 
decision, the Supreme Court of Washington had construed Article 17 of 
the Washington State Constitution to hold that title to gradual shore-
line accretions vested in the owner of the adjoining land. In a deci-
sion twenty years later, the Supreme Court of Hashington reversed itself 
and held that Article 17 terminated the rights of such landowners. 
Justice Stewart posed the problem in the following manner: "Does such a 
prospective change in state property law constitute a compensable 
taking?"398/ 
Answering this question in the affirmative, Justice Stewart argued 
that such changes in state law constituted a "taking" violative of the 
fifth amendment: 
[A] state cannot be permitted to defeat the 
constitutional prohibition against taking 
property without due process of law by the 
simple device of asserting retroactively that 
the property it has taken never existed at all. 
Whether the decision here worked an unpredict-
able change in state law thus inevitably 
presents a federal question for the determina-
tion of this Court.399/ 
Thus, according to Justice Stewart, state law which is in the 
process of changing does not remain solely an issue of state law: 
To the extent that the decision of the 
Supreme Court of Washington on that issue 
arguably conforms to reasonable expectations, 
we must of course accept it as conclusive. 
But to the extent that it constitutes a sudden 
change in state law, unpredictable in terms 
of relevant precedents, no such deference 
would be appropriate.400/ 
Justice Stewart's view is based on an "I-know-it, when-I-see-it" 
reasoning. It must be a "taking" because prior to the decision the 
landowners had the property which is suddenly no longer their property 
after the decision. Obviously, in the eyes of Justice Stewart, property 
was "taken." It is no less so when the result of action taken by the 
judiciary instead of by the executive branch: 
Because the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment forbids such confiscation by a State, 
no less through its courts than through its 
legislature, and no less when a taking is delib-
erate, I join in reversing the judgment.40l/ 
-
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However, no matter how "logical" this view is, it creates insurmountable 
practical and theoretical problems in terms of the balance between state 
and federal courts. 
The traditional view is that courts in their mediational roles do 
not "take" property from one litigant and "give" it to another. Courts 
do not "take," they "declare" what rights each litigant has. Other 
agencies of the State, charged with the enforcement of judicial deci-
sions (such as sheriffs) can "take" property. The courts themselves, 
however, do not "take" but only make declarations upon which other state 
agencies or officials may eventually "take." Hence, it is incorrect to 
assert that the McBryde decision itself was an unconstitutional depri-
vation of property. The decision only declared rights. In that sense, 
the decision could be "wrong" (in terms of ignoring precedent) but, the 
decision itself could not be called "unconstitutional." 
Other governmental action resulting from the McBryde decision could 
conceivably be unconstitutional and could constitute a taking. If such 
action did constitute a "taking," then the Robinson petitioners would 
have had a cause of action if they could have specified the nature of 
the threatened government action. The government, however, had not 
taken or threatened any imminent action, because all parties were 
waiting for further judicial interpretation. It could be argued, 
therefore, that the allegation of a governmental taking was not "ripe" 
for judicial review. 
In any event, the Robinson court did not believe it necessary to 
specify any threatened governmental action in order to establish a 
possible "taking." In the eyes of the court, a "taking" had already 
occurred in the form of the declarations contained in McBryde. 
Not only is it logical to state that as a general rule courts 
"declare" and do not "take," but more specifically, in terms of adju-
dicating title and ownership rights, courts cannot be said to be "tak-
ing" ownership from one party and giving it to another. Rather, in this 
situation the judge is "finding" who was the true and original owner.402/ 
The notion that judges "find" rather than "make" law is the tradi-
tional "Blackstonian" 403/ view of the appellate process. However, 
strict adherence to th~judicial philosophy was set aside with Supreme 
Court approval of the technique of prospective overruling.404/ Although 
it has been argued that prospective overruling should be favored in 
property cases,405/ this technique simply does not work for the de-
termination of ownership or title which was at issue in McBryde. 
The concept of ownership is inherently retroactive. When one 
speaks about "ownership" one is speaking about a characteristic or 
quality of the item that has an ultimate final answer. There is, in 
other words, a "true state" of ownership. Thus, decisions involving 
ownership require a search to "find" who is the true owner. In this 
sense, prospective overruling would be totally inappropriate as applied 
to ownership questions. Thus, any redetermination of ownership must be 
retroactive in nature. 
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It is this retroactive nature of the decision which causes so many 
problems in McBryde. It cannot be said, after McBryde, simply that the 
State is now the owner of the surplus water. The decision holds that 
the State has always (retroactively) been the owner of the surplus 
water. Others, namely, McBryde and Robinson who have used the waters, 
have never (retroactively) been the "owners" of these waters. It is 
this retroactive nature of McBryde which many perceive as constituting a 
"taking" by the State of the water without compensation. 
The constitutionality of retroactive overruling has had a confused 
history in the law.406/ At one point the United States Supreme Court 
did rule that retroactive overruling could be unconstitutional.407/ 
In Muhlker v. New York and Harlem Railroad,408/ the petitioner 
alleged that the decision of the New York Court or-Appeals which re-
versed earlier law constituted a deprivation of property without just 
compensation. When plaintiff Muhlker purchased his land in 1888, New 
York law held that the erection of an elevated railroad was not a public 
purpose or street use within the meaning of an 1813 New York statute. 
The statute, thus interpreted, allowed a property owner to sue anyone 
for damages who built an elevated railroad adjacent to the property. 
Subsequently, the New York and Harlem Railroad constructed a track in 
front of Muhlker's property. The New York Court of Appeals reversed its 
prior decision and held that an elevated railroad was a public use 
within the meaning of the statute. Therefore, Muhlker could not sue. 
The United States Supreme Court, however, reversed and held that the New 
York Court of Appeals' decision, which retroactively overruled the cases 
upon which Muhlker had relied, constituted a deprivation of property 
without due process of law. 
The facts in Muhlker are similar to those in t'1cBr1ide. In ~1cBryde, 
petitioners claim to have relied on earlier cases esta l;shing that 
certain adjoining landowners could own the surplus waters of a stream. 
As in Muhlker, McBryde overruled earlier decisions ~ in order to hold 
that the State was the "owner" of the private waters of the stream. 
Hence, if Muhlker has continued validity, it is an important case upon 
whi ch the Robi nson petiti oners can rely. Petiti oners have cited t~uhl ker 
in all of their post-McBryde arguments. Moreover, Judge Pence in 
Robinson also based his decision on the ~1uhlker rul ing.4l0/ 
Thus, a critical question in determining the likelihood of the 
reversal of Robinson is whether Muhlker is still a good precedent. 
Twelve years prior to Muhlker the Supreme Court took the opposite 
position in Central Land Co. v. Laidle1·~ In Laidley, the West 
Virginia Supreme Court reinterpreted a statute to hold that a deed, 
which had been valid under an earlier construction of the statute, was 
invalid, and held that a later deed conveyed proper title. The peti-
tioner claimed that the new construction was an unconstitutional depri-
vation of property without due process. The United States Supreme Court 
rejected this argument. In contrast to its later position in Muhlker, 
the Court stated that an "erroneous decision of a state court does not 
deprive the unsuccessful party of his property without due process of 
1 aw. "412/ 
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Thus, Laidley and Muhlker are at odds with each other. Although 
Muhlker has never been expressly overruled, in a number of subsequent 
cases the Court has followed Laidley and not t1uhlker, undercutting the 
assertion that retroactive overruling could be unconstitutiona1.~ 
Finally, two Supreme Court cases, one in 1930 and another in 1938, 
implicitly eliminated any validity remaining in the views expressed in 
Muhlker. In 1930, the Supreme Court decided Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust and 
Savings Co. v. Hill,~ and reaffirmed the position it took in Laidley 
that an erroneous state court decision could not deprive litigants of 
any right guaranteed by the substantive component of the due process 
clause.4l5/ In essence, on issues of state law, whether right or wrong, 
state courts are final and the Supreme Court is bound by that deter-
mination. Thus, state court decisions that overrule prior law cannot 
"take" property in a fifth amendment sense. 
The court in Brinkerhoff-Faris also made an important distinction. 
It held that although a state court decision could not deprive a person 
of property in a fifth-amendment substantive-due-process sense, courts 
could act to deny persons of procedural due process in violation of the 
fourteenth amendment. The court said: 
Our present concern is solely with the 
question whether the plaintiff has been 
accorded due process in the primary sense,--
whether it has had an opportunity to present 
its case and be heard in its support.~ 
~1uch of the confusion over whether state courts can "take" has been 
caused by the manner in which the fifth amendment is made applicable to 
the states. Until 1897, the fifth amendment's "taking" provision was 
not applicable to the states. In Chicago Burlington and quincy R. R. v. 
Chicago,~ the fifth amendment was held to apply to the states through 
the fourteenth amendment. Because some support exists for including 
state courts within the definition of "states" in the fourteenth amend-
ment, it has been argued that the fourteenth amendment due process 
clause incorporates the application of the fifth amendment to the 
actions of state courts.418/ 
However, careful analysis of Brinkerhoff-Faris should make clear 
the distinction between the substantive and procedural components of the 
due process clause. Brinkerhoff-Faris sanctions only the application of 
procedural due process to the actions of state courts. Hence, in view 
of Brinkerhoff-Faris and the cases that ignored rluh1ker and followed 
LaidleY,4l9/ there can be no federal question based on a "takings" 
argument. 
The second case that substantially undercut tluh1ker was Erie v. 
Tompkins, decided in 1938.420/ One of the weaknesses of r-luhlker was 
that it implicitly relied on-Gelpcke v. Dubugue.421/ The Gelpcke line 
of cases 422/ stood for the principle that in determining whether to 
apply an earlier state supreme court decision or a later overruling 
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state supreme court decision, which possibly constituted a "taking," a 
federal court hearing the case under diversity jurisdiction had the 
freedom of selecting the earlier state decision in order to avoid a 
"taking." However, this ability to iqnore the latest state supreme 
court decision was based on the peculiarities of diversity jurisdiction 
and the confusion under Swift v. Tyson 423/ as to which state decision 
could be applied. -
After Erie, the federal courts, when acting under diversity juris-
diction, have no power to choose between the earlier and later state 
decisions. Erie commanded the federal court to apply the latest state 
court decision regardless of whether that decision resulted in a retro-
active overruling of prior law. Thus, to the extent that Muhlker relied 
on Gel peke, thi s rati ona 1 e for tluh 1 ker was swept away with the advent of 
Erie in 1938. If Robinson rests upon a view that the retroactive 
overruling of earlier decisions is an unconstitutional deprivation of 
property without due process, the only case supporting that position is 
Muhlker, which has been moribund for years. 
Thus, no case or sound legal theory supports the assertion that 
courts can "take" in violation of the fifth amendment. No valid basis 
exists op which to assert federal question jurisdiction, and Robinson is 
also subject to reversal for this reason. 
Res Judicata. 
A third reason supporting reversal of Robinson is that the 
doctrine of res judicata should have been applied to bar the federal 
court from hearing the case. Simply stated, the doctrine of res judi-
cata prevents a trial court from hearing a case that has already been 
decided on the merits by a different court. The Latin words might be 
translated "the matter has been adjudicated." The purpose of res 
judicata is to provide a point of finality in the judicial process.424/ 
Thus, if a case is brought in one court and pursued to a judgment 
on the merits, the losing party cannot refile the same causes of action 
in a different court. The question presented in Robinson is whether a 
federal district court is compelled to apply res judicata to causes of 
action in t"cBryde that were litigated in state court. 
It can be argued quite forcefully that a federal district court 
sitting in the state where judgment was rendered must apply res judicata 
as if it were a state court and were so compelled by the substantive law 
of the state. The basis for this assertion lies in the force and effect 
of a federal statute, 28 U.S.C. sec. 1738. That section provides: 
The ... judicial proceedings of any court 
of any ... State ... shall have the same 
full faith and credit in every court within 
the United States ... as they have by law 
or usage in the courts of such State 
from which they are taken.425/ 
-209-
The language "every court within the United States" clearly in-
cludes the federal district courts.426/ Hence, the court in Robinson 
should have applied res judicata ana-refused to hear the action if the 
doctrine of res judicata would have been properly applied by a state 
court. 
It seems highly probable that the Hawaii state courts would have 
applied res jUdicata if Robinson had been filed in state instead of 
federal court.427/ As set forth earlier, the causes of action in 
McBryde and RobTnson are essentially the same. If it is agreed that the 
constitutional validity of a state supreme court decision does not 
create a new cause of action, then the cause of action or "ultimate 
practical question"428/ in both cases was the same--namely, the deter-
mination of rights ~ater. Because this issue had been already once 
determined, the doctrine of res judicata would have been invoked by the 
Hawaii state courts to prevent relitigation. 
The Robinson court justifies its refusal to apply res judicata on 
the grounds that the result reached in McBryde was totally "unexpect-
ed. "429/ However, the decision to apply res judicata is not to be 
measured by the nature of the decision reached, but rather by the 
congruence of the parties involved and causes of action which are 
asserted.430/ 
Furthermore, it might be argued that res judicata need not apply 
because the parties in Robinson and McBryde were different. This 
argument has also been discussed earlier.431/ The addition in Robinson 
of state officials charged with the enforcement of the decision does not 
change the real nature of the action. It is not an original action but 
a disguised appeal from a state supreme court decision. The "new" de-
fendants are not really "new" because they were impl icitly involved in 
McBryde to the extent that they were responsible for enforcing the 
decision. Moreover, courts have steadily moved away from a strict 
requirement that all parties be the same in order that res judicata be 
applied.432/ 
Lastly, an argument might be made in defense of the Robinson 
decision that a second action filed in federal court asserting the 
deprivation of a civil right under 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 should constitute 
an exception to the res judicata requirement. Section 1983 provides 
legal and equitable redress for deprivations of federal constitutional 
or statutory civil rights by persons acting under color of state law.433/ 
The asserted constitutional violation in Robinson was that the IkBryde 
decision "took" petitioners property in violation of the fifth amend-
ment. 
If it is agreed that decisions cannot "take" property, then, this 
cause of action affords no basis for a Section 1983 claim. Moreover, 
although the United States Supreme Court has not ruled in the question 
of whether a Section 1983 claim constitutes an exception to res judi-
cata,434/ the vast majority of the federal appeals courts have ruled 
that ~does not.435/ The Robinson court attempts to distinguish this 
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line of cases on the grounds that the litigants could not have antici-
pated and therefore, could not have raised the Section 1983 claims.436/ 
The court argued that the McBryde decision created the Section 1983 
claim and thus, in Robinson, petitioners were raising that claim at the 
first possible opportunity. However, this justification crumbles if one 
agrees with the analysis that a decision cannot "take" property. If a 
decision could "take" property, then each decision that allegedly "took" 
property or was in some manner unexpected, could be relitigated despite 
the doctrine of res judicata. 
If this were so, the appellate process would be undermined because 
every unexpected state (or federal) trial court decision could be 
re1itigated in federal (or state) court. Litigants would have no need 
to follow the appropriate path of appeal to each higher court. The 
absurdity of this situation results from the original premise that 
courts can "take" property. 
At this point, it should be acknowledged that the manner in which 
courts act through their decisions may have all the effects and rami-
fications of a "taking," in the sense that property formerly "belonging" 
to one person is no longer in that person's possession. However, words 
have whatever meanings one chooses to assign to them. We could cer-
tainly agree to say that courts can "take." However, the consequences 
of assigning courts the abil ity to "take" would be to reduce the judi-
cial process to shambles. For practical and theoretical considerations, 
we must conclude that it is better to say that courts cannot "take." 
There is no inherently "true" answer to the question whether 
courts can "take." But if we examine the consequences of a decision to 
include courts within the "taking" provision of the fifth amendment, as 
this section has attempted to do, we see that those consequences are 
devastating to our judicial system and in conflict with our philoso-
phical approach to the manner in which courts act. 
The only reason the Robinson court felt obliged to say that "courts 
can take" was to preserve another valued principle--that property 
cannot be "taken" by government without just compensation. However, as 
will be discussed later, it is not necessary to assert that courts can 
"take" in order to preserve this principle. 
Summary. 
Three reasons have been offered for predicting a reversal of 
Robinson. The first two arguments assert that the federal district 
court had no jurisdiction or power to hear the case. It lacked this 
jurisdiction on the grounds that it had no power to act directly or 
indirectly as an appellate court of the state and that no substantial 
federal question had been presented to the court. Finally, the Robinson 
court, because of the doctrine of res judicata, should have chosen to 
bar relitigation of essentially the same cause of action asserted in 
McBryde. 
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Sotomura v. County of Hawaii 
On October 16, 1978, the United States District 
District of Hawaii issued its opinion in Sotomur.a v. 
a case that raises many of the same issues addressed 
Because of the similar procedural context of the two 
cussion of Sotomura is needed here. 
Court for the 
County of Hawaii ,437/ 
in Robinson. 
cases, some dis-
The County of Hawaii began a condemnation action in July, 1970, to 
purchase the Sotomuras' beachfront property for inclusion in a new 
public park. The Sotomuras' property had been registered with the land 
court in 1962, and the seaward boundary of the land was fixed by decree 
of the land court at the seaweed line, according to the practice at that 
date. 
The trial judge determined that some erosion had occurred since 
registration. To locate the current seaward boundary of the land, the 
trial judge applied the rule set down in In re Ashford,438/ that the 
seaward boundary of unregistered land was the upper reaches of the wash 
of the waves, the so-called "debris" line. On appeal, the Supreme Court 
of Hawaii held that the seaward boundaries of the Sotomuras' property 
was to be measured by the "vegetation" line, a line farther inland from 
the trial court's determination. The "vegetation" line was approxi-
mately 43 feet inland from the "seaweed" line where the boundary had 
been set by the land court at the time of registration; the "debris" 
line was 27 feet inland from the seaweed line. 
In essence, the Hawaii Supreme Court had retroactively changed the 
definition of the high water mark. Their decision was justified by 
reference to earlier Hawaiian customs and was supported by reasoning 
that is persuasive to many. Regardless of the merits of the decision, 
however, a change in property law occurred leading to a federal claim 
that the court had "taken" property. In the lower court proceeding, the 
high water mark was measured by the line where the debris could be found 
on the beach. The Supreme Court held that the high water mark was 
measured by the vegetation line. This re-definition by the Hawaii 
Supreme Court of the high water mark deprived the landowners of property 
valued at $37,000. 
The Sotomuras petitioned for a rehearing before the Hawaii Supreme 
Court. The rehearing was denied.439/ Subsequently, the Sotomuras 
sought review in the Supreme CourtlDf the United States, which was also 
denied.4401 
Thereafter, as in Robinson, the Sotomuras filed an action in 
federal court alleging that the decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court was 
a "taking" of their property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. In 
October of 1978, the federal district court, Judge Dick Yin Hong, issued 
its opinion agreeing with the Sotomuras' contentions. The Court in its 
conclusions stated: 
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The Hawaii Supreme Court's retroactive 
application of Ashford standards to locate 
the seaward boundary of the property at the 
vegetation line, following erosion, ignoring 
vested property rights and without determin-
lng the extent of actual erosion, was so 
radical a departure from prior state laws as 
to constitute a taking of the Owner's property 
by the State of Hawaii without just compensa-
tion in violation of rights secured them by 
the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States 
Constitution.11Jj 
Thus, the two major issues present in Robinson also exist in 
Sotomura. First is the question of whether the action brought in 
federal court was an improper appeal of a state supreme court decision. 
The Sotomuras clearly were seeking a reversal of the state supreme 
court's decision. As in Robinson, the validity of the federal court's 
intervention rests wholly on the assertion that the state supreme court, 
through its decision, "took" the property of the Sotomuras. As in 
Robinson the conclusion that a court can substantively "take" property 
based on Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Hughes v. llashing-
ton.4421 
The second major question in Sotomura, as in Robinson, is whether 
the federal district court should have avoided this controversy because 
of the doctrine of res judicata. In its conclusion, the court stated: 
The claims of the Owners in this action 
were not litigated and could not have been 
litigated in the Third Circuit Court, State 
of Hawaii, or in the Hawaii Supreme Court, 
absent a granting of the Petition for Rehear-
ing, and are not barred by the doctrine of 
res judicata. (Scoggin v. Schrunk, 522 F.2d 
436 (9th Cir. 1975), cited by defendants is 
clearly distinguishable.) 
In essence, as in Robinson, the court stated that the "taking" of 
property by the state supreme court was a new cause of action which 
arose out of the decision itself. Because this cause of action was a 
new one, it could not have been raised before and thus was not barred by 
the doctrine of res judicata. The validity of this view rests upon the 
conclusion that an unexpected decision of a state court can create a 
"taking" cause of action. 
The most significant difference between Robinson and Sotomura is 
the federal court's conclusion in Sotomura that the failure of the state 
court to give res judicata effect to the land court decree was a denial 
of the substantive protection of the due process clause. This con-
clusion raises the issue of whether the federal constitution limits the 
ability of state courts to fashion state res judicata law. Such law has 
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been traditionally a matter of state concern. The question is whether 
the departure from a settled rule about when res judicata applies is a 
denial of due process in violation of the federal constitution. 
Arguably, the improper application of res judicata to bar a claim 
and deprive a litigant of his or her day in court would be a denial of 
procedural due process.4431 The remedy would be to grant the litigant a 
day in court. On the other hand, the failure to apply res judicata or 
collateral estoppel to bar litigation on a claim or issue of fact which, 
in effect, would give a party an unexpected chance to litigate an issue 
would not be a violation of procedural due process to the adverse party. 
No party was deprived of a previous right to a hearing or right to 
litigate an issue. This situation is what occurred in Sotomura. A 
party, in this case the State, was the unsuspecting beneficiary of the 
right to open an issue once thought resolved--namely, the demarcation of 
the high water mark. Thus, an unexpected change in the law of res 
judicata which unexpectedly opens the right to relitigate an issue (as 
opposed to an unexpected decision which closes the door on an oppor-
tunity to be heard) does not violate the Brinkerhoff-Faris 4441 re-
quirement of a fair opportunity to be heard. 
Moreover, so long as one agrees that courts cannot "take" property, 
the unexpected decision to stop giving res judicata effect to land court 
decrees does not raise a substantial federal question. 
Thus, in conclusion, Sotomura and Robinson are largely based on the 
same reasoning. In both cases, the opinions significantly leave out any 
discussion of the Rooker doctrine 445/ and the applicability of 28 U.S.C. 
sec. 1738,446/ and their failure tOiresolve these issues raises a strong 
possibility-Qf reversal. 
The Impact of McBryde 
If Robinson is overturned by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit, then McBryde becomes the controlling judicial decision 
governing water law in Hawaii. Our task would then become one of 
interpreting what tlcBryde means and determining what impact it will have 
on possible legislative action in the area of water management. The 
McBryde decision is significant because of two particular rulings--that 
the private landowners cannot transport water from one watershed to 
another and that the State is the owner of the surplus water. 
Transportation of Water. 
t,1a ny ha ve wondered about the effect of the 1 anguage in McBryde 
that states that the private landowners may not transport water from one 
watershed to another. Indeed, representatives of the sugar industry 
have pointed out that if this ruling is fully enforced, irrigation to 
the sugar fields in the dry parts of the islands will be terminated and 
the industry will collapse. Undoubtedly, the construction of further 
irrigation projects and the purchase and sale of water rights and land 
claiming such rights has been paralyzed because of this uncertainty.4471 
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First, we should be clear on what the court actually says. The 
McBryde majority does not state that water can never be transported out 
of its original watershed area. The court holds only that the private 
landowners cannot transport water out of the Hanapepe Valley because 
their water rights are appurtenant and riparian rights which are limited 
to use within the original watershed.448/ The majority opinion also 
holds that, because the early Hawaiian-5tatutes were designed to bring 
the riparian doctrine to Hawaii, no landowner can divert water to the 
injury of other landowners who "are entitled to have the flow of water 
in the Hanapepe River in the shape and size given it by nature. "449/ 
The court based these rulings on two early Hawaiian statutes 450/ and 
invited the legislature "to conduct a thorough re-examination of the 
area."lli/ The legislature could, therefore, amend these rulings. 
The court's statement that the private landowners cannot transport 
water is also possibly open to question, because this issue was not 
before the court and so the court's statements are "dicta" rather than a 
binding "holding." The impact of a court's statement on an issue 
depends on whether the statement is considered part of the holding of 
the case. Was this statement necessary for the judgment at issue, or 
merely dicta, a kind of off-hand pronouncement by the court?452/ The 
questiop at issue in McBryde was who owned the surplus water--. --Were the 
issues of the severability of water rights and transportability of water 
necessary for a determi nati on of the "ownership" of water? It appears 
that a determination of the ownership question would not first require a 
determination of whether water may be transported from one watershed to 
another. 
For example, if landowner A asserts an easement right over the 
property of his neighbor landowner B, suppose the court, after ruling 
that landowner A does have such an easement right, were to say that 
landowner A could not transfer that easement right to another party. 
Suppose, also, that this statement regarding transfer is the first such 
expression in the jurisdiction. How would one classify the effect of 
this statement? Because it does not appear to be a necessary issue to 
resolve prior to a resolution of the issue of ownership, it would appear 
to be dicta. In other words, it is merely predictive of how the court 
is likely to act in a case properly brought before it, where transfer of 
an easement right is at issue. 
Although a later court can overrule a holding (the rule of the 
case) just as it can ignore a statement that is dicta, it is generally 
agreed that dicta is accorded much less deference. Dicta regarding the 
transfer of water is merely predictive of how the court is likely to act 
in much the same manner as a law review article authored by a judge is 
predictive. Dicta is a notice of the possibility of change in a legal 
doctrine. 
The McBryde majority's statement on the transportability of water 
ts thus indicative of possible future changes, but does not constitute a 
present change in the law. The possibility that this change will 
become a realjty is subject to various factors, such as changes in the 
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composition of the court and persuasive arguments presented in the legal 
literature before the court addresses this issue directly. Certainly, 
it can be agreed that the statement does not operate in the same manner 
as a criminal statute granting the State the power to jailor fine those 
who transport water. 
It seems that all that can be presently determined regarding this 
statement is that, assuming the prediliction of the Hawaii Supreme Court 
remains the same as it was at the time of the McBryde decision, the 
court is likely to rule, given a properly presented case, that certain 
as yet undefined parties can prevent the transportation of water out of 
the watershed by other parties. 
However, it is also clear that the situation has not remained the 
same as it was at the time of the McBryde decision. The composition of 
the court has changed. Justice Abe, who authored McBryde, is no longer 
on the court. Two new justices will join the court in 1979. r10reover, 
many commentators have expressed concern about the adverse economic 
impact of a ruling prohibiting all transfer of water. Thus, the criti-
cal question is the probability of a newly constituted court accepting 
the suggestion in ~1cBryde that water cannot be transported from one 
watershed to another. 
Some may fault the court for not making it clear whether or not the 
ruling was dicta. However, traditionally, courts have not taken it upon 
themselves to distinguish self-consciously between dicta and the rule of 
the case in their decisions. What constitutes dicta is not something 
which the court has any control over. A court could not pronounce new 
rules not related to the issue presented and by mere declaration magic-
ally change them from di'cta into part of the holding. The essential 
function of courts is to render judgments, not write opinions. More-
over, opinions do not "create" law, they really only indicate to us the 
likely judgments of a court in the future as to certain fact situations. 
The real difference between a holding and dicta is that a holding is 
much more predictive of the future than is dicta. 
Thus, if it can be agreed that the transportability ruling is more 
suggestive than self-executing, it should not inhibit the legislature 
from considering this question directly. Although the State could 
decide to restrict transportability, it is difficult to envision any 
water management system which would, as a permanent feature, prevent all 
transportation of water. 
If the Hawaii Supreme Court were to follow its suggestion in 
rkBryde regarding transportability in a future case, the legislature 
would still have the power to overrule such a decision and permit 
transfer, because the court has rested its view on earlier statutes.453/ 
Once the legislature acts, it will then provide the guidance that ha--s--
been missing. It can clarify the earlier statutes or substitute new 
guidelines. The problem so far has been that the state supreme court 
has been compelled, because of its responsibility in resolving disputes, 
to create a system of water law with no legislative guidance. 
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State "Ownership" of \later. 
The fundamenta 1 reason for the confus i on fo 11 owi ng ~1cBryde has 
been an inability to agree on what the majority meant when they spoke of 
"state ownership" of the surplus waters. The term "ownership" has been 
assigned a number of different meanings when used in reference to 
water.454/ In some statutes and constitutions, "state ownership" has 
been interpreted to mean publici juris, i.e., belonging to the state in 
the sense that it is the sovereign or the "representative" of the public 
to enforce the public interest.455/ Other courts have interpreted state 
ownership in a "public trust" sense, such that the state is the trustee 
of the water for the benefit of the public.~ Another manner of 
interpreting state ownership is in a res publicae or proprietary sense, 
that is, ownership in the manner that the state owns the state capitol 
and Washington Place.457/ 
It is this last definition that seems to cause all of the problems. 
Under the first two definitions, the State does not "own" the water in 
the sense that one owns an automobile. Rather, the State "owns" the 
water in the sense that it has the power of control over the water. 
On the other hand, the res publicae or proprietary sense of owner-
ship connotes a much more commonly held conception of ownership. In 
essence, it means "ownership" similar to the way one owns a watch or 
car. It is this res publicae use of the word that creates the belief 
that the McBryde decision caused a "taking." If the State is now the 
owner of the water, this newly found ownership must have displaced a 
previous owner. 
Host states do not assert ownership over water in a res publicae 
sense,458/ because many state purposes are served by the more limited 
claim Qf"state ownership" to effectuate control and regulation.459/ 
Moreover, a court does not need to declare "state ownership" in order to 
grant the state the powers of control and regulation. Control and 
regulation can be justified under the exercise of the police powers. 
Thus, if "state ownership" as used in tkBryde is interpreted in its most 
meaningful sense, as reaffirming the power of state control and regula-
tion, then nothing was "given" to the State. It already had powers of 
control and regulation. It does not make sense to say that anything was 
"taken" from other parties. 
Furthermore, although the McBryde decision does speak of "state 
ownership" of water, evidence indicates that the court intended to use 
the "public trust" connotation.460/ This "public trust" usage implies 
much more of a "control-and-regUlate" usage than a res publicae usage. 
If these vi ews. a re accepted, the ~1cBryde deci s i on does not raise a 
"ripe" controversy regarding compensation. The declaration of "state 
ownership" in f1cBryde, if it means only that the State can control and 
regulate, does not take property. 
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The question of compensation may arise when the government does 
actually seek to control and regulate water. But this situation has not 
come about and is totally unrelated to the facts in t1cBryde and Robinson. 
The question whether such actual regulations constitute a "taking" would 
be measured under the same judicially promulgated tests that have been 
used to measure the validity of other government controls. 
Thus, much of the hostility towards f1cBryde rests upon the belief 
that the court attempted, by circuitous reasoning, to deny compensation 
for property that had been "taken." But, no property was "taken." If 
the court had stated that the "state shall have the power to control and 
regulate surplus waters," then, there would have been no controversy. 
Instead, it is the use of the term "state ownership" that caused much of 
the confusion. 
If the 11cBryde decision is reviewed in this light, it does not 
appear to be a drastic or radical decision. At most, the court may be 
guilty of avoiding one of the questions presented to it. It is as if 
the court, when asked to determine whether a party "A" had acquired 
prescriptive rights from "B," had replied, "no, neither A nor B has such 
rights because the state has the power to control and regulate the 
property." The second part of the statement does not answer the ques-
tion initially posed. If the result is that neither A nor B may take 
water, then the justification that the state may control water is not 
an answer and does not necessarily follow. For example, under its power 
to control and regulate, the state may actually determine that it is a 
valid practice for A or B to take water from the stream. 
The critical point is that if the state had prevented A or B from 
taking water out of the stream, then the case would be "ripe" for a 
determination of whether a "taking" had occurred. It does not matter 
whether the justification for preventing A or B from taking water rested 
on the power to regulate under the police powers or rested upon the 
McBryde decision's declaration of state control. Hhether or not such 
government action constituted a "taking" would be measured under the 
traditional tests.46l/ 
McBryde may thus have very little impact on future legislative 
action. If "state ownership" is interpreted to mean "control or regu-
lation," then the State really did not receive any new power that it did 
not already possess by virtue of the police powers. Hence, new water 
legislation would not conflict with the ruling in I1cBryde. 
If, on the other hand, Robinson is affirmed on appeal and the 
McBryde decision is effectively "voided," then, the state of the law is 
returned to the situation that existed prior to 11cBryde. The major 
cases before HcBryde did sanction private ownership of water.462/ 
However, the State would still have the inherent power to control and 
regulate water. Hence, these "private waters" would not be beyond 
control by the State even though such control might eventually require 
compensation. 
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Conclusion 
Although it does seem, for the three major reasons set forth 
earlier, that Robinson will be reversed on appeal, the effect of a 
reversal or even of an affirmance may not have a major impact on the 
future course of water management. 
Even in the event of reversal, the McBryde decision may not lessen 
the obligation to pay compensation if property rights are deemed to have 
been taken by government regulation. Moreover, the power and inherent 
authority of the State to regulate water was neither enlarged nor 
reduced by McBryde. The statement of the court in McBryde that water 
may not be transported is merely predictive of a future ruling by the 
court. The likelihood of such a ruling may have lessened because of 
changes in the composition of the court and substantial comment on the 
adverse impact of such a ruling. 
It appears that the real lessons to be learned from McBryde and 
Robinson concern the nature of the judicial process. As to Robinson, it 
is important that the theory that courts can "take" property be dis-
credited. Affirmance of Robinson would constitute a large step towards 
undermining the state judicial process. As to McBryde, perhaps the 
lesson to be learned is that judicial language does not always mean what 
it purports to convey and that the impact of judicial language must be 
interpreted in light of the functions a court performs. 
THE WATER RIGHTS SYSTEMS OF OTHER STATES 
Introduction 
Many other states have experienced controversies over water rights, 
and Hawaii's current disputes can be better understood by comparing the 
situation here to those of other states. This section focuses on the 
water systems of nine western states (Alaska, Arizona, California, 
Colorado, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Texas, and Wyoming), which were 
chosen because their experiences and problems parallel those of Hawaii 
in some way. Examples are offered from other states as well, to illus-
trate innovative approaches that are relevant to Hawaii. 
The fresh water resources of the nine selected states are eco-
nomically or physically scarce. As a result, water law is an important 
part of their legal tradition. These selected states represent both 
"generally more arid" and "generally less arid" conditions. Conse-
quently, their laws and practices portray a variety of options regard-
ing: (1) conceptualizing and expressing state or public dominion over 
inland waters; (2) taking private water rights for public or private 
uses; (3) utilizing the courts to formulate water rights policies; and 
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(4) creating organizational and administrative structures to regulate, 
control, and adjudicate water rights. 
The Ownership Concept 
State constitutions and statutes differ in their manner of assert-
ing and expressing state or public ownership concepts. Some states 
assert that water is the property of the state. Others assert that 
waters are the public's property, held in trust by the state. Still 
other states avoid the "ownership" concept by asserting the state's 
right to regulate and control water use. 
The exact language chosen is rarely crucial, but two different 
conceptions of state "ownership" can be identified. The basic dif-
ference involves viewing the state (1) as the owner of the corpus 
(physical substance) of the water in the res publicae or proprietary 
sense of having exclusive title, or (2) as the possessor of a sovereign 
right which empowers it to carry out its proper functions by regulating 
private water use for the common benefit of the people (publici juris). 
In general, most commentators have felt that the corpus of freely 
flowing water is not anyone's property because no one can possess 
running water, and possession is generally an essential legal element of 
ownership. The right to use water, however, can be and generally is 
treated as property. Therefore, the only practical function of con-
stitutional or statutory declarations of ownership, in whatever form, is 
to lay a foundation for control and management of this resource. 
A few examples can illustrate this treatment. ltlyoming drafted its 
constitutional provisions on water rights while it was a territory, and 
these provisions remain the basis for the present system of water 
management. One provision states unequivocally that all waters are the 
state's property: 
The water of all natural streams, springs, 
lakes or other collections of still water, 
within the boundaries of the state, are 
hereby declared to be the property of the 
state.463/ 
Another provision provides that: 
Priority of appropriation for beneficial 
uses shall give the better right. No 
appropriation shall be denied except when 
such denial is demanded by the public 
interest. 464/ (An "appropriation" system 
is described later in this text, pages 
222-26.) 
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The Supreme Court of ~Jyomi ng interpreted these cons tituti ona 1 provl s 1 ons 
as an affirmation that state "ownership" is in the nature of a sovereign, 
not a proprietor.465/ In a more recent case, the court stated: 
The state holds the water merely as trustee 
for the public and not in a proprietary 
capacity.466/ 
Montana and Texas have constitutional and statutory provlslons that 
are similarly worded.467/ Again the state supreme courts rejected the 
res publicae, proprie~y, or possessory ownership concept and ruled 
that ownership is only in the publici juris sense of sovereignty.468/ 
The constitutions and statutes of Arizona, Colorado, Nevada, and 
New Mexico also state that all waters are the property of the public.469/ 
These four states all permit private use of water under systems of 
appropriation, which are described below. Alaska constitutionally 
requires the legislature to maximize the benefit, to the people, of 
natural resources that are for common use.470/ The California Consti-
tution explicitly spells out the view that---prevails in most Hestern 
states: 
The use of all water now appropriated, or 
that may hereafter be appropriated, for sale, 
rental, or distribution, is hereby declared 
to be a public use, and subject to the regu-
lation and control of the State, in the 
manner to be prescribed by law.~ 
The Acguisition of Private Water Rights - Legal Doctrines 
States exercise their powers of control and regulation by first 
adopting a legal doctrine governing the acquisition of private water 
rights and then legislating procedures to govern such acquisitions. 
Courts and legislatures have focused on two legal doctrines, "riparian-
ism" and "appropriation," although none of the selected Western states 
now has an exclusively riparian system. 
Riparianism. 
Riparianism is a common law system originating in England and 
utilized in many of the Eastern states of the United States where water 
is abundant.472/ Its principal feature is that rights in water arise 
from, and on~from, ownership of land which adjoins a watercourse. The 
riparian right is a right to use the water, but the riparian landowner 
does not "own" the water.473/ The right cannot be destroyed by nonuse 
of the water, but it is generally 1 imited to "reasonable" use with 
respect to the rights of others in the watercourse.474/ Reasonable use 
may be determined by apportioning quantities, by giving one type of use 
preference over others, or by giving priority to an established use over 
a proposed new use.475/ The reasonable use theory assumes the right to 
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divert a reasonable amount of water from the natural streambed but 
demands that water diverted and unused be returned to the streambed.476/ 
Diversion of the waters in riparian systems is subject to two 
restrictions. First, some jurisdictions restrict use of the water to 
the riparian lands. California courts have generally held to this view. 
In one of the first cases exemplifying this philosophy, the California 
Supreme Court prohibited a riparian proprietor from transporting water 
for irrigation to a noncontiguous and non-riparian land parcel that he 
also owned.477/ By contrast, the Supreme Court of Texas has taken the 
position th~although the general rule constrains water use to riparian 
lands, its use on non-riparian lands will be permitted where water is 
abundant and no possible injury to other users will result.478/ 
The second restriction upon riparian diversion that is more gen-
erally followed precludes diversion of water from the watershed of a 
stream. 479/ This rule is based upon a long-standing property theory 
that "where water is used on such land, it will, after such use return 
to the stream, so far as it is not consumed, and that, as the rainfall 
on such land feeds the stream, the land is in consequence entitled, so 
to speak, to the use of its waters. "480/ 
Some riparian states--even in water abundant regions in the East--
have begun to regulate .riparian uses and issue permits for new uses. In 
New York, for instance, existing riparian uses are protected and pre-
served without any permit requirements, but new riparian water users 
must obtain permits before they can take water from streams. Non-
riparian water uses can also be acquired through permit systems similar 
to those described below.48l/ 
Permits are usually administered by a central state agency and are 
usually issued for fixed terms. Depending on the administrative agency's 
opinion of the water situation at the end of the permit period, permits 
mayor may not be renewed or extended. In some states, permits may be 
cancelled at any time when the administrative agency feels that such 
cancellation would best serve the public interest. However, before such 
cancellation becomes effective, notice is given to the permit holder and 
hearings are held.482/ 
Florida's 1972 Water Resources Act, for instance, states that 
permits are issued for a period of time not to exceed twenty years, 
depending on the water source and type of use, or both. Permits may, 
however, be issued for up to fifty years if the applicant is a govern-
ment body or public works corporation, or if the extended time is 
necessary for the retirement of bonds to be issued to finance construc-
tion of waterworks or waste disposal facilities.483/ Permits may be 
renewed or modified prior to renewal. RevocationlJf permits can occur 
for a number of reasons including false statements on applications, 
willful violation of permit conditions or provisions of the act, nonuse 
of the water, and voluntary consent of the permittee.484/ During 
emergencies resulting from water shortage, permits are subject to 
special limitations.485/ 
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In New Jersey, a permit is granted upon conditions that the ad-
ministrative agency deems necessary to protect the public interest.486/ 
All permits are limited for a period of up to twenty-five years 487/ and 
are not transferrable except upon approval of the administrative agen-
cy.488/ All permit users are required to pay an annual charge to the 
state for the right to divert surface waters. These charges are fixed 
by statute and are based on the amount of water diverted.489/ 
A major distinction between riparian rights and appropriation 
rights is that in contrast to the "first in time is first in right" 
concept among appropriators, no riparian owner can claim a superior 
right based merely on prior use of the water. The use of the stream 
belongs to all owners and is divided equally among them if the water is 
sufficient for all owners using it.~ In actual practice, however, 
prior uses are often protected.491/ Also, a riparian owner's right is 
not limited to any specific amount of water but is, as noted earlier, 
defined only in terms of reasonable use.492/ 
Appropriation. 
The essence of the appropriation system is that all water is 
available for use by anyone who can apply it to beneficial use. The 
first person to initiate a use has the first or prior right over all 
subsequent users, providing the use remains beneficial. The early water 
uses in the West began before any legal doctrines governed such use. 
The early miners and farmers settled in areas where water was available 
and simply diverted and used water as their needs required. Because few 
courts and no established water law doctrines existed during that 
period, early water users operated in accordance with rules and customs 
which they developed to control water use practices in their respective 
areas. It was during this early period that many Western areas rejected 
the riparian rights doctrine as incompatible with successful development 
and settlement, because under the riparian rights system water in 
streams could be used only by the riparian owner, which usually was the 
federal government. The local courts, therefore, decreed that riparian 
rights would not be recognized and that water could be diverted from a 
stream as long as it was put to beneficial use.493/ 
The doctrine of "prior appropriation" is recognized in the appro-
priation states, which means simply that water users are given priority 
as of the date when the use first commenced, so that each user has a 
right which is superior to later users but inferior to all earlier 
users. In times of shortage, or when a stream is "over appropriated," 
the owner of the oldest water right is first entitled to have his or her 
right satisfied in full before subsequent users are entitled to any 
water. All appropriators, however, are limited by the requirement that 
they keep their water in a beneficial use.494/ The Colorado Constitu-
tion, for instance, recognizes that between those using water for the 
same purpose, priority of appropriation gives the better right. Appro-
priators are entitled to have water distributed to them according to 
their priorities as established by judicial decrees.495/ 
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In an appropriation system, one acquires under a procedure provided 
by state law a right to divert a specific quantity of water from a 
public water supply (provided that it is available in excess of the 
requirements of existing vested rights) and to apply such water to a 
specific beneficial use. All nine selected Western states have statu-
tory procedures for appropriation under the control and supervision of 
state administrative officials or agencies, most commonly a state water 
engineer. The following model of an appropriation system describes in 
general terms the system used in our selected states,496/ except for Colorado and Montana: 
(1) The applicant submits a request for a 
desired quantity of water specifying the 
intended use and the place and method of 
diversion. 
(2) The authority responsible for deciding 
whether to grant such request notifies 
other state agencies charged with respon-
sibility for conservation, resource plan-
ning, wildlife management, etc., and also 
notifies private parties that may have an 
interest in the application. 
(3) Objections may be filed and hearings held. 
(4) The deciding authority evaluates all facts 
submitted to determine if the use is bene-
ficial, if the public interest would be 
served by the intended use, and if the pro-
ject is feasible. In several states, general 
evaluation criteria are specified in statutes (see below, pages 227-29). 
(5) A permit to proceed with the proposed diver-
sion may be issued or denied. The state 
engineer may grant a permit for a smaller 
amount of water than applied for or may vary 
the periods of annual use of the water. If 
the application is denied altogether or in 
part, the applicant may apply to the court 
for judicial review. 
(6) Construction of the diversion facility must 
commence within a reasonable time and pro-
ceed at a reasonable rate. 
(7) Upon completion of the facility and the 
application of the water to use, the permit 
granting authority reviews the project to 
determine if it complies with the terms of 
the permit. 
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(8) The deciding authority issues a certificate 
of appropriation if the facility and use 
comply with the terms of the permit. 
(9) The right of use continues until the benefi-
cial use ceases to exist or the right is lost 
by actions of the appropriator or by action 
of law as described later in this text. 
Most statutes prescribe the criteria for issuing water permits in 
terms that are very general, leaving substantial discretion to the 
admi ni strators. Exampl es of such criteri a, "preferences," or pri orities 
are given below, pages 227-29. 
colorado and ~Iontana give their courts a greater role in dividing 
up their waters than the other ~Jestern states we have focused on. In 
Colorado, the state engineer, who is also the head of the division of 
natural resources, shares responsibility with the judiciary for water 
administration and control. Administrative matters and technical advice 
are the responsibilities of the state engineer and the seven water 
engineers who serve in the seven water districts which correspond 
roughly to the major drainage basins of the state. For each district, a 
"water judge" is selected from among the state court judges to determine 
the amounts and priorities of applications for water appropriation. The 
judge may be aided by an appointed water referee.~ 
Montana divides its waters into "adjudicated" and "unadjudicated." 
Adjudicated waters are those that have been considered by a court in the 
past; an appropriator seeking these waters files a permit application 
with the court and a civil adjudication ensues. Rights in unadjudicated 
waters may be acquired non-statutorilY by merely diverting the water and 
applying it to beneficial use. Or, rights can be acquired statutorily 
by posting notice of the intended diversion and use at the point of 
intended diversion and filing the notice with the county clerk. The 
statutory procedure is advantageouS in that the priority of the appro-
priation is determined at the time the notice is filed instead of after 
the diversion is completed. 
"Dual System" States--California and Texas. 
Only California and Texas among the selected states continue 
to recognize the riparian doctrine concurrently with the appropriation 
doctrine.498/ In both states, referred to as "dual system" states, 
riparian rights have been subjected to the same restrictions as appro-
priated rights _ reasonable, beneficial use by reasonable methods of 
diversion. (See the discussion regarding the changes in these states' 
laws later in this text, pages 234-37.) iJith the exception of Alaska, 
which legislatively converted all riparian rights to appropriated rights 
(discussed later on page 236) and the dual system states, the remaining 
six states repudiated the riparian doctrine while still territories or 
shortly after they attained statehood. 
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In Texas, rights of riparian owners to use water are incident to 
the ownership of land adjacent to the watercourse. Riparian rights, 
therefore, pass with a conveyance of the riparian land. The riparian 
owner, however, may divert riparian waters outside the watershed if 
other riparian owners are not deprived of an adequate supply.499/ In 
California, riparian rights are appurtenant to the land and are trans-
ferred by conveyance of real property.500/ Unless expressly stated in 
the conveyance, riparian rights do not pass with land which is not 
contiguous to the watercourse.501/ A riparian water right may be 
conveyed to non-riparian land only if no injury occurs to other ri-
parians or if other riparians consent to the transfer.502/ 
The exclusive method for the appropriation of water rights in both 
states is by acquisition of a permit from the administrative agency. As 
is the case in all appropriation states, beneficial use is the measure 
of all appropriation rights.503/ 
California courts have decreed that between appropriators and 
riparians on the same watercourse, riparians in general have paramount 
rights,504/ except where the senio~ appropriator's permit grants first 
rights to use water that is beyond the reasonable needs of riparians on 
the watercourse.505/ Texas courts leaned toward recognition of the 
riparian doctrine-Tn the 19th century,506/ but the legislature intro-
duced an appropriation system in 1889.507/ Then in 1913, the Texas 
legislature established a policy of nonrecognition of riparian rights in 
any land that passed from state to private ownership after July 1, 1895. 
This bill included, however, provisions protecting existing riparian 
rights.508/ 
Litigation has frequently involved disputes between appropriators 
and riparians. A major confrontation occurred in California between the 
riparian and appropriation doctrines in 1926, when the state supreme 
court upheld a riparian right against that of an appropriator, notwith-
standing the wastefulness of the riparian use.509/ This decision 
prompted a constitutional amendment in 1928 thar-required all users of 
water to be "reasonably beneficial."510/ 
Texas's early water law caused considerable debate over the exis-
tence of riparian rights with respect to the Spanish and Mexican land 
grants on the lower Rio Grande around the 18th and 19th centuries.511/ 
During the period of Spanish rule, the Spaniards built acequias, or--
community ditches, to provide the missions and colonies with water. 
Local regulations governed these acequias.~ The central concept of 
water law of that period was that all water belonged to the sovereign 
and irrigation rights were acquired by specific grant from the sov-
ereign.~ In a 1961 court decision, the Texas Court of Civil Appeals 
concluded that these early grants did not carry with them appurtenant 
irrigation rights.514/ Although acknowledging that Spanish and flexican 
law governed these-grants at the time they were made, the court con-
cluded that the civil law governing the navigable rivers of those two 
countries did not include customary riparian rights for irrigation. 
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A later Texas case concerned water rights to certain waters of the 
Rio Grande for nearly 3,000 persons whose claims were based upon ri-
parian rights, appropriation permits, customary water rights, and so on. 
After years of hearings, the court adopted a complicated system of 
"weighted priorities" instead of adopting the usual principle that 
priority in the time gives priority in right among appropriators. It 
also recognized "equitable" ripari~n rights, which had no earlier 
precedent in Texas water law.~ 
Advantages of the Appropriation Doctrine. 
The appropriation doctrine is frequently viewed as advan-
tageous for arid or semi-arid states because it permits the state to 
control the use of water and promote its maximum use. Although courts 
in riparian or dual system states generally prohibit wasteful use of 
water, these doctrines nonetheless reduce transferability of water 
rights because riparian rights generally cannot be lost by nonuse. A 
riparian right may bar appropriation of the water for a beneficial 
purpose. f1any view it to be an advantage of the appropriation system 
that courts have generally held appropriated rights to be freely sever-
able and transferable for use on other lands if the rights of others are 
not compromised.516/ 
Appropriated water rights can--as a general rule--be sold and 
transferred, either with the sale of the land upon which the water is 
used or separately. If the new owner of the water right continues the 
same use at the same place, the new owner needs only to register the 
transaction. If, however, the new owner alters the point of diversion, 
the place of use, or the purpose of use, change applications must be 
reviewed by the water rights administrator.517/ As previously dis-
cussed, riparian rights may be limited to t~riparian lands and are 
generally limited to the watershed of the stream. 
A third advantage of the appropriation system is that it allows the 
state to define priorities among beneficial uses and to apply the 
priorities on a case-by-case basis. This feature is discussed more 
fully below on pages 227-29. 
Water Ri hts policies Common to All Hestern S stems 
Three policies are basic to all Western water rights law, regard-
less of the legal doctrine involved. They have been alluded to in the 
introductory description of the riparian and appropriation systems but 
merit individual identification. These policies are: (1) the policy of 
beneficial use, (2) the policy of maximum use or minimum waste, and 
(3) the policy of priority among beneficial uses. 
Beneficial Use. 
All state constitutions or water-related statutes studied 
require that water be put to beneficial use before an appropriation will 
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be allowed.~ California has extended this requirement to riparian 
rights as well.519/ As discussed more fully in a later section re-
garding changes-,r; the law, Texas legislatively restricted riparian 
beneficial use to domestic and stock watering purposes.520/ 
Maximum Use or Minimum Waste. 
The maximum use policy is expressed in several forms. The 
first is by constitutional or statutory mandates that no appropriation 
request will be denied unless the use contemplated is against the public 
interest. The constitutions of Wyoming and Colorado, in the interest of 
encouraging use, contain such a provision.521/ A second form is to 
provide legislatively (a) that water rights-do not include the right to 
waste water, (b) that the state may act administratively or judicially 
to prevent wasteful or unreasonable use, or (c) that waste is a criminal 
act. 522/ In addition, the courts emphasize these policies in their 
decisions. 
It is the policy, not only of the Supreme Court 
of t~ontana, but of all rJestern states, to recog-
nize the highest and greatest possible duty from 
the waters of the state in the interests of 
agriculture and other beneficial purposes.523/ 
It is an obvious proposition that development of 
all state resources - industrial, agricultural, 
residential, power and the like - depends largely 
on the fullest use of the water resources of the 
state.524/ 
Priorities Among Beneficial Uses. 
State policies regarding priorities among beneficial uses are 
also expressed in constitutions, statutes, and court decisions. The 
Colorado constitution provides that domestic use is paramount, followed 
by irrigation.525/ The Idaho constitution similarly gives preference to 
domestic water~ers over other water users in times of shortage, 
followed by agricultural uses.526/ Arizona statutes assign priority to 
domestic and municipal use, foTTOwed by irrigation and stock watering, 
power, mining, recreation, and wildlife.527/ 
The statutes of Texas similarly state that when two or more appli-
cations conflict for the use of available water, preference should be 
given to domestic and municipal use over all other uses.528/ The Texas 
Supreme Court expanded on the statutory guide by stating~at irrigation 
must be given priority lest certain areas become useless; the court thus 
favored a person seeking water for irrigation over another who had 
applied earlier, seeking the water for power.529/ (\lJhen water has 
already been appropriated for a beneficial use, however, a claim for a 
state-defined higher priority use is generally limited by the require-
ment of payment of just compensation to the prior user for the taking 
and related damages.)530/ Wyoming recognizes preferred uses which 
III 
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include rights for domestic and transportation purposes, steam power 
plants, and industrial purposes.§llj 
Alaska offers an example of one of the most detailed statutory 
provisions governing water permits: 
(a) The commissioner shall issue a permit if he 
finds that 
(b) 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
rights of a prior appropriator will not 
be unduly affected; 
the proposed means of diversion or 
construction are adequate; 
the proposed use of water is beneficial; 
and 
the proposed appropriation is in the 
public interest. 
In determining the public interest, the 
commissioner shall consider 
(l) the benefit to the applicant resulting 
from the proposed appropriation; 
(2) 
(3) 
(4) 
(5) 
(6) 
(7) 
(8) 
the effect of the economic activity 
resulting from the proposed appropria-
tion; 
the effect on fish and game resources and 
on public recreational opportunities; 
the effect on public health; 
the effect of loss of alternate uses of 
water that might be made within a reason-
able time if not precluded or hindered by 
the proposed appropriation; 
harm to other persons resulting from the 
proposed appropriation; 
the intent and ability of the applicant 
to complete the appropriation; and 
the effect upon access to navigable or 
public waters.532/ 
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These criteria, although not expressed in terms of priorities or pre-
ferences, give the decision-maker more guidance than the statutes of 
most other states. 
Other Common Water Regulation Techniques 
Rotation. 
Water use rotation by alternating periods of use among users 
is another method of maximizing beneficial use of water. The practice 
was historically employed to settle disputes among riparian owners using 
water for irrigation, but the Supreme Court of California saw no reason 
the concept could not also be applied to regulate claims by appropria-
tion. In a 1912 case, an irrigation ditch no longer carried sufficient 
water volume to provide each of two appropriators with the volumes 
specified in their respective appropriations. The court's solution was 
to fix the times when the entire ditch flow could be used by each party. 
The duration of·use was allocated in proportion to respective rights of 
the appropriators as represented by the volume of water granted in each 
appropriation.533/ Arizona, Wyoming, and Nevada have statutes per-
mitting such rotation agreements to be made privately without court 
intervention. 534/ 
Local Water Management Organizations. 
All states examined, through constitutional or statutory 
enactments, have provided for the creation of public water supply, 
conservation, reclamation, water management, irrigation, flood control, 
or similarly named districts and for the licensing of private municipal 
water supply and irrigation companies. Each water district is created 
or licensed by a separate enabling act and is presided over by an 
elected or appointed governing body. The objective is to provide local 
management and control over water use, quick response capability to 
changing local conditions, and local resolution of conflicts without 
protracted litigation in the courts. One result of the domination of 
local conflict resolution by these administrative bodies is that recent 
court decisions establishing legal water rights principles or inter-
preting statutes are scarce, and examples of such decisions are pri-
marily found in very early reported cases. 
These water "sub-agencies" may be created at will by the legis-
lature in response to a request by the state head of the natural re-
sources agency responsible for water management or by petition of a 
certain percentage of interested water users or suppliers. In Cali-
fornia, these water agencies number in the hundreds, and although the 
powers of each differ, they may include the exercise of eminent domain; 
the issuance of bonds and other borrowing instruments; the issuance of 
capital stock; the levy of ad valorum, use, and pump taxes; the regu-
lation of water rates; the sale and transfer of water; the adminis-
trative resolution of conflicting claims; and the assessment of users or 
pumpers for capital improvements. 
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Condemnation and Taking of Water Rights 
Introduction. 
Both condemnation by individuals for private rights of way and 
condemnation by eminent domain for public use may result in a "taking" 
of private water or associated land rights. Most Western states permit 
private individuals to condemn the private property of others for rights 
of way required for their own irrigation purposes on the theory that 
irrigation is a public use. 
The Utah Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this pro-
cedure.535/ The decision was affirmed by the United States Supreme 
Court which noted that water rights principles in the Western states 
must differ markedly from those in the East because of physical dif-
ferences that require enactment of laws to further the growth and 
prosperity of these states.536/ In the Utah case, a farmer refused 
another farmer permission t01Niden an irrigation ditch on the former's 
property so that both farms could be irrigated. The court granted the 
deprived farmer a condemnation order on the basis that irrigation of 
arid lands is a public purpose and that using water for irrigation is a 
public use. 
The Arizona constitution sanctions such private "takings" by 
providing: 
Private property shall not be taken for private 
use, except for private ways of necessity, and 
for drains, flumes, or ditches, on or across the 
lands of others for mining, agricultural, domes-
tic, or sanitary purposes.53?/ 
The Arizona Supreme Court interpreted this provision and held that 
taking private property for private use was permissible in certain 
circumstances upon due notice, a hearing, and payment of adequate 
compensation. 538/ The court emphasized that these private takings would 
not be permissible in Arizona in the absence of the provision in the 
Arizona Constitution quoted above. 
The California Constitution and water code authorize public pur-
poses condemnations, not only by the state government, but also by state 
and privately created municipal water, drainage, irrigation, levee, 
reclamation, flood control, and conservation organizations and dis-
tricts.539/ Just compensation must be made to the condemnee, including 
riparian owners.540/ 
Representative examples of takings by condemnation illustrate how 
this process works. 
(1) An irrigation district in California, formed to 
reclaim arid land as a public use, had the power 
to exercise eminent domain and condemn rights of 
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way for irrigation ditches across intervening 
lands of private parties upon payment of compen-
sation.~ (See examples of how just compensa-
tion has been determined later in this text.) 
(2) Periodic overflows of the San Joaquin River kept 
certain grasslands of downstream riparian pro-
prietors alive and suitable for harvesting and 
grazing. When diversion of the river as part of 
the California Central Valley water plan resulted 
in loss of these periodic overflows, the United 
States Supreme Court held that a taking had 
occurred and that damages were payable to the 
riparian owners affected.542/ 
(3) A water storage district sought to impound 
periodic natural overflows and floodwaters 
which had previously augmented the flow of 
another river. The result was that riparian 
irrigators using water from the augmented 
river had less water to irrigate than they 
had prior to the impoundment. The California 
Supreme Court enjoined the impoundment 
because it constituted a taking of the water 
rights of the riparian irrigators.543/ 
Exercise of Police Powers Distinguished from Takings. 
The exercise of a state's police powers through generally 
applicable nondiscriminatory statutes does not require compensation. In 
contrast to the above cases, the California Supreme Court held in 1933 
that a city and its water district could appropriate extraordinary storm 
and flood waters not part of the usual, ordinary, and customary flow of 
the stream, which were not being benefically used by riparian owners, 
because these waters would otherwise be lost to the sea and wasted. In 
this case, the City of Santa Barbara's water supply was exhausted. The 
city is located on a plain abutting foothills and was not within the 
watershed of the stream. The city built a dam and a tunnel to divert 
water captured by the dam after acquiring a valid appropriation permit. 
The waters captured by the dam were largely the result of spring storm 
runoff, and much of these waters was annually lost to the sea. 
The California Supreme Court held that all property is subject to 
the reasonable exercise of state police power, and constitutional 
provisions declaring that property shall not be taken without due 
process and just compensation has no applicability in such cases. The 
court thus held that the California Constitutional Amendment of 1928 
(discussed more fully on pages 235-36, below), which declared that 
riparian owners are limited to reasonable and beneficial uses of water 
and are not entitled to the entire natural flow, was a valid exercise of 
that police power. In this case, the subject water taken from the 
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riparian owners had not been beneficially used by them and the appro-
priation by the city thus did not require compensation.544/ 
The police power extends, however, only to matters of general 
welfare or emergency and cannot be used to single out only a few or to 
alter pre-existing rights. An 1895 California case illustrates this 
distinction. A developer and a city water company attempted to employ 
the state police power to enjoin an upstream sawmill and small village 
from draining sewage, barnyard runoff, and mill waste into a stream, 
arguing that state water law prohibited the polluting of streams used by 
municipalities for public water supplies. The California Supreme Court 
found that the pollution was within tolerable limits for uses other than 
a public water supply and that the developer built his diversion faci-
lities many years after the sawmill and village were established. The 
level of pollution became unlawful only because of the developer's later 
attempts to fulfill his commitment to the city to provide pure water 
from the stream. The court held that the police power will not extend 
to deprive a party of property rights - in this instance, the right to 
use a stream for drainage - even for a public use when such property can 
be condemned and paid for.545/ 
The Role of Federal Courts. 
An important aspect of the condemnation and taking problem 
that requires emphasis is that federal courts have generally deferred to 
state courts to define the governing water rights law and measure the 
appropriate compensation when a taking does occur. An example is a case 
in the 1960's arising in New Mexico. A ranch company brought an action 
against a coal mining operator to enjoin further trespass on ranch lands 
and to recover damages for the operator's entry onto the ranch lands and 
diversion of water from a river across the ranch lands to a mine. The 
United States District Court dismissed the action, but the United States 
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit reversed the dismissal reasoning 
that coal mining was not public in nature and hence that the ranch 
company had a legitimate complaint.546/ The United States Supreme Court 
admonished the lower federal courtsfor not "staying their hands" on the 
merits of the case, because the issue of what constitutes a public 
purpose for water use is of vital concern in ari d New rlex i co, and the 
issue must be decided by state courts interpreting state law. The case 
was remanded with instructions that the federal action be stayed.~ 
A similar federal-state problem arose when the Federal Bureau of 
Reclamation moved the Colorado River channel to improve the river's 
navigability. As a result of the diversion, a landowner formerly 
bordering on the river was now separated from it by the lands of third 
parties. The federal court based its decision on state law, holding 
that because Arizona does not recognize the riparian doctrine, the 
complaining parties did not have or lose any property rights and could 
not claim compensation. 548/ 
A third recent example occurred in Kansas where the state legis-
lature converted its water rights system from riparian to appropriation, 
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thereby severely limiting riparian rights. A riparian proprietor of an 
underground stream asserted that he was unconstitutionally deprived of 
property rights to such waters because public officers were issuing 
permits to others to utilize the underground waters. The permits were 
issued in accordance with the state law which survived constitutional 
challenge in federal courts.549/ Later, the U.S. Court of Appeals for 
the Tenth Circuit held that a state may modify or reject the riparian 
doctrine but must recognize valid and existing rights. The court said 
that questions of ownership of water rights should be decided by local 
law "without any impairment by federal action. "550/ The court thus 
upheld the state action and ruled against the riparian complainant. 
Measuring Damage and Just Compensation. 
A fixed value per unit of water is rarely used as a measure of 
damage or just compensation in condemnation and taking proceedings 
because of the difficulty of finding open market transactions in water 
under precisely the same conditions. As a result, loss of crop income 
or diminution in property values is the generally employed measure of 
damages, as illustrated in the following examples: 
(1) The State of Idaho constructed a bridge across 
a river and concurrently modified a highway in 
such a manner as to narrow the river's water-
course and raise its normal level. As a result, 
the river periodically flooded the complainant's 
land and destroyed his crops. The Supreme Court 
of Idaho held that the state had committed a tak-
ing of property and ordered that the landowner's 
claim of a $20,000 diminution in the market 
value of the land be tried in a condemnation 
proceeding.~ 
(2) A 1962 Arizona case considered the compensation 
due after the state condemned a strip of land 
and constructed a highway tunnel which diverted 
the underground water supply from a well and 
caused it to run dry. The well had supplied 
water to a private residence and a restaurant. 
The court stated that the market value of the 
real property actually taken and damage to 
adjacent property was the correct measure of 
compensation. Addressing the question of the 
now-dry well, the court held that the loss of 
the water supply should be considered as it 
affects the property value, but that it was 
improper to attempt to assign a separate value 
to the lost water itself.552/ 
(3) The Nebraska Supreme Court considered the ques-
tion of compensation in 1914 after an appropria-
tor of water from a stream obstructed the stream 
(4) 
(5 ) 
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flow and cut off the supply that formerly had 
gone to his neighbor who used it for watering 
his cattle. The evidence showed that during this 
period of interference, the neighbor's cattle 
became thinner and their market value fell by 
$800. The court held that the claimed reduction 
in market value of the cattle was the proper 
measure of da~age for the loss of water.553/ 
The Colorado Supreme Court also looked at lost 
profits to measure damages in a 1915 case. An 
irrigation company constructed its irrigation 
ditch in a manner that destroyed the lateral 
ditches by which the complainant's land was irri-
gated, thus destroying his crops for two years. 
The Colorado court held that the measure of 
damage was the reasonable value of the last crops 
over the two-year period. To determine this 
value, the court instructed the jury to consider 
all evidence regarding probable maturing of the 
crops, the cost of harvesting, and the probable 
yield.554/ 
A California water company failed to deliver 
water to a subscriber for the irrigation of his 
lands for part of the growing season. As a 
result, the complainant received only one crop 
of alfalfa instead of the three normally har-
vested. The California Supreme Court concluded 
that the proper measure of damages was the 
value of the two lost crops plus costs of 
reseeding.555/ 
In all these cases, water is not given a market value. Instead, the 
measure of damage is the lost profits or reduction in land values 
resulting from the loss of water. 
Effects of Changes in Laws on Private \Jater Rights 
An unexpected or rapid change in a state's statutes or consti-
tutional provisions that abrogates previously recognized property rights 
can be considered a taking. A state can, however, avoid the taking 
problem by providing mechanisms that preserve vested rights or by 
implementing the change in a manner that will not cause compensable 
damage. 
California. 
California twice experienced what many viewed as si~nificant 
changes in its law of water rights. In 1902, a dispute came before the 
California Supreme Court questioning whether landowners have the right 
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to draw percolating water from their land and sell it to others when 
such action diminishes the water available to the landowner's neighbors. 
The lower court ruled that a landowner does have such a right, basing 
its ruling on the common law doctrine of cujus est solum, ejus est usgue 
ad inferos, or "he who owns the soil owns it to the lowest depths 
below." The California Supreme Court reversed, adopting a rule of 
correlative water rights 556/ similar to the doctrine adopted by the 
Hawaii Supreme Court in 1929.557/ 
Corporations and municipalities that had spent vast sums of money 
to drill wells and distribute waters to others were outraged at this 
decision and demanded a rehearing. The California Supreme Court granted 
the rehearing, but stuck by its earlier decision that the common law 
rule of absolute ownership had never been firmly established in the 
state and that the correlative rights doctrine was the proper approach.55S; 
Even though the state's water law had arguably been changed, the state ---
never paid any compensation to any landowner as a result of this decision. 
A second and more explicit change in the law occurred in 1928 when 
California adopted a constitutional amendment that restricted riparian 
rights to standards of reasonable beneficial use and reasonable methods 
of diversion.55g/ Prior to the amendment, a riparian owner was entitled 
to the full fTOW of a stream without diminution.560/ 
The first case requiring the California Supreme Court to interpret 
the amendment involved an attempt by the city of Vallejo to appropriate 
and store storm and floodwaters of a stream, thereby depriving lower 
riparian owners of the full natural flow of the stream.561/ The court 
held that to determine if the city's appropriation was proper, the trial 
court must (1) determine whether complaining riparian owners, consider-
ing all the needs of those in the particular water field, were bene-
ficially using the water, and then (2) determine whether a surplus 
exists in the water field subject to appropriation. If these facts are 
found, the city's appropriation is valid and may not be enjoined. 
However, as regards future beneficial uses which riparian owners may 
undertake, the appropriative right can only be deemed temporary and 
cannot be allowed to ripen into a prescriptive ri9ht by adverse use. 
(Prescription is discussed below at pages 238-39.) In this sense, a 
riparian right is a paramount and nonextinguishable right. 
The United States Supreme Court recognized that the 1928 California 
amendment attempted to serve the welfare of the state by preserving but 
limiting both appropriative and riparian rights to beneficial use. The 
Court held that the amendment was a valid exercise of legislative powers 
and destroyed no constitutional rights, because a riparian right that 
was actually damaged by reason of a deprivation of water that the 
riparian proprietor had put to beneficial use remained compensable.562/ 
One recent case dealing with this California amendment involved an 
appropriation from a stream that prevented a riparian proprietor down-
stream from using the water as an agent by which to expose and carry 
sand, gravel, and rocks. The court held that the riparian owner's use 
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was unreasonable, and that because the downstream owner had no property 
right in an unreasonable use, no taking had occurred and no compensation 
or injunction could be rightfully demanded.563/ 
The two basic rules in California thus appear to be: (1) an 
appropriative use of water that causes damage to the paramount riparian 
right, considering all present and reasonably prospective beneficial 
uses, is an impairment of that right and entitles the riparian owner to 
damages or injunctive relief, and (2) if the appropriative use is not 
impairing a current beneficial use, the riparian's relief is limited to 
a declaration of his preferential and paramount right to enjoin the 
assertion of an adverse use which might otherwise ripen into a pre-
scriptive right. 
Alaska. 
Alaska enacted the Alaska Water Use Act of 1966 to create a 
unified and comprehensive system for appropriation and use of water.564/ 
Prior to this enactment, riparian rights had been a cause of confusion. 
Landowners claimed riparian rights and courts sometimes seemed to 
acknowledge their existence. 565/ Riparian rights were, however, offi-
cially recognized only in a limited context in two mining use statutes. 
The 1966 Act repealed these statutes and, to that extent, abolished 
riparian rights. 
Alaska legislators dealt with this problem by converting all 
riparian rights to appropriative rights, which would be forfeited if the 
water was not put to beneficial use within five years, Alaska's statu-
tory forfeiture period.566/ To date, the only reported appellate cases 
concerning the 1966 Act have addressed the question of what constituted 
a beneficial use during the periods specified in the Act.567/ 
Texas. 
The early history of Texas's water law is explained above on 
pages 224-26 of this section. In 1967, the Texas legislature restricted 
riparian rights, except for domestic and livestock purposes, to the 
extent of maximum actual application of water to beneficial use made 
during any calendar year from 1963 and 1967 or to the end of 1970 if 
facilities were under construction before the effective date of the 
act. 568/ To date, this legislation has not been interpreted or con-
struea-by the Supreme Court of Texas or the courts of civil appeals. 
This statute was companion legislation to the 1967 Hater Rights Adju-
dication Act which requires riparian owners and those who acquired 
claims under special irrigation acts and not by appropriation permits, to 
file a statement with the water commission specifying the location of 
the claim, the nature of its use, the date of commencement of facilities 
construction, and other data. Both acts are part of a vigorous program 
of rights cancellation inaugurated by the water commission in 1957 by 
legislative mandate. 569/ The 1957 program was upheld by the Texas 
Supreme Court on the grounds that, although water rights are vested 
property interests, no one has a vested right to nonuse that is waste-
fu1.570/ Under the program, nonuse for ten years allowed the court to 
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presume an intent to abandon the right. The ultimate goal was to 
destroy ancient unused riparian rights and merge the riparian system 
into the appropriation system. 
Other States. 
Other states have experienced changes in their water law over 
the years. Oklahoma's history is like that of Texas, and Oklahoma's 
legislature has gradually limited the rights of riparian owners on 
natural streams to domestic purposes only.571/ Uses beyond domestic 
purposes must be secured by a permit under-rhe system generally govern-
ing appropriated rights.572/ Kansas shifted more completely from a 
riparian system to an appropriation system through legislation passed in 
1945; all prior existing rights were preserved and protected, but they 
were limited by the beneficial use requirement.573/ 
Oregon also followed this approach. The Oregon legislature enacted 
a comprehensive code in 1909 based on the appropriation system. Ri-
parian rights were protected to the extent that they were actually used 
prior to the code. If riparian rights were not used for two years in a 
row, they were forfeited.574/ The Oregon courts sustained all chal-
lenges to this code and denied compensation to those whose rights were 
10st.575/ 
Nevada's Supreme Court waffled back and forth during the nineteenth 
century on the doctrine that governed the limited water in this desert 
state, finally deciding that the appropriation doctrine was better 
suited to the conditions of the state than the riparian doctrine.576/ 
The important element common to each state that legislatively 
changed its water rights law is that a period of time was provided to 
allow the claimant of a vested right to act to protect it.577/ 
Loss of Rights in Watercourses 
Other ways in which rights in watercourses may commonly be subject 
to partial or complete loss include abandonment, statutory forfeiture, 
prescription, estoppel, and laches. Riparian rights have been tradi-
tionally exempt from loss by abandonment or statutory forfeiture, but as 
discussed above, even these rights may be changed by legislative action. 
Abandonment. 
Abandonment is a doctrine recognized by court decisions in all 
of the selected states.578/ Alaska and Colorado statutorily recognized 
abandonment and its conceptual foundations.579/ 
Abandonment requires both the act of yielding possession and the 
intent never to repossess. These questions of fact are to be determined 
from the evidence and surrounding circumstances. tlonuse may be evidence 
of an intent to abandon but such evidence may be rebutted by other 
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evidence indicating that the owner did not so intend. The essential 
element is voluntariness. Forced discontinuance of use has no effect. 
Also, in water rights law. care must be taken not to confuse abandonment 
of a physical facility with abandonment of a right to use water. One 
may discard a flume or abandon a ditch without abandoning the water 
right. Examples of court interpretations of circumstances evidencing 
abandonment follow: 
(1) 
(2) 
Water had been appropriated to irrigate a small 
experimental agricultural project conducted on 
rented land in California. The experiment was 
fully accomplished. the parties had dispersed 
to other localities. and the only action that 
had been taken was to sell the ditch for $25 
two years later. The California Supreme Court 
held that the appropriation right was abandoned. 
580/ 
A Colorado town had not used its water right to 
a stream diversion for over twenty years. The 
town had installed a new source of water supply 
which was adequate and all appliances for diver-
sion and transportation had been removed. The 
Colorado Supreme Court held that the appropria-
tion right had been abandoned.58l/ 
Statutory Forfeiture. 
When the owner of an appropriated water right fails to use the 
water for a period prescribed by statute. the water right is forfeited 
and the unused water reverts to the public as unappropriated water. 
Unlike abandonment, forfeiture is not concerned with the intent of the 
owner of the water right; the fact of nonuse is sufficient. Seven of 
the nine selected states (Colorado and Montana are the exceptions) have 
forfeiture statutes. Except for Texas and California, each state has a 
five-year statutory forfeiture period.582/ California has a statutory 
period of three years. 583/ Texas has merely couched a statutory for-
feiture statute in "abandonment" language by stating that ten years of 
nonuse is conclusive indication of intent to abandon; intent is not 
required in statutory forfeiture.584/ 
Prescription. 
Unlike abandonment and statutory forfeiture. loss of rights by 
prescription does not return the right to the available pool of appro-
priable rights but actually transfers .ownership of the right to the 
adverse user. Prescription occurs when an outsider invades the pos-
session of the rightful owner, claims title adverse·to the rightful 
owner's claim, and continues this unlawful possession and use openly. 
notoriously, and continuously for a period of time specified by state 
law or deemed by a court to be sufficient to have perfected the pre-
scriptive right. The rightful owner must have actual or constructive 
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knowledge of the adverse use. At the end of the period. if the rightful 
owner has not attempted to use his right or has failed to bring an 
action to remove the intruder, the unlawful intruder becomes the lawful 
owner of the right and no compensation is required. The Hawaii cases 
that have grappled with this doctrine are discussed above at pages 
179-81. 
Adjudication in the selected Western states has almost exclusively 
concerned whether the unlawful intruder has met all of the requirements: 
(1) Was the use an actual use of the water right? 
(Using seepage or overflow water would not be 
considered a use of the basic water right, for 
example.) 
(2) Was the use adverse or hostile to the rightful 
owner? (Did it deprive him of water when he 
needed it?) 
(3) Was the use open and notorious enough that the 
rightful owner knew or should have known of 
the intrusion? 
(4) Was the use exclusive - not shared with the 
rightful owner? 
(5) Was the use more-or-less continous? 
(6) Did the adverse use encompass the statutory 
period, if provided, or was it of sufficient 
duration to satisfy the court that the pre-
scriptive right should be perfected? 
Alaska now statutorily forbids acquiring water rights by prescrip-
tion.585/ Colorado and Montana statutorily accept the doctrine and 
provi~required periods of adverse use.586/ The state supreme courts 
of Arizona. California. and Texas have allowed water rights to be 
acqui red by prescri pti on. 587/ The state supreme courts of Nevada. flew 
r·~exico. and ~Jyoming have questioned whether prescriptive rights are 
recognized in their states. They have continued to consider individual 
cases in which prescriptive rights are claimed, but have not found all 
conditions required to perfect the right to be present in any reported 
claim to date. All nine states currently have statutes allowing title 
to land to be acquired by adverse use for periods ranging from five to 
eighteen years.588/ 
Estoppel and Laches. 
Estoppel, and its close relative laches, are equitable prin-
ciples that developed in courts of equity. It is therefore difficult to 
say that one state recognizes these principles and another state does 
not, because they are applied on a case-by-case basis and determined by 
the individual circumstances and conduct of the parties. 
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The loss of a water right by estoppel occurs when the lawful owner 
of the right is barred, because of something the owner has done or has 
failed to do, from asserting his title in court. Generally, the orig-
inal owner must have expected that the party attempting to defeat his 
assertion of title would act in reliance upon the owner's represen-
tations. Generally, the owner will have been guilty of some turpitude 
in these representations--fraud, misrepresentation, or wilfull con-
cealment of an essential fact. The second party generally (1) must have 
been ignorant of the nature of the "owner's" title, with no reasonable 
way of obtaining such knowledge, and (2) must have relied on the repre-
sentations, verbal or physical, made by the owner. 
Three examples illustrate how this doctrine is used: 
(1) One farmer, who had exclusive title to the water 
rights in the area, stood passively by and 
allowed another to irrigate his fields for six-
teen years in the belief that he had water rights 
of equal priority. The farmer was estopped from 
subsequently denying the other's right to use 
water. 589/ 
(2) A party used an irrigation ditch for many years. 
The ditch was under the absolute and paramount 
title of the owner who acquiesced in the joint use, 
not only by silence, but by overt affirmative acts. 
The owner was estopped from subsequently denying 
the other's right to use the ditch.590j 
(3) The officers of an organization who stood by and 
allowed another organization to enlarge a ditch 
which they controlled, with the understanding that 
the second organization had acquired an interest 
in the ditch, were estopped to deny the right of 
the other organization to use the ditch.~ 
Laches is distinguished from estoppel only in that the turpitude 
(fraud, misrepresentation, or concealment) element required in the 
doctrine of estoppel is replaced by inexcusable delay in asserting the 
owner's right. 
The Utah Supreme Court summarized the equitable principles involved 
as follows: 
Where a person with actual or constructive 
knowledge of the facts induces another by 
his words or conduct to believe that he 
acquiesces in or ratifies a transaction, 
or that he will offer no opposition thereto, 
and that other, in reliance on such belief, 
alters his position, such person is estopped 
from repudiating the transaction to the 
other's prejudice.592/ 
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Summary 
All the selected Western states and most jurisdictions throughout 
the country exercise considerable control over water use. Legal labels, 
such as "ownership" or "public trust," rarely help in describing how 
these systems actually work. Most states closely supervise the use of 
water to ensure that this important resource is being used for the 
maximum benefit of the states' citizens. Private parties are uniformly 
permitted to obtain water, insofar as supplies will allow, and most 
states encourage the use of water for agricultural irrigation and other 
activities that are economically beneficial to the community. 
The riparian system of water rights has a lingering appeal in many jurisdictions because it relates the water to its neighboring land and 
thus promotes historical uses of water, protects the original watershed 
ecosystem, and frequently ensures the most logical uses for the water. 
The doctrine is somewhat inflexible, however, and sometimes permits 
precious water to be wasted or misused because neighboring landowners do 
not make the most of the water. 
I~ost water-short areas have adopted the appropriation system, 
sometimes referred to as a permit system. Private parties who need 
water for crops or some other beneficial purpose request the water from 
a state agency; occasionally the private party is permitted to "appro-
priate" the water first and then perfect the claim to the water later. 
Most Western states view appropriated rights as rights without a 
fixed duration in time, but the use of these rights is nonetheless 
monitored closely and the water right can revert to the state if not 
used for a beneficial purpose. Some states now issue water permits only 
for limited terms of years. Florida issues permits for from 20 to 50 
years; New Jersey's permits are for 25 years. 
Appropriated water rights can generally be transferred, but some 
states now require governmental approval for such transfer, particularly 
if the use of the water is changed. 
Many states have changed their water laws during the past century, 
and the constitutional obligation to pay damages for a "taking" of 
property has generally been avoided by making some arrangement to 
protect historical rights. Some legislatures have required owners of 
riparian rights to register their rights and convert them into appro-
priated rights. The federal courts have generally deferred to the state 
Courts in supervising the fairness of s~ch changes, viewing water law as 
within the state court's jurisdiction over property. I'lhen compensation 
has been required for deprivations of water, the damages have been 
measured by the lost profits or reductions in land value caused by the 
loss of water rather than by the market value of the water i tse 1 f. 
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THE LAW GOVERNING "TAKINGS" OF PROPERTY IN HAVlAIl 
Introduction 
The Hawaii Supreme Court ruled in its Hanapepe Valley decision 593/ 
that nineteenth century Hawaiian statutes did not permit the king to 
transfer water rights to "surplus" waters with transfers of land. Under 
the court's view, the private landowners never owned water rights to the 
"surplus" waters and because they never had these rights, no property 
was taken from them. Dissenting Justice Bernard Levinson 594/ and U.S. 
District Judge Martin Pence 595/ both felt, however, that the private 
landowners did "own" rights tathe "surplus" waters which were unconsti-
tutionally taken from them by the majority's decision. Under their 
view, the state must pay "just compensation" before it can obtain these 
water rights. 
The analysis contained on pages 194-218 of this report concludes 
that the view of the Hawaii Supreme Court's majority is a good faith 
attempt to sort out confusing sources of law and that the federal 
district court's intervention will probably be reversed because of 
procedural reasons related to our dual federal-state court systems. 
"Taking" law is, however, somewhat unpredictable, and it is difficult to 
know with confi dence what an appe 11 ate court mi ght do. 
The general contours of the law on takings, along with references 
to recent texts on the subject, are contained in the 1977 booklet of the 
Hawaii Institute for 11anagement and Analysis in Government on Growth 
Management Issues in Hawaii.596/ This section summarizes the recent 
Hawaii cases on the subject to provide a guide to what compensation 
might be required if the appellate courts do determine that a taking has 
occurred. 
One 1978 decision of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit illustrates the unpredictability of the law in this area, parti-
cularly where issues of public access or the public trust are involved. 
In the case of United States v. Kaiser Aetna,597/ the court ruled that 
no compensation was due to the private owners--o:f Hawaii-Kai t1arina (for-
merly Kuapa Pond) even though the "private" marina had to be made 
available to public access and use. 
Kuapa Pond, originally a privately-owned fish pond, was converted 
into a navigable marina by the developers of the Hawaii Kai subdivision 
on Oahu. The United States brought an action seeking a declaratory 
judgment that the waters of the marina were "navigable waters of the 
United States" and that the public had access to these waters. U.S. 
District Judge f1artin Pence ruled that the waters were in fact "navi-
gable" and that the United States had jurisdiction over the waters to 
prevent interference or obstruction to navigation.598/ He also ruled, 
however, that the United States "cannot impose a public navigation 
servitude upon such a privately constructed waterway without paying a 
reasonable compensation for the use thereof·"W 
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The appellate court reversed the requirement of compensation 
holding Simply that ' 
[TJhe federal navigational servitude and the 
public right of use are not imposed or appro-
priated by action of the government in the 
nature of seizure. They exist as characteris-
tics of all navigable waters of the United 
States.6001 
The fact that Kaiser Aetna once had a private body of water and no 
longer has private jurisdiction over that water was not important to the 
appellate court. The nature of the water determined the right of the 
public to use the water. 
Although the analogy to the surface waters involved in the Hanapepe 
Valley litigation is not exact, the Hawaii Supreme Court also ruled that 
the nature of these waters determined the rights of the public to use 
the water. The Kaiser Aetna case at least indicates that the U.S. Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is not unfamiliar with or unsympathetic 
to such an approach. 
The decisions of the Hawaii Supreme Court that have addressed 
directly the questions of "takings" and the compensation requirement 
have involved fact situations far removed from water rights. Usually 
they have involved changes in zoning laws that have affected develop-
ments on private property. If the federal courts conclude that com-
pensation is required in the water situation, however, these precedents 
may provide guides for determining the manner in which compensation would 
be measured. 
Establishing the Right to a Remedy 
One of the leading Hawaii precedents is the 1971 case of Denning 
v. County of Maui.6011 A private party purchased a parcel of land on 
11aui, which at the time of purchase was within a "hotel district" as 
deSignated by the master plan of the county. This designation specified 
limitations on the height of a building that could be put on the land 
and the ratio of floor area to lot area. The purchaser engaged a 
development corporation to construct a condominium on the property and 
requested approval of the construction plans from the planning director 
for the County of 11aui. The di rector gave written "prel iminary appro-
val," but also stated that the County Council of flaui had before it a 
"general plan" proposal that would reclassify this lot and that such 
reclassification might affect the permissible development on the lot. 
Subsequently, the Council enacted an "interim ordinance" that 
lowered the height that could be permitted in this zone. The developer 
revised the construction plans accordingly and again received "pre-
1 iminary approval" from the planning director. Later, the director 
issued a letter to the development corporation stating that the revised 
plans conformed to all existing zoning requirements. 
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On the basis of these assurances, the developer proceeded with the 
project and incurred substantial architectural, advertising, and legal 
fees. Less than two months after the director's letter, the County 
Council enacted into law a zoning ordinance that contained more severe 
restrictions on buildings in this region. Because the proposed con-
dominium plans could not comply with these new restrictions, the plan-
ning director denied a final permit. 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii reversed the trial court's decision 
that the Board of Adjustment and Appeals had jurisdiction to authorize 
the owner to proceed with construction under the previous zoning regu-
lations. Remanding the case to the lower court for trial, the supreme 
court laid down the following "rules of law" for the lower court's 
guidance. For the owner to be allowed the right to proceed with con-
struction, the facts must show (1) that the owner had been given assur-
ances of some form that the proposed construction met zoning require-
ments by the officials responsible for enforcing zoning ordinances,602/ 
and (2) that the owner had a right to rely on such assurances to a 
degree that the officials would be precluded by considerations of 
fairness and equity from enforcing the new zoning ordinance. This 
second "rule of law" is usually referred to as the doctrine of "equi-
table estoppel."603/ The court pointed out that a crucial consideration 
could be the interim ordinance lowering the height limitation, the 
function of which was to protect the design of the proposed general plan 
while zoning regulations pertaining thereto were in an early stage of 
formulation. In conclusion, the court emphasized that "mere good faith 
expectancy that a permit will issue does not create in a property owner 
a right to continue proposed construction."604/ The Hawaii Supreme 
Court's decision cited several cases from other jurisdictions which help 
explain the operation of these principles. 
The Nature and Source of the Assurances 
In a 1963 Illinois case,605/ a group of doctors, desiring to con-
struct a medical building near-a hospital, purchased a parcel of land 
zoned for commercial purposes. Because the area so zoned was adjacent 
to residential areas, an important part of the zoning regulations were 
specifications regarding off-street parking capacity. 
The doctors engaged architects to make a site study and to deter-
mine that the parcel was properly zoned. During meetings with the 
building commissioner, building inspector, and other officials, the 
architects received approval for the planned construction, but a formal 
and final permit was never given or denied. Based on these assurances, 
the doctors organized a corporation and proceeded with their plans, 
thereby incurring substantial organizational and developmental expenses. 
For a year prior to the date of purchase of the property and during 
the time in which the site study and meetings were taking place, various 
city planning committees were considering amending the comprehensive 
zoning ordinance that regulated off-street parking. The doctors and 
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their representatives were not aware of this activity. After the 
doctors had proceeded with their plans, the City Council passed an 
ordinance substantially increasing the required parking space for office buildings. 
The Illinois Supreme Court held that the developers had substan-
tially changed their position in reasonable reliance on the probability 
of obtaining a permit and ruled that the doctors should be permitted to 
build their office without the new parking requirements. The court 
emphasized that applicable zoning ordinances were in effect at the time 
of the property's purchase and that the city officials responsible for 
knowing and enforcing zoning regulations had given their assurances that 
the building was acceptable, thereby providing the doctors with a vested 
right to have a building permit. 
The Right to Rely on Assurances (Eguitable Estoppel) 
In a 1954 Florida case,606/ the owner of a chain of drive-in movie 
theaters purchased unzoned land and erected a highway billboard adver-
tising the site of a new theater in the chain and announcing its capa-
city. Subsequently, but before construction had commenced, the Board of 
County Commissioners zoned the proposed drive-in site agricultural. The 
owner petitioned the Board to rezone the land commercial. Public 
hearings were held, no protests were filed, and the Board complied with 
the request. After the owner had prepared the site and purchased sound 
equipment, protests were filed with the Board and the Board rescinded 
its previous action, claiming it had not fully complied with the notice 
requirements of the zoning regulations in conducting its previous public 
hearings. The owner's pleas for reconsideration and for a permit for 
nonconforming use were denied even though evidence showed that the land 
was only suitable for commercial use. 
The Florida Supreme Court reversed the Board's action and ordered 
the permit to be issued on the basis that the owner had been given no 
reason to believe that the "official mind" would change or that the 
Board had failed to comply with its own regulations. Thus, the Board 
was equitably estopped from rescinding its action. 
Mere Good Faith Expectation Insufficient 
In contrast with these cases, a 1967 California case 607/ demon-
strates that the timing of events can negate reliance on an-expectation 
of approval to justify proceeding with a project. During 1963 and 1964, 
the San Francisco Planning Commission and the Board of Supervisors 
considered and approved a proposed ordinance establishing a maximum 
height limit on buildings in the Russian Hill area of the city. This 
approval did not constitute enactment of a law. On January 22, 1964, 
knowing of the Comrr.ission and Board's actions, a developer filed with 
the Permit Bureau an application to construct an apartment building that 
exceeded the proposed height limitation. On February 10, 1964, while 
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the application was being considered, the Board of Supervisors enacted 
the proposed ordinance to become effective on March 23, 1964. On 
March 12 and 19, the City Planning Commission and the Permit Bureau, 
respectively, approved the permit application subject to a right of 
appeal within ten days to the Board of Permit Appeals. The permit 
advised the developer to incur no expense until the appeal time had 
lapsed. 
The Russian Hill Improvement Association filed a timely but un-
successful appeal to enjoin construction. The Board of Permit Appeals 
found that the Permit Bureau had acted properly under the laws that 
existed at the time of approval and denied a rehearing. The developer, 
relying on the Board's action, proceeded with the project. The Associa-
tion appealed to the San Francisco Superior Court which, on May 4, 1964, 
revoked the developer's permit. The California Supreme Court upheld the 
lower court's action, holding that because the law changed between the 
time the Permit Bureau acted and the time that the application came 
before the Board of Permit Appeals, the application came before the 
1 atte_r body de novo - as a new case. Thus, the 1 aw to be app 1 i ed was 
the law in effect at the time the application was considered by the 
Board. 
The developer argued that a section of the San Francisco City 
Charter "immunized" an outstanding permit from changes in the law. The 
court agreed but stated that normal principles of administrative law 
contemplate protection of only those permits that have obtained finality 
in the administrative process and that a permit is not lawfully granted 
until the appropriate channels of administrative review have been 
exhausted. 
The Nature of the Remedy 
In the cases discussed, the remedy to the parties injured by 
unreasonable changes in the law was permission to continue their pro-jects. An alternative remedy would, of course, be a denial of the right 
to continue the project and an award of damages for expenses incurred in 
reasonable reliance upon assurances that the project would be permitted. 
This theory of remedy was rejected by the Supreme Court of Hawaii in a 
1977 decision that reversed a lower court's award of money damages.608/ 
A developer had purchased land in Waialua, Oahu, and proceeded with---
architectural and engineering work necessary to apply for a permit for 
construction of a condominium. Prior to the completion of the appli-
cation, however, a draft ordinance to rezone the property and lower the 
height limitation was introduced to the City Council by certain Waialua 
residents in an effort to stop high-rise development in the area. The 
developer testified in oPPosition to the ordinance but it was eventuallY 
passed. Prior to the enactment, several government agencies had ini-
tialed their approval of the permit application, but the application was 
withdrawn after the ordinance was passed. The Building Department had 
not finally approved or denied the permit. 
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The trial court held that mere introduction of a bill did not 
constitute notice to the developer that the zoning would be changed, 
that the developer had a right to rely on the prior zoning requirements, 
and that the city was liable for the costs incurred by the developer in 
reliance upon the zoning laws in effect and on the reasonable probabi-
lity that the permit would issue. The Hawaii Supreme Court re-affirmed 
its rulings on equitable estoppel as announced in the 1971 Denning 
opinion,609/ but it did not carefully examine these facts to determine 
whether that doctrine applied to this case. Instead it looked at the 
trial court's remedy and ruled that money damages were not an appro-
priate solution. If the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied, the 
developer should be permitted to continue the project. The court could 
find no judicial precedents for a damage award and also rejected mone-
tary awards as unsound policy, reasoning that it would render a city 
incapable of action if, each time it sought to rezone, it feared judi-
cially enforced compensation. Furthermore, the court stated that 
monetary awards would inhibit governmental experimentation in land use 
control and community control over resource allocation and would con-
stitute a usurpation of legislative power. If the city wanted to stop 
construction even though the doctrine of equitable estoppel applied, it 
could buy the property through its powers of eminent domain. This 
choice to spend public funds must be made by the city, not the property 
owners. 
Conclusion 
As explained earlier, these precedents do not apply directly to the 
dispute over water rights, and analogies are elusive. In the cases 
discussed, owners had undisputed rights to "property" and their right to 
use their property was impaired. In the water litigation, the issue is 
whether the landowners had valid property rights to water, not whether 
those rights were impaired. 
Justice Levinson did argue in his dissenting oplnlon, however, that 
the doctrine of equitable estoppel should have been considered by the 
~1cBryde majority and that their failure to do so was "legally inex-
cusable."610j He argued that (1) the government's silence while the 
landowners-llnvested large sums of money to exploit the water resources 
and (2) the government's taxation of the surplus waters as private 
property should prevent the government from later claiming that the 
private landowners did not own the water.§llI 
The majority did not respond to these arguments, but in a later 
case, the Hawaii Supreme Court explicitly ruled that actions by the 
taxing agencies of the government did not prevent other branches of the 
government from claiming title to property.612j Other cases in Hawaii 
and elsewhere have held that certain types or-property cannot be alien-
ated by the government even if the government intends to, because such 
property is held in trust for the public.§llI 
The actions of previous Hawaii governments and the decisions of 
previous Hawaii Supreme Courts on water issues have not been consistent, 
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and so the McBryde majority looked to two early statutes as the firmest 
foundation to find the law on this issue.614/ How the federal appellate 
court might rule on the taking issue (if ~reaches this issue) cannot 
be definitely predicted. But the Hawaii Supreme Court was acting in 
accordance with substantial precedent when it examined the ancient law 
to determine ownership and public access without considering the issues 
of equitable estoppel or taking. As explained in the introduction to 
this section,§l2j the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
similarly ignored these issues in the 1978 Kaiser Aetna case. 
Introduction 
JURISDICTIONAL PROBLEMS REGARDING THE 
GOVERNANCE OF WATER IN HAHAII 
The federal, state, and county governments, native Hawaiians, and 
private landowners all have certain claims to "jurisdiction" over some 
of Hawaii's waters. 
Hawaii statutes provide for the creation of county boards of water 
supply and describe their powers and duties.616/ The four county 
charters list the specific powers that the counties have granted to 
these boards.617/ On Oahu, the Honolulu Board of Water Supply (BWS) is 
charged with the task of providing current and prospective domestic 
water needs. Yet many agricultural and industrial water consumers on 
Oahu with private wells, as well as the military bases which also have 
their own wells, do not fall under the immediate jurisdiction of the 
board. The board's ability to oversee, manage, and control the total 
amount of groundwater withdrawal is, therefore, limited. 
The State Board of Land and Natural Resources has broad powers and 
responsibilities to oversee, manage, and control all groundwater uses 
statewide under the provisions of the Ground Water Use Act of 1961.618/ 
The board has monitoring and research functions under this Act, andlnOre 
importantly, is empowered to declare any portion of the State facing a 
water shortage a designated groundwater area. The Act states that such 
a designation should be made where "groundwater must be regulated and 
protected for its best utilization, conservation, and protection in 
order to prevent the threat of exhaustion, depletion, waste, pollution, 
or deterioration by salt encroachment .... "619/ Although almost 18 
years have passed since the enactment of the law, rules and regulations 
necessary to implement these provisions are only now being drafted and 
debated. 
In February, 1978, a consulting engineer's report to the Honolulu 
Board of Water Supply showed that at least 18 pumping stations and wells 
on Oahu maintained an annual average water withdrawal that exceeded the 
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stations' sustainable yield.620/ ~lore water was removed from the 
groundwater lens at these stations in 1977 than returned via perco-
lation. Although 1977 had a particularly dry winter, the continuation 
of such rates of withdrawal over a prolonged period (10 to 20 years) and 
the likely increase in demand with a growing population could exhaust 
certain groundwater supplies or generate saltwater intrusion in re-
maining reservoirs. 
Effective water management will require avoiding jurisdictional 
conflicts, particularly in periods of water shortages. The potential 
for such conflicts is demonstrated by recent efforts of the Honolulu 
Board of IJater Supply to regulate both publ icly- and privately-owned 
wells on Oahu (including the federal wells) in times of shortage by 
amending Chapter III of its rules and regulations.621/ The State, under 
the 1961 Ground 14ater Use Act, could also regulatethese wells. (A 
synopsis of the proposed BI~S amendment and a summary of the State Ground 
Water Use Act are presented in Appendix III below at pages 273-74.) The 
remainder of this section examines the competing constitutional and 
statutory claims of jurisdiction over Hawaii's waters. 
The Interphase of State and County Jurisdictions 
The Hawaii Constitution requires the legislature to promote the 
conservation, development and utilization of water, land and other 
natural resources of the State, and grants to the legislature the power 
to vest the management of such resources in executive boards or commis-
sions.622/ However, the constitution also provides that the "mandatory 
provisions of this section shall not apply to the natural resources 
owned by or under the control of a political subdivision or a department 
or agency thereof."623/ Simi larly, the constitution specifies: 
The legislative power over the lands owned by or 
under the control of the State and its political 
subdivisions shall be exercised only by general 
laws, except in respect to transfers to or for 
the use of the State, a political subdivision, 
or any department or agency thereof.624/ 
Neither these constitutional provisions nor the state statutes and 
county charter provisions regarding county boards of water supply 
clearly delineate the conditions under which the State has authority 
superior to that of the counties and vice versa. The relationship is 
further confused by statutes declaring that the state may not initiate 
irrigation projects in any county unless the State Board of Land and 
Natural Resources first consults the Board of Water Supply of that 
county. 625/ 
One of the questions that remain unresolved is currently being 
investigated by the State Attorney General's Office: Do the Honolulu 
Charter provisions empowering the BWS to regulate private wells 626/ 
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exceed the authority granted to them by the legislature?627/ The cri-
tical words in Hawaii Revised Statutes, section 54-15, are "manage, 
control, and operate the waterworks of the county and all property 
thereof, for the purpose of supplying water to the public in the county 
... " (emphasis added). The answer to this question requires an 
analysis of legislative history which had not yet been completed by the 
Attorney General's Office at the time of this writing. Controversies 
regarding state and county powers have been frequent in recent years and 
are not limited to water rights.628/ 
The only Hawaii water statute that specifically asserts the state's 
superior authority is the 1961 Ground Water Use Act, which had not been 
fully implemented at the time of this writing. The Act provides that: 
No state or local government agency may enforce any 
ordinance, rule, or regulation that affects the use 
of ground water from a designated ground water area 
... unless the board of land and natural resources 
has approved the ordinance, rule, or regulation.629/ 
This statute is only applicable, however, to groundwater and to areas 
"designated" in response to shortage conditions. The legislative 
history and language of the 1961 Ground \Jater Use Act clearly indicate 
that the legislature did not intend that the state's power preempt the 
BWS's power, except when the State actually designates a groundwater 
area.630/ Jurisdictional conflicts may still arise, however, because 
(1) t~BWS asserts that it cannot adequately fulfill the assignment 
given it in the county charter unless it has control over all wells on 
Oahu, and (2) if the BWS amends its rules (see Appendix IIr:-pages 
273-74), the same shortage conditions may trigger both state and BWS 
action, resulting in inconsistent procedures and directives under 
dissimilar regulations and unnecessary governmental duplication. 
The question whether the State or the county is the appropriate 
governmental entity to regulate, manage, and control groundwater use, 
under either normal or shortage conditions, requires consideration of 
four major issues: 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
The power of the county, through the BWS, to 
regulate privately owned wells. 
The intention of the BWS, in times of shortage 
as measured at certain test locations, to 
restrict pumping on an island-wide basis with-
out preserving existing uses (see Appendix III, 
pages 273-74, for the proposed amendment to 
Chapter III of the BWS rules and regulations). 
The legality and desirability of the BWS 
practice of transporting water from one hydro-
logical basin for use in another area while 
restricting users in the supplying area because 
of shortage conditions. 
L 
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(4) The potential conflicts of interest and disin-
centives that result when a water purveyor has 
regulatory authority beyond its own system. 
Regulating Privately Owned ~Jells. 
is based 
and: 
The BWS's assertion of jurisdiction over privately owned wells 
on two sections of the Honolulu Charter which state: 
All water and sanitary sewerage systems of the 
city,631/ including water rights and water sources, 
together with all materials, supplies and equip-
ment and all real and personal property used or 
useful in~nnection with such water and sanitary 
sewerage systems shall be under the control of the department. 632/ 
The board of water supply shall: ... Prescribe 
and enforce rules and regulations having the force 
and effect of law to carry out the proVisions of 
this article of the charter, including •.. (6) in 
times of shortage or threatened shortage of water 
or of danger to potability of the water of any 
ground water basin or area by overdraft on such 
basin, the restriction of the drawing of water in 
all wells supplied from such basin on a basis pro-
portionate to the proper and beneficial uses served 
by them respecti ve1y .... 633/ 
In the opinion of the presiding officer of the State Water Commission, 
these provisions directly overlap state powers to designate groundwater 
areas and to require permits for water use in times of shortage 634/ 
(see Appendix III - Summary of the Ground Water Use Act, pages 2~75). 
The BWS claim of statutory authority to regulate private wells 
derives exclusively from the pervasive use of the word all in the above 
provisions. An alternative construction, however, woul~ollow from 
emphasis on the words "systems of the city." The latter construction 
would restrict the county's jurisdiction to its own system. The legis-
lature, in the 1961 Ground Water Use Act, specifically asserts state jurisdiction over any and all persons, defined to include "public and 
private corporations, associations, estates, and individuals."635/ Lack 
of such specificity in the charter provisions might indicate that the 
framers of the charter did not intend to assert such an expansive 
authority over the private sector. Regardless of the legitimacy of the 
county's statutory claim, one must next address the question of whether 
the state or county will prove supreme when jurisdictional conflicts do arise. 
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A 1976 Hawaii Supreme Court case illustrates the statutory and 
constitutional issues involved in a conflict between state and city 
powers over private property.636/ The State instituted eminent domain 
proceedings to condemn private-residential property to expand the mauka 
area of the University of Hawaii's nanoa campus. The property owners 
challenged the proceeding on the basis that the General Plan of the City 
and County of Honolulu designated that area as residential. The prop-
erty owners supported their position by reference to Honolulu Charter 
provisions stipulating that no improvement or project shall be initiated 
or adopted unless it conforms to and implements the development plan for 
that area.637/ Furthermore, the legislature provided that the city 
charter is the organic law of the county and: 
shall supercede any existing charter and all laws 
affecting the organization and government of the 
county which are in conflict therewith.638/ 
The court nonetheless upheld the condemnation based on the pro-
vision of the Hawaii Constitution requiring the State to provide for 
establishment, support, and control of the state university. The court 
stated: 
On functions of statewide interest and concern, the 
general rule is that if the counties are not given 
specific authority to take over that function, the 
counties cannot thwart the State from performing 
its duty. 639/ 
The court, in support of its holding, also cited the Hawaii consti-
tutional provision that: 
Each political subdivision shall have power to frame 
and adopt a charter for its own self-government within 
such limits and under such procedures as may be ~
scribed by general law.640/ 
Although the court's analysis would appear to support state su-
premacy over private property rights in a manner that seems analogous to 
state regulation of private water wells, the Honolulu BWS and deputy 
corporation counsel have tried to distinguish the two situations by 
arguing that counties have been given specific authority to take over 
the water regulation function.64l/ Also, they point out that the Hawaii 
Supreme Court concluded its opinion by stating: 
We make it expressly clear that this opinion of the 
court does not deal with the question, to wit: is 
Section 5-412.3 of the Charter inapplicable to all 
State public projects? It could very well be that 
the "balancing of interests" test ... is the 
appropriate test to apply in determining whether 
certain other State public projects fall within the 
provisions of Section 5-412.3 of the Charter.642/ 
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Thus, the deputy corporation counsel's oplnlon concludes that 
litigation could result in a decision that the State has absolute power 
to ignore BWS restrictions or in the application of some "balancing of 
interests" solution. Accordingly, the deputy corporation counsel urged 
the BWS to frame its jurisdictional powers broadly. As a result, 
private wells have been included within the provisions of the proposed 
amendment to the BWS rules. 
Preservation of Existing Uses During Periods of Restriction. 
The State and the Honolulu BViS appear at the moment to have 
different philosophies of restriction during periods of shortage. Under 
the 1961 Ground !~ater Act,643/ the State would preserve existing uses 
and restrict additional uses; the county's proposed regulations would 
restrict existing uses and they express no necessary prohibitions 
against new uses. The attorneys for Campbell Estate advance the argu-
ment that the BWS cannot possibly regulate private water wells in this 
manner because the state legislature cannot delegate powers to a poli-
tical subdivision superior to the powers that it has reserved for the 
State.644/ The 1961 Ground Water Use Act recognizes and respects 
privateiWater rights by (1) exempting domestic uses from permit require-
ments, and (2) allowing existing uses to continue in full, providing 
that they are certified to the Board of Land and tJatural Resources, and 
(3) requiring that all increased or new uses be by permit _ including 
those contemplated by the BHS. Because such permits apparently would 
not be granted where they interfere with existing uses, new municipal 
uses would have no higher priority and the BWS would be simply another 
applicant. This result may not have been intended by the legislature, 
and it could be corrected by amending the governing state statute. 
Transporting Water from Its Hydrological Source. 
The practice of the Honolulu BWS is to transport municipal 
water from developed hydrological groundwater basins where water is 
plentiful to areas overlying distant and distinct basins where water is 
scarce. Even during periods of normal water supply, this practice has 
been opposed by Life of the Land, the Navy, Oahu Sugar Company, Campbell 
Estate, Foster Botanical Gardens, Oahu Nursery Growers, and individual 
farmers. 645/ Thus, even though the sugar companies have benefited from 
their transportation of surface waters for distant irrigation, they have 
tended to oppose the transportati on of groundwater by the Bl1S to serve domestic consumers. 
The arguments against BWS groundwater transfers concern both 
economics and growth management. Groundwater transfers allow the BWS to 
guarantee water supplies to new development projects by drawing from the 
basins of other users, thereby penalizing voluntary conservation efforts 
and elevating urban development above agriculture and alternative uses. 
Through this manipulation, it is argued, the BWS is unilaterally making 
economic policy regarding land use and state development. Oahu Sugar 
Company's situation typifies the concern.646/ Oahu Sugar's president 
has stated that the company remains in business only because they can 
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demonstrate profitability in several years based on higher yields and 
more producing acreage.647/ Their planning does not take into account 
unexpected water shortages or restrictions resulting from transportation 
of their groundwater elsewhere. 
Oahu Sugar Company and Campbell Estate advance the following legal 
defenses against restrictions upon water use in an area from which the 
BWS is supplying or has supplied other areas.648/ First, the doctrine 
of correlative rights, as interpreted by the Hawaii Supreme Court,649/ 
provides that land ownership carries with it the right to use under-
ground water beneath the surface of the land owned, limited only by the 
requirements (a) that the use does not injure the water supply of 
neighboring landowners and (b) that the water is used upon the land 
overlying the source. Other users who do not own overlying land may 
acquire water rights in excess waters, but those rights are inferior to 
correlative rights. Thus, in times of shortage, the non-landowner who 
is exporting water must cut back first. If the BWS is the exporter, 
supplying municipal needs in another area, and the BWS is also restrict-
ing pumping by overlying landowners, a conflict of interest appears. 
Conceivably, a court could find an unconstitutional taking of property 
rights without just compensation. 
A second argument is that the BIIS powers enumerated in the Honolulu 
Charter, although ambiguous, arguably state that any restrictions on the 
use of water must be limited to the basin in which the shortage exists. 
This argument is based on an interpretation of the words: 
... in times of shortage ... or of danger to 
potability of the water of any ground water basin 
. . . the restriction of the drawing of water in 
all wells supplied from such basin .... 650/ 
Thus, the argument is that if the BWS cannot supply its customers from 
the basin over which they reside because of a shortage in that basin, it 
cannot make up their shortage by restricting overlying users of a 
different supplying basin. Oahu has six groundwater basins, as de-
lineated in the Hawaii Water Resources Plan of April, 1977.651/ The 
hydrological evidence seems to indicate that pumping from one-area does 
not reduce levels in another.652/ Thus, BWS restriction of pumping in 
any area without a shortage to-5ubsidize users in a shortage area is 
arguably a violation of its charter mandate. 
Conflicts of Interests and Disincentives. 
Many technical arguments against the proposed BWS amendment 
concern (1) the criteria employed to determine that a shortage or danger 
exists, (2) the ambiguous wording of the criteria, and (3) the arbitrary 
division of users into classes with unlimited discretion to regulate 
each class separate1y.653/ Common to these criticisms and fundamental 
to the state/county jurisdictional question is the concern that, without 
state regulation, the BWS need never regulate itself and has made no 
provisions for doing so. Therefore, the BWS has no incentive to develop 
""'--
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new sources (such as tapping the virtually untapped north shore dis-
trict), modernize its drill ing techniques (such as using "skimming 
wells"--instead of vertical wells--as recommended by the Navy) ,654/ 
upgrade its facilities, or explore methods of treating and uSin9iJrban 
effluent on agricultural land rather than discharging it to sea. Some 
have argued that the proposed shortage criteria measures not the condi-
tion of the basin but the antiquity of the BWS equipment.655/ 
Because it is a water supplier, the BWS may have a tendency to 
encourage new development, keep revenues high, and de-emphasize urban 
conservation. As a result, according to the president of the Oahu Sugar 
Company, Oahu has one of the highest per capita consumption rates in the 
nation.656/ Because it is also a water regulator, the BWS can adopt the 
least expensive alternative and maintain supply by restricting other private uses. 
Federa 1 ~4e 11 s 
To supply its military facilities throughout Oahu, the federal 
government obtains fresh water both from the BWS and from its own four 
wells. The Navy does not contest the power of the BHS to regulate Navy 
use of the BWS system and asserts no greater right than any other BWS 
customer. However, the Navy denies any state or county jurisdiction 
over water from federally-owned wells.657/ 
A 1976 United States Supreme Court decision restated the general 
principles governing water rights on federal lands.658/ In 1952, the 
United States had established Devil's Hole NationalMOnument in rJevada . 
Devil 's Hole consisted, in part, of a surface pond and a subsurface pool 
fed by an underground water source. A unique type of desert fish 
thrived in the pool and depended upon certain water levels for its 
existence. In 1968, private ranch owners drilled wells on their prop-
erty within two and one-half miles of Devil 's Hole. The ranch owners 
applied to the r~evada State Engineer for pumping permits, which were 
granted over the objections of the National Park Service. No party 
contested the fact that the Devil 's Hole and the ranch aquifers were 
hydrologically connected. Pumping by the ranch owners began to lower 
the Devil's Hole water level. 
The Supreme Court enjoined the ranch owners from pumping quantities 
that would lower the Devil's Hole aquifer to unacceptable levels. In so dOing, the Court stated: 
This Court has long held that when the Federal 
Government withdraws its land from the public 
domain and reserves it for a federal purpose, 
the Government, by implication, reserves 
appurtenant water then unappropriated to the 
extent needed to accomplish the purpose of 
the reservation. In so doing, the United 
States acquires a reserved right in unappro-
priated water which vests on the date of the 
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reservation and is superior to the rights of 
future appropriators.659/ 
In addition: 
In determining whether there is a federally 
reserved water right implicit in a federal 
reservation of public land, the issue is· 
whether the Government intended to reserve 
unappropriated and thus available water. 
Intent is inferred if the previously 
unappropriated waters are necessary to 
accomplish the purposes for which the 
reservation was created.660/ 
Drilling wells to supply major naval facilities clearly constitutes 
removal of land from the public domain for a federal purpose and evi-
dences intent to reserve unappropriated water necessary for that pur-
pose. However, the City and County of Honolulu's deputy corporation 
counsel has argued that the case cited is different from the situation 
in Hawaii in the following ways:~ 
(1) 
(2) 
(3) 
Devil 's Hole involved surface water as well 
as ground water. 
Nevada recognizes the doctrine of prior 
appropriation whereas Hawaii has judicially 
established the correlative rights doctrine.662/ 
The federal government was the first to 
claim rights in the Devil's Hole aquifer 
(the ranch owners drilled later), whereas 
in Hawaii, several plantation wells were 
drilled before the Navy drilled its wells. 
On this basis, the deputy corporation counsel concludes that the federal 
government does not have a "clear cut" case and that undiminished tlavy 
pumping in times of shortage, when all other water users are regulated, 
may be a constitutional violation of the equal rights of all other water 
users as defined by the correlative rights doctrine. The deputy corpora-
tion counsel's opinion, while again recommending that the BWS draft its 
regulations as broadly as possible to regulate federal as well as 
private wells, does contain an important caveat: if the BI<IS must 
enforce its rules against federal or state agencies, it may have to 
resort to negotiation or arbitration, rather than legal action, because 
the rule of primacy as to water rights in Hawaii is unsettled if invoked 
against a governmental agency with superior sovereign powers. 
The three distinctions claimed in the corporation counsel's opinion 
appear to be addressed in the U.S. Supreme Court's Devil 's Hole opinion 
and answered in favor of federal claims. As to the distinction between 
surface and groundwater, the Court states: 
--
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Thus, since the imp1ied-reservation-of-water_ 
rights doctrine is based on the necessity of 
water for the purpose of the federal reserva-
tion, we hold that the United States can pro-
tect its water from subsequent diversion, 
whether the diversion is of surface or ground 
water.663/ 
As to state legal doctrines, the Court states: 
Federal water rights are not dependent upon 
state law or state procedures and they need 
not be adjudicated only in state courts.664/ 
And regarding distinction(s) that private plantation wells were drilled 
prior to the Navy wells, the Court speaks not to the question of which 
party drilled first but to the question of whether unappropriated or 
available water was present at the time of the reservation. The fact 
that the B~JS' s predecessors dri 11 ed thei r well s after the Navy dri 11 ed 
its wells indicates that water was available beyond the needs of the 
plantations. Accordingly, one must conclude that the power of the B\~S 
or the State to impose mandatory restrictions on federal wells is 
limited, especially because the Navy has implemented a voluntary con-
servation program that has resulted in a 40% reduction in fresh water 
consumed by Naval activities within the last year.665/ 
Native Hawaiian Claims and the Reserved Water Rights Doctrine 
The United States Supreme Court in its 1976 Devil 's Hole opinion 
relied heavily on a 1908 Supreme Court decision,~ in which the Court 
first enunciated the imp1ied-reservation-of-water-rights doctrine.667! 
The 1908 case, Winters v. United States, involved a group of investors 
and farmers who developed a scheme to dam and divert the Milk River in 
Montana to provide irrigation water to settlers who acquired property 
under the federal homestead and desert land use acts. Following size-
able expenditures and after complying with state appropriation proce-
dures, they created a successful farming community. Downstream, how-
ever, the Fort Belknap Indian reservation had previously been created by 
treaty between the United States and certain Indian nations. The 
upstream diversion restricted the water flow reaching the reservation to 
the point that it was no longer adequate for irrigation, livestock, or 
domestic use by the Native-Americans. 
The United States brought a suit on behalf of the natives to 
prevent the upstream diversion. The Court held that the federal govern-
ment had acquired, as of the date of the treaty, an appropriation of all 
water needed to fulfill the purpose of the reservation. Since the Fort 
Belknap treaty was concluded in 1888 and the upstream diverters began 
their activities in 1900, the upstream appropriators were junior in 
right to the natives, and the newcomers were thus enjoined from di-
verting any substantial quantities of water from the Milk River. The 
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fact that the natives had not begun to use substantial quantities of 
Milk River water until 1904 was deemed immaterial by the Court, as was 
the substantial economic losses that would accrue to the upstream 
community. 
The Court reasoned that the natives had, prior to the treaty, 
control over all of the lands bordering the Milk River and, consquently, 
control over all of the river waters. These lands, excepting Fort 
Belknap, were ceded to the United States in the 1888 treaty. These 
ceded lands became part of the public domain and were subject to settle-
ment and disposal in fee simple under various homestead and desert land 
use laws. The natives, however, having water rights in all of the 
larger areas, did not cede them with the land but confined them to a 
smaller area in their effort to become a stable and civilized society. 
The object and intent of the parties was to give the natives sufficient 
resources to establish permanent homes and to gain a livelihood by 
cultivation of the soil. The intent of the government to reserve 
unappropriated and available water as of the date of the treaty was 
inferred because the water was clearly necessary to accomplish the 
purposes for which the reservation was created. 
The facts in the Fort Belknap case are analogous to the historical 
circumstances surrounding Hawaii's annexation and the transfer of 
sovereignty over its lands to the United States. In 1921, the United 
States Congress passed the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920,668/ 
which created the Hawaiian Homes Commission as the executive board of 
the State Department of Hawaiian Home Lands.669/ The department was 
charged with leasing tracts of these lands tOinative Hawaiians at 
nominal rentals on ninety-nine year leases.670/ Under the conditions of 
the lease, the lessee would occupy and commence to use or cultivate the 
tract as his or her home or farm.671/ Also, the Act provides for re-
volving funds to underwrite priva~loans and for direct loans for home 
construction or repair, commercial and mercantile establishments, and 
the purchase of livestock, farm equipment, and other agricultural 
supplies. As for water rights, the Act defines "surplus water" as 
government-owned water under a water license or privately-owned water in 
excess of the quantity required for the use of the licensee or owner.672/ 
The department is authorized to use, free of charge, government water---
needed to supply the agricultural or domestic needs of lessees and to 
purchase or condemn p~ivate surplus water for the same purpose.673/ 
Furthermore, the Act provides that all water licenses issued after its 
passage are subject to the condition that the licensee shall, upon 
demand of the department, grant to it the right to use, free of charge, 
any water which the department deems necessary to supply the livestock 
or the domestic needs of individuals on the leased tracts.674/ 
Subsequent to the Act's passage, the State Organic Act was amended 
to exclude from "public lands" any lands reserved by the Department of 
Hawaiian Home Lands.675/ Later, the Admissions Act required adoption of 
the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act as a provision of the state consti-
tution, with some pr.ovisions subject to amendment or repeal only with 
the consent of the United States Congress.676/ The Hawaii Constitution 
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thus provides that the State and its people accept, as compact with the 
United States, that the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, shall 
govern the management and disposition of Hawaiian Home Lands and that 
the "spirit of the Hawaiian Homes Commission Act looking to the con-
tinuance of the Hawaiian homes projects for the further rehabilitation 
of the Hawaii race shall be faithfully carried out."677/ 
The parallels between the Hawaiian and the Fort Belknap circum-
stances are many. In both cases, the natives had originally held water 
rights to a generalized area. Most of the area was later ceded to the 
United States. In both cases, certain lands were reserved by Congress 
for the benefit of the natives. The clear intention of the Congress in 
reserving the lands was to create stable, civilized, agriculturally-
based communities. In both Hawaii and ~10ntana, lands not so reserved 
became part of the public domain. The only substantive difference 
between the two situations is that in Montana the land reservation was 
an integral part of the same instrument that ceded the lands to the 
United States - the 1888 treaty. In Hawaii, the reservation of the 
lands occurred through a special act of Congress in 1921, over twenty 
years after the formal transfer of sovereignty from the Republic of 
Hawaii to the United States (1898) and the establishment of the terri-
tory of Hawaii by the Organic Act in 1900. 
This analysis suggests that under the implied-reservation-of-water_ 
rights doctrine, lessees of tracts of Hawaiian Homes Commission land are 
senior appropriators of any water available as of July, 1921, in quanti-
ties sufficient to accomplish agricultural or domestic purposes for 
which the tract is occupied. Thus, the water rights provisions of the 
Hawaiian Homes Commission Act itself are consistent with the implied-
reservation-of-water-rights doctrine, and the doctrine itself would 
appear to confer these rights even in the absence of such provisions. 
Conclusion 
The State Department of Land and flatural Resources and the pre-
siding officer of the State Water Commission have recommended that the 
proposed amendment to the B\~S rul es and regul ati ons del ete references to 
private wells and that if area-wide groundwater control is necessary, 
the BWS work with the Department of Land and Natural Resources under the 
1961 Ground liater Use Act as follows:678/ 
(1) At the initiative of any party, the department 
will assess a possible shortage or danger situa-
tion in cooperation with major purveyors (BI~S, 
rlavy, private). 
(2) Upon department designation of a low ground 
water area, all purveyors will be given notice 
to restrict pumping proportionately. This 
notice would be implemented by formal coopera-
tion agreements, or by formation of agency 
associations as provided under the Act. 
(3) 
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The permit and other provlslons of the 1961 
Ground Water Act would be put into effect.679/ 
The Department and the Water Commission's spokesperson assert that this 
scenario works well on the other islands and is most logical on Oahu 
because: 
(1) 
(2 ) 
(3) 
The state has higher jurisdictional authority 
and questions exist concerning the extent 
of county authority over private wells. 
The department can better coordinate and 
cooperate with state agencies at the same 
level of sovereignty (for example, the 
Department of Health). 
The State has no vested interest as a purveyor 
of water. 
The State Ha ter Commi ss i on's 1978 report formally recommends that the 
State regulate water development and use on all the islands.680/ In 
addition to the reasons listed above, the report emphasizes alSo that 
other Western states have statewide regulatory programs and that the 
1978 Water Resources constitutional amendment §§lI specifically in-
structs the legislature to establish a new "water resources agency" to 
regulate all of the state's water resources. 
Because of the 1978 constitutional amendment, which is discussed 
below at pages 264-66, a statewide regulatory approach is now required. 
The water rights of the federal government and of native Hawaiians may, 
however, in some cases be superior to all others--including the State--
and therefore negotiation may be necessary with these two groups. 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
This report has covered extensive territory in detail, and the 
reader should refer back to the text for the arguments and supporting 
data that have led us to the conclusions and recommendations that 
follow. Because so many others have written on this subject before and 
because reasonable people can disagree on these issues, our conclusions 
and recommendations are offered not as the final word on the subject but 
rather as our attempt to make some sense out of the past and to help 
chart a direction for the future. 
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Conclusions 
1. The 200 years that separate us from the traditional Hawaiian 
approach to water rights and other property questions vlere years of 
unusual turmoil and change. Cultures based on vastly different ex-
periences came together on these islands and struggled to deal with the 
economic and human problems that existed. Change occurred rapidly. 
Traditions were lost. New institutions were created, not always with 
the support of the majority of those living here. The islands were 
annexed to one of the most powerful nations in the world, and new laws 
and institutions were imposed on the residents. Only recently has full 
self-government been restored and only recently have the native peoples 
begun to petition for a full redress of their grievances. It is prob-
ably more appropriate, therefore, for the "law" to be re-examined and 
restructured here than it would be in a community where change had been 
achieved more gradually and with the full participation of the citi-
zenry. 
2. The review of the decisions of the Hawaii Supreme Court on 
pages 176-200 concludes that the law on water rights was not "settled" 
prior to 1973 when the Hawaii Supreme Court rendered its decision in 
McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson.682/ The Hawaii Supreme Court reversed 
itself several times in its early cases involving water rights,683/ and 
the Territory at several points argued that it had ri9hts to water 
greater than those that had been recognized.684/ Native claims to water 
were not fully articulated until recently andlWere rarely considered by 
the court. Although several commentators tried to codify Hawaii's water 
law,685/ they all viewed the law in Hawaii as unique and presented their 
summaries with caution. 11any questions never reached the courts. The 
1917 decision 686/ was based on different principles than those that had 
governed the 1904 decision,687/ and the 1930 decision 688/ rejected the 
principles that had guided the 1917 court. Even the important 1930 case 
of Territory v. Gay 689/ was decided by a divided court with each of the 
three justices having different views on the issues. The majority's 
holding in this case appears to be based on principles that differ from 
those used by the same court in another water case the year before.690/ 
The law has been actively disputed for years and cannot be describedias 
"settled." 
3. The majority opinion of the Hawaii Supreme Court's 1973 
deci s i on in t1cBryde looks at the enti re hi s tory of Hawai ian 1 aw and 
attempts to integrate its inconsistent features into a coherent whole.691/ 
Although reasonable persons can disagree on the details of the court's---
opinion, and on the result, it was certainly proper for the court to try 
to reconcile conflicting themes in Hawaii's jurisprudence. The court 
acted within its jurisdiction, and the result should not be viewed as 
unreasonable, arbitrary, shocking, or particularly surprisin9. The 
majority opinion bases its conclusions on an interpretation of statutes 
and states that the legislature is free to enact new statutes if it 
prefers a different result.692/ 
4. The law in Hawaii on water rights prior to f1cBryde (1973) was 
unique in the United States. No other jurisdiction permitted private 
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ownership of water to the extent claimed by the sugar companies and 
apparently authorized by the Hawaii Supreme Court in 1904 and 1930.693/ 
Water is generally viewed elsewhere as a resource that cannot be "owned" 
because it is free-flowing and is thus not subject to possession. The 
debate over "ownership" of waters may not be as significant as some 
advocates have claimed. As we explain at pages 216-17, above, the 
conclusion in t1cBryde that the State owns the water may mean only that 
the State can control and regulate the water--a power the State has 
always had. Under this interpretation, it would not make sense to say 
that anything was "taken" from other parties. Other states where water 
is scarce allow private water use by issuing permits for such use or by 
allowing an "appropriation" of the water by a private user who generally 
must register the appropriated claim. This right to use "appropriated" 
waters is not an ownership right. It cannot be bought and sold as 
freely as land. It does not necessarily last forever. It is a right to 
use the water that is valid either for a specific number of years or for 
as long as the water is being put to a beneficial use.694/ 
5. The t1cBryde decision does not state that water can never be 
transported from one watershed area to another. The majority's opinion 
holds that the two private landowners, tkBryde Sugar Company and Gay & 
Robinson, cannot transport water out of the Hanapepe Valley because 
their water rights are appurtenant and riparian water rights which are 
limited to use within the original watershed area.695/ The court also 
holds that, because the early Hawaiian statutes were-designed to bring 
the riparian doctrine of water rights to Hawaii, no landowner can divert 
water to the injury of other landowners who "are entitled to have the 
flow of water in the Hanapepe River in the shape and size given it by 
nature. "696/ The court explicitly grounded these rulings on the early 
Hawaiian-statutes that were found to govern this subject,697/ and the 
court invited the legislature "to conduct a thorough re-examination of 
the area."698/ The legislature can, therefore, consider new legislation 
that would amend the court's rulings on the transferability question.699/ 
6. The 1973 decision of the Hawaii Supreme Court on water 
rights 700/ will probably survive federal court review and stand as a 
contribution to the law of Hawaii. Although the U.S. District Court 
issued a stinging rebuke to the Hawaii Supreme Court in its 1977 deci-
sion of Robinson v. Ariyoshi,ZQl/ the claim of the federal district 
court that it has jurisdiction over this controversy is open to serious 
doubt. If federal courts can review state court decisions whenever the 
rules of property law are altered, then our dual system of courts will 
have been drastically transformed. The trend of decisions by the U.S. 
Supreme Court in recent years has been to reduce federal court inter-
vention into state affairs.702/ The 1977 decision of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of H~ii is in conflict with these opinions and 
will probably be reversed on appeal.703/ 
7. Hhatever the final decision on who "owns" the water, it is 
clear that the sugar companies have been using the water in recent years 
and have been producing economic benefit from this use. The sugar 
companies have helped develop the water resources of the islands by 
building and maintaining the irrigation ditches. Virtually no on'e has 
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argued that the sugar companies should be denied access to this water 
during the near future. The water situation is probably not yet criti-
cal enough to justify reallocation of this water at the present time. 
Any permit system that is adopted should acknowledge the need for some 
stability on the part of those who have invested in water during pre-
vious years. 
8. It would not, however, constitute a "taking" of property for 
the interest of the sugar companies in water to be converted to an 
economically equivalent use right through a state-administered program. 
The State Water Commission has recommended that the legislature adopt a 
permit system, under which all water users (except domestic consumers) 
would be required to obtain permits for their use which would be limited 
in time to a 30- to 50-year period.704/ This time period was selected 
to allow "the permittee to amortize his investment. "705/ "[R]enewals 
would be subject to review and approval. "706/ This proposal is similar 
to statutes adopted in other states.7071 Such conversion statutes have 
not generally required compensation and have been accepted as consti-
tutional by the courts.7081 From an economic perspective, a right of 
ownership of water--which is a right to use that water forever--is not 
significantly different from a right to use the water for 30 to 50 
years. 709/ This period should be adequate to justify new capital 
investment to exploit water sources. Some economists think that if the 
sugar companies were to sell a right to use water for 30 years, they 
would receive approximately the same amount they would receive if they 
sold their "ownership" interest in that same water. 710/ If this analy-
sis is correct, substituting a right to use water for-30 to 50 years for 
an "ownership" right would not involve any discernible economic loss to 
the sugar companies and hence, would not require any compensation. The 
State Water Commission's proposal would allow permits to use water to be 
freely "transferable within the permit period if there were no change in 
use."lll! 
9. If the federal district court decision overturning McBryde is 
sustained on appeal and if the permit system described above were found 
to constitute a "taking" in violation of the federal constitution, the 
measure of compensation the State would have to pay the private land-
owners would be the difference in the value of the land attributable to 
this change. Courts have consistently used the change in land value as 
the measure of damages when water rights are altered because water is 
not freely traded on the open market and hence has no easily measurable 
fair market value of its own. The burden would be on the private 
landowners to prove how much the land value has been affected because of 
the loss of water. In other words, the court would compare the value of 
the land with water rights to its value without those rights. If the 
land can be easily converted to a profitable use requiring less water,. 
or if the private landowners are not making much profit by their current 
use (raising sugar), then the State might not have to pay much compensa-
tion for their "taking" of the water.7l21 
10. Whatever the final result of the federal litigation might be, 
it is appropriate for the legislature to act--and to act soon--to 
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regulate water uses in Hawaii. The present state of uncertainty has 
inhibited the state's regulation of water resources, and this uncer-
tainty should be ended as soon as possible. Private as well as public 
users need certainty regarding the availab"ility of water, and it is in 
all of our interest to use our water in the most efficient and bene-
ficial manner. No matter what the final outcome may be in the Hanapepe 
Valley litigation, the State will be able to control most of the water 
both because the State already owns much of the land in the rainy 
sections of the islands and because its police power permits the regula-
tion of private water for the public welfare. A great deal of the 
state's water has been leased to private parties, frequently at rates 
that seem generous to the private parties.7l3/ The State could control 
these waters more carefully. And, the legTSlature is free to regulate 
private waters as other states do.7l4/ rio reasons exist why the state 
legislature needs to wait for the end of the federal litigation before 
acting. 
11. The \Iater Resources amendment recently added to Hawaii's 
Constitution 715/ requires the legislature to "assure" "appurtenant 
rights," whichare the rights to water needed to grow taro on plots that 
have historically been used for this purpose. This goal could be 
achieved by excluding small plots of land (~, less than ten acres) 
from the requirement of obtaining a use permit. New water legislation 
in Hawaii must also acknowledge the federal commitment to provide 
sufficient water for the native lands now governed by the Hawaiian Homes 
Commission and other federal rights to water, which may be superior in 
some respects to competing claims to water.7l6/ 
12. The legislature can and probably should set priorities for 
water use. Most states do this in quite general terms. Chapter 177 of 
the Hawaii Revised Statutes, relating to groundwater restrictions in 
designated shortage areas, grants a priority to "domestic, municipal, 
and mil itary uses "ZlZ/ without goi ng into any greater detai 1. The 
Alaska statute, quoted above at page 228, is one of the most specific 
formulations, but still leaves considerable discretion to the decision-
making body. It would seem appropriate for the Hawaii Legislature to 
spell out priorities of water use in some greater detail, although 
flexibility should be left for the water agency to meet unexpected 
future demands after full public hearings. Priorities in Hawaii should 
include protection of the fragile environment of the islands, and thus 
should guarantee some minimum stream flow. 
Recommendatfons 
The legislature should consider adopting a permit system of water 
use applicable to all ground and surface water resources in Hawaii. To 
provide incentives for conservation efforts, this system should apply 
equally to all water users, including governmental bodies that supply 
municipal or other public requirements. Such a system could be modeled 
on Chapter 177 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which is now applicable 
to groundwaters in designated areas where the waters are being depleted. 
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Chapter 177 requires all groundwater users in a designated area (except 
domestic users) to register their use.71B/ Existing uses are then 
maintained, subject to equitable regulation needed to cope with the 
depleted resource.2l2/ The permits granted to pre-existing users under 
Chapter 177 are not limited in time but can be revoked for nonuse of the 
water or for other violations of the chapter.720/ And, as mentioned 
earlier, the pre-existing user has no absolute-right to the water and 
must cut-back use as required by the Board of Land and natural Resources in times of shortage.l£lI 
The new ~ia ter Resources cons tituti ona 1 amendment adopted in 1978 722/ 
is similar to Chapter 177 in maintaining at least some of the pre-
existing water uses. The new amendment requires a new "water resources 
agency" to "establish criteria for water use priorities while assuring 
appurtenant rights and existing correlative and riparian uses and 
establish procedures for regulating all uses of Hawaii's water 
resources. "723/ The intent of thi s 1 anguage seems to be to preserve the 
ancient tarOlWater rights against all subsequent extinguishment and to 
preserve correlative groundwater rights and riparian rights to surface 
waters insofar as they have actually been used. All other waters would 
be apportioned according to the established "criteria for water use 
priorities." The language regarding correlative and riparian uses is 
somewhat similar to that used in the 1928 California constitutional 
amendment which restricted riparian rights to reasonable beneficial use 
and reasonable methods of diversion.724/ The language certainly au-
thorizes the water agency to require-cQrrelative and riparian users (but 
perhaps not holders of appurtenant rights) to register their claims and 
obtain permits. The amendment sets no limits on the regulation of 
waters not covered by such pre-existing uses. This new language con-
stitutionalizes some of the holdings of the McBryde decision,725/ but 
still gives the legislature considerable flexibility in implementing the 
amendment. 
The statutes of other states offer additional models. Several 
recently enacted permit systems restrict water use rights to a specific 
term of years ranging from 20 to 50 years.726/ The State Hater Com-
mission's proposal for such a permit system limited in time (30 to 50 
years)727/ would be appropriate in Hawaii for those waters not covered 
by the----ri"ew constitutional amendment's language referring to "appurtenant 
rights and existing correlative and riparian uses," so that future 
generations will not be unnecessarily bound by the decisions of their 
parents and grandparents. I'iater users need some security about thei r 
water source, but many economists feel that 30 to 50 years is an ade-
quate time frame to ensure this security. If a water user plans addi-
tional capital investment, the user can petition for a renewal at any 
time to ensure a full 30- to 50-year use to justify the investment. 
Such a petition would be granted if water supplies are sufficient and if 
the use is consistent with the state's priorities at that time. 
Under such a system, existing water uses would be registered and 
current water users would be given permits "if the existing use is a 
reasonable beneficial use.728/ Requests for additional water would be 
granted if such additional-u5es do not injure current users and if the 
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requested use fits into the community's priorities for water use. 
Statutes from other states that incorporate these ideas are offered in 
the text at pages 221-22, above, and footnotes 483-89. 
Three additional issues need to be considered. The new consti-
tutional amendment's preservation of "appurtenant rights" appears designed 
to ensure that native and other small farmers are not deprived of their 
remaining rights. Beginning with the Great t1ahele in 1848 and con-
tinuing in the years following annexation, governments in Hawaii have 
required persons to register rights to land, water, fishing areas, and 
so on, and the result has always been that many of the poor have lost 
what little they have had to the rich and better-educated.729/ It may 
be appropriate to exempt persons using water for agricultural purposes 
on fewer than ten acres of land from a registration requirement, to 
ensure that such a loss does not occur again. Such an exemption would 
be analogous to Chapter 177 of the Hawaii Revised Statutes, which 
excludes domestic users from the general requirement of obtaining 
permits to continue using groundwaters.730/ The proposal of the State 
Water Commission does exempt water uses-rrcterived from appurtenant 
rights" from the permit requirement.731/ Their proposal does, however, 
require the appurtenant users to register their uses in order to ensure 
that the regulatory agency has a complete picture of all water uses, 
once again following the model established in Chapter 177.732/ 
The second related issue is whether water use permits should be 
freely transferable. Given perfect market conditions, economists would 
generally favor free transferability of such rights to promote maximum 
beneficial use. However, some economists would argue that private 
markets do not correctly reflect the external costs and benefits to 
society associated with significant changes in water use (~, from 
agriculture to urban). In order to ensure that society's water use 
priorities are maintained, some states permit free transferability of 
use permits if the type of use remains the same, but require new permits 
if the purpose for which the water is used changes.733/ This latter 
approach has been recommended by the State viater Commi ss i on. 734/ 
Finally, should the water itself be transferable from its point of 
origin to an area needing irrigation outside the original watershed 
area? All economists and water engineers appear to agree that transfers 
of water are necessary to promote maximum economic use of land and other 
resources. Water has been transferred in Hawaii from the earliest times 
that such transfers became economically feasible. Water is needed today 
in the arid regions of the islands, and a decision that prevented water 
transfers would prevent our full uses of the arid parts of our com-
munity. Surely, therefore, some transfers should be permitted. 
Such transfers should, however, be closely supervised, because they 
can cause important changes to the ecological system. Permits should be 
required for all transfers of water. They should be granted when the 
water transfer would not h,arm the existing ecosystem and the use to 
which it is being put is consistent with the overall priorities for the 
region. Even parties with appurtenant, correlative, and riparian water 
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rights should not be permitted to transfer their water freely because 
such transfers would distort the meaning of their rights. They should 
be required to obtain authorization for such transfer and should not be 
given any superior right to transfer based on their appurtenant, cor-
relative, or riparian use right. 
To summarize: 
(1) A permit system of water use applicable to all fresh waters on 
the islands appears to be a constitutionally acceptable management 
approach. Such regulation could provide the basis for defining rights 
to and beneficial uses of water in Hawaii. 
(2) Any system adopted should preserve the ancient taro or appur-
tenant water rights of native and other small farmers. 
(3) It should also recognize existing correlative and riparian 
water uses but should require such users to obtain use permits. 
(4) The legislature should give serious consideration to the 
proposal of the State Water Commission requiring all major users of 
water to obtain use permits limited in time to 30 to 50 years in 
length.735/ Under this proposal, renewals would not be automatic, but 
would depend on the availability of water and the community's priorities 
for water use. Renewals could be requested at any point to enable users 
to add new capital investment to their water distribution system. 
(5) Under the State Water Commission's proposal, use would be 
freely transferable if the purpose for which the water is used remained 
the same. If the purpose changes, a new permit would be required. 
(6) Water should be transferable to other lands, but a special 
permit should be required for such transfers. Transfer permits should 
be issued only (a) if excess water is available, (b) if the transfer is 
reasonable, and (c) if the transfer will not cause substantial injury to 
the ecology of the area. 
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Appendix I 
ADtmnSTRATORS OF PUBLIC LANDS 
1875 - 1949 736/ 
Minister of the Interior 
~J. L. r1oehonua 
H. L. rloehonua 
J. Ilott-Smith 
J. r~ott-Smith 
vii 1 der 
Wilder 
H. A. P. Carter 
H. A. P. Carter 
J. E. Bush 
Gulick 
Gulick 
Gulick 
L. Aholo 
L. A. Thurston 
L. A. Thurston 
L. A. Thurston 
C. N. Spencer 
C. N. Spencer 
G. N. Vlil cox 
OVERTHROVI OF rmNARCHY 
J. A. King 
REPUBLIC OF HAWAII 
King 
King 
King 
King 
King 
A. Young 
TERRITORY OF HA~-JAI I 
Commissioner of Public Lands 
J. Brown 
E. S. Boyd 
E. S. Boyd 
De~artment of Public Lands 
J. W. Pratt 
J. ~J. Pratt 
J. 11. Pratt 
J. vi. Pratt 
J. loJ. Pratt 
J. vi. Pratt 
r~. Campbe 11 
M. Campbell 
C. Judd 
J. Tucker 
Commission of Crown Lands 
J. S. Walker, R. H. Stanley, J. O. 
Dominis 
J. S. Walker, Moehonua, Dominis 
Carter, ~1ott-Smith, Domi ni s 
Carter, Matt-Smith, Dominis 
(Not available) 
Kapena, Preston, Judd 
Carter, lIalker, Judd 
Carter, !Jal ker, Judd 
H. 11. Gibson, E. Preston, Judd 
W. M. Gibson, E. Preston, Judd 
Gibson, Kapena, Judd 
Gibson, Kapena, Judd 
Gibson, Kapena, C. P. Iaukea 
H. L. Green, G. Brown, Iaukea 
Green, Austin, Iaukea 
S. M. Damon, Austin, Iaukea 
G. Brown, A. Peterson, Iaukea 
S. Parker, flott-Smith, Iaukea 
M. P. Robinson, C. Brown, Iaukea 
King, W. Smith, Iaukea 
King, W. Smith, Iaukea 
Commission of Public Lands 
King, J. Brown, Thurston 
King, J. Brown, Dodge 
Ki ng, J. Brown, Dodge 
King, J. Brown 
Young, Brown 
Court of Land Register 
P. L. Weaver: Judge 
E. rlott-Smi th, C. Peterson: Exami ners 
IJeaver: Judge 
Dickey, r1ott-Smith, Peterson, Monsarrat, 
W. Castle: Examiners 
I'lea ver: Judge 
Di ckey, Ilott-Smith, Peterson, 11onsarrat, 
I'!. Castle, C. Hemenway: Examiners 
~Iea ver: Judge 
Ilonsarrat, Dickey, Hemenway: Examiners 
Heaver: Judge 
Dickey, ~1onsarrat: Examiners 
Ileaver: Judge 
Dickey, Lightfoot, Thayer: Examiners (Not available) 
Land Board 
W. Kinney, J. Brown 
l'J. Kinney, J. Brown 
H. Kinney, J. Brown 
I 
rv 
(J) 
00 
I 
I 
rv 
(J) 
<0 
I 
1914 
1915 
1916 
1917 
1918 
1919 
1920 
1921 
1922 
1923 
1924 
1925 
1926 
1927 
1928 
1929 
1930 
1931 
1932 
1933 
1934 
1935 
1936 
1937 
1938 
1939 
1940 
1941 
1942 
1943-
1947 
1948 
1949 
J. Tucker 
J. Tucker 
J. Tucker 
B. Rivenburg 
B. Rivenburg 
B. Rivenburg 
C. T. Bail ey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
Department of 
Public Lands 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bai 1 ey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bail ey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
C. T. Bailey 
L. l~h itehou se 
L. Whitehouse 
Department of 
Public Lands 
L. ~Ihitehouse 
L. ~Jh i tehouse 
L. Whitehouse 
L. Wh i tehouse 
Military Government 
Lester Marks 
Lester rlarks 
Land Board 
~J. Ki nney, J. Brown 
J. Raymond, J. Brown 
J. Raymond, H. Wilder 
J. Raymond, !J. !-Ji 1 der 
C. Rice, W. Wilder 
J. Brown 
J. Brown 
J. Brown 
J. Brown 
A. Castro 
A. Castro 
Hawaiian Homes Commission 
Farrington (Governor) 
Farrington (Governor) 
Farrington (Governor) 
Farrington (Governor) 
Farrington (Governor) 
L. M. Judd (Governor) 
L. M. Judd (Governor) 
L. M. Judd (Governor) 
L. M. Judd (Governor) 
L. M. Judd (Governor) 
Poindexter (Governor) 
C. Iaukea 
F. Krauss 
F. Krauss 
Hawaiian Homes Commission 
F. Krauss 
B. ~1cBri de 
B. fkBride 
Land Board 
A. Castro 
A. Castro 
J. H. \~aldron, Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
Waldron, A. Castro 
J. Child, Pittman 
J. Child, Pittman 
J. Child, C. Hite 
Land Board 
J. Child, C. Hite 
J. Child, C. Hite 
J. Child; C. Hite 
A. Castro; J. Stickney 
A. Castro, Stickney 
A. Castro, Stickney 
I 
N 
" 0 I 
I 
N 
" 
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Appendix II 
GOVERNl\IENT LAND SALES, 1886-1888. 737/ 
-
~ -
No·1 R. P. To whom. Date. Area. Location. 
--- ------------ ------- -------
3391 T. A. J •. Will~. !I1ny 26, 1886. 1.42 acre~ Maui-Knhuwai. 
3392 Mailolo Will. (W). 
" 
5.41 
" " 
Niumalu. 
3393 T. A. Wilt.. 
" 8.02 " " 1\laalo. 3394 Kahllu (w.) et al. July 31, 1886. 106 
" " 
PlIukRlaiipu. 
33951 Emslia Po"p"e. Jan. 22, 1887. 123.75 sq. ft. Oahu-Honolulu. 
33Ufl Kalama K. KumulOR. Jan. 14, 1887. 1276 acres Hawllii-.()lelomoRna I. 
3397 " .. 42~4 
" " 
Papa II. 
3399 Paul Neumann. I Feb. 17, 1887. :! " Oahu-Hnlelena. 3400 Pomalkelani. April 6, 1887. 11111u 
" 
.. Kulaokahua. 
3403 Anton& Ros". MlIY 5, 1887. 43" • .1.. 
" " 
Koloaloo. 
3-104 
" 
.. 37N ... 
" " 
Pohakaa. 
340f> Trustees est. .1as. Wood,," I May 12, 1887. 280 
" 
Hawaii-Kou & Poapoa. 
3-106 
" " 
98 
" " 
.. 
3409 Samuel Parker. " 27 
" " 
Kaomoali. 
3410 " May 19, 1887. 22 
" " 
Heneheneula. 
a~H2 H. Cooptlr. 
" 7 f. " " " 3413 
" " 
26 
" 
., 
" 3414 Samuel Parker. )Iny 21, 1887. 23! 
" 
II Manai &: Haukoi 
3415 Hamakua Plaut. Co. May 25, 1887. 149 i .. II Kamaui Kaule 
kohdU. 
Amounts carried forward .. .................... ..................... . ................................... 
• $11£150 paid into Governor'. office at'Maul, a. per statement of August 25, 1876. 
GOVERNMENT LAND SALES, 1886-1888-CONTINUED. 
:.~.I To whom. Date. Area. Location. 
---I Amounts brought forward. ................ .... ................ .... ................ ; ................... 
3416 Trusteese"!. B. P. Bishop. July 13, 1887. 2200· acres Ha waii-Umauma. 
3417 ! Konale ~arkham. Aug. 24, 1887. It-O U Ouhu-Kaluaopalena. 
3418 I Antone Rodrl~ueg. Sept. 10, 1887. Ilf() " " Mahani. 
3419 i Portuguese Beneftt Soc'y. 
" t
20¥o " .. Honolulu. 
3420 1 C. P. Iaukea, trustee. Oct. 22, 1887. 6,.20 " " Kalihi. 
34:?1 I " " 105.741 sq. ft. II Kulaokahlla. 3422 ! Honokaa LyceL(ll. II 2 fu3.<J acres H;waii-Honokaa. 
342~ '. C. P. lankea, trustee. II In lall " Oahu-I{aloalu. 
3~1:l4 j C. P. laukea. Oct. 25, 1887. 455 
" 
.. Kaltnnaiki. 
·14 i Board of Education. Jan. 7, 1~8. 2\G.2 
" " 
\V"i"lua. 
342.; I D. P. Kt'llett. Jan. 24, 1888 .. A " II I{unn\v9i. l4'O l1\Iolakai-Kahanui. 
" 
12 
" 
Consider-
ation. 
, 710 
27 Of> 
4010 
................ 
12500 
5000 
5000 
5000 
4,787 50 
50000 
40000 
43000 
755 00 
588 UO 
36650 
7000 
26000 
150 110 
1,43300 
$10,08925 
Consider. 
ation. 
$10.08925 
~ 250 00 
1300 
-200 00 
5000 
411500 
65000 
1000 
. 9500 
2,010 60 
.. ·····iSG·oO 
flQ 00 
'" cO
'" 
S 
• 
$£ 
~ 
5 
5 
5 
;; 
Ii 
5 
5 
5 
1\ 
() 
5 
:; 
5 
;; 
5 
5 
5 
5 
:; 
5 
5 
~ 
~ 
5 
5 
5· 
5 3426 . R. W. Meyer. 
3~U7 I' Antone Rodrigue!!. It 1\Iar. 23, 1888. 1\ 15 f·-l. II \ Oahu-1\Iahani. II 350 ooi 11 34~8 D. H. Nahinu. ,", "·1 Hawaii-Kauhako. 130 Oor f> 
1 1----1-
Totals .................................................. J ........................ ;., ......... ~ 814,51-1'"25!$165 
A. 
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Appendix III 
Possible Groundwater Level Conditions: 
(1 ) Caution (2) Alert 
(3) Criti ca 1 
Criteria Determining Condition Severity: 
(1) A three-month rise in chloride content according to a 
schedule for each level of severity experienced "at 
sufficient sources (facilities) to hamper operations"; 
(2) Head levels below specified amounts for each level of 
severity at three or more of six Honolulu and five 
suburban measuring locations. 
Board of Water Supply Action: 
Caution - Appeal for voluntary conservation measures in 
the mass media and letters to large consumers; 
Alert: 
BWS Customers - Lawn, groundwater irrigation and other 
domestic use restrictions. 11aximum monthly water allot-
ments for the commercial, residential, industrial, 
military, governmental, and agricultural consumer 
classes, not less than 90% of their previous year's 
monthly average use. 
Private ~Iells - Maximum monthly water allotment for each 
well or battery of wells as a percentage, not less than 
90%, of th~ highest average daily draft for each month of 
the year over the last five years. 
Critical - Same as for Alert except the maximum percentages 
are not to be less than 70% of the base quantities. 
Penalties for Violations: 
By any person - citations, injunctions 
By BWS Customers - mandatory flow restriction devices in-
stalled at customer cost. 
B. 
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Surcharges for Excess Hater - BVJS Customers: 
Excess 
5,000 gal. 
10,000 gal. 
15,000 gal. 
20,000 gal. 
over 20,000 gal. 
Multiple of Existing Rate 
2 
3 
4 
12 
20 
Summary of the Ground \~ater Use Act of 1961, Chapter 177, Hawai i 
Revised Statutes 
The Board of Land and Natural Resources may designate groundwater 
areas for regulation upon its own initiative or upon petition by 
interested parties when, upon notice and after public hearings it 
finds: 
(1) The use of groundwater exceeds the rate of 
discharge; 
(2) Groundwater levels are declining or have 
excessively declined; 
(3) Chloride content of the water is increasing 
to a level that materially reduces the value 
of the use to which water is being put; 
(4) Excessive preventable waste of water is 
occurring; 
(5) Any proposed water development which, if 
constructed, would in the opinion of the 
board lead to one of the above conditions. 
After a Groundwater Area is Designated: 
(1) Domestic uses may be continued without diminu-
tion and new domestic uses may be initiated 
without a permit; 
(2) Uses existing at the date of declaration, to 
be made in conjunction with facilities under 
construction at such date, or made within five 
years prior to the date may be continued if 
the use remains beneficial and a declaration of 
such use is filed with the board; 
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(3) Additional uses (including increases or 
changes in existing uses) require a permit 
from the board which may be granted if: 
Penalties: 
(a) Water is available; 
(b) The use is beneficial; 
(c) The most beneficial use and devel-
opment of the water resources of the 
state will not be impaired by grant-
ing the permit; 
(d) Granting the permit will not substan-
tially or materially interfere with 
preserved or domestic uses. 
Permit revocation; 
Injunction. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. See pages 146-53 for a more complete description of the native 
Hawaiian approaches to water use and water rights. 
2. This history is explained in more detail at pages 153-76. 
3. For a more complete explanation of appurtenant water rights, see 
pages 177-79. 
4. Riparian water rights, and the use of this term by the Hawaii 
Supreme Court, are discussed in more detail at pages 181-85. 
5. These Hawaii Supreme Court cases are analyzed fully at pages 185-
91. 
6. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. vlailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 
675 (1904). 
7. Carter v. Territory, 24 Hawaii 47 (1917). 
8. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
9. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and lJater Comm'n, 30 Hawaii 912 
(1929) . 
10. See Justice Banks' oplnlon in Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 410-
412 (1930) for a discussion of the apparent contradictions between 
the two cases. And see pages 191-94 for a full discussion of the 
City tli 11 case. 
11. 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 
260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
12. See pages 218-41 for a full discussion of the water law in selected 
states with water problems similar to Hawaii. 
13. See pages 194-99 for a full discussion of the 11cBryde decision. 
14. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 189 n. 15, 504 P.2d 
1330, 1340 n. 15 (1973) quoted on page 143 of this report. 
15. ~, cert. denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
16. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). See pages 
198-218 for a full discussion of this decision. 
17. See pages 200-18. 
18. See pages 260-67. 
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19. "The tenures were in one sense feudal, but they were not mil itary, 
for the claims of the superior on the inferior were mainly either 
for produce of the land or for labor, military service being rarely 
or never required of the lower orders." Principles Adopted by the 
Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, L. 1847, in 2 Rev. 
Laws of Hawaii, at 2124 (1925). See also P. Chun, Sequent Occu-
pance in Ilaihe'e Valley, Oahu 21 (1954) (unpublished master's 
thesis, University of Hawaii). 
20. E. S. Handy and E. G. Handy, Native Planters in Old Hawaii 58 
(1972) . 
21. Id. at 57. 
22. Id. at 58. 
23. W. Hutchins, The Hawaiian System of Water Rights 21 (1946) (quoting 
from Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land 
Titles, L. 1847, in 2 Rev. Laws of Hawaii, at 2124 (1925)). 
24. 1 R. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian Kingdom 1778-1854 269 (1938). This 
characterization of the land as privately owned was adopted by the 
Hawaii Supreme Court in several of its cases: 
"Originally the King was the sole owner of 
the water as he was of the rest of the land 
and could do with either or both as he 
pleased." Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. 
v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 675, 680 
(1904); Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 
385 (1930). 
. . under the ancient Hawaiian system 
all land belonged to the king or ruling 
chief who allotted tracts of land from 
time to time to the principal chiefs, 
subject to revocation at will." Territory 
v. Bishop Trust Co., 41 Hawaii 358, 361 
(1956). 
25. Handy and Handy, supra note 20, at 277. 
26. Id. at 278. 
27. "These districts or mokus were geographical subdivisions only, and 
no administrators were assigned to them. . . . At the time of the 
Great Mahele of 1848, the Island of Oahu was divided into: Ewa, 
Kona, Koolauloa, Koolaupoko, Haialua, and \Jaianae." J. Chinen, 
The Great Mahele 3 (1958). 
28. "Hawaiian life vibrated from uka, mountain, whence came wood, kapa, 
for clothing, olona, for fish line, ti-leaf for wrapping paper, 'ie 
for ratan lashing, wild birds for food, to the ~, sea, whence 
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came ia, fish, and all connected therewith." M. Kelly, Changes in 
Land Tenure in Hawaii, 1778-1850 at 20 (1956) (unpublished master's 
thesis, University of Hawaii) (quoting C. J. Lyons, Land natters 
in Hawaii 1 The Islander 111 (1875)). 
29. Levy, r~ative Hawaiian Land Rights, 63 Cal. L. Rev. 848, 849 (1975). 
30. "They were also called 'ili' aina or 'ilipa'a (long narrow strip of 
land complete within itself)." Kelly. supra note 28, at 22. 
31. Id. at 24. 
32. "This class may be divided into three groups in accordance with the 
role each performed in the economic life of the community .... 
(1) The highest ranking of the three groups was composed of indi-
viduals and their families who had leadership qualities and were 
skilled farmers, fishermen, or craftsmen .... (2) The second 
group also included farmers and fishermen, but these lacked the 
leadership qualities apparent in the first group .... (3) The 
third subdivision was composed of individuals who apparently 
labored little, produced least, and are described by Hawaiian 
historians as irresponsible and shiftless." rd. at 27-28. 
33. Levy, supra note 29, at 849. 
34. D. Malo, Hawaiian Antiguities 53 (Bishop Museum ed. 1951). 
35. ~ at 53-54, 58. 
36. Handy and Handy, supra note 20, at 63. 
37. Id. 
38. Id. 
39. Kelly, supra note 28, at 42. 
40. Levy, supra note 29, at 849. 
41. III\.,. III..J\,.V'J VI Ll..lII"-' vnll\.,.I •. H11t' III Hawaii, in Ancient 
~. "'.-~'- M ""reI 1- ___ 'M of lectures delivered at 
42. Malo, supra note 34, at 204. 
43. S. Kamakau, Works of the People of Old 23 (1976). 
44. Chun, supra note 19, at 49. 
45. Id. at 32, 33. 
46. Handy and Handy, supra note 20, at 63. 
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47. Id. 
48. Id. 
49. Malo, supra note 34, at 204. 
50. Two Hawaiian Supreme Court cases offer divergent interpretations of 
this practice of running water through taro patches: 
(a) Peck v. Bailey, 8 Hawaii 658, 671 (1867): 
"It is very true that irrigation early claimed the attention 
of the cultivators of the soil on these islands, not only from 
the fact of its being a necessity on most of the land, but 
from the fact that [taro] required flowing water ... " (emphasis added). 
(b) Lonoaea v. ~Jailuku Sugar Co., 9 Hawaii 651, 663 (1895): 
In speaking of the continuous flow of water through the irri-
gation system, the court in Lonoaea stated: "It would be 
wasteful, for neither [taro] nor cane reguire a continuous 
flow of water upon them." (emphasis added). 
Another source has the following to say of the taro culture: 
"Location of Land: ... without a sufficient 
supply of good running water, taro cannot be 
grown to advantage. Stagnant water must be 
avoided ... 
* * * 
"Irrigation: ~1ater that is kept actively 
circulating is best for the taro. If stagnant 
water must be used it should be agitated or 
changed as often as possible." 
D. Akana, The Production of ~Iet Land Taro (1932) (Hawaii University 
Agricultural Extension Service, No. 16). 
Two explanations for these different opinions are that (a) many 
varieties of taro exist, requiring different growing conditions, 
and (b) growing conditions vary according to the different terrain 
and rainfall of the different parts of the islands. 
51. Malo, supra note 34, at 205. 
52. E. Nakuina, Ancient Hawaiian Water Rights, in Thrum's Hawaiian 
Almanac and Annual, 1894 at 79. 
53. 
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Originally, the konohiki was subservient to the chief or alii 
within the ahupuaa or ili. The chief usually appointed the kono-
hiki to administer the details of water use throughout the ahupuaa. 
Later writings, cases, and statutes used interchangeably the terms 
"konohiki" and "chief." They both have come to mean the landlord 
of the ahupuaa. 
54. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 102. 
55. Nakuina, supra note 52. 
56. Id. 
57. A. Perry, A Brief History of Hawaiian Water Rights 6 (1912) (un-
published speech read at the annual dinner of the Hawaii Bar 
Association) . 
58. This beneficial use of water in the hands of the maka'ainana 
parallels the systems among the western states that operate under 
the doctrine of appropriation. See generally, H. Wadsworth, ~ 
Historical Summar of Irri ation in Hawaii, in 37 Hawaiian Plant-
ers' Record 131 1933. 
59. Nakuina, supra note 52, at 80. 
60. Perry, supra note 57, at 6. 
61. Id. 
62. Wadsworth, supra note 58, at 131; vJadsworth wrote that "the dis-
tribution seems to have been based upon the idea of rotation and 
not continuous delivery, although a continuous flow seems to be 
ordinarily used for taro irri9ation in modern practice." (See also 
footnote 50, supra). 
63. Id. 
64. Nakuina, supra note 52, at 83: 
"[Ancient] water right were primarily for lois, that is, for [taro] 
culture." Chief Justice Perry pointed out that domestic uses also 
had a high priority under the early system: 
"Hater for domestic purposes on a lower ahupuaa 
is in any event assured under Hawaiian law. Every 
portion of land, large or small, ahupuaa, ili or 
kuleana, upon which people dwelt was, under the 
ancient Hawaiian system ... entitled to water 
for other domes tic purposes." Territory v. Gay, 
31 Hawaii 376, 395 (1930). 
65. Wadsworth, supra note 58, at 132. 
......... 
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66. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. l~ailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 675, 680 (1904). 
67. See pages 186-87, 189, and 191 for more discussion of this case. 
68. Perry, supra note 57, at 7. 
69. Handy and Handy, supra note 20, at 61. 
70. Id. 
71. Perry, Hawaiian Water Rights, in Thrum's Annual, 1912 at 90. 
72. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 22. 
73. Arthur Alexander, Land Titles and Surveys in Hawaii 68 (paper read 
before the Honolulu Social Science Association, March 1, 1920). 
74. Robert King, Hawaiian Land Titles, in First Progress Report of the 
Territorial Planning Board 43 (1939). 
75. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 22. 
76. "[Kalanimoku] then addressed the chiefs. And after setting forth 
the defects of the laws and customs among them, he especially 
referred to the inconveniences arising from the reversion of lands 
to the king on the death of their occupants, a custom revived under 
[K]amehameha II, but which it had been the object of [K]amehameha I 
to exchange for that of hereditary succession. This project of 
their great king he proposed to adopt as the law, excepting in such 
cases as when a chief or landholder should infringe the laws; then 
his lands should be forfeited. "R. Kuykendall, The Hawaiian 
Kingdom, 1778-1854 119 (1938). 
77. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 22. 
78. Hawaii Const. of 1840 (Exposition of the Principles on Which the 
Present Dynasty is Founded) in Fundamental Law of Hawaii 3 (Thurston 
ed. 1904). The Constitution stated: 
"Kamehameha I, was the founder of the kingdom, 
and to him belonged all the land from one end 
of the Islands to the other, though it was not 
his own private property. It belonged to the 
chiefs and people in common, of whom Kamehameha 
I was the head, and had the management of the 
landed property. Wherefore, there was not 
formerly, and is not now any person who could 
or can convey away the smallest portion of land 
without the consent of the one who had, or has 
the direction of the kingdom." (emphasis added) 
79. Id. at 3 . 
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80. The Preamble to the Constitution of 1840 (Declaration of Rights of 
1839) s ta ted: 
"Protection is hereby secured to the persons of 
all the people, together with their lands, their 
building lots, and all their property, while they 
conform to the laws of the kingdom, and nothing 
whatever shall be taken from any individual except 
by express provision of the law." IsL at l. 
81. Kuykendall, supra note 76, at 277. 
82. Id. at 278. 
83. Id. at 278-79. 
84. Id. 
85. Law Creating the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land Titles, in 
Fundamental Laws of Hawaii 137 (Thurston ed. 1904). 
86. Id. sec. 9, at 139. 
87. Id. sec. 10. 
88. Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners to Quiet Land 
Titles, in Their Adjudication of Claims Presented to Them, in 
Fundamental Laws of Hawaii 140 (Thurston ed. 1904). 
89. Levy, supra note 29, at 854. 
90. IsL; Kuykendall, supra note 76, at 280. 
91. Levy, supra note 29, at 854. 
92. Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners, supra note 88, at 
142-143. 
93. Kuykendall, supra note 76, at 287. 
94. Levy, supra note 29, at 854. 
95. R. Apple and P. Apple, The Great ~1ahe1e, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, 
June 16, 1978, at A-19, col. 6. 
96. R. Schmitt, Historical Statistics of Hawaii 298 (1977). 
97. Kuykendall, supra note 76, at 289. 
98. Kelly, supra note 28, at 118. 
99. R. Schmitt, Demographic Statistics of Hawaii 1778-1965 at 36-37 
(1968). 
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100. IsL at 10. 
101. 
102. 
Reprinted with the permission of Robert Schmitt 
Statistics of Hawaii, supra note 96, at 298. 
Kuykendall, supra note 76, at 297. 
from Historical 
103. S. Dole, Hawaiian Land Policy, in Thrum's Hawaiian Annual, 1898 at 
125. 
104. Laws of 1842, in Fundamental Laws of Hawaii 29-30 (Thurston ed. 
1904). 
105. Principles Adopted by the Board of Commissioners, supra note 88, at 
144-45. 
106. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 504 P.2d 1330, 1338, 54 Hawaii 174, 
186 (1973). 
107. Enactment of Further Principles, in 2 Rev. Laws of Hawaii at 2142 
(1925). 
108. 54 Hawaii at 192-93, 504 P.2d at 1342. 
109. 54 Hawaii at 205, 504 P.2d at 1348 (Marumoto, J., dissenting), and 
55 Hawaii at 270, 517 P.2d at 32 (Levinson, J., dissenting). 
110. King, supra note 74, at 42. 
111. G. Daws, Shoal of Time 174-75 (1968). 
112. A. Lind, An Island Community: Ecological Succession in Hawaii 166 
(1939). 
113. Daws, supra note 111, at 208. 
114. Id. at 312. 
115. King, supra note 74, at 42. 
116. L. Whitehouse, Public Lands, in First Progress Report of the Terri-
torial Planning Board 49 (1939). 
117. Id. 
118. P. Thompson, Kahaluu and the Development of Windward Oahu 2 (Hawaii 
Observer Reprint No.1). 
119. L. H. Fuchs, Hawaii Pono: A Social History 251 (1961). 
120. Id. at 252-53. 
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121. R. H. Horowitz, Public Land Policy in Hawaii: Major Landowners 13 
(Legislative Reference Bureau, 1967' 
122. Thompson, supra note 118, at 4. 
123. Wadsworth, supra note 58, at 146. 
124. Thompson, supra note 118, at 3. 
125. J. M. Lydgate, The Vanishing Kuleana, in Thrum's Hawaiian Annual, 
1915 at 107. 
126. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 574 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
127. Id. at 576. 
128. \~adsworth, supra note 58, at 139. 
129. The state archives in Honolulu contain only the proceedings for the 
Kona (South) District of Oahu from 1859 to 1887. ~'any of the early 
controversies were recorded in Hawaiian. 
130. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 54. 
131. See pages 158-59. 
132. Schaefer v. Kekiipio, 2 Records of Commission of Private Hays and 
Water Rights 316 (Oahu, Kona District, 1885). 
133. Hadsworth, supra note 58, at 140. 
134. L. 14atson, Summary of History of East /,1!lui Hater Licenses and East 
Maui Irrigation Company, Ltd., and Predecessors, (appendix to an 
unpublished report entitled Land and Hater Rights of f1aui, 1973, 
obta i ned from the Department of Land and Natural Resources). 
135. Id. 
136. ~Iadsworth, supra note 58, at 1. 
137. See generally, J. Adler, Claus Spreckels, The Sugar King in Hawaii 
33-51 (1966) and R. Apple and P. Apple, Politics of Hater in the 
Kingdom, Honolulu Star-Bulletin, Sept. 15, 1978, at A-14, col. 3. 
138. Watson, East ~1aui, supra note 134, at 20. 
139. 11. Rho, IJater Saga of Central r1aui (reprint from 8 Ampersand, 
No.3, at 44 (1972)). 
140. Id. at 45. 
141. Id. 
---
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142. A Fresh Idea Pays Off in Maui, 13 CH2M HILL Quarterly, ~o. 1 (1975). 
143. Department of Land and Natural Resources, General Leases No. 
S-3695 (Feb. 1962), S-3578 (Aug. 1959), S-3505 (Nov. 1954), and 
S-3349 (Nov. 1950), at 1 and 2 of each. 
144. ~ Honomanu Lease G.L. S-3695 (Feb. 1962) at 11. 
145. The 1938 East Maui Water Agreement illustrates how the price of 
water fluctuated with the price of sugar. If the average price per 
pound of raw sugar exceeded 3¢, then payment for water increased at 
a rate of 3% for everyone-tenth of a cent increase above 3¢ but 
below 4¢. If the price of sugar exceeded 4¢ a pound, a prede-
termined maximum amount for water, as set down in the agreement, 
prevailed. These amounts ranged between $.95 at Nahiku to $2.10 at 
Honomanu (Department of Land and IJatural Resources, East r~aui Hater 
Agreement (1938), at 5-6). These figures reflect 1938 prices and 
are no longer part of current water license negotiations. 
146. Interview with Manabu Tagamori, Department of Land and ~atural 
Resources, Sept. 1978. 
147. 1,1aui County Water Dept., A Brief Summary of State IJater Licenses on 
Maui 2 (April 1961). 
148. Id. 
149. Id. at 5. 
150. Id. 
151. Robert Chuck (DLNR), Resale Cost of Water Under EMI State Hater 
License, 1 (memorandum to Attorney General, Apri 1 27, 1973). 
152. Id. 
153. L. Watson, The Lands and Water Rights of Kauai, 2-68 to 2-71 (Dept. 
of Land and Natural Resources, June 1972). 
154. See, ~, Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
155. Wadsworth, supra note 58, at 147. 
156. Watson, Kauai, supra note 153, at 2-69. 
157. Id. at 2-70. 
158. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 177, 504 P.2d 1330, 
1334 (1973). 
159. Thrum's Annual, 1907 at 115. 
160. Id. 
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161. Id. at 116. 
162. Id. 
163. Interview with Ralph Yukumoto, Department of Health, July 1978. 
164. Public Utilities Commission, Decision No.9, at 3 (1921). 
165. Id. 
166. Id. at 7. 
167. Id. at 22. 
168. Dept. of Land and Natural Resources, Report on State Owned ~Iaters 
and Facilities at North Kohala Hawaii 5 (1965). 
169. Interview with Ralph Yukumoto, supra note 163. 
170. Wadsworth, supra note 58, at 150. 
171. Id. at 155. 
172. L. H. Herochler, Fifty Years of ~Iater Service 4 (Waiahole ~later 
Company, 1966). 
173. Id. 
174. The \-Iaiahole Tunnel Project, Thrum's Annual, 1916 at 174. 
175. Wadsworth, supra note 58, at 156. 
176. Department of Land and Natural Resources, Water Resources of 
Windward Oahu, Hawaii 102 (1969). 
177. J. Blount, Report of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. 
Senate 1782-1783 (1894). 
178. Fuchs, supra note 120, at 22. 
179. Id. at 154. 
180. 
181. 
Daws, supra note 111, at 313. 
P. H. Mulholland, Land Court Registration, in 
of the Territorial Planning Board 45 (1939). 
182. Id. 
183. Id. at 47. 
184. Thompson, supra note 118, at 3. 
First Progress Report 
---
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185. Id. 
186. Id. 
187. This section has benefited from the work of many commentators. In 
addition to those cited in the footnotes that follow, we have 
particularly benefited from the work of George Cooper, who has been 
working on this subject for the Legal Aid Society, and from the 
work of Paul Fong, whose seminar paper at the University of Hawaii 
Law School (Spring, 1978) was entitled Robinson v. Ariyoshi: 
Can Federal Judge Martin Pence Be Right? 
188. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 395 (1930), aff'd, 52 F.2d 356 
(9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677 (~. 
189. See, ~, Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. IJailuku Sugar Co., 
15 Hawaii 675, 680 (1904); Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 385 
(1930); Territory v. Bishop Trust Co., 41 Hawaii 358,361 (1956) 
190. See pages 146-53 of this report (liThe Ancient Hawaiian l'later 
System") . 
191. R. N. Anderson, ~, Hater as a Factor in Growth tlanagement, in 
Growth Management Issues in Hawaii 116 (Hawaii Institute for 
Management and Analysis in Government, 1977). 
192. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and l~ater Comm'n, 30 Hawaii 912 
(1929). See pages 191-94 for a full discussion of this case. 
193. Perry, supra note 39, at 3. 
194. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and l'later Comm'n, 30 Hawaii 912, 
928 (1929). 
195. See Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). See pages 187-91 for a 
full discussion of this case. 
196. Id. at 395. 
197. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 102. 
198. Carter v. Territory, 24 Hawaii 47, 57-58 (1917). 
199. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 102. 
200. Id. 
201. The Hawaii Supreme Court stated this distinction clearly in Terri-
tory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 383-84 (1930): 
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"In these latter instances [referring to 
'appurtenant' rights] the adjudication 
that the lands had water rights was not 
dependent upon any use with continuity or 
hostility for any particular period of 
time but merely followed from the fact 
that just prior to the qrant of the 
awards water was being used on those 
lands, presumably by right. These are 
the rights which in this opinion are 
called 'appurtenant' as distinguished 
from 'prescriptive'." 
202. Peck v. Bailey, 8 Hawaii 658 (1867). 
203. Id. at 661 (emphasis added). Chief Justice Allen, in the Peck 
case, uses the term "prescription" or "prescriptive" two ways: 
1. "There can be no difference of Opl nl on that 
the complainants were entitled to all the 
water rights which the lands had by pre-
scri tion at the date of their title." 
emphasis added; at 661) The Peck opinion 
included the passage above in the context 
of appurtenant water rights: water rights 
gained by immemorial usage in the watering 
of taro patches. 
2. Regarding \~aste waters that flowed fron the 
taro patches into a ditch, then flowed onto 
complainants' property: "The question is 
whether it was such a use as would give a 
rescri tive right." (emphasis added; at 
668 In this context, Allen examines the 
basic elements of a classical prescriptive 
claim: actual, open and notorious, hostile, 
continuous, and exclusive use of the water. 
204. Peck v. Bailey, 8 Hawaii 658 (1867), involved a controversy between 
two landowners in the single ahupuaa of Hailuku, on the Island of 
~aui. The Wailuku River was the main natural watercourse in the 
ahupuaa. Three major ditches drew water from the river. They 
included the Kalaniauwai, the ditch farthest upriver; the Kamaauwai, 
situated below the Kalaniauwai; and the mill watercourse, which 
diverted water downriver from the ditches mentioned above. 
The complainants owned a sugar plantation and sugar mill on the 
lIai1uku River. They alleged that the defendant illegally and 
wrongfully diverted more water from the river than he was entitled 
to. The complainants contended that such dive~sion caused great 
interruption to the function of the mill and injury to their 
sugarcane. They further alleged that the defendants illegally 
.;. 
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diverted water to kula or uncultivated lands within the same 
ahupuaa. 
Defendant recognized the title to the land occupied by the com-
plainants. He denied, however, complainants' right as lord para-
mount of Wailuku River. Defendant claimed that he had not used 
more water than he was entitled to by immemorial usage. 
Given these allegations and facts, the court in Peck v. Bailey had 
to decide whether either or both parties enjoyed appurtenant water 
rights, and whether defendant could rightfully extend appurtenant 
water to kula lands. 
Chief Justice Allen maintained that both parties to the controversy 
obtained properties that originated from the same source: the 
grantor whose ancestor was the konohiki of this ahupuaa. The 
konohiki originally enjoyed rights to the river subject to the 
rights of the tenants. The Land Commission confirmed these tenant 
rights that included certain taro patches and the water necessary 
for their cultivation. (~at 662) 
The court decided that because both parties received their lands 
from the same grantor, neither could be lord paramount over the 
Wailuku River. Both parties were limited to waters appurtenant to 
their lands, neither having exceptional water rights. (~at 
663) 
205. 8 Hawaii at 666: 
The Court is of opinion, ... that the defendant 
had the right to use the water of his [taro] land 
on other lands, if in the transfer or passage of 
water over his own land no injury was done to others. 
He is limited to the same quantity of water to which 
he was entitled on his [taro] land by immemorial usage. 
206. 15 Hawaii 675 (1904). 
207. rd. at 691. 
208. Black's Law Dictionary 133 (revised 4th ed. 1968): "Appurtenant: 
Belonging to, accessory or incident to; adjunct, appendaged, or 
annexed to." 
209. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 383-384 (1930): 
"The same term has, however, sometimes been used 
to denote or to include rights not shown to have 
been acquired adversely or by prescription but 
which were being enjoyed by and regarded as 
appurtenant to certain lands at the date when 
those lands first passed into private ownership 
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by the generosity of the king and with the 
administrative assistance of the land commission." 
210. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 108: 
"The ancient uses of water in Hawaii by taro (kalo) 
cultivators were not hostile to the konohiki, by any 
means; they were made with his permission, with water 
distributed through systems that he controlled." 
211. Peck v. Bailey, 8 Hawaii 658, 661 (1867) (emphasis added); compare 
this use to quotation 2 in footnote 203, supra. 
212 . .!..eL (emphasis added). 
213. Lonoaea v. \!ailuku Sugar Co., 9 Hawaii 651 (1895). 
214. Id. at 660. 
215. Id. at 662. 
21 6. 1 5 Hawa i i 675 (1 904) . 
217. The question whether appurtenant rights and prescriptive rights 
were adjudicated in the Lonoaea decision divided the justices on 
the court and persisted after the decision. Justice Frear, dis-
senting in Lonoaea, claimed that "the day right, appurtenant to the 
company's lands, ... is limited to the amount of water actually 
taken by day on those lands for twenty years." 9 Hawaii at 669 
(emphasis added). 
The Hawaii Supreme Court finally held in 1904 that the judg~ent in 
Lonoaea was a complete adjudication as to waters covered by ~­
scriptive rights: 
"In our opinion, all of the respondent's prescriptive 
rights were adjudicated, including in the term prescrip-
tive as here used the rights appurtenant to taro land. 
The right of taro lands to water has generally, •.. 
been regarded and referred to by our courts as well as 
by parties as a prescriptive right acquired against 
the konohiki in the manner in which such rights can be 
acquired." (Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. llailuku 
Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 675, 683 (1904)) 
The court subsequently denied a motion for the rehearing of the 
prescriptive issue. It asserted that ancient appurtenant rights 
had been included in rights by prescription, regardless of the 
technical inaccuracy of the terms. (16 Hawaii 113, 115-16). 
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218. In Davis v. Afong, 5 Hawaii 216 (1884), some of the plaintiffs' 
witnesses testified that water had been taken "furtively," and 
therefore plaintiff argued that the defendant acquired no pre-
scriptive right to such water. (Id. at 221.) The defendant held 
certain parcels of land in l'iaialua;-on the Island of Oahu, which 
contained several springs or ponds. From the largest pond extended 
an auwai that continued to the plaintiffs' properties. The de-
fendant also owned several patches adjacent to the ponds, but fed 
from the main auwai. The plaintiff argued that these adjacent 
patches were not entitled to water by prescription because they 
were originally watered at irregular intervals. 
The court, however, was not concerned by the irregularity or 
furtiveness of the taking. Although the defendant did not draw 
water to the respective patches during stated periods of time, the 
Davis court maintained that such taking was by a sufficiently long 
and adverse open use. The court based this finding upon a general 
principle "that a land-owner is entitled to the use of the water 
originating upon his land, subject only to the rights which others 
may acquire by prescription." (.!..eL) 
219. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 112. 
220. 1870 Hawaii LaloJs ch. 22, sec. l. 
221. 1898 Hawaii Laws Act 19, sec. 1. 
222. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 657-31 (1977). 
223. Hawaii Const. art. 16, sec. 12 (added in 1978). 
224. Lonoaea v. \~ailuku Sugar Co., 9 Hawaii 651 (l895). 
225. Id. at 662. 
226. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 114. 
227. I d. at 11 7. 
228. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 396-397 (1930). For a discussion 
of the riparian doctrine in other states, see pages 220-22. 
229. Id. at 396. 
230. Id. at 397. 
231. Id. 
232. Black's Law Dictionary 1712 (revised 4th ed. 1968): "Usufruct: 
The right of enjoying a thing, the property of which is rested in 
another, and to draw from the same all the profit, utility, and 
advantage which it may produce, provided it be without altering the 
substance of the thing." 
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233. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 397 (1930). 
234. C. Meyers, Water Resource Management 53 (1971). 
235. 5 R. Powell, Real Property 364-366 (1977). 
236. Id. at 362-363. 
237. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer & Water Comm'n, 30 Hawaii 912 
(1929). 
238. Id. at 923. 
239. Id. 
240. Id. at 925. 
241. Peck v. Bailey, 8 Hawaii 658,670 (1867); see footnote 204, supra. 
The complainants 'were owners of a sugar plantation and mill situ-
ated in the ahupuaa of Wailuku, on the Island of Maui. Their major 
contention was that the defendant, another sugar grower, had 
wrongfully extended an auwai and diverted the water to kula lands 
within the same ahupuaa. The complainants alleged that this 
diversion had injured their mill and cane. The defendant admitted 
that he had dried some of his taro lands and had transferred the 
same water to another portion of his cane land, which he believed 
he had a legal right to do. 
Because the case directly involved appurtenant taro water rights, 
Allen's discussion of the riparian principle is dicta. Never-
theless, the dicta does illustrate certain philosophies of the 
court. It appeared that by the deed to the land of the complain-
ants, a small portion of their larger acreage bordered on the 
Wailuku River. The court chose not to apply the riparian concept 
to this small portion. The rights enjoyed by the Kalaniauwai 
offered more than would have been provided by riparian principles. 
242. Id. at 661-662. 
243. Id. 
244. Id. at 671 (emphasis added). 
245. Id. 
246. 5 Hawaii 216 (1884). 
247. The defendant owned parcels of land which contained several springs 
or ponds in Waialua, Oahu. The defendant also owned taro patches 
adjacent to these springs. Hence, the defendant advocated the 
general principle that a landowner is entitled to the use of water 
that originates upon his land, subject only to rights acquired by 
adverse use or prescription. The evidence further showed that 
\ 
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water went from these springs to an auwal ln known and ascertained 
channels. The auwai had been transporting water to the plaintiffs' 
lands for over twenty years. Plaintiffs complained that the 
defendant diverted waters that normally flowed from the springs 
into the auwai. They claimed that by adverse possession they had a 
right to the usual flow of the water in the auwai. 
The Davis court suggested that the applicable principle was the 
riparian doctrine, and that the controlling fact was whether the 
water flowed in an ascertained course. The court quoted a British 
property authority and said: 
"The controlling circumstance is not whether the 
stream was above or below ground, but whether it 
was or was not ascertained and defined as a stream. 
If there is a natural spring, the water from which 
flows in a natural channel, it cannot be lawfully 
diverted by anyone to the injury of riparian pro-
prietors." (5 Hawaii at 223; emphasis added). 
The court thus confirmed that a right by prescription or adverse 
possession could be acquired to waters of a spring that come to the 
surface and that flow into an auwai constructed for the express 
purpose of transferring water to lands where it may be used for 
irrigation. Davis ultimately held that the plaintiffs had acquired 
a right by prescription to the water flowing from the springs in 
question to the auwai. Taro patches on both sides of the auwai 
naturally had priority over the prescriptive waters. (~at 224) 
248. 24 Hawaii 47 (1917). 
249. The case involved many questions, including the abandonment of 
water rights, ancient appurtenant rights, rights to drinking water 
declared by statute, superiority of domestic use over irrigation 
use, proportional diminution of use in time of water shortage, and 
changes in the method of diversion. r~ost of the opinion is devoted 
to these questions. See generally, Hutchins, Hawaiian System. 
supra note 23, at 90. 
250. Carter v. Territory, 24 Hawaii 47. 57 (1917) (citing Rev. Laws of 
Hawaii, sec. 1 (1915)). 
251. Id. at 64. 
252. Id. at 67. 
253. Id. at 70. The Waikoloa Stream originated on territory land, and 
flowed partly upon territory land, partly upon the land of the 
petitioner. and partly along the boundary between the two parties. 
The stream had from time immemorial been tapped by a number of 
ditches or auwais. The weight of the evidence also showed that in 
254. 
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order to satisfy the primary domestic rights to water of the 
petitioner and individual respondents virtually all the waters in 
the Waikoloa Stream had to be claimed and only a small quantity 
remained available for other uses. The evidence further showed 
that no persons had been living on the territory's land of Lolamilo 
below Lihue for forty or fifty years and that during that time, no 
water had been used for irrigation thereon. (~at 62) 
Id. at 70. The court seems to have been using the terms "storm or 
freshet waters" and "surplus waters" interchangeably. Earlier in 
the opinion, the court held that "the surplus, after satisfying all 
rights for domestic use, would be available for irrigation on the 
lands of the petitioner." (rd. at 68; emphasis added) Such 
confusion in the terms has limited the court's holdings, see text 
at pages 187-91. 
255. Id. at 70. 
256. Hutchins, Hawaiian S stem, sjpra note 23, at 91; Territory v. Gay, 
31 Hawaii 376, 396-397 1930. 
257. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 91. 
258. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930), aff'd, 52 F.2d 356 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. 
denied, 284 u.S. 677 (T93lT. 
259. Id. 
260. Nakuina, supra note 52, at 83. 
261. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930), preceded by Territory v. 
262. 
Gay, 26 Hawaii 382 (1922), and Territory v. Gay, 25 Hawaii 651 
(1920). 
The case of Peck v. Bailey, 8 Hawaii 658 (1867) (see footnotes 204 
and 241, supra), specifically adjudicated ancient appurtenant water 
rights. The court in Peck also spoke of riparian rights in dicta. 
The opinion stated that the King originally owned the ahupuaa of 
Wailuku, and that his conveyance of portions of the land included 
the auwais used from time immemorial and the rights in the stream 
upon which the lands bordered. Unfortunately, Peck did not expound 
on these rights in the natural stream. These rights, presumably 
riparian rights, referred to surplus waters or perhaps those waters 
that stayed in the natural stream after the several landowners 
acquired their appurtenant waters. But exactly how the court 
intended to identify this surplus was not included in the decision. 
Davis v. Afong, 5 Hawaii 216 (1884) (see footnote 247, supra), 
discussed the rights of the konohiki in ancient times to use, as he 
pleased, the water that originated from springs upon his own 
property. The konohiki's right was subject only to those rights 
that others may have acquired by prescription or an appurtenant 
right. Again, the Hawaii Supreme Court failed to define the waters 
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to which the konohiki or landowner had rights. We may assume that 
the court intended for the konohiki to have rights to surplus 
waters from the springs that emerged on his property. Neverthe-
less, the basic question remained: What kind of surplus water? 
263. 9 Hawaii 651 (1895). 
264. Id. at 659; emphasis added. 
265. Id. 
266. 14 Hawaii 50 (1902). 
267. ~ at 61. The plaintiff, a California corporation, sought to 
restrain the defendant from diverting water from the Wailuku Stream 
on the island of Maui. The plaintiff owned the greater part of the 
ahupuaa of Wailuku and various kuleanas therein. The defendant, a 
Hawaii corporation, owned a considerable portion of the arable land 
and numerous kuleanas in the same ahupuaa. 
268. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 14 Hawaii 50, 63 (1902): 
"It would indeed have been strange if the court 
had intended to adjudicate rights to so-called 
surplus water without more explicit language. 
Such rights are fast becoming of very great 
importance and their adjudication would involve 
questions of great difficulty. r10reover, the 
question of the right to such water has been a 
mooted question suggested in numerous cases that 
have come before this court and always recognized 
as one of great difficulty, and this court has 
carefully avoided passing upon it until compelled 
to do so and has always regarded it as an unsettled 
question." 
269. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 
675 (1904). 
270. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
271. 15 Hawaii at 680. 
272. Id. 
273. Id. at 683. See the earlier discussion of the confusion involving 
these terms, footnotes 203 and 209, supra, and text at pages 179-81. 
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274. Id. at 680-681: 
"Originally the King was the sole owner of the water 
as he was of the rest of the land and could do with 
either or both as he pleased. In later years, the 
rule seems to have been for him not to dispossess 
tenants of their lands except for cause and to that 
extent, perhaps, he would not have deprived cultiva-
tors of the water to which their lands were by usage 
entitled. But no limitation, so far as we can learn, 
ever existed or was supposed to exist to his power to 
use the surplus waters as he saw fit." 
The court supported this view with reference to Peck v. Bailey, 8 
Hawaii 658, 661 (1867): 
"By the deed, the water courses were conveyed and a 
right to the water accustomed to flow in them ... 
If any of the lands were entitled to water by 
immemorial usage, this right was included in the 
conveyance as an appurtenance. . . . But if lands 
had no such rights, and no additional grant of 
water rights was made, it certainly could take 
nothing by having been a portion of the Ahupuaa." 
275. See pages 146-53 of this report. 
276. 15 Hawaii at 680-81. 
277. 24 Hawaii 47 (1917). 
278. Id. at 70. 
279. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
280. Id. at 393-394. 
281. Id. at 404-408. 
282. rd. at 408-417. 
283. See 24 Hawaii at 70-71. 
284. Id. at 380-381. See page 147 of this report. ~ (1930) derived 
this principle from the late Chief Justice Judd who described the 
situation in the case of Harris v. Carter, 6 Hawaii 195, 206-207 
(1877): 
"There are two kinds of ilis. One, the ill of the 
ahupuaa, is a mere subdivision of the ahupuaa for 
the convenience of the chief holding the ahupuaa, 
. . . The other class were the 'ili kupono'. These 
were independent of the ahupuaa, nor did they pay 
general tribute to it." 
~ 
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The valleys of Koula and Manuahi were held to be ilis kupono, 
independent of the ahupuaa of Hanapepe. 
285. The facts of Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. \'Jailuku Sugar 
Co., 15 Hawaii 675 (1904), are also similar in that the 1904 case 
also involved the rights of upper and lower landowners to surface 
waters. No water in Hawaiian Commercial was diverted out of the 
ahupuaa, however, and so the Carter court did not view Hawaiian 
Commercial (1904) as a governing precedent. 
286. Carter v. Territory, 24 Hawaii 47, 70 (1917). 
287. Honolulu Advertiser, March 13, 1943, at A-3, col. 6. 
288. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 393 (1930). 
289. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 
675, 680 (1904). 
290. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 391, quoting from Carter v. 
Territory, 24 Hawaii 47, 70 (1917). 
291. 24 Hawaii at 71. 
292. Justice Parsons' oplnlon concurring in part and dissenting in part 
emphasizes also the distinction between "the surplus normal flow" 
and "the surplus flood and freshet waters" (31 Hawaii at 407), and 
his separate opinion is based on this distinction. The Carter 
court, however, does not appear to have used the concept~he 
surplus normal flow" (24 Hawaii at 71) in the same sense that 
Justice Perry used that concept in the Hawaiian Commercial opinions 
(14 Hawaii at 61 (1902) and 15 Hawaii at 680 (1904)) and in ~ (31 
Hawaii at 385-388). Justice Perry used "surplus" waters to refer 
to all waters not covered by appurtenant, prescriptive, or riparian 
rights, and felt that the konohiki had unlimited discretion to use 
this "surplus" and divert it out of the original watershed. The 
Carter court said that a landowner of a water source did have 
rights to the "surpl us normal flow" but that this right was limited 
in quantity to the amount of water "to which the lands owned by him 
were entitled for such purposes by custom at the time the lands 
first passed into private ownership." As thus restricted by the 
Carter court, this concept is closer to an appurtenant right tied 
to the land than to Perry's unlimited right to divert. 
293. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 395 (1930). 
294. See pages 183-85 and footnotes 241-258, supra. 
295. See pages 156 and 159 . 
296. See McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 192, 504 P.2d 
1330, 1344 (1973). 
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297. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 399 (1930). 
298. Id. at 397. 
299. Id. at 398. 
300. Id. 
301. Id. at 403. See also the discussion of riparian principles on 
pages 183-85. 
302. Id. Although Perry ultimately rejected the principle of riparian 
rights as applied in Carter, he did acknowledge that landowners of 
a lower ahupuaa did have some rights to water for domestic pur-
poses. He agreed that "Every portion of land ... upon which 
people dwelt was ... entitled to drinking water for its human 
occupants and for their animals and was entitled to water for other 
domestic purposes. At no time in Hawaii's judicial history has 
th i s been den i ed. " ~ at 395. Perry probably acknowl edged th is 
right to domestic water in recognition of the Laws of 1850 or 
"Enactment of Further Principles." The 1850 law provided that "the 
people [meaning owners of land] also shall have a right to drinking 
water and running water and the right of way." See pages 156 and 
159. 
303. Id. at 409. 
304. 30 Hawaii 912. 
305. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 412 (1930). 
306. Id. 
307. Id. at 413. 
308. 30 Hawaii 912 (1929). 
309. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23, at 145-147. 
310. Id. at 224. 
311. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376,403 (1930). 
312. 1925 Hawaii Laws Act 150. 
313. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and \>later Comm'n., 30 Hawaii 912, 
913 (1929). 
314. Id. at 915. 
315. Id. at 922. 
316. Id. at 925. 
-......--
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317. Id. at 927. 
318. Id. at 922. 
319. rd. at 924. 
320. rd. at 923. 
321. rd. at 934. 
322. rd. at 935. 
323. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 412 (1930). 
324. McBryde Su~ar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 180, 504 P.2d 1330, 
1335 (1973). 
325. The clearest holding on this question was Territory v. Gay, 31 
Hawaii 376 (1930). 
326. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), 
aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
327. See pages 147 and 188 and note 284, supra, for an explanation of 
these Hawaiian terms. 
328. For a more complete explanation of these terms, see pages 185-91. 
329. See pages 154-160 for a more complete explanation of the Great 
Mahele. 
330. 1847 Hawaii Laws sec. 85; 2 Rev. Laws of Hawaii at 2124, 2128 
(1925); see text at pages 155-56 and 159. 
331. rd. 
332. McBryde Su~ar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 186, 504 P.2d 1330, 
1338 (1973). 
333. ~ at 187, 504 P.2d at 1339. 
334. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 
270, 517 P.2d 26,32 (1973) (Levinson, J., dissenting) (emphasis in 
original) (quoting from 2 Rev. Laws of Hawaii at 2123 (1925). 
335. Id. at 271, 517 P.2d at 32-33. 
336. ~ at 270, 517 P.2d at 32. 
337. For a more complete discussion of case law prior to t1cBryde, see 
pages 176-94. 
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338. t1cBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 276, 517 P.2d 26, 35 
(1973) . 
339. rd. at 277, 517 P.2d at 36 (quoting from Hater Commission Report at gr,-
340. ~ at 281, 517 P.2d at 38. 
341. ~ at 283, 517 P.2d at 39. 
342. rd. at 262, 517 P.2d at 27. 
343. rd. 
344. ~ at 302, 517 P.2d at 50. 
345. See pages 156, 159, and 190 for a more complete description of the 
Enactment of Further Principles. 
346. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 7-1 (1977): 
"The people shall also have a right to drinking 
water, and running water, and the right of way. 
The springs of water, and running water, and 
roads shall be free to all, on all lands granted 
in fee Simple; provided, that this shall not be 
applicable to wells and watercourses, which 
individuals have made for their own use." 
347. rkBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 192, 504 P.2d 1330, 
1342 (1973). 
348. ~ at 197, 504 P.2d at 1344. 
349. ~ at 198, 504 P.2d at 1344. 
350. See Chief Justice Perry in Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376, 399-
402 (1930) for a discussion of the policies against the riparian 
system in Hawaii (summarized at page 190 of this report). 
351. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 
291, 517 P.2d 26,44 (1973) (Levinson, J., dissenting). 
352. rd. 
353. rd. at 285-286 n. 25, 517 P.2d at 40 n. 25. Justice Levinson turns 
hTS analysis from the riparian doctrine to ancient Hawaiian usage 
and judicial precedent by virtue of Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 1-1 (1976) : 
"The common law of England ... is declared to be 
the common law of the State of Hawaii in all cases, 
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except as otherwise expressly provided by . 
Hawaiian judicial precedent, or established by 
Hawaiian usage. " 
354. rkBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 187-188, 504 P.2d 
1330, 1339 (1973). 
355. ~ at 191, 504 P.2d at 1341. 
356. ~ at 198, 504 P.2d at 1344. 
357. rd., aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 292, 517 P.2d 26, 44 (1973) 
TLevinson, J., dissenting). 
358. See pages 146-53 for a more complete discussion of ancient Hawaiian 
use of water. 
359. r1cBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 
293, 517 P.2d 26, 45 (1973) (Levinson, J., dissenting). 
360. 31 Hawaii 376 (1930); see pages 187-91 for a more complete descrip-
tion of Chief Justice Perry's opinion in Territory v. Gay (1930). 
361. 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
362. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F.Supp. 559, 586 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
363. rd. at 564. 
364. rd. 
365. rd. at 566. 
366. Id. at 568. 
367. rd. at 583. 
368. ~kBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 189 n. 15, 504 P.2d 
1330, 1340 n. 15 (1973). 
369. 
"Take" Property? 
370. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
371. 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973). 
372. 441 F. Supp. at 564. See 54 Hawaii 174, 201, 504 P.2d 1330, 1346 
(Marumoto, J., dissenting) and 55 Hawaii 260, 262, 517 P.2d 26, 27 (Levinson, J., dissenting). 
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373. 441 F. Supp. at 584-85. 
374. Id. at 586: 
"Those porti ons of McBryde I and 11 ho 1 di ng that 
the State owns all surplus water and, under the 
aegis of the English common law doctrine of 
riparian rights, restraining the free diversion 
of surface waters for use outside the lands of the 
plaintiffs to which they are appurtenant, must be 
declared untenable and void." 
375. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
376. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
377. See Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930), aff'd, 52 F.2d 356 (9th 
Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677 (1931;:---
378. 54 Hawaii 174, 200, 504 P.2d 1330, 1346 (1973). 
379. Id. 
380. See Currie, Res Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 41 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 317,341 (1978). 
381. 441 F. Supp. at 587. 
382. See Currie, supra note 380, at 341. 
383. Id. at 333-34. 
384. 
385. With one exception, see ~ at 947, n. 22. 
386. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1257 (1970). 
387. 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
388. 263 U.S. 413 (1923). 
389. Id. at 416. 
390. Demorest v. City Bank, 321 U.S. 36,42 (1944); Herb v. Pitcairn, 
324 U.S. 117, 125 (1945): 
"This Court from the time of its foundation has 
adhered to the principle that it will not review 
judgments of state courts that rest on adequate 
~ 
i~ 
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and independent state grounds [citations omitted]. 
The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been 
thought to warrant statement. It is found in the 
partitioning of power between the state and federal 
judicial systems and in the limitations of our own 
jurisdiction. Our only power over state judgments 
is to correct them to the extent that they incorrectly 
adjudge federal rights. 
391. Justice Stewart suggests unexpectedness or unpredictability may be 
a basis for jurisdiction: 
"[A] state cannot be permitted to defeat the consti-
tutional prohibition against taking property without 
due process of law by the simple device of asserting 
retroactively that the property it has taken never 
existed at all. ~~hether the decision here worked an 
unpredictable change in state law thus inevitably 
presents a federal question for the determination of 
this Court." 
Hughes v. Hashington, 389 U.S. 290, 296-297 (1967) (Stewart, J., 
concu rri ng) . 
392. See generally, Stolz, supra note 384, at 944 nn. 5 and 6. 
393. See Currie, supra note 380, at 323 n. 46. 
394. Id. at 323 n. 49. 
395. Id. at 324 n. 51. Petitioners in Robinson had the opportunity to 
retry the facts. 
396. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1331 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. sec. 1343 (1970). 
397. 389 U.S. 290, 294. 
398. Id. at 295-96. 
399. Id. at 296-97. 
400. Id. at 296. 
401. rd. at 298. 
402. For a general discussion of the nature of appellate lawmaking in 
terms of "making" law as opposed to "finding" law, see Levy, 
Realist Jurisprudence and Prospective Overruling, 109 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1, 2 (1960) 
403. rd. at 2-6. 
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404. Great Northern Ry. v. Sunburst Oil and Refining Co., 287 U.S. 358 
(1932). 
40S. Note, Prospective Operation of Decisions Holding Statutes Uncon-
stitutional or Overruling Prior Decisions, 60 Harv. L. Rev. 437 
(1947). 
406. See Stimson, Retroactive Application of Law--A Problem in Con-
stitutional Law, 38 Mich. L. Rev. 30, 47-54 (1939). 
407. Muhlker v. New York and Harlem R. R., 197 U.S. 544 (1905). 
408. Id. 
409. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930); Carter v. Territory, 24 
Hawaii 47 (1917); Foster v. Waiahole Water Co., 25 Hawaii 726 
(1921); Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. liailuku Sugar Co., 15 
Hawaii 675 (1904); Palolo Land and Improvement Co. v. Wong Quai, 15 
Hawaii 554 (1903). 
410. 441 F. Supp. at 58S. 
411. 159 U.S. 103 (189S). 
412. Id. at 112 (1895). 
413. See Stimson, supra note 406, at 50-S1 (citing Patterson v. Colorado 
ex rel Attorney General, 205 U.S. 4S4, 460 (1907); and Dunbar v. 
City of New York, 251 U.S. S16 (1920)). 
414. 281 U.S. 673 (1930). 
41S. Id. at 680: 
and that the mere fact that a state court 
had rendered an erroneous decision on a question 
of state< law, or has overruled principles or doc-
trines established by previous decisions on which 
a party relied, does not give rise to a claim 
under the Fourteenth Amendment or otherwise confer 
appellate jurisdiction on this Court." 
416. Id. at 681. 
417. 166 U.S. 226 (1897). 
418. The Robinson court cites Brinkerhoff-Faris Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 
673 (1930), at 441 F. Supp. at 580. 
419. See cases cited in footnote 413, supra. 
420. 304 U.S. 64 (1938). 
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421. 1 \Jall. (68 U.S.) 175 (1863); see Stimson, supra note 406, at S4 n. 
108. 
422. Douglass v. Pike County, 101 U.S. 677 (1880); Anderson v. Santa Ana 
Township, 116 U.S. 356 (1886). German Savings Bank v. County of 
Franklin, 128 U.S. 526 (1888); Los Angeles v. Los Angeles City 
Water Co., 177 U.S. 558 (1900). 
423. 41 U.S. 1 (1842). 
424. "To 1 itigate the same matter twice or more would impose costs on 
the parties and the burdened and subsidized judicial system. 
Indeed, if a judgment were not conclusive as to what it actually 
determined, 'the adjucative process would fail to serve its social 
function of resolving disputes. "' F. James and G. Hazard, Civil 
Procedure 530 (2d ed. 1977). --
425. 28 U.S.C. sec. 1738 (1970); see Currie, supra note 380. 
426. See Currie, supra note 380, at 318 (citing Huron Holding Corp. v. 
Lincoln Mine Operations Co., 312 U.S. 133 (1941), and Davis v. 
Davis, 30S U.S. 32 (1938). 
427. When the first action is brought in state court and the second in 
federal court, the federal court is compelled to apply res judicata 
if the substantive res judicata law of the state so requires. 
Oklahoma Packing Co. v. Oklahoma Gas and Electric Co., 309 U.S. 4 (1939). 
428. Currie, supra note 380, at 341. 
429. 441 F. Supp. at 584 n. 35 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
430. See generally, Currie, supra note 380. 
431. See text at page 202. 
432. Strict "mutuality" has been steadily losing ground. See Blonder 
Tongue Laboratories v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 
(1971) and Bernhard v. Bank of America Nat'l Trust and Savings 
Ass'n, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 122 P.2d 892 (1942). 
433. 42 U.S.C. sec. 1983 (1970): 
"Every person who, under color of any statute, 
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any 
State or Territory, subjects or causes to be 
subjected, any citizen of the United States or 
any other person within the jurisdiction thereof 
to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, 
shall be liable to the party injured in an action 
" 
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at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress." 
434. Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). 
435. Ten circuits have applied res judicata to subsequent sec. 1983 
actions (as cited in Currie, SUDra note 380, at 332 n. 106): 
1·1astracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d i257 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 
420 U.S. 909 (1975); Thistlewaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 
(2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1093 (1974); Roy v. Jones, 
484 F.2d 86 (3rd Cir. 1973); Davis v. Towe, 526 F.2d 588 (4th Cir. 
1975), ~ 379 F. Supp. 536 (E. D. Va. 1974); Brown v. Chastain, 
416 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970); 
Coogan v. Cincinnati Bar Ass'n, 431 F.2d 1209 (6th Cir. 1970); 
Blanker v. City of Chicago, 504 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1974); rlorwood 
v. Parenteau, 228 F.2d 148 (8th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 351 U.S. 
955 (1956); Francisco Enterprises, Inc. v. Kirby, 482 F.2d 481 (9th 
Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 415 U.S. 916 (1974); 11etros v. United 
States District Court, 441 F.2d 313 (10th Cir. 1971). 
Some commentators have argued that sec. 1983 should constitute an 
exception to res judicata. See Averitt, Federal Section 1983 
Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. Colo. L. Rev. 191 (1972); 
McCormack, Federalism and Sec. 1983: Limits on Judicial Enforce-
ment of Constitutional Claims Pt. II , 60 Va. L. Rev. 250 1974); 
Comment, Develo ments in the Law--Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 
Harv. L. Rev. 1133 1977. But, for another view and an excellent 
analysis see Currie, supra note 380, at 327-332. See also, Lombard 
v. Bd. of Education, 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 
U.S. 976 (1975); Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285 (9th Cir. 1971) 
(alternative holding); Brown v. Chastain, 418 F.2d 1012 (5th Cir. 
1969) (Rives, J., dissenting), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970) 
and Preiser v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 475, 499 n. 14 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
436. 441 F. Supp. at 584 n. 35. 
437. Civ. rIo. 75-0067 (D. Hawaii, filed Oct. 16, 1978). 
438. 50 Hawaii 314, 440 P.2d 76 (1968). 
439. 55 Hawaii 677 (1973). 
440. 419 U.S. 872 (1974). 
44l. Sotomura v. County of Hawaii, Civ. No. 75-0067, slip opinion at 18 (D. Hawaii, filed Oct. 16, 1978). 
442. 389 U.S. 290, 294 (1967), discussed at pages 204-05. 
443. Brinkerhoff-Faris Trust Co. v. Hill, 281 U.S. 673 (1930). 
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444. ~ 
445. See page 202. 
446. See pages 208-10. 
447. See, Motion For Leave to File Brief Amicus Curiae of Hawaiian Sugar 
Planters' Association and Brief, McBryde v. Robinson, U.S. Supreme 
Court, Nos. 73-1440, 73-1441 and 73-1442 (March 1974). 
448. r1cBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 191, 198, 200, 504 
P.2d 1330, 1341, 1344, 1345 (1973). 
449. Id. at 199, 504 P.2d at 1345; see also id. at 198, 504 P.2d at 
1344. -
450. ~ at 185-87, 191-97, 504 P.2d at 1338-39, 1341-44. 
451. ~ at 189 n. 15, 504 P.2d at 1340 n. 15. 
452. See Casad, Res Judicata 8 (1976): 
"Declarations of law or of the meaning of laws 
made by the court have no binding force as 
precedent for later cases unless the declaration 
was made in resolving a question of law that was 
necessary to the decision of the case before the 
court. Only such declarations are 'holdings' 
having stare decisis effect. Other statements 
of law contained in the court's opinion are dicta 
which mayor may not be followed in later cases." 
453. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii, 174, 185-90, 197-9B, 504 
P.2d 1330, 1338-40, 1344 (1973). 
454. See Tre1ease, Government Ownership and Trusteeship of Hater, 45 
455. 
456. 
~~n /'nL7\. and see the discussion on pages 219-20 
rd. at 641 nn. 11-12; Ariz. Compo Laws 1864-1871, art. 22; Colo. 
Const. art. XVI, sec. 5. 
See, ~, Hilley V. Decker, 11 Hyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903). 
457. Tre1ease, supra note 454, at 640. 
45B. See the discussion on pages 219-20. 
459. See generally, Tre1ease, supra note 454. 
460. McBryde V. Robinson, 54 Hawaii at 1B6, 504 P.2d at 1338 (1973): 
;~j , 
.fl 
tJ,1 
• , 
t Jil 
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"He believe that the right to water is one of the 
most important usufructs of lands, and it appears 
clear to us that by the foregoing limitation the 
right of water was specifically and definitely 
reserved for the people of Hawaii for their common 
good in all of the land grants." 
461. See pages 230-37 and pages 242-48. 
462. See ~, Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930), aff'd, 52 F.2d 
356 (9th Cir. 1931), cert. denied, 284 U.S. 677 (l~ 
463. l~yo. Const. art. 8, sec. 1. 
464. ~ art. 8, sec. 3. 
465. \~i11ey v. Decker, 11 Vlyo. 496, 73 P. 210 (1903). 
466. Merril v. Bishop, 74 Hyo. 298, 287 P.2d 620,625 (1955). 
467. "All surface, underground, flood and atmospheric waters within the 
boundaries of the state are the property of the state for the use 
of its people and are subject to appropriation for beneficial uses 
as provided by law." Mont. Const. art. IX, sec. 3, cl. 3. 
"The water of the ordinary flow, underflow, and tides of every 
flowing river, natural stream, and lake, and of every bay or arm of 
the Gulf of r1exico, and the storm water, floodwater, and rainl'later 
of every river, natural stream, canyon, ravine, depression, and 
watershed in the state is the property of the state." Tex. I/ater 
Code Ann. tit. 2, sec. 11.021, cl. a (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
468. The corpus of water in natural streams is publici juris - the 
property of the public. t1ettler v. Ames Realty Co., 61 t10nt. 152, 
201 P. 702, 704 (1921). 
The state owns in trust for the people the waters of all natural 
streams. Goldsmith and Powell v. State, 159 S.I'1.2d 534, 535 (Tex. 
Civ. App. 1942). 
469. "The waters of all sources, flowing in streams, canyons, ravines or 
other natural channels, or in definite underground channels, 
whether perennial or intermittent, flood, waste or surplus water, 
and of lakes, ponds and springs on the surface, belong to the 
public and are subject to appropriation and beneficial use as 
provided in this chapter." Ariz. Rev. Stat. sec. 45-101, cl. A 
(1956). 
"The water of every natural stream, not heretofore appropriated, 
within the state of Colorado, is hereby declared to be the property 
of the public, and the same is dedicated to the use of the people 
of the state, subject to appropriation as hereinafter provided." 
Colo. Const. art. XVI, sec. 5. 
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"The water of all sources of water supply within the boundaries of 
the state whether above or beneath the surface of the sround, 
belongs to the public." Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 533.025 (1973). 
"All natural waters flovling in streams and watercourses, whether 
such be perennial, or torrential, within the limits of the state of 
rlew Mexico, belong to the public and are subject to appropriation 
for beneficial use." N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 75-1-1 (1953). 
470. "The legislature shall provide for the utilization, development and 
conservation of all natural resources belonging to the State, 
including land and waters, for the maximum benefit of its people 
Wherever occurring in their natural state, fish, wild-
life, and waters are reserved to the people for common use." 
Alaska Const. art. VIII, secs. 2, 3. 
471. Cal. Const. art. X, sec. 5. 
472. Resources Management, 37 Public 
a discussion of how the riparian 
see pages 281-85 and 297-98. 
473. R. L. Dewsnup and D. H. Jensen, A Summary-Digest of State Water 
Laws 35 (1973). 
474. J. L. Sax, Water Law, Planning & Policy 1 (1968). 
475. Id. 
476. 2 VI. Hutchins, Water Rights Laws in the Nineteen Western States 91 
(1977). 
477. Gould v. Stafford, 77 Cal. 66, 18 P. 879 (1888). Consistent with 
this view, that riparian rights are vested exclusively in the 
riparian owner and "extend only to the use of the water upon the 
abutting land and none other," the California Supreme Court in a 
1922 case held that a city, the boundaries of which extended to a 
stream, had no right to apply the water to public use within the 
city. Antioch v. Williams Irr. Dist., 188 Cal. 451,457,205 P. 
688, 691 (1922). 
478. A riparian proprietor had contracted with an oil company to supply 
water to its drilling sites and later repudiated the contract on 
the basis that water diversion to non-riparian lands was illegal. 
The court held that, because no possible damage to other riparian 
owners could result, the contract was not for an illegal purpose 
and was valid. Texas Co. v. Burkett, 177 Tex. 16, 296 S.W. 273 
(1927). 
479. A riparian owner of land abutting a tributary of California's Santa 
Ana River was diverting water from the main Santa Ana River and 
transporting it across a high natural bluff to irrigate the lands 
abutting the tributary. The bluff formed separate drainage basins 
. { 
~: 
~!, ~ 
I 
t~ 
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for the tributary and the river. The riparian owner unsuccessfully 
argued that the entire Santa Ana River system was one watershed for 
the purpose of determining riparian rights. The court held that 
where two streams unite, each is considered as a separate stream 
and that land lying within the watershed of one stream above the 
point of confluence is not considered to be within the watershed of 
the main stream when hills and bluffs form separate watersheds. 
"Land which is not within the watershed of the river is not ri-
parian thereto, and is not entitled, as riparian land, to the use 
or benefit of the water from the river, although it may be part of 
an entire tract which does extend to the river." Anaheim Union ~Iater Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 88 P. 978, 980 (1907) (citing in 
Support of the decision Chauvet v. Hill, 93 Cal. 410,28 P. 1066 
(1892) and Hatkins L. Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.H. 733 (1905)) • 
480. Id. 
481. Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 17-19. 
482. I d. at 1 9. 
483. Florida Water Resources Act of 1972, Fla. Stat. Ann. sec. 373.236 (West 1974): 
"Duration of permits 
"(1) Permits may be granted for any period of time 
not exceeding twenty years. The governing 
board or the department may base duration of 
permits on a reasonable system of classifica-
tion according to source of supply or type of 
use, or both. 
"(2) The governing board or the department may 
authorize a permit of duration of up to fifty 
years in the case of a municipality or other 
governmental body or of a public works or 
public service corporation where such a period 
is required to provide for the retirement of 
bonds for the construction of waterworks and 
waste disposal facilities." 
484. ~ sec. 373.243: 
"Revocation of permits 
"After a hearing under Sec. 373.126, the governing 
board or the department may revoke a permit as follows: 
" (1) 
" (2) 
"(3) 
"(4) 
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For any material false statement in an appli-
cation to continue, initiate, or modify a use, 
or for any material false statement in any 
report or statement of fact required of the 
user pursuant to the provisions of this 
chapter, the governing board or the department 
may revoke the user's permit, in whole or in 
part, permanently. 
For willful violation of the conditions of the 
permit, the governing board or the department 
may permanently or temporarily revoke the 
permit, in whole or in part. 
For violation of any prOV1Slon of this chapter, 
the governing board or the department may revoke 
the permit, in whole or in part, for a period 
not to exceed one year. 
For nonuse of the water supply allowed by the 
permit for a period of two years or more, the 
governing board or the department may revoke 
the permit permanently and in whole unless the 
user can prove that his nonuse was due to 
extreme hardship caused by factors beyond his 
control. 
"(5) The governing board or the department may 
revoke a permit, permanently and in whole, 
with the written consent of the permittee." 
485. Id. sec. 373.246: 
"Declaration of water shortage or emergency 
"(l ) 
"(2) 
The governing board or the department by 
regulation shall formulate a plan for imple-
mentation during periods of water shortage. 
As a part of this plan the governing board or 
the department shall adopt a reasonable system 
of permit classification according to source 
of water supply, method of extraction or diver-
sion, use of water, or a combination thereof. 
The governing board or the department by order 
may declare that a water shortage exists within 
all or part of the district when insufficient 
water is available to meet the requirements of 
the permit system or when conditions are such as 
to require temporary reduction in total use 
within the area to protect water resources from 
serious harm. Such orders shall become final and 
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be reviewable in the same way as orders under 
Sec. 373.126. 
"(3) In accordance with the plan adopted under 
subsection (1), the governing board or the 
department may impose such restrictions on 
one or more classes of permits as may be 
necessary to protect the water resources of 
the area from serious harm and to restore 
them to their previous condition. 
"(4) A declaration of water shortage and any 
measures adopted pursuant thereto may be 
rescinded by the governing board or the 
department. 
"(5) When a water shortage is declared, the govern-
ing board or the department shall cause notice 
thereof to be published in a prominent place 
within a newspaper of general circulation 
throughout the area. Such notice shall be pub-
lished each day for the first week of the 
shortage and once a week thereafter until the 
declaration is rescinded. Publication of 
such notice shall serve as notice to all users 
in the area of the condition of water shortage. 
"(6) The governing board or the department shall 
notify each permittee in the district by 
regular mail of any change in the condition of 
his permit or any suspension of his permit or 
of any other restriction on his use of water 
for the duration of the water shortage. 
"(7) If an emergency condition exists due to a 
water shortage within any area of the district, 
and if the department, or the executive director 
with the concurrence of the governing board, 
finds that the exercise of powers under subsec-
tion (1) are not sufficient to protect the public 
health, safety, or welfare, the health of animals, 
fish or aquatic life, a public water supply, or 
recreational, commercial, industrial, agricultural, 
or other reasonable uses, it or he may, pursuant 
to the provisions of Sec. j73.l19, issue orders 
reciting the existence of such an emergency and 
requiring that such action, including but not 
limited to apportioning, rotating, limiting, or 
prohibiting the use of the water resources of the 
district, be taken as the department or the 
executive director deems necessary to meet the 
emergency. 
-
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"(8) An affected party to whom an emergency order is 
directed under subsection (7) shall comply i~me­
diately, but may challenge such an order in the 
manner set forth in Sec. 373.119." 
486. N.J. Stat. Ann. sec. 58:1-39 (West 1966): 
.. It shall be determined whether the application 
is justified in the public interest, whether it pro-
vides for proper and safe construction of all works 
connected therewith, whether it provides for proper 
protection of the supply of the watershed from con-
tamination, whether the reduction of the dry-season 
flow of any stream will be caused to an amount likely 
to produce unsanitary conditions or otherwise unduly 
injure public or private interests, and whether the 
plans are just and equitable to all persons concerned, 
particular consideration being given to the present 
and future necessity for sources of water supply. A 
permit may be made upon such conditions or terms as 
the council may deem necessary in the public inter-
est .... " 
487. Id. sec. 58:1-44: 
"Limitation on duration of permits; review prior to 
renewal; modification 
"All permits except those issued under the provlslons 
of section 4 hereof [referring to subsurface and 
percolating waters] shall be limited to a definite 
period of time to be determined by the council, 
which shall be long enough to provide for amorti-
zation, at a reasonable rate, of capital investment 
in structures and facilities necessary to divert 
and utilize the water required, but not longer than 
25 years, and shall further provide for adequate 
review prior to renewal, and for modification if 
required in the public interest." 
488. Id. sec. 58:1-41: 
"Transfer of permits 
"Permits may not be transferred except by the council 
for identical use on the same lands or after due 
consideration of the use to be made of the water by 
the transferee." 
-314-
489. Id. sec. 58:1-46: 
"Pennit fee; annual charge for water diverted 
"All diverters of surface waters in watershed areas 
delineated under section 2 hereof shall pay to the 
State of New Jersey, through the division, for each 
diversion pennit a fee of $10.00 upon the granting 
thereof. All such diverters for consumptive use 
shall also pay an annual charge, at the rate of 
$0.50 per million gallons, for all water so diverted 
under said .pennit in excess of the first 100,000 
gallons diverted on any day, beginning with the 
date of delineation. All such diverters for noncon-
sumptive use shall pay an annual charge at the 'rate 
of $10.00 per million gallons, based on the average 
daily amount of water diverted over and above 100,000 
gallons beginning with the date of delineation or such 
subsequent date as the diversion may begin." 
490. 3 Hutchins, Water Rights Laws, supra note 476, at 521. 
491. Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 35. 
492. Note, The Texas I~ater Rights COl'll1ission: Allocating a Limited 
Natural Resource for Co~peting Uses, 47 Texas Law Review 864, 874-
75 ( 1969). 
493. Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 5. 
494. Id. at 32. 
495. Colo. Const. art. XVI, sec. 6; Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 37-92-301(3) (1973). 
496. See, ~, lUI. Stat. Ann. secs. 75-5-1 to 75-5-37 (1953). 
497. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. secs. 37-92-201 through 37-92-204 and 37-92-
301 through 37-92-304 (Supp. 1976). 
498. Other "dual system" states include (a) Oklahoma, which has a system 
of water rights law similar to that used in Texas (see Dewsnup and 
Jensen, supra note 473, at 603-610 and Hudson, Property: Riparian 
and A ro riation Ri hts to Forei n Water in Oklahoma, 19 Okla. L. 
Rev. 462, 463 966, and b Oregon, which primarily relies on the 
appropriation system but still has vestiges of the riparian doc-
trine (see Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 609-629, and 3 
Hutchins, Hater Rights Law, supra note 476, at 459-466. 
499. I~atkins Land Co. v. Clements, 98 Tex. 578, 86 S.H. 733 (1905). 
500. Holmes v. Nay, 186 Cal. 231, 236-37, 199 P. 325 (1921). 
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501. Anaheim Union I~ater Co. v. Fuller, 150 Cal. 327, 331, 88 P. 978 
(1907) . 
502. Spring Valley ~jater Co. v. Alameda County, 88 Cal. App. 157, 164, 
263 P. 318 (1927). 
503. See the constitutional and statutory provisions quoted in note 518, 
infra. 
504. 'leridian, Ltd. v. San Francisco, 13 Cal. 2d 424, 445, 90 P.2d 537, 
91 P.2d 105 (1939). 
505. Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 143. 
506. Id. at 700-701. 
507. 3 Hutchins, Water Rights Laws, supra note 476, at 506 (citing 1889 
Tex. Laws, ch. 88). 
508. Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2, sec. 11-303 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
509. Henninghaus v. Southern California Edison Co., 200 Cal. 81, 252 P. 
607 (1926). 
510. Cal. Const. art. XIV, sec. 3. See pages 235-36 for further details 
on this change. 
511. Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 700. 
512. 3 Hutchins, \~ater Rights Laws, supra note 476, at 503. 
513. Ko10dey, Water Rights--Spanish Land Grants - Appurtenant Irrigation 
Rights, 17 Southwestern L. J. 193, 194 (1963). 
514. Texas v. Valmont Plantations, 346 S.W.2d 853 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961), 
aff'd on appeal, 163 Tex. 381, 355 S.W.2d 502 (1962). 
515. State v. Hidalgo County ~Iater Control and Imp. District, 443 S.W.2d 
728 (Tex. Civ. App. 1969). 
516. Haney v. Neace-Stark Co., 109 Ore. 93,216 P. 757 (1923). The 
court held that a company can capture appropriated water in storage 
dams and pump it for irrigation to other lands if such use does not 
interfere with vested rights of others to water use during the 
irrigation season. 
517. Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 37. See, for example, N.J. 
Stat. Ann. 58:1-41 (\~est 1966), quoted in note 488, supra. 
518. "State waters may be appropriated for any beneficial use." Tex. 
Water Code Ann. sec. 11.023 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
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"Beneficial use shall be the basis, the measure and the limit of 
the right to the use of water." Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 533.035 (1973). 
"It is hereby declared that because of the conditions prevailing i~ 
this State the general welfare requires that the water resources of 
the State be put to beneficial use .... " Cal. Const. art. X, 
sec. 2. 
See also the statutes quoted in notes 467, 469, 470, supra. 
519. "Riparian rights in a stream or water course attach to, but to no 
more than so much of the flow thereof as may be required or used 
consistently with this section, for the purposes for which such 
1 ands are, or may be made adaptable, in view of such reasonable and 
beneficial uses; ... " Cal. Const. art. XIV, sec. 3 (constitu-
tionally upheld in Peabody v. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351,40 P.2d 486 
(1935)). 
520. Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2, sec. 11-303 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
521. Wyo. Const. art. VIII, sec. 3; Colo. Const. art. XVII, secs. 5, 6. 
522. Cal. Water Code sec. 275 (LJest Supp. 1977) provides that the state 
may bring an action to enjoin waste in water use, as does Tex. 
Water Code Ann. tit. 2, secs. 11.092, 11.093 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
Section 11.095 of the Texas code cited provides that water waste is 
a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment. 
523. Worden v. Alexander, 108 Mont. 208, 90 P.2d 160, 163 (1939) (the 
water supply in an irrigation ditch was insufficient to satisfy the 
irrigation requirements of two appropriators; the court ignored 
claims of priority and apportioned the water to maximize the 
combined output of high-value crops from the farms). 
524. Waterford Irrigation Dist. v. Turlock Irrigation Dist., 50 Cal. 
App. 213, 194 P. 757, 761 (1926). The court held that one joint 
owner of an irrigation dam could require the other owner to re-
construct its dam gates to maximize the outflow to the customers of 
the districts. 
The Alaska Supreme Court also recognized the maximum use policy in 
interpreting certain provisions of the Alaska Water Use Act of 
1966. "[T]he provisions of [this article] were intended to en-
courage the broadest possible access to and use of state waters by 
the general public." Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 1191, 1198 
(Alaska 1974). 
525. Colo. Const. art. XVI, sec. 6. 
526. Idaho Const. art. XV, sec. 3. 
-317-
527. Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 45-147, cl. B (West Supp. 1977). 
528. Tex. Water Codes Ann. tit. 2, sec. 11.024 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
529. Tolle v. Corith, 31 Tex. 362, 98 Am. Dec. 540 (1868). The court 
rejected an application for an appropriation of water for power 
purposes in favor of subsequently filed applications to store water 
for domestic and irrigation purposes. 
530. Peck v. Sharrow, 96 Idaho 512, 531 P.2d 1157 (1975). Although the 
state constitution assigns preference to domestic use, the court 
held that a ho~eowner could not divert the water from a creek to 
his home, thereby decreasing the volume available to a downstream 
prior appropriator (who was using most of his awarded water for 
irrigation) without either installing a meter to assure the re-
quired flow downstream or compensating the prior appropriator for 
damages. The only case cited in support of the decision was an 
earlier Idaho Supreme Court case with virtually identical facts. 
In that case the court stated: "It is clear that under the Con-
stitution, those using water for domestic purposes have the pref-
erence over those claiming for any other purpose; but the usage for 
such.superior purpose is subject to provisions regulating the 
taking of private property." Bassinger v. Taylor, 30 Idaho 289, 
164 P. 522, 523 (1917). In this earlier case, the court did not 
enjoin the domestic user from taking water but warned that proven 
damage to the other party would be compensable. 
531. Wyo. Stat. sec. 41-3-102 (1977). 
532. Alaska Stat. sec. 46.15.080 (1977). 
533. Hufford v. Dye, 162 Cal. 147, 121 P. 400 (1912). The court held 
that an appropriation right is not measured by the extent of the 
appropriation specifications or by the volume actually diverted 
from a stream but by the extent to which the appropriator applies 
the water to beneficial purposes; and where stream water is in-
sufficient to permit a diversion and simultaneous use, the court 
may fix times when. by rotation, the whole may be used by each 
party. 
534. Ariz. Rev. Stat. ~ec. 45-245, cl. B (1956); \~yo. Stat. sec. 41-3-
612 (1977); Nev. Rev. Stat. sec. 533-075 (1973). 
535. Nash v. Clark, 27 Utah 158, 75 P. 371 (1904), aff'd, 198 U.S. 361 
(1905). See also White v. 1'1arty, 97 Idaho 85,540P.2d 270 (1975) 
in which, under identical circumstances (an action to condemn a 
right of way across lands of another for an irrigation ditch) the 
Idaho Supreme Court also upheld the constitutionality of such a 
procedure. 
536. Clark v. Nash, 198 U.S. 361 (1905). The Court held that because 
Utah is an unusually dry state, a statute permitting condemnation 
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of a right of way across the lands of another for irrigation, 
although not a public use within the normal purview of the Con-
stitution of the United States, is within the legislative power of 
the state by virtue of the special local circumstances. The Court 
thus upheld the state statute's validity. 
This case has been cited in many state and federal.court cases and 
the decision has not been overruled or criticized •. One recent 
federal court case in which the Clark decision was followed as 
authority is Schneider v. District of Columbia, 117 F. Supp. 705 
(D.D.C. 1953). In this case, the court upheld a local statute t~at 
enabled condemnations for a slum clearance and beautification 
project against claims by the realty owners that no public purpose 
was served. 
537. Ariz. Const. art. II, sec. 17. 
538. Cienega Cattle Co. v. Atkins, 59 Ariz. 287, 126 P.2d 481 (1942). 
A cattleman sought to condemn a right of way across the land of the 
complainant to permit his cattle to pass from his homestead to a 
National Forest where he held grazing permits. The court granted 
the condemnation because such a right of way was necessary for full 
utilization of valuable and scarce grazing land. This decision has 
not been challenged in the federal courts. 
539. Cal. Const. art. 1, sec. 19; Cal. Water Code sec. 1007 (West 1971). 
540. Cal. Const. art. 1, sec. 19; for a leading case applying this 
provision to riparian owners, see footnote 542, infra. 
541. Turlock Irrigation Dist. v. Williams, 76 Cal. 360, 18 P. 379 
(1888). 
542. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950), 
~, 76 F. Supp. 87 (Ct. Cl. 1948). The United States Govern-
ment, manager of the California Central Valley project, contested 
an award of damages made by the Court of Claims to the riparian 
owners for the loss of their grasslands. The Government contended 
that the 1928 California Constitutional Amendment restricted 
riparian use of waters to reasonable and beneficial uses and that 
periodic innundation of "uncontrolled grasslands" was wasteful and 
not within the definition of reasonable and beneficial. 
The United States Supreme Court interpreted the 1928 California 
amendment as seeking not to destroy existing rights but to place 
reasonable limits on all uses of water, however the right came into 
existence. The Court found that the grasses destroyed were a 
beneficial commodity and that the riparian owners had done nothing 
wasteful in taking advantage of the floodwaters. Accordingly, the 
Court held that the California legislature had not destroyed 
existing rights, that loss of vested riparian rights was compen-
sable under California law, and that the Court of Claims had 
properly awarded damages. 
, 
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543. Chowchilla Farms, Inc. v. 11artin, 219 Cal. 1, 25 P.2d 435 (1933). 
544. Chow v. City of Santa Barbara, 236 Cal. 159, 22 P.2d 5 (1933). 
545. People v. Elk River Mill and Lumber Co., 107 Cal. 221,40 P. 531 (1895) . 
546. ~J. S. Ranch v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 388 F.2d 257 (lOth Cir. 1967). 
547. ~, 391 U.S. 593 (1968). 
548. Sherrill v. U.S., 381 F.2d 744 (Ct. Cl. 1967). 
549. Baumann v. Smrha, 145 F. Supp. 617 (D. Kan. 1956), aff'd per 
curium, 352 U.S. 863 (1956). 
550. ~Iilliams v. City of Ifichita, Kansas, 279 F.2d 375, 377-78 (lOth 
Cir. 1960). 
551. Renninger v. State, 70 Idaho 170,213 P.2d 911 (1950). 
552. Suffield v. State ex rel Morrisson, 92 Ariz. 152, 375 P.2d 263 (1962). -- , 
553. Norman v. Kusel, 96 Neb. 400, 150 N.I~. 201 (1914). 
554. North Sterling Irrigation Dist. v. Dickman, 59 Colo. 169, 149 P. 97 
(1915). 
555. Lowe v. Yolo County Consolo Hater Co., 157 Cal. 503, 108 P. 297 
(1910). 
556. Katz V. Iialkinshaw, 141 Cal. 116,70 P. 663 (1902). 
557. City ~1ill CO. V. Honolulu Sewer & Hater Comm'n, 30 Hawaii 912,927 
(1929). See the discussion of this case at pages 191-94. 
558. Katz v. Halkinshaw, 141 Cal. at 116, 74 P. at 766. 
559. Cal. Canst. art. X, sec. 2. 
560. See, ~, Lux V. Haggin, 69 Cal. 255, 4 P. 919 (1884). 
561. Peabody V. Vallejo, 2 Cal. 2d 351,40 P.2d 486 (1935). 
562. United States v. Gerlach Live Stock Co., 339 U.S. 725 (1950) (see 
note 542, supra). 
563. Joslin V. Marin Mun. Water Dist., 67 Cal. 2d 132, 429 P.2d 889 
(1967). 
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564. Alaska Laws 1966, ch. 50, Alaska Stat. sec. 46.15.010 et. seq. 
(1977). 
565. See generally 3 Hutchins, Water Rights Laws, supra note 476, at 
150-55 and Dewsnup and Jensen, supra note 473, at 95. 
566. 
567. 
Alaska Stat. sec. 46.15.060 (Supp. 1977): "A water right acquired 
by law before July 1, 1966 or a beneficial use of water on July 1, 
1966, or made within five years before July 1, 1966, or made in 
conjunction with works under construction on July 1, 1966, under a 
lawful common law or customary appropriation or use, is a lawful 
appropriation under this chapter. The appropriator is subject to 
applicable provisions of this chapter and rules and regulations 
adopted under this chapter." 
G & A Contractors, Inc. v. Alaska Greenhouses, Inc., 517 P.2d 1379 
(Alaska 1974) (holding that beneficial use encompasses plans to 
enhance the attractiveness of the streamsides to create a showplace 
in connection with a nursery business); Wernberg v. State, 516 P.2d 
1191 (Alaska 1973) (holding that stream access to a tidal inlet 
employed for commercial fishing purposes is a beneficial use). 
568. Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2, sec. 11-303 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
569. Id. 
570. Texas Water Rights Comm' n v. ~Iright, 464 S.I-l.2d 642 (Texas 1971). 
This case involved a constitutional challenge to Tex Rev. Civ. 
Stat. art. 7519a, which authorized cancellation of water permits 
upon proof of nonuse for ten consecutive years. In 1928, the 
complainants were issued permits to direct irrigation water from 
the Rio Grande River. The permits were used until 1954 when a 
flood washed out the pumps and diversion facilities. The pumps and 
facilities were never replaced and no water was subsequently used 
under these permits. 
The effective date of the statute was August 21, 1957. The com-
plainants' permits were cancelled in 1967. The Texas Supreme Court 
reasoned that because beneficial use is the basis, measure and 
limit of the right to use water in Texas, nonuse confers no right. 
The court held that due process was observed because the complain-
ants were given notice when the law was passed and were given ten 
years to correct their position. This decision was not challenged 
in federal court. 
571. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 60, sec. 60 (West 1971). 
572. Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 82, secs. 105.1-105.2 (West Supp. 1977-78). 
573. Kan. Stat. Ann. secs. 82a-701 to 82a-717a (1977); see text at pages 
232-33, and see Ausness, Water Use Permits in a Riparian State: 
Problems and Proposals, 66 Ky. L. J. 191,247-50 (1977). 
1 
.-i 
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574. Ausness, supra note 573, at 245 (citing Eakin, Adjudication 
Provisions Under the 1909 Code, 50 Ore. L. Rev. 664, 669-71 (1971)). 
575. Id. at 245-47 (citing In re Willow Creek, 144 P. 505 (Ore. 1914); 
rn-re Hood River, 227 P. 1065 (Ore. 1924); California - Oregon 
Power Co. v. Beaver Portland Cement Co., 73 F.2d 555 (9th Cir. 
1934), aff'd, 295 U.S. 142 (1935)). 
576. See, ~, Lobdell v. Simpson, 2 Nev. 274, 90 Am. Dec. 537 (1866); 
Vansickle v. Haines, 7 Nev. 249 (1872); Jones v. Adams, 19 Nev. 78, 
6 P. 442 (1885). 
577. See generally, Ausness, supra note 573, at 250-56. 
57B. Gould v. Maricopa Canal Co., 8 Ariz. 429, 76 P. 598 (1904); Utt v. 
Frey, 106 Cal. 392, 39 P. 807 (1895); Thomas v. Ball, 66 ~10nt. 161, 
213 P. 597 (1923); Schulz v. Sweeny, 19 fJev. 359, 11 P. 253 (1886); 
State ex rel Reynolds v. South Springs Co., 80 rU1. 144, 452 P.2d 
478 (1969f;-Laramie Rivers Co. v. Le Vasseur, 65 llyo. 414, 202 P.2d 
680 (1949); City of Anson v. Arnett, 250 S.W.2d 450 (Tex. Civ. App. 
1952) . 
579. Alaska Stat. sec. 46.15.140 (1977); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. sec. 
37-92-103 (1973) provides that the water engineer shall treat 
nonuse for ten years as a rebuttable presumption of abandonment. 
580. Davis v. Gail, 32 Cal. 27 (1867). 
581. San Luis Valley Irrigation Dist. v. Alamosa, 55 Colo. 386, 135 P. 
769 (1913). 
582. "When the owner of a right to the use of water ceases or fails to 
use the water appropriated for five successive years, the right to 
the use shall cease, and the water shall revert to the public and 
shall again be subject to appropriation." Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. 
sec. 45-101, cl. c (1956). Similarly worded provisions in other 
state statutes are as follows: Alaska Stat. sec. 46.15.140, cl. a 
(1977); Cal. ~Iater Code. Ann. sec. 1241 (West 1971); tlev. Rev. 
Stat. sec. 533.060, cl. 2 (1973); N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 75-5-26 
(1953); I'lyo. Stat. sec. 41-3-401, cl. a (1977). 
583. Cal. Water Code secs. 1240, 1241 (West 1971). 
584. Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 2, sec. 11.173 (Vernon Supp. 1978). 
585. Alaska Stat. sec. 46.15.040 (1977). 
586. Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 38-41-101 (1973); t10nt. Rev. Codes Ann. sec. 
93-2504 (Supp. 1977). 
587. Egan v. Estrada, 6 Ariz. 248, 56 P. 721 (1899); Pasadena v. Alham-
bra, 33 Cal. 2d 908, 207 P.2d 17 (1949); Martin v. Burr, 111 Tex. 
57, 228 S.W. 543 (1921) . 
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588. Alaska Stat. sec. 09.25.050 (1973) (statutory period is seven 
years); Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. secs. 12-522 through 12-526 (1956) 
(statutory period is five years); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code sec. 1007 
(West 1954) (five years); Colo. Rev. Stat. sec. 38-41-101 (1973) 
(eighteen years); Mont. Rev. Codes Ann. secs. 93-2504 through 93-
2513 (Supp. 1977) (five years); rtev. Rev. Stat. sec. 11.080 (1973) 
(five years); N.M. Stat. Ann. sec. 23-1-22 (Supp. 1975) (ten 
years); Wyo. Stat. sec. 1-3-103 (1977) (ten years); Tex. Rev. Civ. 
Stat. Ann. tit. 91, secs. 5507, 5509, 5510, 5512 (Vernon 1958) 
(five years). Note: The statutory periods cited above are for 
general circumstances. Special circumstances (such as having 
"color of title" or large acreages) will modify these periods. 
589. Dalton v. Rentaria, 2 Ariz. 275, 15 P. 37 (1887). 
590. \~edgeworth v. ~Jedgeworth, 20 Ariz. 518, 181 P. 952 (1919). 
591. Halford Ditch Co. v. Independent Ditch Co., 22 N.M. 169, 159 P. 860 
(1916). 
592. Tanner v. Provo Res. Co., 76 Utah 335, 289 P. 151, 159 (1930). 
593. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973). 
594. Id., 55 Hawaii 260, 303, 517 P.2d 27, 50 (1973) (Levinson, J., 
dissenting). 
595. Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. Supp. 559, 585-86 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
596. Selinger, Van Dyke, Amana, Takenaka, and Young, Selected Legal 
Issues Related to Growth Management in Hawaii, in Growth tlanagement 
Issues in Hawaii 171-76 (Hawaii Institute for t1anagement and 
Analysis in Government, 1977); reprinted sub nom Selected Consti-
tutional Issues Related to Growth Management in the State of 
Hawaii, 5 Hastings Con. L. Q. 639,695-702 (1978). 
597. Nos. 76-2400 and 76-1968 (9th Cir., Aug. 11, 1978). 
598. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, 408 F. Supp. 42. 52 (D. Hawaii 
1976). 
599. ~; emphasis in original. 
600. United States v. Kaiser Aetna, Nos. 76-2400 and 76-1968 (9th Cir .• 
Aug. 11, 1978), slip opinion at 10. 
601. 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971). 
602. ~ at 658-59, 485 P.2d at 1051, citing Cos Corporation v. City of 
Evanston, 27 Ill. 2d 570, 190 N.E.Zd 364 (1963), discussed below at 
note 605. 
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603. ~ at 659,485 P.2d at 1051, citing Bregar v. Britton. 75 So. 2d 
753 (Fla. 1954), discussed below at note 606. 
604. Id. 
605. Cos Corporation v. City of Evanston, 27 Ill. 2d 570. 190 N.E.2d 364 
(1963) . 
606. Bregar v. Britton, 75 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1954). 
607. Russian Hill Improvement Ass'n v. Bd. of Permit Appeals, 66 Cal. 2d 
34. 423 P.2d 824 (1967). 
608. Allen v. City and County of Honolulu, 
328 (1977). 
Hawaii __ , 571 P.2d 
609. Denning v. County of ~1aui, 52 Hawaii 653, 485 P.2d 1048 (1971). 
610. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 55 Hawaii 260, 283. 517 P.2d 26, 39 
(1973) (Levinson, J., dissenting). 
611. Id. at 281. 517 P.2d at 38; see also Robinson v. Ariyoshi, 441 F. 
Supp. 559, 576, 582 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
612. State v. Zimring, 58 Hawaii 106, 566 P.2d 725 (1977). The state 
sued to quiet title to approximately eight acres of land formed 
when volcanic eruption extended the shoreline. The court held that 
"the combination of the collection of taxes on, and silence with 
respect to a claim for the subject land does not estop the State" 
from asserting ownership to the land. (Id. at 128, 566 P.2d at 
738). -
613. Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois, 146 U.S. 387 (1892). 
The 1869 Illinois legislature had granted over 1,000 acres under-
lying Lake Michigan. constituting the commercial waterfront of 
Chicago. to the railroad. The 1873 legislature repealed the grant 
and brought action to have it anul1ed. The court held for the 
state and declared that submerged lands are held in trust for the 
enjoyment of commerce, fishing, and navigation rights by citizens 
of the state. 
King v. Oahu Railway and Land Co., 11 Hawaii 717 (1899). The 
company alleged that a certificate of approval by the cabinet 
concerning the location of the company's terminal land carried with 
it the right to condemn land under Honolulu harbor for its own 
purposes. Basing its decision on Illinois Central, the Hawaii 
Court held that the cabinet could not have conveyed these rights 
because "lands under the navigable waters in and around the terri-
tory of the Hawaiian Government are held in trust for the public 
uses of navigation" (at 725). 
614. See the analysis of McBryde on pages 294-99. 
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615. See text at pages 242-43. 
616. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 54-15 (1976): 
"Powers and duties of board. 
"The board of water supply shall manage, control, 
and operate the waterworks of the county and all 
property thereof, for the purpose of supplying 
water to the public in the county, and shall 
collect, receive, expend, and account for all 
sums of money derived from the operation thereof 
and all other monies provided for the use or 
benefit of the waterworks and all property used 
for or held in connecti on therewith." 
617. Charter of Honolulu art. VII, sec. 7-105 (1976); Charter of the 
County of Mau~ art. VIII, sec. 8-11.3 (1976); Charter of the County 
of Hawaii art~ VIII, sec. 8-2 (1976); Charter of the County of 
Kauai art. XVIII, sec. 18.03 (1976). 
618. Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 177 (1976). 
619. ~ sec. 177-2(3). 
620. Honolulu Advertiser, Feb. 23, 1978, at A-l. 
621. Honolulu Star-Bulletin and Advertiser, June 18, 1978, at A-3. 
622. Hawaii Const. art. X, secs. 1, 2. 
623. Id. sec. 2 (emphasis added). 
624. Id. sec. 4. 
625. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 174-1 (1977). 
626. Charter of Honolulu art. VII, sec. 7-103.1 and sec. 7-105 (1976). 
627. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 54-15 (1976). 
628. For example, in Hawaii Government Employees' Ass'n v. County of 
Maui, No. 6524 (Hawaii Supreme Court, t1arch 22, 1978), the Employ-
ees' Association joined with the State Civil Service Commission and 
the ~laui Board of l~ater Supply, Police Commission, and Liquor 
Control Commission to challenge provisions of the f1aui County 
Charter that were allegedly in conflict with state statutes address-
ing the same subject. The complainants sought to have certain r1aui 
Charter provisions invalidated because: 
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(1) they authorized the r1aui corporation counsel 
and the public prosecutor to appoint deputies 
and staff exempt from civil service regulations, 
and authorized the t~ayor (instead of the Maui 
Civil Service Commission) to appoint and define 
the duties of the county director of personnel 
services (both authorizations allegedly being 
in conflict with Hawaii Rev. Stat. secs. 76 
and 77 which prohibit such employees from 
exemption under civil service regulations); 
(2) they established a county organizational struc-
ture and delegated powers and functions in a 
manner inconsistent with state statutes by 
changing the membership requirements of the 
Police Commission and Board of I-later Supply, 
reducing the autonomous power of the Board 
of Water Supply to regulate the public water 
works, changing the method by which the Police 
Commission could remove the chief of police, 
setting different criteria as qualifications of 
the director of the Department of Personnel 
Services, and changing the appointment require-
ments for the director of the Department of 
Liquor Control. 
Officials responsible for enforcing the county charter defended the 
offending provisions on the basis that an exception to legislative 
control over local affairs is the political subdivisions' right to 
form its executive, legislative" and administrative structure and 
organization without legislative interference. The State Consti-
tution art. 7, sec. 2, states: 
Each political subdivision shall have power to 
frame and adopt a charter for its own self-
government within such limits and under such 
procedures as may be prescribed by general law. 
The prescribed procedures, however, shall not 
require the approval of a charter by a legis-
lative body. 
Charter prOV1Slons with respect to a political 
subdivision's executive, legislative and admin-
istrative structure and organization shall be 
superior to statutory provisions, subject to 
the authority of the legislature to enact general 
laws allocating and reallocating powers and 
functions. 
A law may qualify as a general law even though it 
is inapplicable to one or more counties by reason 
of the provisions of this section. 
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The complainants directed the court's attention to Hawaii Rev. 
Stat. sec. 50-15 (1976), and maintained that all state laws are 
superior to conflicting county laws on the same subject as stated 
therein: 
Notwithstanding the provlslons of this chapter, 
there is expressly reserved to the state legis-
lature the power to enact all laws of general 
application throughout the State on matters of 
concern and interest and laws relating to the 
fiscal powers of the counties, and neither a 
charter nor ordinances adopted under a charter 
shall be in conflict therewith. 
The central issue to the court was whether the questioned pro-
visions were concerned with a political subdivision's "structure 
and organization" powers provided in the state constitution or 
involved "matters of concern and interest and laws relating to the 
fiscal powers of the counties" under the state statute. The court 
held that the merit system was a policy of state government and the 
state bears certain costs in its administration; therefore, all 
civil service matters are of statewide concern and the legislature 
is the final authority in such matters. The court also found, 
however, that the second group of complaints (see above) involved 
only local functions and held that nothing restricts a locality 
from designing a local agency in such a manner as to accommodate 
local needs. The court provided no generalized rule to distinguish 
between matters of statewide concern and matters of local political 
structure and organization. 
629. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. l77-8(a) (1977); see Appendix III, pages 
274-75, for a summary of the 1961 Ground \'later Use Act. 
630. 1959 Hawaii House Journal, House Standing Committee Report No. 528, 
at 778. 
631. "City" refers to the City and County of Honolulu. Charter of 
Honolulu art. I, sec. 1-101 (1976). 
632. Id. art. VII, sec. 7-103.1 (1976) (emphasis added). "Department" 
means the governmental unit known as the Board of Hater Supply and 
"board" refers to the seven-member policy-making body of the Board 
of ~Iater Supply. ~ art. VII, secs. 7-l02(a) and (b) (1976). 
633. rd. art. VII, sec. 7-l05(j)(6) (emphasis added). 
634. Written testimony of George Vuen, Presiding Officer, Hawaii State 
Water Commission, at the Honolulu BWS Public Hearing on Low Ground 
~Iater Regulations on Oahu, t1ay 25, 1978. 
635. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 177-2(9) (1976). 
636. Kunimoto v. Kawakami, 56 Hawaii 582, 545 P.2d 684 (1976). 
-327-
637. Charter of Honolulu art. V, sec. 5-412.3 (1976). 
638. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 50-10 (1976). 
639. Kunimoto v. Kawakami, 56 Hawaii 582, 585, 545 P.2d 684, 686 (1976). 
640. Id. at 586, 545 P.2d at 687, citing Hawaii Const. art. VII, sec. 2 
Temphasis added). 
641. Opinion of Samuel P. King, Jr., deputy corporation counsel, 11arch 8, 
1978, citing Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 54-15 (1976) (printed in note 
616, supra). 
642. Kunimoto v. Kawakami, 56 Hawaii 582, 586, 545 P.2d 684,687 (1976). 
643. Hawaii Rev. Stat. ch. 177 (1976). 
644. Written testimony of Cuyler Shaw, Ashford & Reston, attorneys for 
Campbell Estate, at the Honolulu BWS Public Hearing on Low Ground 
Water Regulations on Oahu, May 25, 1978. 
645. Written testimony was received from the following persons at the 
Honolulu mls Public Hearing on Low Ground Hater Regulations on 
Oahu, May 25, 1978: Mr. George Hudes, Vice-President, Life of the 
Land; Capt. H. H. Haynes, CEC, USN Commanding Officer, U.S. Navy; 
tk. David Ballie, President and Manager, Oahu Sugar Company; ~lr. 
Cuyler Shaw, Ashford & Reston, Attorneys for Campbell Estate; J. I. 
Frederick Reppun, M.D., Chainnan, Kahaluu Neighborhood Bd., No. 29; 
Pa;trick Takahashi, President, Oahu Nursery Growers Ass 'n; J. N. S. 
arid Janet Thebaud Gillmar. 
646. Written testimony of David Ballie, President and ~lanager, Oahu 
Sugar Company, at the Honolulu BWS Public Hearing on Low Ground 
viater Regulations on Oahu, Ivlay 25, 1978. 
647. Id. 
648. I~ritten testimony of Cuyler Shaw and David Ballie, supra notes 644 
and 646. 
649. City 14i 11 Co. v. Hono 1 u 1 u Sewer and I'later Commi ss i on, 30 Hawa i i 912 
(1929); see the discussion of this case at pages 291-94. 
650. Charter of Honolulu art. VII, sec. 7-l05(j)(6) (1976) (emphasis 
added) . 
651. Kahuku, Kaneohe, Honolulu, Ewa-Pearl Harbor, Waianae, vlaialua. 
652. Written testimony of Capt. H. H. Haynes and David Ballie, supra 
notes 645 and 646. 
653. Hritten testimony of David Ball ie, supra note 646. 
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654. Written testimony of Capt. H. H. Haynes, supra note 645. 
655. Written testimony of David Ballie, supra note 646. 
656. rd. 
657. \~ritten testimony of Capt. H. H. Haynes, supra note 645. 
658. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128 (1976); see also United 
States v. lIew ~1exico, 46 U.S.L.W. 5010 (U.S., July 3, 1978). 
659. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. at 138 (emphasis added). 
660. rd. at 139. 
661. Opinion of Samuel P. King, Jr., supra note 641. 
662. City Mill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and Hater Commission, 30 Hawaii 912 
(1929); see pages 291-94. 
663. Cappaert v. United States, 426 U.S. 128, 143 (1976). 
664. rd. at 145. 
665. 
666. 
667. 
Written testimony of Capt. H. H. Haynes, supra note 645. 
Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908); see also United 
States v. New Mexico, 46~.S.L.W. 5010 (U:S., July 3, 1978). 
See generally, Note, Water and ~Jater Courses - Limiting the Reser-
vation Doctrine: Mimbres Valle Irri ation Co. v. Salo ek, 13 U. 
of Wyo. Land and Hater L. Rev. 501 1978; United States v. New 
f1exico, 46 U.S.L.VI. 5010 (U.S., July 3, 1978). 
668. Hawaiian Homes Commission Act, 1920, Act of July 9, 1921, c 42, 42 
Stat. 108 (the Act is now part of the Hawaii Constitution and is 
subject to amendment or repeal as provided in Hawaii Const. art. XI). 
669. Id. tit. 2, sec. 202. 
670. ~ tit. 2, sec. 208(2). 
671. Id. tit. 2, sec. 208(3). 
672. Id. tit. 2, sec. 22l(a)(2). 
673. Id. tit. 2, sec. 22l(c). 
674. Id. tit. 2, sec. 22l(b). 
675. An Act to Provide a Government for the Territory of Hawaii, Act of 
April 30, 1900, C339, 31 Stat. 141, sec. 73(a)(3) (as amended, 
1976). 
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676. An Act to Provide for the Admission of the State of Hawaii into the 
Union, Act of March 18, 1959, Pub L. 86-3, 73 Stat. 4, sec. 4. 
677. Hawaii Const. art. XI, sec. 2. 
678. \'Jritten testimony of ~1r. George Vuen, supra note 634. 
679. Id. 
680. State Hater Commission, ~Iater Policies for Hawaii 29-30 (Report to 
the Governor, Preliminary Draft, Oct. 20, 1978). 
681. Hawaii Const. art. XI, sec. 7 (added 1978). 
682. 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 
260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). 
683. See pages 176-94. 
684. See, ~, Carter v. Territory, 24 Hawaii 47 (1917), and Territory 
v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
685. See, ~, U. Hutchins, Hawaiian System, supra note 23. 
686. Carter v. Territory, 24 Hawaii 47 (1917). 
687. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. Wailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 
675 (1904). 
688. Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
689. Id. 
690. City t1ill Co. v. Honolulu Sewer and Ilater Comm'n, 30 Hawaii 912 
(1929). 
691. For a full analysis of ~1cBryde see pages 194-98. 
692. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 189 n. 15, 504 P.2d 
1330, 1340 n. 15 (1973). 
693. Hawaiian Commercial and Sugar Co. v. Hailuku Sugar Co., 15 Hawaii 
675 (1904); Territory v. Gay, 31 Hawaii 376 (1930). 
694. See pages 218-41 for a full discussion of water rights in other jurisdictions. 
695. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 191, 198, 200, 504 
P.2d 1330, 1341, 1344, 1345 (1973). 
696. Id. at 199, 504 P.2d at 1345; see also id. at 198, 504 P.2d at 
1344. -
- - -----" ---,..-
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697. ~ at 185-87, 191-97, 504 P.2d at 1338-39, 1341-44. 
698. ~ at 189 n. 15, 504 P.2d at 1340 n. 15. 
699. See pages 213-15 for a more detailed analysis of this issue. 
700. McBryde Sugar Co. v. Robinson, 54 Hawaii 174, 504 P.2d 1330 (1973), 
aff'd on rehearing, 55 Hawaii 260, 517 P.2d 26 (1973), cert. 
denied, 417 U.S. 962 (1974). --
701. 441 F. Supp. 559 (D. Hawaii 1977). 
702. See, ~, Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975); O'Shea v. Little-
ton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974); Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976); 
Reetz v. Bozanich, 397 U.S. 82 (1970); Lake Carriers' Association 
v. MacMullan, 406 U.S. 498 (1972). 
703. See pages 200-18 for a full discussion of the current federal 
litigation. 
704. State Water Commission, supra note 680, at 34-36. 
705. Id. at 35. 
706. Id. 
707. See pages 221-22. 
708. See generally, Ausness, supra note 573, at 253-54 (citing State 
ex re1 Emery v. Knapp, 207 P.2d 440 (Kan. 1949) and Knight v. 
Grimes, 127 N.W.2d 708 (S.D. 1964)). 
709. Conversations with Professor Robert Anderson, of the University of 
Hawaii Economics Department, and his task force on the management 
aspects of water use, August, 1978. 
710. Id. 
711. State Water Commission, supra note 680, at 35. 
712. See pages 230-37 for a full discussion of judicial decisions in 
other states that have faced this issue. 
713. See pages 167-69 for examples of this phenomenon. 
714. See pages 218-41. 
715. Hawaii Const. art. XI, sec. 7 (added 1978). 
716. See pages 255-59. 
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718. ~ sec. 177-16. 
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723. Id. 
724. Cal. Const. art. X, Sec. 2 (West, Supp. 1977); see pages 235-36 for 
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727. State Water Commission, supra note 680, at 34-36. 
728. Id. at 35. 
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732. Hawaii Rev. Stat. sec. 177-13(a) (1976). 
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